James v. Halter et al

Filing 134

OPINION AND ORDER. The Court denies the Detectives' motion to dismiss 121 and grants the City's motion to dismiss 120 . The City's motion is granted on the basis of James' failure to adequately state a Monell claim and denied on the statute of limitations basis. James is granted leave to amend his complaint to address the deficiencies with his Monell claim. Signed by the Honorable Sara L. Ellis on 1/25/2018: Mailed notice(rj, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
NED JAMES,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
CITY OF CHICAGO, LISA BUCKHALTER, )
DANIEL RANDALL, EMMETT WELCH,
)
MICHAEL ZUBER, and UNIDENTIFIED
)
CHICAGO POLICE OFFICERS,
)
)
Defendants.
)

No. 11 C 4418
Judge Sara L. Ellis

OPINION AND ORDER
After receiving multiple beatings at the hands of various Chicago police officers and
detectives in January 2011, Plaintiff Ned James filed the present civil action alleging violations
of his civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants Lisa Buckhalter, Daniel
Randall, and a number of unnamed Chicago police officers. Shortly after filing, the Court stayed
his case pending the resolution of a related criminal case. Over five years later, the Court lifted
the stay and James amended his complaint to add the City of Chicago (the “City”) and Detectives
Emmett Welch and Michael Zuber (collectively, the “Detectives”) as defendants. The City and
the Detectives now move to dismiss [120, 121] the amended complaint arguing that the
applicable two-year statute of limitations bars James’ claims against them and that James has
failed to adequately state a claim against the City under Monell v. Department of Social Services
of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978). Because James’
failure to initially include the City and the Detectives in his original complaint was due to a
mistake recognized under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(1)(C), his amended complaint
relates back to the date of his original complaint and the statute of limitations does not bar it, and

the Court denies both motions to dismiss on this basis. However, James concedes that he has not
adequately pleaded his Monell claim against the City, so the Court grants the City’s motion to
dismiss on this basis and grants James leave to amend his complaint to address the deficiencies.
BACKGROUND1
On January 17, 2011, Chicago police officers arrested James. After placing James in
handcuffs, Officers Buckhalter and Randall kicked him and struck him in the head, causing
injuries, including lacerations above both eyes that required treatment at the hospital. After
James was treated and released from the hospital, officers took him to the police station. Once at
the police station, James was beaten again, this time by Chicago Police Detectives Welch and
Zuber. James again went to the hospital following this second beating where he received
treatment and was released back to police custody.
On June 29, 2011, James filed his initial pro se complaint in this case. In that complaint
he named Buckhalter and Randall but not the City or the Detectives. James attempted to amend
the complaint on October 25, 2011 to add additional defendants, including the Detectives, but
Judge Aspen2 denied the motion because it did not comply with the requirements for amending a
complaint. On November 28, 2011, Judge Aspen stayed the case pending the resolution of the
related criminal proceedings against James. The stay was extended numerous times over the
subsequent years, and the Court finally lifted the stay on February 15, 2017. On January 12,
2017, the Court granted James’ motion for attorney representation. James, now with the
assistance of counsel, filed his amended complaint in this case on June 22, 2017. Additionally,
1

The facts in the background section are taken from James’ amended complaint and are presumed true
for the purpose of resolving Defendants’ motions to dismiss. See Virnich v. Vorwald, 664 F.3d 206, 212
(7th Cir. 2011); Local 15, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, AFL-CIO v. Exelon Corp., 495 F.3d 779, 782 (7th
Cir. 2007).

2

This case was originally assigned to Judge Aspen. It was reassigned to Judge Durkin on January 1,
2013, Doc. 34, and finally reassigned to this Court on October 23, 2013, Doc. 49.

2

on April 12, 2012, while this case was stayed, James attempted to file a related case against the
City and several Chicago police officers, not including the Detectives. James v. City of Chicago,
No. 12 C 2819, Doc. 1 (N.D. Ill. April 17, 2012). Judge Darrah dismissed that case without
prejudice as duplicative of this case. Id. Doc. 5 (N.D. Ill. June 21, 2012).
The City moves to dismiss, arguing that the statute of limitations has run on the claims
against it and that James did not adequately plead his Monell claim. The Detectives also move to
dismiss on the basis of the statute of limitations.
LEGAL STANDARD
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the complaint, not
its merits. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Gibson v. City of Chicago, 910 F.2d 1510, 1520 (7th Cir.
1990). In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court accepts as true all wellpleaded facts in the plaintiff’s complaint and draws all reasonable inferences from those facts in
the plaintiff’s favor. AnchorBank, FSB v. Hofer, 649 F.3d 610, 614 (7th Cir. 2011). To survive
a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the complaint must not only provide the defendant with fair notice of a
claim’s basis but must also be facially plausible. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct.
1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009); see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.
Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
ANALYSIS
The City and the Detectives move to dismiss the claims against them arguing that the
two-year statute of limitations for excessive force claims bars James from amending his
complaint to include them as defendants. The statute of limitations is an affirmative defense that

3

need not be anticipated in the complaint in order to survive a motion to dismiss. United States v.
Lewis, 411 F.3d 838, 842 (7th Cir. 2005). But that is not the case where “the allegations of the
complaint itself set forth everything necessary to satisfy the affirmative defense, such as when a
complaint plainly reveals that an action is untimely under the governing statute of limitations.”
Id.; see also Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 579 (7th Cir. 2009) (considering statute of limitations
defense on motion to dismiss where relevant dates were set forth in the complaint). Section 1983
claims are governed by the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury claims, in this
case, two years. Ashafa v. City of Chicago, 146 F.3d 459, 461 (7th Cir. 1998); 735 Ill. Comp.
Stat. 5/13-202. Although the statute of limitations is borrowed from state law, federal law
determines when the claim accrues. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388, 127 S. Ct. 1091, 166 L.
Ed. 2d 973 (2007). Under federal law, § 1983 claims accrue when a plaintiff knows or has
reason to know that his constitutional rights have been violated. Wilson v. Giesen, 956 F.2d 738,
741 (7th Cir. 1992). James’ claims for excessive force claim accrued immediately. Evans v.
Poskon, 603 F.3d 362, 363 (7th Cir. 2010).
A.

The Detectives: Statute of Limitations

In the initial complaint, James alleged that unknown officers beat him while he was at the
police station after being arrested. He now believes those officers to be the Detectives. At the
time James amended his complaint in 2017 to include the Detectives, the statute of limitations on
his excessive force claim against them had already run. Therefore, his claims against them are
only timely if his amended complaint relates back to his original complaint pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(1)(C).
Rule 15(c)(1)(C) provides that a claim asserted against a newly identified defendant
relates back if:

4

within the period provided by Rule 4(m) for serving the summons
and complaint, the party to be brought in by amendment:
(i) received such notice of the action that it will not be prejudiced
in defending on the merits; and
(ii) knew or should have known that the action would have been
brought against it, but for a mistake concerning the proper party’s
identity.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(C). The Detectives argue that no amendment naming them could relate
back to the filing of James’ original complaint, relying on long-standing Seventh Circuit
precedent holding that the naming of John Doe defendants does not stop the statute of limitations
and that a plaintiff’s lack of knowledge does not constitute a mistake for purposes of relation
back. See King v. One Unknown Fed. Corr. Officer, 201 F.3d 910, 914 (7th Cir. 2000)
(complaint did not relate back where plaintiff lacked knowledge of proper party within
limitations period). After the Supreme Court’s decision in Krupski v. Costa Cruciere S.p.A., 560
U.S. 538, 130 S. Ct. 2485, 177 L. Ed. 2d 48 (2010), however, the focus of the relation back
inquiry has shifted away from the plaintiff’s to the defendant’s knowledge, with the plaintiff’s
knowledge “relevant only if it bears on the defendant’s understanding of whether the plaintiff
made a mistake regarding the proper party’s identity.” Id. at 548. Thus, the proper inquiry for
the Court at this stage is whether the Detectives knew or should have known, during the Rule
4(m) period, that but for a mistake on the part of James, they would have been named in the suit,
and whether they would be prejudiced in defending the merits of the case if relation back is
allowed. Joseph v. Elan Motorsports Techs. Racing Corp., 638 F.3d 555, 559–60 (7th Cir.
2011).
The Detectives do not assert that they were unaware of the complaint during the Rule
4(m) period or that they would be prejudiced in their defense if relation back were allowed; they

5

only contend that the type of mistakes James made in failing to name the City and the Detectives
in his initial complaint are not recognized under Rule 15(c)(1)(C) as a basis for allowing relation
back. Although there is still no consensus on whether or not naming fictitious defendants is a
mistake for purposes of Rule 15(c)(1)(C) post-Krupski, this Court and many others in this district
have previously held that where a plaintiff initially names a fictitious defendant because the
plaintiff does not know the defendant’s true identity, a subsequent amended complaint can relate
back to the initial complaint. See Ryan v. City of Chicago, No. 15 C 9762, 2016 WL 6582570, at
*2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 7, 2016); see also Cheatham v. City of Chicago, No. 16-cv-3015, 2016 WL
6217091, at *2–3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 25, 2016) (finding relation back proper even though plaintiff
identified John Doe defendant after the statute of limitations had run, finding that Krupski
changed the inquiry to focus on the defendant’s instead of the plaintiff’s knowledge); Karney v.
City of Naperville, No. 15 C 4608, 2016 WL 6082354, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 18, 2016) (rejecting
traditional John Doe rule in favor of focus on defendant’s knowledge). Therefore, the Court
denies the Detectives’ motion to dismiss.3
James also asserts that the doctrine of equitable tolling preserves his claims against the
Detectives because he was unable, despite reasonable diligence, to discover the identities of the
Detectives within the statute of limitations period. James, as the party seeking equitable tolling,
has the burden to establish “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some
extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418, 125 S.
Ct. 1807, 161 L. Ed. 2d 669 (2005). James asserts that despite filing the initial action during the
limitations period, he was unable to obtain any further discovery on the defendants’ identities
because the case was stayed for five-and-a-half years during his criminal proceedings, and that it
3

As noted above, the Detectives did not assert that they did not know of this lawsuit during the Rule 4(m)
period, therefore, the Court does not address this issue. Regardless, their knowledge is likely a fact
intensive inquiry and not resolvable at the motion to dismiss stage.

6

was only after his appointed counsel received documents once the Court lifted the stay that he
was able to identify the Detectives. He attempted to have the stay lifted on numerous occasions,
but was unsuccessful.
The Detectives do not address the impact of the stay on James’ ability to obtain their
identities. Instead, they focus their reply on the fact that James filed the separate 2012 action
before Judge Darrah without naming them as defendants. They focus on how the filing of the
2012 action shows that James was not prevented from filing a complaint or mistaken about how
to initiate a lawsuit. But this misses the point. James does not assert that he did not know how
to file a lawsuit or that he was prevented from doing so, but that he was prevented from
conducting adequate discovery because of the stay and therefore could not identify the
Detectives during the limitations period.
Based on these arguments, the Court cannot determine whether equitable tolling applies.
James has pointed to no case law stating that a stay constitutes extraordinary circumstances or
detailed any efforts he took outside of formal discovery to obtain the names of the Detectives.
Furthermore, neither party addresses how the inclusion of the Detectives’ names in James’
attempted amended complaint on October 25, 2011 affects this analysis. But, because the Court
has already found that James has made a sufficient showing that his amended complaint relates
back to the original complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the Court does not need to reach
the equitable tolling issue at this time.
B.

The City: Statute of Limitations

The City asserts that the two-year statute of limitations bars James’ Monell claim against
it. Like the Detectives, James did not name the City in his original complaint, only adding the
City as a party in his amended complaint filed in 2017. The City argues that the amended

7

complaint adding it as a party does not relate back to the original complaint because the omission
of the City from the original complaint was not a mistake under Rule 15(c)(1)(C). A mistake
about whether to sue an entity or an individual (or both) is a common legal mistake and is “the
very type of mistake Rule 15 contemplates.” Jackson v. Kotter, 541 F.3d 688, 696 (7th Cir.
2008). The main issue to decide when determining whether Rule 15 applies in such a case is
whether the notice requirement was met. Id. However, here, the City does not address the notice
issue, instead resting on its argument that the type of mistake James made is not recognized
under Rule 15.4 Thus, the Court denies the City’s motion to dismiss on the basis of the statute of
limitations.
The City also moves to dismiss James’ Monell claim arguing that he did not adequately
plead his claim. In his response James concedes this point. Therefore, the Court grants the
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and grants James leave to amend his complaint to
address the deficiencies in his Monell claim against the City.

4

In each of the City’s and the Detectives’ briefs on this issue, they rely almost solely on a misquotation of
Krupski. In each of their motions and replies, the Defendants state, “As Krupski explains, Rule
15(c)(1)(C) can be used only to ‘correct a formal defect such as a misnomer or misidentification.’ See
Krupski, 560 U.S. at 550–51 (discussing the history of Rule 15(c)(1)(C); Advisory Committee’s 1991
notes).” Doc. 120 at 4–5; Doc. 121 at 4; Doc. 132 at 1 (including identical language with the full cite for
Krupski); Doc. 133 at 1 (same). This language does not appear in Krupski and misrepresents the holding
of the case. If Defendants wish to raise the statute of limitations issues again at a later point, they would
do well to revisit Krupski.

8

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reason the Court denies the Detectives’ motion to dismiss [121] and
grants the City’s motion to dismiss [120]. The City’s motion is granted on the basis of James’
failure to adequately state a Monell claim and denied on the statute of limitations basis. James is
granted leave to amend his complaint to address the deficiencies with his Monell claim.

Dated: January 25, 2018

______________________
SARA L. ELLIS
United States District Judge

9