Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Zani et al

Filing 49

Opinion and Order entered. The Court grants the petition 46 in part and denies it in part. It is hereby ordered that the petition for fees and costs is granted in the amount of $6,460. This amounts to $525 in filing and service costs, $995 in travel costs, and $4,940 in attorneys fees. No appearance required, 3/12/2014. Mail AO 450. Signed by the Honorable Sara L. Ellis on 3/11/2014: Mailed notice(rj, ) Modified on 3/12/2014 (rj, ).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
JOE HAND PROMOTIONS, INC.,
Plaintiff,
v.
DRITAN ZANI, et al.,
Defendant.

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No. 11 C 4319
Judge Sara L. Ellis

OPINION AND ORDER
Now before the Court is a petition for attorneys’ fees and costs brought by Plaintiff Joe
Hand Promotions (“Hand”). Hand seeks $15,645 for work performed by the three attorneys and
one paralegal whom Hand retained on this matter. The Court grants the petition [46] in part and
denies it in part. The Court awards Hand a total of $6,460 in fees and costs. The Court grants
the unopposed request to recover $525 in costs Hand incurred in filing and serving the
complaint. The Court further grants Hand’s petition to recover attorney Ryan Janis’ travel costs
in the amount of $995, as those costs were reasonable and appropriately documented. The Court
denies the request to recover fees incurred by attorneys David Van Dyke and Emily Bennett
because Van Dyke and Bennett do not describe in any detail what work they performed in this
case. Finally, the Court grants the request to recover Mr. Janis’s and a paralegal’s fees in the
amount of $4,940. This Court arrives at this award by reducing the amount requested by 35% in
light of the limited success Hand achieved in this litigation, the disproportionate amount of fees
incurred relative to the damages award, the fees awarded in similar cases, and the relative
simplicity of this suit.

BACKGROUND
Hand’s business is predicated on licensing its exclusive rights over Ultimate Fighting
Championship (“UFC”) events to commercial establishments.

Relevant to this case, Hand

owned the exclusive right to transmit the telecast of a December 2010 UFC event. Defendant
Zani is the proprietor of the Abram Gale Sports Bar (“AGSB”) in Chicago, Illinois. Because the
AGSB was mistakenly outfitted with a residential DirecTV account, the bar was able to purchase
a pay-per-view telecast of the December 2010 UFC event at the residential rate, rather than the
commercial rate of $1,300. The bar advertised the event on its Facebook and Twitter pages and
ultimately broadcast the UFC event to its patrons. Hand brought a suit under 47 U.S.C. § 605
against Zani and the AGSB, requesting statutory damages of as much as $50,000. The Court
granted summary judgment in favor of Hand.
With regard to damages, however, the Court awarded Hand far less than it requested.
Title 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(3)(C) sets out potential damages for violations of § 605(a). Section
605(e)(3)(C)(i)(II) sets out damages between $1,000 and $10,000 for each violation. Hand
requested the maximum of $10,000, but the Court held that Hand had not sufficiently supported
its claims for loss. Alternately, Hand sought $50,000 in damages under § 605(e)(3)(C)(ii), which
involves willful violations of the statute. But again, Hand did not support its assertions that Zani
had violated the statute willfully, nor did Hand controvert Zani’s assertion that DirecTV
mistakenly installed a residential account without his knowledge and that he had no reason to
know that the residential pay-per-view fee he paid was not the appropriate fee. Further, Hand
did not controvert Zani’s assertion that an award of $250 under § 605(e)(3)(C)(iii) would be far
more appropriate. Subsection (C)(iii) reduces the minimum statutory damages to $250 if the
court finds that the violator was not aware of the violation and had no reason to believe that he

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had violated the statute. Finding this measure of damages most appropriate, the Court awarded
Hand only $250 in damages.
ANALYSIS
Hand now seeks to recover its attorneys’ fees and costs in the amount of $15,645. An
award of reasonable attorneys’ fees is mandatory if the plaintiff prevails on its claim under 47
U.S.C. § 605(a). Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. That Place, LLC, 11-CV-931, 2012 WL 2525653
(E.D. Wis. June 29, 2012); Charter Communications Entertainment I, DST v. Burdulis, 460 F.3d
168, 171 n.2 (1st Cir. 2006); Directv v. Crespin, 224 Fed. Appx. 741, 758 (10th Cir. 2007).
When determining what amount of attorneys’ fees is reasonable, courts begin by calculating the
“lodestar” by multiplying an attorney’s reasonable hourly rate by a reasonable number of hours
expended. Johnson v. GDF, Inc., 668 F.3d 927, 929–30 (7th Cir. 2012). A court may then
adjust the fees award depending on a variety of factors, including the degree of success, the
relationship between the lodestar amount and the damages awarded, awards in similar cases, and
the novelty and difficulty of the issues. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 430 n.3, 434, 103 S.
Ct. 1933, 76 L. Ed. 2d 40 (1983); Moriarty v. Svec, 233 F.3d 955, 967–68 (7th Cir. 2000).
I.

Costs
First, Hand asks to recover a $350 filing fee and $175 cost to effectuate service. In its

response, Zani does not oppose these costs. Finding these costs reasonable, the Court grants the
petition to recover $525 in filing and service costs.
Hand also seeks to recover costs in the amount of $1,045 that its attorney Ryan Janis
incurred when he traveled from Pennsylvania to Chicago to attend a settlement conference in
June of 2013. These costs cover Janis’ airfare, hotel, taxis in Chicago, and parking at the
Philadelphia airport. While Mr. Zani correctly points out that travel expenses are not included in

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28 U.S.C. § 1920, which outlines categories of costs that are generally taxable, reasonable
attorney travel costs are recoverable in cases such as these “because travel and meal expenses are
the sort of things that a lawyer includes with a bill for professional services.” Calderon v.
Witvoet, 112 F.3d 275, 276 (7th Cir. 1997); see also Moore v. Univ. of Notre Dame, 22 F. Supp.
2d 896, 911 (N.D. Ind. 1998). Further, the Court finds that Mr. Janis’ travel costs and his
presence at the settlement conference were reasonable, with one minor exception. Mr. Janis’
flight itinerary reports one night’s stay in Chicago, but his parking receipt indicates that his car
remained at the Philadelphia airport for more than three days—incurring $75 in charges. The
Court limits Mr. Janis to recover $25 in airport parking for his one day trip. Therefore, the Court
grants Hand’s motion to recover Mr. Janis’ travel costs, but limits the recoverable amount to
$995.
II.

Sufficiency of Support
In addition to costs, Hand seeks to recover $14,065 in attorneys’ fees. Hand requests

$7,775 in fees incurred by Ryan Janis and a paralegal. Mr. Janis’ hourly rate is $250, while his
paralegal bills at $100 per hour. In total, Mr. Janis billed 29 hours on this matter while the
paralegal billed 3.5 hours. As an initial matter, the petition requests $525 in fees for time billed
by the paralegal. However, because the petition states that the paralegal spent 3.5 hours on the
case at a rate of $100 per hour, the Court reads the request for $525 for the paralegal’s time as a
typographical or arithmetical error, and limits the recovery for the paralegal’s work to $350.
The fees of Mr. Janis and the paralegal are supported by billing statements broken into 23
dated entries and enumerated in six-minute increments. Although Mr. Janis and the paralegal
use block billing rather than task billing, they break down their entries by day and describe in
sufficient detail the tasks performed during that time.

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Thus, before being subject to the

diminution outlined in Section III below, the Court finds that Hand provides adequate support for
$7,600 in fees.
As to the attorneys’ fees of David Van Dyke and Emily Bennett, the Court finds that
these fees are not properly supported by the petition or the attorneys’ declarations. Mr. Van
Dyke and Ms. Bennett report that they billed ten and nine hours on the matter respectively.
Because their billing rates vary significantly, Van Dyke’s fees total $4,400 1 while Bennett’s
amount to $1,890. But neither Van Dyke nor Bennett provides any breakdown or meaningful
description of the time spent on this matter. Instead, Van Dyke and Bennett submit an identical
description of their work on the case. Both state simply that they “contributed to strategy,
drafted documents, ensured compliance with local rules and attended requisite hearings.”
Docket Nos. 46-2 at 1, 46-3 at 1. This merely describes what a generic attorney does on a
generic case. The description does not provide the Court with any insight into what work Van
Dyke and Bennett actually performed on this matter.
As the Supreme Court has noted, “[w]here the documentation of hours is inadequate, the
district court may reduce the award accordingly.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433-34. While block
billing—combining several tasks in a daily time entry—is not prohibited, courts in this district
have reduced fee awards or even barred recovery on block-billed time. See, e.g., Gibson v. City
of Chicago, 873 F. Supp. 2d 975, 987 (N.D. Ill. 2012); Reyes v. Nations Title Agency of Illinois,
Inc., 00 C 7763, 2001 WL 687451, at *1 (N.D. Ill. June 19, 2001). As the Court holds with
regard to Mr. Janis’ declaration, block billing is acceptable “[s]o long as the billing statement
reasonably sets forth the dates of work, description of work, total hours expended, and total cost

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Mr. Van Dyke’s declaration contains an apparent typographical error, stating that his “billable fees
equal Four Thousand Four Hundred Dollars ($4,410.00).” Docket No. 46-2 at 2. Based on the
context, the Court understands this to mean $4,400.

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for task.” Chao v. Current Dev. Corp., 03 C 1792, 2007 WL 2484338, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 27,
2007).
Here, Van Dyke and Bennett do not even provide block-billed time entries. Instead, they
merely state the total number of hours they worked on the case and describe their work in the
vaguest possible terms. The Court has no way of knowing whether the time spent or the costs
incurred were reasonable.

Thus, the Court finds Van Dyke and Bennett’s documentation

woefully inadequate and therefore denies Hand’s request to recover any portion of their fees.
III.

Other Considerations
In calculating whether the lodestar is appropriate, the Supreme Court has made clear that

a court should consider the degree of success, the relationship between the fees incurred and the
damages awarded, awards in similar cases, and the novelty and difficulty of the case. Hensley,
461 U.S. at 430 n.3. The court must determine whether “the plaintiff achieve[d] a level of
success that makes the hours reasonably expended a satisfactory basis for making a fee award.”
Id. at 434. When calculating whether and how much to reduce an award of attorneys’ fees,
“[t]here is no precise rule or formula . . . . The district court may attempt to identify specific
hours that should be eliminated, or it may simply reduce the award to account for the limited
success.” Id. at 436-37. This analysis is particularly crucial where, as here, Plaintiff did not
nearly recover what it requested in damages. Id. at 434.
Here, the Court finds that each of the above factors weighs in favor of reducing Hand’s
fee award. First, Hand recovered a small fraction of the amount it requested in damages. In fact,
the Court awarded the statutory minimum damages. Perhaps most importantly, this result was
based on Hand’s failure to offer any evidence to support its alleged damages or to even
controvert Zani’s assertion that $250 in damages was appropriate. Relatedly, the fees requested

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are more than 60 times greater than the damages awarded. While there is no mechanical
formula, the Court finds this request inappropriate in light of the minimal damages awarded.
Additionally, after reviewing Hand’s fee petitions in other similar matters, the Court notes that
the fees request here are much higher than usual while the damages award is lower than usual.
See, e.g., Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. L. A. Moon LLC, 12-CV-446-WMC, 2013 WL 633572
(W.D. Wis. Feb. 20, 2013) (Hand incurred $1,954 in fees and costs on a $33,000 damages
award); Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Cat’s Bar, Inc., 08-4049, 2009 WL 700125 (C.D. Ill. Mar.
16, 2009) (Hand incurred $831 in fees and costs on a $16,000 damages award); Joe Hand
Promotions, Inc. v. Parlavecchio, 10-3294, 2011 WL 4527338 (C.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 2011) (Hand
incurred $1,509 in fees and costs on a $13,900 damages award). Finally, the Court finds that the
issues at play in this case were neither novel nor difficult.

The Court finds that the

straightforward nature of these claims and Hand’s status as a serial litigant should enable Hand
to limit its fees. With all this in mind, the Court finds that the $7,600 in fees incurred by Mr.
Janis are unreasonable. Bearing in mind the Court’s denial of fees incurred by Mr. Van Dyke
and Ms. Bennett, the Court reduces Mr. Janis’ fees of $7,600 by 35%. Therefore, the Court
awards Hand $4,940 in fees.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants Hand’s petition for fees and costs [46] in the
amount of $6,460. This amounts to $525 in filing and service costs, $995 in travel costs, and
$4,940 in attorneys’ fees.

Dated: March 11, 2014
SARA L. ELLIS
United States District Judge
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