Williams v. Hardy et al

Filing 23

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Ronald A. Guzman on 5/15/2012. Mailed notice (cjg, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
MELVIN WILLIAMS (#A-01181),
Plaintiff,
v.
MARCUS HARDY, et al.,
Defendant.

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No. 11 C 4838
Judge Ronald A. Guzman

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff, Melvin Williams, an inmate presently incarcerated at Stateville Illinois Correctional
Center, has brought this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In his complaint,
Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants, Warden Marcus Hardy and Assistant Warden Edwards,
violated his constitutional rights by instituting a mail delivery system at Stateville Correctional
Center that results in delayed mail delivery (See Plaintiff’s complaint, pp. 4-6). Plaintiff alleges
that because of the consistent delays in receiving mail from the Stateville Correctional Center mail
room, he missed a filing deadline in the class-action lawsuit Dunn v. City of Chicago, Case No. 04
C 6804 (N.D. Ill.) (Gettleman, J.).
Presently before the Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure
to state a claim [#15]. In their motion, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s complaint is deficient
because Plaintiff does not satisfactorily plead a violation of his First Amendment Rights with respect
to delayed receipt of his mail and that Plaintiff has not sufficiently pled Defendants’ personal
involvement in the alleged constitutional violation. For the reasons stated in this order, Defendant’s
motion to dismiss is denied.
It is well established that pro se complaints are to be liberally construed. Haines v. Kerner,

404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); see also McCormick v. City of Chicago, 230 F.3d 319, 325 (7th Cir.
2000). Fact pleading is not necessary to state a claim for relief. Thompson v. Washington, 362 F.3d
969, 970-71 (7th Cir. 2004). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” in order to “‘give the defendant
fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47,
(1957)).
The allegations “must actually suggest that the plaintiff has a right to relief, by providing
allegations that raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d
1074, 1084 (7th Cir. 2008) (quotation omitted). In making this determination, the complaint is
construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accepting as true the well-pleaded allegations,
and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Tamayo, 526 F.3d at 1081.
ANALYSIS
A.

Plaintiff has Adequately Pled a First Amendment Violation.

Inmates have a First Amendment right both to send and receive mail, Rowe v. Shake, 196
F.3d 778, 782 (7th Cir. 1999), but that right does not preclude prison officials from examining mail
to ensure that it does not contain contraband, Kaufman v. McCaughtry, 419 F.3d 678, 685-86 (7th
Cir. 2005); citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 576, 94 S. Ct. 2963, 41 L. Ed. 2d 935; Rowe,
196 F.3d at 782. An inmate’s legal mail, however, is entitled to greater protections because of the
potential for interference with his right of access to the courts. Rowe, 196 F.3d at 782. U.S. at 577,
94 S.Ct. 2963; Castillo v. Cook County Mail Room Dep’t, 990 F.2d 304, 305-06 (7th Cir. 1993).
To state a right of access claim, Plaintiff must make specific allegations that as a result of the

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Defendants’ alleged conduct, he suffered prejudice such as missed court deadlines, failure to make
timely filings or dismissal of legitimate claims. Ortloff v. United States, 335 F.3d 652, 656 (7th Cir.
2003). Plaintiff must allege that he had a non-frivolous legal claim that was frustrated or impeded
by the failure of the prison officials to assist him in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal
papers and that he suffered some quantum of detriment as a result. Lehn v. Holmes, 364 F.3d 862,
868 (7th Cir. 2004).
In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges an ongoing problem with receiving his mail (for a period
of eleven years) (see Plaintiff’s complaint, p. 4). Plaintiff alleges that the ongoing problem is due
to a long policy of under-staffing the mail room and that Defendants had been repeatedly made
aware of the problem via grievances (over three thousand, according to Plaintiff Id.) and prior law
suits.
As an example of the problems Plaintiff has suffered due to the persistent problem of
delayed mail delivery, he cites a particular letter that was mailed to him on October 4, 2010, that he
did not receive until either November 24 or 26, 2010. The letter contained information relating to
the settlement of a class action suit then pending in the Northern District of Illinois, Dunn v. City
of Chicago, Case No. 04 C 6804 (N.D. Ill.) (Gettleman, J.) of which Plaintiff alleges he was a
member of the class. Plaintiff further alleges that because he did not receive the correspondence in
a timely fashion, he missed the deadline of November 1, 2010, to submit his settlement claim form.
Read liberally, Plaintiff seems to plead that the delay was deliberate to prevent him from collecting
his Dunn settlement award of between four and eighty-five hundred dollars.
The Court finds that under Ortloff and Lehn Plaintiff has alleged sufficient delay and
detriment in his pursuit of non-frivolous legal claims. Unlike in Rowe, wherein short term, sporadic

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and non-content based delays failed to state a cause of action, see Rowe, 196 F.3d at 782, Plaintiff
alleges that the problem was long term and pervasive, that Defendants had been notified so many
times about the problem and did nothing to rectify it, and he believes that in the particular case of
the letter regarding his settlement in Dunn, the delay was content based: deliberately delayed to
prevent him from collecting his settlement award. Taken collectively, the Court cannot state at this
point in the litigation, that Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights were not violated. Accordingly,
Plaintiff has stated a valid claim for violation of his First Amendment rights, and Defendants’
motion is denied.
B.

Plaintiff has Adequately Pled Personal Involvement

Plaintiff’s complaint does not indicate whether he is suing Defendants Hardy and Edwards
individually and/or in their official capacities. Liability under the Civil Rights Act for an individual
capacity claim requires a defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation.
See Palmer v. Marion County, 327 F.3d 588, 594 (7th Cir. 2003). Section 1983 creates a cause of
action based on personal liability and predicated upon fault; thus, “to be liable under § 1983, an
individual defendant must have caused or participated in a constitutional deprivation.” Pepper v.
Village of Oak Park, 430 F.3d 809, 810 (7th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). Although direct
participation is not required, there must be at least a showing that the individual acquiesced in some
demonstrable manner in the alleged constitutional violation. See Palmer, 327 F.3d at 594.
To be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, supervisors “must know about the conduct and
facilitate it, approve it, condone it, or turn a blind eye for fear of what they might see. They must
in other words act either knowingly or with deliberate, reckless indifference.” Chavez v. Illinois
State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 651 (7th Cir. 2001). Here, Plaintiff has alleged a long-standing issue

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with the delay of mail delivery at Stateville Correctional Center over a period of at least eleven
years, and that Defendants have received notice of the problem via in excess of three thousand
grievances. (See Plaintiff’s complaint, p. 4.) Plaintiff further pleads that Defendants have responded
to the grievances in a manner that indicates that they acknowledge that the problem exists, but that
they have taken no steps to fix the problem. Id. at p. 4-5. Plaintiff finally pleads that he suffered
damages because of the mail delay. Id. at p. 6. Drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s
favor, this allegation supports an inference that Defendants knew of the problems in the mail room
and turned a blind eye to the problem. Accordingly, Plaintiff state a cause of action against
Defendants Hardy and Edwards in their individual capacities.
Claims filed against government officers in their official capacity are actually claims against
the government entity for which the officers work. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167
(1985); Guzman v. Sheahan, 495 F.3d 852, 859 (7th Cir. 2007). A governmental entity is liable for
damages under Section 1983 only if the plaintiff can show that the alleged constitutional deprivation
occurred as a result of an official policy, custom, or practice. See Monell v. Department of Social
Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978). Unconstitutional policies or customs generally take three forms:
(1) an express policy that, when enforced, causes a constitutional deprivation; (2) a widespread
practice that, although not authorized by written law or express municipal policy, is so permanent
and well settled as to constitute a usage or custom with the force of law; or (3) a constitutional injury
was caused by a person with final policy-making authority. Brokaw v. Mercer County, 235 F.3d
1000, 1013 (7th Cir.2000). Under the facts pled, Plaintiff has also stated an official capacity claim
against administrators Hardy and Edwards.

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C. Unserved John Doe Defendant
The Court notes that Plaintiff named a John Doe, the mail room supervisor, as a Defendant
in his complaint. To date, the docket reflects no effort on behalf of Plaintiff to identify the John Doe
Defendant. Plaintiff is again cautioned that there is a two-year statute of limitations for civil rights
actions and that in this circuit, a plaintiff cannot invoke the relation back principles of Rule 15(c)
to replace John Doe defendants with named defendants after the statute of limitations has expired.
See Worthington v. Wilson, 8 F.3d 1253, 1256-57 (7th Cir. 1993); see also Wood v. Worachek, 618
F.2d 1225, 1230 (7th Cir. 1980). Plaintiff should therefore attempt to identify the John Doe as soon
as possible. Plaintiff should serve on Defendants as soon as is practicable, interrogatories pursuant
to FED. R. CIV. P. 33, calculated to determine the identity of the John Doe mail room supervisor.
Once Plaintiff has identified the John Doe Defendant, he can seek leave to amend his complaint to
name the Defendant. Failure to do so may result in dismissal of this Defendant.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion to dismiss [#15] is denied. Defendants Hardy
and Edwards are given 30 days to answer Plaintiff’s complaint, or to otherwise plead. This matter
is set for a status hearing on June 26, 2012 at 10:15 a.m.

Dated: May 15, 2012
_______________________________
Ronald A. Guzman
United States District Court Judge

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