Dumas v. City of Elgin et al

Filing 58

ORDER signed by Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly: For the reasons stated in this order, the Court grants defendants' motion to dismiss in part and denies it in part [# 46]. Counts two and five of plaintiff's amended complaint are dismissed. The motion is otherwise denied. Defendants are directed to answer the remaining claims by no later than July 31, 2012. (mk)

Order Form (01/2005)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois
Name of Assigned Judge
or Magistrate Judge

Matthew F. Kennelly

CASE NUMBER

11 C 3032

CASE
TITLE

Sitting Judge if Other
than Assigned Judge

DATE

7/10/2012

Dumas vs. Jensen, et al.

DOCKET ENTRY TEXT

For the reasons stated below, the Court grants defendants’ motion to dismiss in part and denies it in part [#
46]. Counts two and five of plaintiff’s amended complaint are dismissed. The motion is otherwise denied.
Defendants are directed to answer the remaining claims by no later than July 31, 2012.

O[ For further details see text below.]

Docketing to mail notices.

STATEMENT
James Dumas has sued the City of Elgin and several Elgin police officers. He alleges that on September 19,
2008, detective Mario Elias met with him to discuss a narcotics transaction while wearing a recording device,
while other officers overheard and transcribed the conversation. On September 22, 2008, Dumas alleges,
Elias contacted him three times by phone and caused the conversations to be recorded using an eavesdropping
device, while the other officers overheard and transcribed the conversations. Plaintiff alleges that the
defendants did not obtain judicial approval to record any of these conversations. In January 2009, Dumas was
arrested and charged with possession of narcotics and possession with intent to deliver. The recordings were
offered at his trial, and he was convicted and sentenced to a prison term. On appeal, his conviction was
reversed on the ground that he never possessed the narcotics.
In his amended complaint, Dumas asserts six claims. In count one, he alleges that the officers lacked
probable cause to arrest him. Count two is a claim for violation of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act of 1968; Dumas alleges that the officers violated Title III by intercepting, recording, and
disclosing his conversations with detective Elias. Count three is a claim under the Illinois Eavesdropping
Act; Dumas alleges that the interception and recording of the conversations violated that Act because
defendants did not obtain judicial approval. In count four, Dumas alleges that the officers maliciously
prosecuted him. In count five, he alleges that the officers violated his federal constitutional right to privacy
by intercepting and recording his conversations. Count six is a claim against the City of Elgin, seeking
indemnification for any liability of the officers.
Defendants have moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The
Court rules on the motion as follows:
1.

Defendants’ argument that the Court lacks jurisdiction of Dumas’s claims under the Rooker-Feldman

11C3032 Dumas vs. Jensen, et al.

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STATEMENT
doctrine is frivolous. The Rooker–Feldman doctrine bars federal district courts from hearing “cases brought
by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court
proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil
Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). In other words, “[i]f the injury the plaintiff
complains of resulted from, or is inextricably intertwined with, a state-court judgment, then lower federal
courts cannot hear the claim.” Johnson v. Orr, 551 F.3d 564, 568 (7th Cir. 2008). Dumas’s alleged injuries
result from the interception of his conversations and his arrest and prosecution, not from the state court
judgment. Defendants’ contention that Dumas’s failure to challenge the interception of his conversations in
state court bars his claim has nothing whatsoever to do with Rooker-Feldman.
2.
Defendants’ contention that Dumas’s claims are barred by the doctrine of issue preclusion, or
collateral estoppel, is likewise entirely without merit. Illinois preclusion rules, which govern here, see Allen
v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96 (1980), apply issue preclusion only if the issue in question was (among other
things) actually litigated in the first suit. See, e.g., Talarico v. Dunlap, 177 Ill. 2d 185, 191, 685 N.E.2d 325,
328 (1997). Because it is undisputed that the legality of the interceptions was not litigated in state court, issue
preclusion does not come into play. And defendants offer no authority to support the proposition that
Dumas’s failure to challenge the legality of the interceptions in his criminal case bars him from bringing a
civil suit.
3.
Dumas’s Title III claim fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Dumas’s complaint
makes it clear that Elias, a participant in each of the conversations, authorized their interception. Title III
specifically provides that it is violated where one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent.
18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c).
4.
Dumas’s Fourth Amendment right to privacy claim likewise fails to state a claim. It has been clear
since at least Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966), that the Fourth Amendment is not violated by the
disclosure by a government informer of his conversations with a person suspected of a crime. As the
Supreme Court stated, the Fourth Amendment does not “protect[ ] a wrongdoer’s misplaced belief that a
person to whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it.” Id. at 302. The fact that Elias
caused his conversations with Dumas to be recorded does not alter this analysis.
5.
The individual defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity from liability on Dumas’s
Title III and right to privacy claims. The Court need not address that argument because it has already
dismissed those claims.
6.
The individual defendants also argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity on Dumas’s false
arrest claim. They offer no real argument on this point; rather, they seem to assume that the case is
“remarkably similar” to a 1993 state court case in which a conviction was affirmed. See Defs.’ Mem. at 1314. Defendants do not explain this argument, and the complaint does not contain factual allegations that
would permit the Court to assume that the purported similarity actually exists. Due to defendants’ failure to
develop this argument (or even to explain it), defendants have forfeited the point for purposes of their motion
to dismiss.

11C3032 Dumas vs. Jensen, et al.

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