Sroga v. CPS-Chicago Public Schools et al

Filing 6

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly on 4/11/2011(ca, ).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

KEVIN SROGA,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CPS - CHICAGO PUBLIC SCHOOLS, et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 11 C 2124

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
MATTHEW F. KENNELLY, District Judge:
Kevin Sroga has filed a pro se complaint along with an application to proceed in
forma pauperis, that is, without paying the usual filing fee. The Court therefore has
attempted to review the complaint to determine whether it is frivolous, malicious, or fails
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
Mr. Sroga has filed a sprawling, fifty-four page complaint naming as defendants
the Chicago Board of Education (“Board”) and ten individuals affiliated with it, including
the Board’s former chief executive officer, Ronald Huberman. As best as the Court can
determine – with some difficulty – Mr. Sroga’s claims concern his removal from teaching
responsibilities, an investigation by the Board’s inspector general, his suspension
without pay, and his termination.
Mr. Sroga’s complaint, however, includes a detailed rendition of numerous
events that appear to have, at most, a tangential relation to his claims against the
defendants he has sued in this case. These include the following:

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events in the Chicago neighborhood where he resides (Compl. ¶¶ 17-24);

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his work in an electrician apprenticeship program ten years ago and
minutely detailed allegations regarding his applications and efforts to be
employed by several police departments between 2001 and 2003 (Compl.
¶¶ 25-50);

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his arrest by Chicago police officers in November 2003 and the aftermath
of that arrest through 2006 (Compl. ¶¶ 51-61);

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the effect of those events on his attempt to become a police officer
(Compl. ¶¶ 62-64);

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Mr. Sroga’s decision to become a teacher and events surrounding his
hiring by the Board in 2006 (Compl. ¶¶ 66-79); and

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various details regarding his employment at a Chicago public school from
2006 through 2008 (Compl. ¶¶ 80-96);

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minutely detailed allegations regarding a claim that he was retaliated
against by Chicago police officers in September 2007 as a result of the
events surrounding his 2003 arrest (Compl. ¶¶ 65 & 100-117) (The Court
notes that Mr. Sroga has filed other lawsuits against Chicago police
officers concerning the September 2007 and other arrests. See Sroga v.
Decero, No. 09 C 3286 (N.D. Ill.), and Sroga v. Weiglen, No. 08 C 1789
(N.D. Ill.).);

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allegations about “street stops” by Chicago police officers, including an
incident in which Mr. Sroga and his brother were stopped by Chicago
police officers in 1994 (Compl. ¶¶ 187-193);

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allegations concerning the police officer whom Mr. Sroga alleges
mistreated him in the 1994 incident and how the Chicago Police
Department and the City of Chicago go about hiring new employees
(Compl. ¶¶ 194-197);

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allegations regarding the Chicago Police Department’s special operations
section, including quotes from a “60 Minutes” episode that aired in 2008
(Compl. ¶¶ 198-213).

These detailed and tangential allegations are followed by this explanation:
Finally, Plaintiff states that although some of the above paragraphs “may”
be somewhat a little irrelevant and cumbersome in relation to his
complaint, non-the-less [sic] plaintiff felt and deemed it necessary to state
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all of the above in an effort to fully explain and incorporate all of the set of
circumstances pertaining to this suit.
Compl. ¶ 214.
Plaintiff’s factual allegations are followed by twelve claims against various groups
of defendants for violating his Sixth Amendment rights (Count 1), his federal and state
constitutional due process rights (Counts 2-4), and his federal and state constitutional
equal protection rights (Counts 5-6); retaliating against him for exercising his
constitutional rights (Count 7); failing to intervene to prevent constitutional violations
(Count 8); intentionally inflicting emotional distress (Count 9); municipal liability under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count 10); and respondeat superior and indemnification under
Illinois law (Counts 11-12).
Because of the morass of irrelevant and tangential allegations, however, it is
impossible for the Court to perform its obligation to determine whether Mr. Sroga’s
complaint states a claim against any or all of the defendants or whether it is frivolous or
malicious. In addition, the complaint, in its current form, fails to comply with Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2)’s requirement that a complaint include “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” “[L]ength may
make a complaint unintelligible, by scattering and concealing in a morass of
irrelevancies the few allegations that matter.” Griffin v. Milwaukee County, 369 Fed.
Appx. 741, 743 (7th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). “If a complaint's
length and lack of clarity make it unintelligible, dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) is
permitted . . . .” Lindell v. McCallum, 352 F.3d 1107, 1110 (7th Cir. 2003).

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Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the Court dismisses Mr. Sroga’s complaint
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2). The Court will give Mr. Sroga an
opportunity to file, by no later than May 2, 2011, a proposed amended complaint that
complies with the Rule 8(a)(2)’s requirement that the plaintiff provide “a short and plain
statement” of his claim, and that omits irrelevant, tangential, and unnecessary matters.
If Mr. Sroga fails to do so, the Court will assume that he does not intend to proceed with
the case and will enter judgment dismissing the case with prejudice. If Mr. Sroga files a
timely proposed amended complaint, the Court will assess it under applicable legal
standards.

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MATTHEW F. KENNELLY
United States District Judge
Date: April 11, 2011

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