Cooper v. Stateville C.C. Health Care et al
Filing
106
MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order signed by the Honorable Andrea R. Wood on 9/29/2014. Mailed notice (ac, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
ARSENIO COOPER,
Plaintiff,
v.
DR. SYLVIA MAHONE and
WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, INC.,
Defendants.
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No. 11-cv-04455
Judge Andrea R. Wood
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Arsenio Cooper alleges that while in the custody of the Illinois Department of
Corrections (“IDOC”), he was denied proper medical care by Defendants Sylvia Mahone and
Wexford Health Sources, Inc. (“Wexford”) in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution. Accordingly, Cooper has brought this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
seeking monetary damages and injunctive relief. Now before the Court is Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment (the “Motion”). (Dkt. No. 82.) Because Cooper cannot show that Defendants
acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs, the Motion is granted.
BACKGROUND
The facts underlying this action are substantially undisputed. 1 Cooper is a prisoner with
IDOC, confined at the Stateville Correctional Center (“Stateville”). (Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’ Stmt.
of Material Facts ¶ 1, Dkt. No. 95.) He alleges that he injured his right knee playing basketball
there on April 30, 2011. (Id. ¶¶ 7, 12.) That same day, he was examined at a Stateville hospital.
(Id. ¶ 13.) IDOC had contracted with Wexford to provide medical services at Stateville, and
Mahone was a physician employed by Wexford as a medical director in the hospital unit where
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The following factual summary is compiled from Plaintiff’s Response to Defendants’ Statement of
Material Facts. (Dkt. No. 95.) Unless otherwise noted, these facts are undisputed.
Cooper was examined. (Id. ¶¶ 2, 3.) One of the medical technicians who saw Cooper on the day
of his injury told Cooper that she thought he had fractured his knee, and prescribed a three day
lay-in, Tylenol, and ice for his knee. (Id. ¶ 14.)
On May 1, 2011, Cooper had a follow-up examination at Stateville, after which Mahone
approved his transfer to the emergency room at Provena St. Joseph Hospital in Joliet, Illinois for
further examination. (Id. ¶¶ 15-17.) Cooper was seen by St. Joseph emergency room physician
Daniel Magdziarz later that day. (Id. ¶ 18.) Magdziarz observed swelling of Cooper’s knee, fluid
within the knee joint, and possible internal damage to knee ligaments or cartilage. (Id. ¶ 22.) An
x-ray of Cooper’s knee did not reveal any acute fracture, but Magdziarz could not rule out the
possibility of hairline fractures that would have been revealed only by an MRI exam. (Id. ¶ 21.)
Cooper was fitted with a knee immobilizer (i.e., a knee brace) at St. Joseph. (Id. ¶ 23.)
His discharge form instructed him to wear the brace when he was awake, to use crutches to
prevent weight-bearing use of the knee, and to take prescribed medications to relieve
inflammation and pain. (Id. ¶ 25.) He was instructed to seek a referral to an orthopedist and to
return to the emergency room if his condition worsened. (Dkt. No. 93 at 7.) Magdziarz also
signed a form that represented that Cooper was okay to be readmitted to Stateville. (Id. at 9.) The
readmission form stated that Cooper should wear the knee brace and use crutches to prevent
weight-bearing activity, and specified that Cooper should follow up with an orthopedist within
one week. (Id.) Cooper was not told how long he would need to wear the brace. (Pl.’s Resp. to
Defs.’ Stmt. of Material Facts ¶ 26, Dkt. No. 95.) He returned to Stateville on the night of May 1
wearing the brace. (Id. ¶ 27.) That evening, Mahone issued a telephone order for Cooper to be
provided with a low-galley bunk, Ibuprofen, and crutches. (Id. ¶ 28.)
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Stateville security officers removed Cooper’s brace on May 2, 2011. (Id. ¶ 29.) The
officers told Mahone that Cooper could not have the knee brace because it contained metal bars.
(Id. ¶ 30.) Mahone examined Cooper on May 3 and observed minimal swelling in his right knee.
(Id. ¶ 32.) She prescribed medications for inflammation and pain, authorized a three-day
exemption from his normal prison work responsibilities, and instructed him to refrain from sports
activity for 30 days. (Id. ¶ 33.) Mahone also ordered a metal-free brace for him. (Id. ¶ 34.)
On May 5, 2011, Mahone conferred with a colleague and approved an MRI exam for
Cooper’s knee to check for internal injury. (Id. ¶ 35.) She examined him again on May 13 and
refilled his prescriptions for two medications. (Id. ¶ 36.) Cooper was transferred to the University
of Illinois – Chicago Medical Center (“UIC”) on June 2 for the MRI. (Id. ¶ 37.) That
examination indicated that Cooper’s patella had been dislocated and relocated, and that there
were microfractures in surrounding bones, tears to nearby tissue, and damage to ligaments and
cartilage. (Id. ¶ 39.) Cooper’s knee injury produced fluid and swelling. (Id.) Ejaz Shamim, the
radiologist who interpreted the MRI results, did not prescribe treatment. (Id. ¶ 40.)
Mahone next saw Cooper on June 3, 2011 and observed that he was walking without a
cane. (Id. ¶ 42.) She renewed his prescriptions for two medications and advised him not to put
too much pressure on his knee. (Id. ¶¶ 42-43.) She saw him again on June 8 and approved his
transfer to UIC for an orthopedic evaluation. (Id. ¶ 44.) Cooper was evaluated at UIC on June 10
and was given a home exercise plan consisting of knee stabilization exercises. (Id. ¶ 45.)
Cooper’s prescriptions were refilled on July 20, 2011. (Id. ¶ 46.) His knee was x-rayed on July
28, and the findings were negative. (Id. ¶ 47.) Cooper still had not received a knee brace, and on
September 16, 2011, Mahone requested that Wexford provide one for him. (Id. ¶ 50.) Cooper
finally received a knee brace in November or December 2011. (Id. ¶ 51.)
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DISCUSSION
Summary judgment is appropriate if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
The mere existence of a factual dispute is insufficient to overcome a motion for summary
judgment; the nonmovant “must present definite, competent evidence in rebuttal.” Parent v.
Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 694 F.3d 919, 922 (7th Cir. 2012).
In his complaint, Cooper alleges that the condition of his knee worsened because of
Defendants’ failure to provide him with a knee brace and that this failure constituted deliberate
indifference to his medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel
and unusual punishment. The Eighth Amendment, through the Fourteenth Amendment, imposes
a duty upon states to provide adequate medical care to incarcerated individuals. Johnson v.
Doughty, 433 F.3d 1001, 1010 (7th Cir. 2006). That constitutional provision is violated by state
officials who display deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of prisoners. Id.
Under the Eighth Amendment, a prisoner’s “medical need is sufficiently serious to
require the attention of prison officials if it has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating
treatment or is so obvious that even a lay person would perceive the need for a doctor’s
attention.” Gomez v. Randle, 680 F.3d 859, 865 (7th Cir. 2012); see also McGee v. Adams, 721
F.3d 474, 480 (7th Cir. 2013). “A medical condition need not be life-threatening to be serious;
rather, it could be a condition that would result in further significant injury or unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain if not treated.” Roe v. Elyea, 631 F.3d 843, 857 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing
Gayton v. McCoy, 593 F.3d 610, 620 (7th Cir. 2010)). The parties in the present action agree that
Cooper’s knee injury constituted a serious medical need for Eighth Amendment purposes. But
they dispute whether Defendants acted with deliberate indifference.
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To show deliberate indifference, a plaintiff need not establish that he was literally
ignored. Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 2005). But he must show more than mere
negligence. Duckworth v. Ahmad, 532 F.3d 675, 679 (7th Cir. 2008); see also McGee, 721 F.3d
at 480 (“Deliberate indifference is more than negligence and approaches intentional
wrongdoing.”). To prevail, a plaintiff must show that the defendant knew of a substantial risk of
harm to an inmate and either acted or failed to act in disregard of that risk. Arnett v. Webster, 658
F.3d 742, 751 (7th Cir. 2011).
The undisputed facts preclude any conclusion that Cooper was generally denied
treatment: Cooper received prompt medical attention from Defendants on the day of the injury,
more than one referral to outside specialists, and multiple follow-up examinations and
medication prescriptions. So Cooper bases his deliberate indifference claim not on the absence of
treatment but rather on the delayed provision of the knee brace. He argues that the instruction by
Magdziarz that a brace be used and Mahone’s own decision to order a metal-free brace
established that such equipment was a necessary component of his treatment, and further that the
delay in its procurement constituted deliberate indifference to his serious medical need.
Cooper’s argument is countered, however, by the testimony offered by Defendants’
expert witness. Defendants have presented the expert opinion of Charles Bush-Joseph, a board
certified orthopedic surgeon who is familiar with sports injuries and has treated numerous
patellar dislocation injuries. (Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’ Stmt. of Material Facts ¶¶ 71-72, Dkt. No. 95.)
Bush-Joseph offered the opinion that Cooper suffered his injuries while playing basketball. (Id.
¶ 73.) He also opined that the failure to provide Cooper with a brace would not have caused his
knee to worsen and did not affect the ultimate outcome of his injury. (Id. ¶¶ 76-77.) Bush-Joseph
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further stated that there is no consensus in the orthopedic community about the value of
immobilization in treating injuries such as Cooper’s. (Id. ¶ 74.)
In response to that opinion, Cooper argues that Magdziarz, Mahone, Bush-Joseph, and
Arthur Funk, Wexford’s regional medical director, all conceded the propriety of using a knee
brace for his injury. (See Pl.’s Stmt. Additional Materials Facts ¶¶ 21-22, 27-30, 31, 36, Dkt. No.
96.) But the propriety of one treatment method does not create constitutional liability whenever a
medical professional departs from that method. “[M]edical professionals are not required to
provide ‘proper’ medical treatment to prisoners, but rather they must provide medical treatment
that reflects professional judgment, practice, or standards. There is not one ‘proper’ way to
practice medicine in a prison, but rather a range of acceptable courses based on prevailing
standards in the field.” Jackson v. Kotter, 541 F.3d 688, 697 (7th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).
The course of treatment chosen by a medical professional will therefore be accorded deference
unless no minimally competent professional would have so responded under those
circumstances. Id. at 698; see also Snipes v. DeTella, 95 F.3d 586, 592 (7th Cir. 1996) (“[T]he
Constitution is not a medical code that mandates specific medical treatment.”).
None of the medical testimony cited by Cooper in opposition to the Motion asserts that
the treatment he received was improper. Moreover, none of the evidence suggests that treatment
in the absence of a knee brace created a substantial risk of further injury or that Mahone was
aware of any such risk. Nor does any evidence indicate that the treatment Cooper received was
such a departure from accepted professional standards that it would permit an inference of
deliberate indifference. King v. Kramer, 680 F.3d 1013, 1018-19 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Estate of
Cole by Pardue v. Fromm, 94 F.3d 254, 261-62 (7th Cir. 1996)). Cooper has thus failed to offer
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evidence that would permit a reasonable jury to find in his favor on the deliberate indifference
element of his claim.
Cooper has also failed to provide evidence that would permit a jury to find that any harm
he suffered was the result of Defendants’ delayed provision of his knee brace rather than his
original injury. See Jackson v. Pollion, 733 F.3d 786, 790 (7th Cir. 2013) (“No matter how
serious a medical condition is, the sufferer from it cannot prove tortious misconduct (including
misconduct constituting a constitutional tort) as a result of failure to treat the condition without
providing evidence that the failure caused injury or a serious risk of injury.”) A plaintiff seeking
relief under the Eighth Amendment for delayed medical treatment must offer “verifying medical
evidence” that the delay, rather than his underlying injury, caused him harm. Id. (citing Williams
v. Liefer, 491 F.3d 710, 714-15 (7th Cir. 2007)).
Cooper offers testimony that the condition of his knee worsened after his brace was
removed, but in the absence of any medical evidence demonstrating the causal relationship
between the removal of the brace and his injury, such testimony must be categorized as the sort
of post hoc ergo propter hoc evidence that is routinely rejected as proof of causation. FTC v. QT,
Inc., 512 F.3d 858, 862 (7th Cir. 2008); Musabelliu v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 991, 994 (7th Cir.
2006). Without medical evidence that the delay in providing a knee brace caused him harm,
Cooper would lack proof of a necessary element of his claim even if he could support a finding
that the delay was produced by deliberate indifference.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 82) is
granted.
Entered:
Dated: September 29, 2014
__________________________
Andrea R. Wood
United States District Judge
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