Musial v. Hitachi Home Electronics (America), Inc. et al
Filing
40
MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo on 7/12/2011. (ber, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
ELLIOT MUSIAL, on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff,
v.
HITACHI HOME ELECTRONICS
(AMERICA), INC.; HITACHI AMERICA,
LTD.; and HITACHI LTD.,
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
No. 11 C 1901
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Elliot Musial (“Musial”) Inc. brought this putative
class action against Hitachi Home Electronics (America), Inc.,
Hitachi America, Ltd., and Hitachi, Ltd. (collectively, “Hitachi”)
in Illinois state court, based on an alleged defect in the optical
block of certain Hitachi LCD rear-projection televisions.
Hitachi
removed the suit to this Court and now seeks to transfer it to the
Southern District of California, where other suits against it,
based on the same defect, and brought by the same plaintiffs’
attorneys, have been consolidated (“the Consolidated Action”). For
the reasons discussed below, the motion is granted.
The federal venue-transfer statute provides that, “[f]or the
convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice,
a district court may transfer any civil action to any other
district or division where it might have been brought.”
28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a).
Thus, “[a] court may transfer a case if a moving party
shows that: (1) venue is proper in the district where the action
was originally filed; (2) venue would be proper in the transferee
court; and (3) the transfer will serve the convenience of the
parties and the witnesses as well as the interests of justice.”
Handler v. Kenneth Allen & Associates, P.C., No. 10 C 3728, 2011 WL
1118499, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 24, 2011).
Venue is proper in this District, since it embraces the
Circuit Court of Cook County, where the action was originally
filed.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).
Venue is also proper in the
Southern District of California, since each of the defendants
resides there, 28 U.S.C. § 1391, and in any event, Musial has not
raised any argument to the contrary.
The only issue genuinely in
dispute is whether transfer would serve the convenience of the
parties and the interest of justice.
Making this determination requires consideration of relevant
private interest factors (e.g., plaintiff’s choice of forum; the
situs of material events; relative ease of access to sources of
proof;
convenience
of
the
parties
and
witnesses)
and
public
interest factors (e.g., the court’s familiarity with the applicable
law; the speed at which the case will proceed to trial; and
desirability of resolving controversies in their locale).
See,
e.g., Aldridge v. Forest River, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 2d 959, 960
(N.D. Ill. 2006).
The “interest of justice,” on the other hand,
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“pertains to the efficient administration of the court system, and
is a distinct and separate component of a § 1404(a) analysis.”
Simonian v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 10 C 1193, 2011 WL 2110005, at *2
(N.D. Ill. May 23, 2011).
Hitachi argues that the interest of justice strongly favors
transfer in light of a Consolidation Order (“Consolidation Order,”
“the Order”) entered in the Consolidated Action.
The Order states
that “[t]he Court and parties consent to the transfer of Related
Actions, as that term is defined in Section IV, to this Court.”
Defs.’ Requests for Judicial Notice, Ex. 2 (Doc. 28-5) at I.B.
In
turn, Section IV of the Order provides: “Any proposed class action,
filed in any United States District Court, against one or more of
the
defendants,
alleging
a
defect
in
the
optical
block
of
Hitachi-brand LCD Rear Projection televisions shall be deemed a
‘Related Action.’” Id. IV.B.
There can be no dispute that the instant suit is a “Related
Action” under this definition.
There also can be no question that
transfer would serve judicial efficiency.
The underlying facts,
technical information, and discovery at issue in this case is
similar – and in some respects, identical – to that involved in the
Consolidated Action.
Transferring the case will avoid duplicating
work that has already been undertaken in the Consolidated Actions.
This will also permit the case to proceed more swiftly than would
be the case if it were to remain here.
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Nevertheless, Musial maintains that the case should not be
transferred. He places particular emphasis on the district court’s
denial of the motion for class certification previously filed in
the Consolidated Action.
See In re Hitachi Television Optical
Block Cases, No. 08cv1746 DMS (NLS), 2011 WL 9403 (S.D. Cal. Jan.
3, 2011).1
exercise
According to Musial, “the court there declined to
jurisdiction
of
a
class
containing
non-California
residents based upon its finding – made at Hitachi’s urging – that
there were insufficient contacts with the controversy to the State
of California.”
Resp. at 2.
Despite Musial’s suggestion to the contrary, the court’s
decision does not indicate that suits involving plaintiffs from
Illinois and other states should not be brought in California.
As
noted above, the Consolidation Order’s definition of “Related
Actions” encompasses cases brought against Hitachi in any District
Court in the country, so long as they are based on the same defect
as
that
alleged
in
the
Consolidated
Action.
Indeed,
the
Consolidation Order specifically requests assistance from counsel
“in calling to the attention of the Clerk of this Court the filing
or transfer of any case that might properly be consolidated as part
of the Consolidated Action.”
Consolidation Order IV.B.
1
The plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration of the order was
denied.
However, they have filed a renewed motion seeking
certification of a California statewide class of consumers. That
motion is set to be ruled on in September 2011.
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The court’s denial of the class certification motion was based
on its determination that, since the motion proposed a nationwide
class, it would be arbitrary and unfair under the Supreme Court’s
decision in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985),
to apply California law to the claims of class members residing in
other states.
In re Hitachi Television, 2011 WL 9403, at *10
(quotation marks and citation omitted).
The court specifically
indicated that this problem could be circumvented by the creation
of statewide subclasses.
The court declined to certify any such
subclasses, however, “unless and until” the plaintiffs provided
more
detailed
information
about
the
representatives
for
each
subclass, the size of each subclass, and other criteria required
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.
Musial argues that it can “fairly be implied” from the denial
of the class certification motion that the court “has no interest
or desire for a multi-state trial of this action relying upon the
laws of different states.”
Pl.’s Mem. at 8.
I disagree.
The
portion of the opinion that Musial cites in support of his claim
merely observes that, with respect to the claims at issue in the
suit, California law is not identical to the laws of other states.
Nor, in any event, would transferring this action to the Southern
District of California necessarily entail a multi-state trial. The
Illinois action might be tried separately, or the court might
consolidate the case for discovery purposes only, and transfer the
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action back to this court for trial.
See Reply at 14.
Musial also makes much of the fact that the Seventh Circuit’s
decision in Thorogood v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 547 F.3d 742 (7th
Cir. 2008), was recently vacated and remanded by the Supreme Court
for reconsideration in light of its decision in Smith v. Bayer
Corp., 564 U.S. ---- (2011).
Co.,
See Thorogood v. Sears, Roebuck &
--- S. Ct. ---- (2001).
Hitachi relied on Thorogood in
arguing that, although Musial was not a party to the Consolidated
Action, he was nevertheless bound by the Consolidation Order
entered in the suit.
Hitachi now concedes that, under Bayer,
Musial is not bound by the Consolidation Order.
to Strike or to File Sur-Rebuttal at 2.
See Defs.’ Motion
This is of little
importance, however, because Hitachi never premised its argument
solely on the notion that Musial was bound by the consolidation
order.
Hitachi additionally argued that, irrespective of whether
it was formally binding, the Order clearly weighed very heavily,
indeed decisively, in favor of transfer.2
I agree.
Musial argues that certain private interest factors militate
against transfer. For example, he notes that the case was filed in
his home state of Illinois, and that the plaintiff’s choice of
2
Musial filed a “Notice of Supplemental Authorities and New
Factual Developments Relating to Defendant’s Motion to Transfer,”
after the Bayer decision was handed down. Hitachi has moved to
strike the filing. Since Hitachi’s motion to transfer is granted,
the motion to strike is denied as moot.
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forum is usually entitled to substantial deference in determining
the propriety of transfer.
But this rule does not apply with the
same force where, as here, an action has been removed from state to
federal court.
See, e.g., Wright v. UDL Laboratories, Inc., No.
10-cv-4610, 2011 WL 760067, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 24, 2011)
(“[S]ome courts have noted that a case that has been removed from
state to federal court is no longer in plaintiff's chosen forum,
and therefore does not require as much emphasis on this factor.”)
(citing U.S.O. Corp. v. Mizuho Holding Co., 547 F.3d 749, 752-53
(7th Cir. 2008); Deist v. Washington University Medical Center, 385
F. Supp. 2d 772, 774 (S.D. Ill. 2005); Campbell Software, Inc. v.
Kronos Inc., No. 95 C 7348,
1996 WL 124457, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Mar.
19, 1996).
This is of course not to say that Illinois has no connection
with Musial’s suit.
But even if Musial were correct in arguing
that private interest factors cut against transfer, for the reasons
stated above, transfer still would be appropriate in the interest
of justice. See, e.g., Simonian, 2011 WL 2110005, at *2 (noting
that the interests of justice “may be determinative, even though
the Court would otherwise find the original forum inconvenient for
the parties and witnesses”) (citing Coffey v. Van Dorn Iron Works,
796 F.2d 217, 220 (7th Cir. 1986)) (quotation marks omitted);
Campbell Software, Inc. v. Kronos Inc., No. 95 C 7348,
1996 WL
124457, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 19, 1996) (“The most significant
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factor in this case is the interest of justice and the efficient
operation of the courts.
Although convenience factors may favor
this district, they do not outweigh the interest of justice.”).
For these reasons, Hitachi’s motion to transfer is granted.3
ENTER ORDER:
____________________________
Elaine E. Bucklo
United States District Judge
Dated: July 12, 2011
3
Hitachi raises a number of other arguments in favor of
transfer. For example, it accuses Musial of forum-shopping and
gamesmanship. Specifically, Hitachi argues that Musial opposes its
motion to transfer because it wishes to wait and see whether the
court in the Consolidated Action ultimately certifies a class
consisting of California purchasers. If so, Hitachi anticipates
that Musial himself will seek certification of a class of Illinois
purchasers in the Consolidated Action. If not, he will continue to
pursue the action in this court. Notably, Musial has not disavoed
such an intention.
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