Lafond v. Templeton et al

Filing 9

WRITTEN Opinion entered by the Honorable Sharon Johnson Coleman on 9/7/2011. Plaintiff's amended complaint 8 is dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiff is granted thirty days to submit a second amended complaint (plus a judge's copy and se rvice copies). The Clerk is directed to send Plaintiff an amended civil rights complaint form with instructions and a copy of this order. Failure to submit a second amended complaint within thirty days of the date of this order will result in summary dismissal of this case in its entirety on the understanding that Plaintiff does not wish to pursue his claims in federal court at this time. [For further details see written opinion.] Mailed notice (lw, ).

Order Form (01/2005)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois
Name of Assigned Judge
or Magistrate Judge

Sharon Johnson Coleman

CASE NUMBER

11 C 4107

CASE
TITLE

Sitting Judge if Other
than Assigned Judge

DATE

September 7, 2011

Michael Lafond (R-60610) vs. Templeton, et al.

DOCKET ENTRY TEXT

Plaintiff’s amended complaint [8] is dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiff is granted thirty days to submit a second
amended complaint (plus a judge’s copy and service copies). The Clerk is directed to send Plaintiff an amended civil
rights complaint form with instructions and a copy of this order. Failure to submit a second amended complaint within
thirty days of the date of this order will result in summary dismissal of this case in its entirety on the understanding that
Plaintiff does not wish to pursue his claims in federal court at this time.

O[For further details see text below.]

Docketing to mail notices.

STATEMENT
Plaintiff, Michael Lafond, an inmate at Robinson Correctional Center, has brought this pro se civil rights action
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On July 6, 2011, Plaintiff was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. However, his
complaint was dismissed without prejudice because it impermissibly contained misjoined claims and Defendants and
because he failed to state a claim against two named-Defendants. Plaintiff has submitted an amended complaint.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court is required to conduct a prompt initial review of Plaintiff’s amended
complaint.
Plaintiff alleges that he arrived at LaSalle County Jail on May 20, 2009. At that time, Plaintiff notified intake
deputies that required medical treatment for an open wound on his right leg. His request for medical attention was
denied. Plaintiff was placed in K-pod where his continued requests for medical treatment by unknown deputies were
ignored. Plaintiff filed a grievance regarding the lack of medical care that the staff failed to answer.
Plaintiff also alleges that on August 18, 2009, he was denied medical treatment for hemorrhoids by an
unknown nurse. Plaintiff’s grievance regarding this lack of medical attention went answered. Plaintiff alleges that he
was unable to exhaust his administrative remedies because of the Defendant-Jail administrators “policies, custom or
practice or from a knowing failure to supervise and train staff.”
Plaintiff’s amended complaint still contains misjoined claims and Defendants. See George v. Smith, 507 F.3d
605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007). Plaintiff’s two medical claims are based on two separate incidents and are brought against
different Defendants. Furthermore, Plaintiff’s claims against the unknown Defendants related to his medical care
appear to effectively be time-barred. Federal courts borrow and apply a state’s personal injury statute of limitations to
all Section 1983 claims. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1984). The applicable statute in this instance is 735 ILCS
5/13-202, which provides that actions for damages shall be commenced within two years after the cause of action
accrued. Williams v. Lampe, 399 F.3d 867, 869-70 (7th Cir. 2005); Farrell v. McDonough, 966 F.2d 279, 280-82 (7th
Cir. 1992). Illinois no longer tolls the statute of limitations for inmates. See Wilson v. Giesen, 956 F.2d 738, 741(7th
Cir. 1992). A Section 1983 action accrues when the plaintiff knew or had reason to know of the injury that is the basis
of his claim. See Sellars v. Perry, 80 F.3d 243, 245 (7th Cir. 1996).
Here, Plaintiff ‘s medical claims are based on conduct by the Defendants in May and August of 2009. Thus,
Plaintiff would have to name the actual Defendants involved in the alleged conduct before May and August of 2011.
Naming the actual Defendants in a second amended complaint would not render his claims timely as to the newlynamed Defendants because the inclusion of the newly-added Defendants in the second amended complaint would not
appear to relate back to the original complaint. See Worthington v. Wilson, 8 F.3d 1253, 1256-58 (7th Cir. 1993)
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STATEMENT
(finding that the amended complaint that identified unknown defendants did not relate back to the original complaint
and the claims against the newly-identified defendants were time-barred); Hall v. Norfolk Southern Ry. Co., 479 F.3d
590, 596 (7th Cir. 2006) (for purposes of relating back, “[A] plaintiff’s ignorance or misunderstanding about who is
liable for his injury is not a ‘mistake’ as to the defendant’s ‘identity.’ ”). Accordingly, it appears that Plaintiff’s claims
against the individuals alleged to have violated his constitutional rights relating to his medical care are time-barred.
See Walker v. Thompson, 288 F.3d 1005, 1009-10 (7th Cir. 2002) (expiration of a statute of limitations is an affirmative
defense, but “when the existence of a valid affirmative defense is so plain from the face of the complaint that the suit
can be regarded as frivolous, the district judge need not wait for an answer before dismissing the suit”).
As
to Plaintiff’s claims against the Jail administrators in their official capacity, Plaintiff has not sufficiently stated a claim.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief,” in order to “ ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests.’ ” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355
U.S. 41, 47, (1957)). The factual allegations in the complaint must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level. Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. at 555. “The complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted
as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bonte v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 624 F.3d 461, 463 (7th Cir.
2010) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009)).
Claims filed against government officers in their official capacity are actually claims against the government entity
for which the officers work. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 (1985); Guzman v. Sheahan, 495 F.3d 852, 859
(7th Cir. 2007). A governmental entity is liable for damages under Section 1983 only if the plaintiff can show that the
alleged constitutional deprivation occurred as a result of an official policy, custom, or practice. See Monell v. Department
of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978) Unconstitutional policies or customs generally take three forms: (1) an express
policy that, when enforced, causes a constitutional deprivation; (2) a widespread practice that, although not authorized by
written law or express municipal policy, is so permanent and well settled as to constitute a usage or custom with the force
of law; or (3) a constitutional injury was caused by a person with final policy-making authority. Brokaw v. Mercer County,
235 F.3d 1000, 1013 (7th Cir.2000). Plaintiff’s conclusory statements regarding the Jail administrators are insufficient to
state a claim against any Defendant in his official capacity. Plaintiff cannot “merely parrot the statutory language of the
claims that they are pleading . . . rather than providing some specific facts to ground those legal claims. . . .” Brooks v.
Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. Aug. 20, 2009). “[C]ourts should not accept as adequate abstract recitations of the
elements of a cause of action or conclusory legal arguments.” Brooks, 578 F.3d at 581.
Furthermore, it is not clear what claim Plaintiff is attempting to raise against the Jail administrators. Plaintiff
appears to be alleging that he was unable to complete the grievance procedure because of the Jail administrators. An
inmate does not have a substantive due process right to a grievance procedure. See Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422,
1430 (7th Cir. 1995). The only right attached to a grievance process is a procedural one, that an inmate must be
allowed to exhaust his administrative remedies in order to pursue his right to access to the courts. See Antonelli, 81
F.3d at 1430; DeWalt v. Carter, 224 F.3d 607, 618 (7th Cir. 2000). Here, Plaintiff alleges his dissatisfaction with the
grievance procedure and alleges he was unable to complete it; however, he does not alleges that it caused him the right
to access the courts. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim regarding the grievance procedure.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court dismisses the complaint on file without prejudice. Plaintiff is granted
thirty days in which to submit a second amended complaint. Plaintiff must write both the case number and the judge’s
name on the second amended complaint, sign it, and return it to the Prisoner Correspondent. As with every document
filed with the court, Plaintiff must provide an extra copy for the judge; he must also submit a sufficient number of
copies for service on each Defendant named in the second amended complaint.
Plaintiff is cautioned that an amended pleading supersedes the previous complaints and must stand complete on
its own. Therefore, all allegations must be set forth in the second amended complaint, without reference to the previous
complaints. Any exhibits Plaintiff wants the court to consider in its threshold review of the second amended complaint
must be attached, and each copy of the amended complaint must include complete copies of any and all exhibits.
If Plaintiff fails to comply within thirty days, the case will be summarily dismissed on the understanding that
Plaintiff does not wish to pursue his claims in federal court at this time.

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