Pellegrini v.Cook County, Illinois et al

Filing 49

WRITTEN Opinion entered by the Honorable Ronald A. Guzman on 1/8/2013: For the reasons set forth in this order, the Court finds that there is no genuine issue of material facts as to the claims plaintiff asserts against defendants, who are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Therefore, the Court grants defendants' motion for summary judgment 36 and terminates this case. Mailed notice (cjg, )

Order Form (01/2005)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois
Name of Assigned Judge
or Magistrate Judge

Ronald A. Guzman

CASE NUMBER

11 C 2280

CASE
TITLE

Sitting Judge if Other
than Assigned Judge

DATE

1/8/2013

William Pellegrini vs. Cook County Sheriff Captain Michael Dembosz, et al.

DOCKET ENTRY TEXT

For the reasons set forth in this order, the Court finds that there is no genuine issue of material facts as to the
claims plaintiff asserts against defendants, who are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Therefore, the Court
grants defendants’ motion for summary judgment [36] and terminates this case.

O[ For further details see text below.]

Docketing to mail notices.

STATEMENT
Plaintiff, who is a correctional officer at Cook County Jail, asserts 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against
defendants Slaughter, Jones, Romero, Imhof, Dembosz, for their alleged violation of his Fourth Amendment
rights during a training drill at the jail.1 Defendants have filed a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 56
motion for summary judgment.
Facts2
On April 4, 2009, plaintiff voluntarily participated in a training drill in which he pretended to be an
inmate who had taken a corrections officer hostage. (Id. ¶¶ 7-16.) During the pre-drill briefing, plaintiff was told
to say “time out,” “stop” or “cease,” if something went wrong during the drill. (Id. ¶ 18.)
On the day of the drill, plaintiff and the five other participants dressed as inmates and disguised their faces
so the responding officers would not recognize them as jail employees. (Id. ¶ 20.) They then started the drill by
banging on tables in the day room. (Id. ¶ 22.) By the time defendants Dembosz, Imhof, Slaughter and the five
to ten other responders arrived, there was a small fire in the day room and the participants were holding a fire
extinguisher, a broken mop and bucket. (Id. ¶¶ 23-25.) Ignoring the responders’ orders to “lock up,” plaintiff
brought the “hostage” out of a cell behind the day room, pointed a fake knife at the responders and told them to
move back or he would kill the hostage. (Id. ¶¶ 28-29, 31-32.) The responders did not retreat, and plaintiff
returned the hostage to the cell. (Id. ¶¶ 34-36.)
As plaintiff left the cell, he grabbed Slaughter from behind, and Dembosz put an arm around plaintiff’s
neck to pull him off of Slaughter. (Id. ¶¶ 38-39, 46.) Plaintiff pushed backwards into Dembosz, and the two fell
the ground. (Id. ¶ 47.) Once they were on the ground, Dembosz released plaintiff’s neck, tried to handcuff him,
and when he was unable to do so, used pepper spray on plaintiff. (Id. ¶¶ 48-50, 52.) At that point, plaintiff said
“time out,” and was handcuffed. (Id. ¶¶ 53-54.)
11C2280 William Pellegrini vs. Cook County Sheriff Captain Michael Dembosz, et al.

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STATEMENT
Plaintiff was left handcuffed on the floor while the responders led the other participants away. (Id. ¶ 55.)
The responders then took plaintiff into the day room, leaned him into the sink and rinsed the pepper spray off
of him for about one minute. (Id. ¶¶ 56-58.) Plaintiff then identified himself as a corrections officer, defendant
Imhof immediately removed the handcuffs, and plaintiff continued to rinse the spray off at the sink. (Id. ¶ 59.)
Plaintiff was then moved into the interlock adjacent to the day room, and stayed there for about an hour, while
the drill was repeated with another group of responders. (Id. ¶ 60.) Plaintiff was not restrained and did not ask
for medical treatment at any time during the second drill. (Id. ¶ 61.)
Discussion
To prevail on a summary judgment motion, “the movant [must] show[] that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). At this
stage, we do not weigh evidence or determine the truth of the matters asserted. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). We view all evidence and draw all inferences in favor of the non-moving party.
Michas v. Health Cost Controls of Ill., Inc., 209 F.3d 687, 692 (7th Cir. 2000). Summary judgment is appropriate
only when the record as a whole establishes that no reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party. Id.
Plaintiff alleges that defendants used excessive force against him during the drill, and/or failed to
intervene in other defendants’ use of such force, and seeks damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the alleged
Fourth Amendment violations. To prevail on these claims, plaintiff must show that a seizure occurred, the
seizure was unreasonable and each defendant was personally involved in it. Carlson v. Bukovic, 621 F.3d at 61819 (7th Cir. 2010) (stating that an excessive force claim requires proof both that the plaintiff was seized, i.e., he
did not “believe[] he was ‘free to leave,” and that the seizure was unreasonable); Pepper v. Vill. of Oak Park, 430
F.3d 809, 810 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[T]o be liable under § 1983, the individual defendant must have caused or
participated in a constitutional deprivation.”) (quotation omitted); Harper v. Albert, 400 F.3d 1052, 1064 (7th
Cir. 2005) (stating that a § 1983 plaintiff cannot prevail on a failure to intervene claim unless there is “an
underlying constitutional violation”). It is undisputed that: (1) plaintiff voluntarily participated in the drill and
had the ability to stop at any time; (2) the participants dressed as inmates and disguised their faces so the
responders would not realize the situation was a drill; (3) in his guise as an inmate, plaintiff threatened to kill a
hostage, grabbed defendant Slaughter from behind and resisted defendant Dembosz’s attempts to subdue and
handcuff him; (4) all force against plaintiff ceased when he said “time out”; (5) plaintiff did not ask for medical
attention after the incident; and (6) plaintiff does not know whether any defendant other than Dembosz touched
him during the incident. (See Defs.’ LR 56.1(a) Stmt. ¶¶ 7-21, 25, 28-40, 45-64.) Because the record does not
suggest that plaintiff was seized, unreasonably or otherwise, or that defendants Slaughter, Jones, Romero or
Imhof had any involvement in the alleged seizure, defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on
plaintiff’s claims.
1.Plaintiff’s claims against Cook County have already been dismissed. (See 11/16/11 Minute
Order.)
2.Though the Court gave him several extensions of time to do so, plaintiff did not file a response
to defendants’ motion. Consequently, he is deemed to have admitted all of the properly
supported facts asserted by defendants in their Local Rule 56.1(a) Statement of Undisputed
Material Facts. See LR 56.1(b)(3)(C).

11C2280 William Pellegrini vs. Cook County Sheriff Captain Michael Dembosz, et al.

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