Thompson et al v. Ruddy et al

Filing 99

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: Signed by the Honorable Harry D. Leinenweber on 3/25/2014:Mailed notice(wp, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

BEVERLY THOMPSON, ROBERT
(“BINDY”) ROCK,
Case No. 11 C 4425

Plaintiffs,

Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber

v.
GREGORY P. RUDDY, et al.,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
I.

BACKGROUND

The Plaintiffs, Beverly Thompson (hereinafter, “Plaintiff” or
“Thompson”) and Robert (“Bindy”) Rock (“Rock”), real estate owners,
filed a Complaint against Gregory P. Ruddy (“Ruddy”), the Public
Works

Administrator

of

the

City

of

Joliet,

Mary

J.

Kucharz

(“Kucharz”), City Attorney, and the City of Joliet (the “City”).
The Complaint alleges that the three Defendants conspired against
the Plaintiffs and maliciously prosecuted them in violation of
their rights in connection with a dispute over the placement of
fill on Plaintiffs’ property.

They allege that the actions taken

against them were caused by custom, policy, and practice of the
City

of

Joliet

residents.

to

provide

unequal

treatment

to

low

income

Procedurally, the Court dismissed Count I, conspiracy,

and all claims against Kucharz on September 22, 2011.

On June 28,

2012, the Court dismissed Count II as it pertained to Rock as he
did not own the property at the relative time period.

The

remaining Counts are a state law claim for malicious prosecution
and a Section 1983 claim against the City based on Monell.
The Defendants have moved for summary judgment on both claims
and has filed a Local Rule 56.1 Statement of Material Facts.

The

Plaintiff instead of filing a response admitting or denying the
facts asserted, filed a response that admits certain facts and
takes no position on the remaining facts, claiming that she had
insufficient

time

to

conduct

discovery.

The

Plaintiff

did,

however, file a statement of Additional Facts. Despite Plaintiff’s
claim of insufficient time to conduct discovery, the record shows
that her Complaint was filed more than three and one/half years ago
and has been at issue since August 2012.

The record further shows

that the Defendants filed Motion for Summary Judgment on November
8, 2012 and the Court ordered Plaintiff to file a response brief by
December

5,

2012.

On

December

5,

2012,

the

Plaintiff additional time until January 4, 2013.

Court

extended

On January 4,

2013, the Court extended the date for Plaintiff’s response brief to
March 11, 2013.

On March 14, 2013, the Court again extended the

due date to April 30, 2013.

On May 9, 2013, the Plaintiff moved

for more time but failed to appear in support of her Motion so it
was denied.

However, on May 23, 2013, the Court did grant

Plaintiff more time until June 24, 2013.
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On June 19, 2013 the

Court extended the due date to July 24, 2013.
ruling date for August 29, 2013.

The court set a

On that date the Plaintiff failed

to appear but did file a “Re-Notice of Motion.”

The Court granted

Plaintiff an extension to September 12, 2013.

On that date,

Plaintiff did file a response to the Statement of Material Facts
and a Statement of Additional Facts. The record further shows that
Defendants did serve Plaintiff with the required Notice to Pro Se
Litigant Opposing Motion for Summary Judgment as required by local
rule. The record further shows that the Plaintiff did conduct some
discovery.

She took the deposition of Ruddy.

The Court therefore

declines to accept Plaintiff’s contention that she had insufficient
time to conduct discovery.

At best, the record shows that the

Plaintiff was incredibly dilatory.

This not an excuse that is

contemplated by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 (d).

Wright,

Miller, Kane, Federal practice and Procedure, Chapter 8, Section
2741.

The Court therefore accepts as true the facts set forth in

Defendants’ Local Rule 56.1 Statement.

However, the Court will

also consider Plaintiff’s additional facts filed pursuant to the
local rule.
II.
A.
Illinois

law

DISCUSSION

Count II - Malicious Prosecution
requires

a

plaintiff

suing

for

malicious

prosecution to show (1) the commencement or continuance of a

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criminal proceeding by the defendant; (2) termination in favor of
the plaintiff; (3)absence of probable cause for the proceeding; (4)
presence of malice; and (5) damages to plaintiff resulting from the
commencement or continuation of that proceeding.

Bernhardt v.

Remiyac, 565 N.E.2d 1049, 1051 (Ill.App.2d 1991).

The evidence

from the respective Rule 56 Statements shows that the Ruddy in
2003, after receiving complaints from neighbors of Plaintiff about
flooding of their property, investigated and observed that a large
amount of fill had been deposited on Plaintiff’s property causing
water runoff.

He believed the runoff had been caused by loss of a

substantial amount of depression storage on Plaintiff’s property.
Two years later he received another complaint from a neighbor of
Plaintiff to the same effect.

Ruddy investigated and discovered

that Thompson owned the property.
as

before

but

also

noticed

He observed the same conditions

the

presence

containers, and rubbish on the site.

of

landscape

waste,

As a result, he sent a letter

to Plaintiff requesting that the site be restored to its prior
condition and all illegally placed fill be removed. He received no
response from Plaintiff and the material was not removed.
Based on the lack of response, Ruddy contacted the City of
Joliet Legal Department.

Proceedings were initiated by the filing

of

against

a

civil

complaint

Plaintiff

alleging

ordinance

violations. Eventually the ordinance violations case went to trial
with Ruddy testifying for the City.
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The trial judge found the

Plaintiff guilty of three of four counts.

The Plaintiff appealed

and the Appellate Court for the Third District reversed based on
its conclusion that the evidence had not shown that the waste had
been deposited after the property was annexed to the City of
Joliet, and thus its presence was a non-conforming use and not
illegal.
It is obvious that, based on the evidence before the Court on
the Summary Judgment Motion, that there is no evidence of malice.
First, Ruddy observed a situation that clearly was in violation of
the City of Joliet Ordinance if the property was in the City, and
it was at the time he requested legal enforcement.
trial judge found the Plaintiff guilty.

Second, the

Third, there is no

evidence that Ruddy was aware of the fact that the property was not
in Joliet at the time of the depositing of fill.

In fact, Ruddy

notified Plaintiff of the problem and she did not respond.

She

would be on firmer grounds if she had responded by telling Ruddy
that the deposits were made before the annexation but she remained
silent.

There is no argument that if the deposits were made after

annexation that there would have been grounds for the complaints.
Fourth, Ruddy turned the matter over to the City of Joliet Legal
Department who made the decision to file the complaints.
there

is

Therefore,

no

malice,

the

Motion

there

can

be

for Summary

malicious prosecution is granted.
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no

malicious

Judgement

Since

prosecution.

on Count

II

for

B.

Count III - Monell

The sine qua non of a Monell claim is that there is a
constitutional

violation

that

causes

damages

to

a

plaintiff.

Plaintiff’s claim is that as a matter of policy the City of Joliet
treats

indigent

status.

citizens

differently

based

on

their

There are a number of problems with this claim.

economic
First,

economic status is not a suspect classification although if the
City

did

without

rational

justification

treat

indigents

less

favorably that non indigents, there might be some possible claim.
Second, Plaintiff has not established in any way shape or form that
she is indigent.

All we know is that she is a property owner.

Second, there is no evidence that the City of Joliet refuses to
issue citations to non-indigents who similarly pile debris on their
property creating a watershed problem.

Thus, even if we assume

Plaintiff was indigent, she had not shown that she was treated in
a discriminatory fashion. Accordingly, summary judgment is granted
on the Monell claim, Count III.
C.

Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions

The Plaintiff also filed a Motion for Sanctions contending
that the Defendants were not cooperating in discovery.

The record

shows, however, that Ruddy did show for his deposition but that
Plaintiff had not made arrangements for a notary public or a court
reporter to take the deposition.
for sanctions.

Consequently, there is no basis

The Motion is denied.
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III.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment is granted in favor of Defendant Ruddy on Count II, and in
favor of the City of Joliet on Count III.

Plaintiff’s Motion for

Sanctions is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge
United States District Court
Date:3/25/2014

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