Collins v. Dominguez et al

Filing 3

WRITTEN Opinion entered by the Honorable Edmond E. Chang on 10/27/2011: Plaintiff has filed a complaint without paying the filing fee or submitting an in forma pauperis application to pay the fee in installments. Within 30 days of the date of this or der, he must either prepay the $350 filing fee or submit a completed in forma pauperis application. Plaintiff's failure to comply with this order may result in dismissing the case for lack of prosecution. The clerk is directed to send to Plaintiff an in forma pauperis application and an amended complaint form. (For further details see written opinion.) Mailed notice (ma, )

Order Form (01/2005)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois
Name of Assigned Judge
or Magistrate Judge

Edmond E. Chang

CASE NUMBER

11 C 4533

CASE TITLE

Sitting Judge if Other
than Assigned Judge

DATE

October 27, 2011

Ryan Collins (M-09895) v. Correctional Officer Dominguez, et al.

DOCKET ENTRY TEXT:

Plaintiff has filed a complaint without paying the filing fee or submitting an in forma pauperis application to pay
the fee in installments. Within 30 days of the date of this order, he must either prepay the $350 filing fee or
submit a completed in forma pauperis application. Plaintiff’s failure to comply with this order may result in
dismissing the case for lack of prosecution. The clerk is directed to send to Plaintiff an in forma pauperis
application and an amended complaint form.
O

Docketing to mail notices.

[For further details see text below.]

STATEMENT
Plaintiff Ryan Collins, Stateville Correctional Center inmate #M-09895, has filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983
suit against Stateville Correctional Officers Dominguez, Ferenc, and Dunlap, as well as Stateville Warden
Harding. Plaintiff asserts that, on several occasions in the months preceding this suit, he put either his arm or leg
through the chuckhole (an opening in his cell). On one occasion, Plaintiff requested to speak to a lieutenant; on
another occasion, Plaintiff sought a plunger. After Plaintiff refused orders to retrieve his arm or leg, officers
pushed Plaintiff’s arm or leg back into this cell. Plaintiff also complains that, on another occasion, when he
refused to remove coverings from his windows, officers pushed him around his cell while handcuffed “like a rag
doll,” and denied him a meal.
Plaintiff filed his complaint without either prepaying the filing fee or submitting an in forma pauperis
application. The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) requires all inmates to pay the full filing fee (at least
eventually). 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). If Plaintiff is unable to prepay the $350 filing fee, he may submit an
application to proceed in forma pauperis and pay the filing fee in installments. If his application is granted, an
initial partial filing fee will be deducted from his trust fund account, and prison authorities will continue to make
monthly deductions to pay the remainder of the fee. See § 1915(b)(1)(A), (B). To enable the court to determine
if Plaintiff qualifies for as indigent, Plaintiff must submit with his application, “a certified copy of the trust fund
account statement (or institutional equivalent) for the prisoner for the 6-month period immediately preceding the
filing of the complaint . . . , obtained from the appropriate official of each prison at which the prisoner is or was
confined.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2). Plaintiff’s failure to pay the filing fee or submit a completed in forma
pauperis application will result in dismissal of this case. N.D. Ill. Local Rule 3.3(e). The clerk shall forward to
Plaintiff an in forma pauperis application.
(CONTINUED)
isk

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STATEMENT (continued)
Upon the Court’s preliminary review of the complaint, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, one of the alleged incidents
of excessive force does not adequately state an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim, while the second and
third are adequate. The controlling inquiry for excessive force claims is whether prison guards “maliciously and
sadistically” used force to cause harm, or instead applied force in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore
discipline. Wilkins v. Gaddy, __ U.S. __ , 130 S. Ct. 1175, 1178 (2010) (per curiam). There is no “significant
injury” requirement. Id. Here, Collins’s first alleged excessive force claim fails to state a claim. Collins admits that,
on April 30, 2011, he took his chuck hole “hostage” because of some complaint that he had (apparently concerning
phone usage), and his dissatisfaction was the basis of his refusal to keep his leg in his cell. Collins alleges that
Officer Dominguez attempted to push Collins’s leg back into the cell – but, Collins admits, he “resisted.”
Dominguez managed to get much of Collins’s leg back into the cell, but Collins still resisted and kept his foot out
of the chuck hole. At this point, Collins alleges, Dominguez “slammed the chuck []hole” door “numerous times”
against Collins’s foot “with force.” These allegations describe a good-faith use of force: Collins disobeyed a
command to retract his leg into his cell, but refused to do so. The officer initially tried pushing Collins’s leg back
into the cell, yet Collins resisted. So the officer’s initial response was the application of reasonable force, and it was
Collins who elevated the situation by continuing to resist. See DeWalt v. Carter, 224 F.3d 607, 620 (7th Cir. 2000)
(“not every push or shove by a prison guard violates a prisoner’s constitutional rights”). The slamming of the door
was the next step, and even then Dominguez used “force,” but not even enough force to actually cause Collins to
retract his foot – the force didn’t work (Collins alleges that the officer “gave up”). It is not at all clear what Collins
expected Dominguez to do after trying to push Collins’s leg back into the cell (give up at that point?) The claim
for April 30, 2011 is dismissed.
In contrast, the May 1 and May 22, 2011 allegations state a claim. Collins alleges that, on May 1, he once
again was disobeying an order (this time refusing to uncover the cell window). When Lieutenant Dunlap entered
Collins’s cell to resolve the situation, Dunlap cuffed Collins to a rail. Collins alleges that Dunlap took all of
Collins’s personal belongings, and then instructed Collins to take a step back, which he refused to do. According
to the complaint, Dunlap then swung Collins around the cell “like a rag doll,” “physically abused me while still
hand cuffed,” “ran my body and chin against the wall an[d] then slammed me on the concrete bed frame. He then
snatched me up by the handcuffs, injuring my left wrist.” Those allegations are sufficient to state a claim for
excessive force. (Collins also sufficiently alleges that Dunlap – who was the alleged user of excessive force on the
scene – denied him medical treatment, but the medical-needs allegation against Dominguez is insufficient because
there is only the conclusory allegation that Dominguez denied him medical treatment. To the extent that Collins
complains about missing a meal in connection with this incident, “[o]ne or two missed meals are not actionable
as Eighth Amendment violations.” Curiel v. Stigler, No. 06 C 6880, 2008 WL 904894, *5 (N.D. Ill. Mar.31, 2008)
(Zagel, J.)).
With regard to May 22, Collins admits once again that he took his chuck hole “hostage” (this time, because
Collins wanted a plunger). Not surprisingly, the officers used force to get Collins’s arm back through the chuck
hole, but this time – allegedly – the force used gives rise to the inference (when viewed in Collins’s favor) that its
purpose was to cause harm rather than a good-faith effort to maintain discipline. The complaint alleges that Ferenc
grabbed and twisted Collins’s arm one way, while twisting Collins’s wrist the other way, and meanwhile,
Dominguez was slamming the chuck hole door against Collins’s arm. As Collins continued to resist, Ferenc applied
even more pressure, to the point of “excruciating pain” and causing Collins’s shoulder to pop out of place (Collins
also allegedly suffered scratches on his arm). For now, taking inferences in Collins’s favor, these allegations are
sufficient to state a claim that Dominguez’s and Ferenc’s use of force was so out of proportion to the disciplinary
need that the purpose of force was to maliciously and sadistically cause harm. Collins’s denial of medical-needs
claim against these two officers, who were the alleged users of force on the scene, also survives.
Finally, Defendant Harding (the Warden of Stateville Correctional) is dismissed. There are no allegations
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STATEMENT (continued)
that Harding was personally involved in any way, whether directly or by causing the officers to injure Collins.
Collins is remind that, within 30 days of the date of this order, he must either prepay the $350 filing fee
or submit a completed in forma pauperis application. Plaintiff’s failure to comply with this order may result in
dismissing the case for lack of prosecution. The Clerk is directed to send to Plaintiff an in forma pauperis
application and an amended complaint form.

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