Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Health and Welfare Fund et al v. Lewis et al

Filing 43

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 5/15/2012:Mailed notice(mad, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

CENTRAL STATES, SOUTHEAST AND
SOUTHWEST AREAS HEALTH AND
WELFARE FUND, an Employee Welfare
Benefit Plan, by Howard McDougall, a Trustee
thereof, in his representative capacity,
Plaintiff,
vs.
BEVERLY LEWIS and DAVID T.
LASHGARI, ESQ.,
Defendants.

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No. 11 CV 4845
Judge Joan H. Lefkow

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Health and Welfare Fund (“Central
States”), through one of its trustees in his representative capacity, filed a two count complaint
under § 502(a)(3) of the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”),
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3), seeking an equitable lien and constructive trust (Count I) and a
subrogation lien and constructive trust (Count II) on funds held by Beverly Lewis and her lawyer
David T. Lashgari (“defendants”). Central States alleges that Lewis received a settlement
payment from an automobile accident and that she failed to reimburse Central States for medical
payments that it made on her behalf. Lashgari represented Lewis in the lawsuit related to her
accident. Before the court is Central States’s motion for a preliminary injunction under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 65 enjoining Lewis and Lashgari from disposing of a portion the

settlement fund, specifically $180,033.46, until the claims in this case have been fully litigated.
For the reasons set forth herein, Central States’s motion [#27] will be granted.
BACKGROUND
From the documents submitted,1 the court ascertains the following facts, disputed where
indicated. Central States is an ERISA regulated employee welfare benefit plan under 29 U.S.C.
§ 1002(1). Lewis was a “covered participant” of Central States’s through her husband Michael’s
participation in Central States’s welfare benefit plan under a collective bargaining agreement.
As a covered participant, Lewis was subject to the terms, conditions and limitations upon
payment of benefits, including Central States’s right to full reimbursement, immediate
subrogation, and first lien rights as to any recovery against a third party related to an incident
giving rise to payment under the plan.
Lewis was injured in an automobile accident on October 8, 20082 while riding in a
vehicle driven by Joseph Hanson, her son-in-law. The vehicle was owned by Hanson’s
employer, L.E. Schwartz & Son, Inc. (“Schwartz & Son”), and the accident allegedly occurred
while Hanson was within the scope of his employment. Central States’s plan covered medical

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Central States offers only limited evidence in support of its motion, including (1) the affidavit
of Albert E. Nelson, the Benefit Services Director for Central States’s Health and Welfare and Pension
Funds (Pl.’s Mot. Prelim. Inj. Ex. A); (2) a summary of the accident-related benefits paid by Central
States on Lewis’s behalf (Pl.’s Mot. Prelim. Inj. Ex. A1), which Lewis disputes (Defs.’ Resp. Ex. D;
Lewis Aff. ¶¶ 4–5); and (3) a copy of Central States’s Health and Welfare Fund Plan Document (Pl.’s
Mot. Prelim. Inj. Ex. B). Defendants submitted the following evidence (1) a copy of Lewis’s Bibb
County, Georgia complaint naming Joseph Hanson and his employer, L.E. Schwartz & Son, Inc., as
defendants (Defs.’ Resp. Ex. A); (2) a copy of Hanson and L.E. Schwartz & Son, Inc.’s motion for
summary judgment (Defs.’ Resp. Ex. B); (3) a voluntary dismissal notice for the Bibb County, Georgia
action (Defs.’ Resp. Ex. C); and (4) allegations in the affidavit of Beverly Lewis (Defs.’ Resp. Ex. D).
The facts are taken from these documents and not from the complaint, which is unverified.
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Nelson’s affidavit states that the date of the accident was October 8, 2009, but documents
submitted by defendants indicate otherwise. (See Lewis Aff. ¶ 5; Defs.’ Resp. Ex. A ¶ 7.)

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expenses for Lewis as Michael’s dependent, resulting in payment of $108,003.46 from
October 8, 2008 through April 5, 2011 on Lewis’s behalf. A year after the accident, Lewis and
her husband, by their lawyer, David T. Lashgari, filed a lawsuit in Bibb County, Georgia, Civil
Action No. 73321, against Hanson and his employer, Schwartz & Son, to recover damages
related to the accident. (Defs.’ Resp. Ex. A.)
The complaint alleged several counts of negligence against Hanson and Schwartz &
Son,3 and loss of consortium as to Lewis’s husband. Two additional counts alleged other claims
against Hanson and Schwartz & Son. Count II claimed intentional infliction of emotional
distress based on allegations that Hanson, after the accident, deliberately and maliciously
prevented Lewis’s grandchildren from visiting their severely injured grandmother, caused his
wife and children to cut off all contact with Lewis, failed to apologize to her, and began to
ridicule her to others. Count III claimed invasion of privacy alleging that Schwartz & Son,
through Hanson, wrongly obtained and disseminated private medical information belonging to
Lewis. (Defs.’ Resp. Ex. A.) On May 4, 2011, after a motion for summary judgment was filed,
the Lewises voluntarily dismissed their complaint without prejudice. (Id. Ex. B & C.) Shortly
thereafter, a settlement occurred. Lewis settled her claims for $500,000, but, according to Lewis,
the settlement related only to Hanson’s post-accident conduct. (Answer ¶ 9, Lewis Aff. ¶ 6.)
Lashgari states that he disbursed to Lewis an unspecified amount from the settlement fund on
June 15, 2011. (Presumably, he paid himself an attorney’s fee first). Central States filed the
present lawsuit on July 19, 2011.

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Schwartz & Son was accused of negligent entrustment of the vehicle; negligent hiring, training,
supervision and retention of Hanson; and respondeat superior liability for Hanson’s negligence.

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LEGAL STANDARD
A party seeking a preliminary injunction must demonstrate that (1) its claim has some
likelihood of success on the merits; (2) traditional legal remedies would be inadequate; and (3)
absent injunctive relief, it will suffer irreparable harm in the period prior to final resolution of its
claim. Girl Scouts of Manitou Council v. Girl Scouts of the U.S. of Am., Inc., 549 F.3d 1079,
1086 (7th Cir. 2008). If the moving party satisfies these threshold requirements, the court must
balance the threatened injury to the moving party with the threatened harm the injunction may
inflict on the nonmovant. Id. The court also must consider the public interest in either the grant
or denial of the injunctive relief. Id. In applying these criteria, the court uses a “sliding scale”
approach: if a claim is very likely to succeed on the merits, less harm to the plaintiff will be
required to justify injunctive relief and vice versa. Abbott Labs. v. Mead Johnson & Co.,
971 F.2d 6, 12 (7th Cir. 1992).
ANALYSIS
I.

Whether Central States is Seeking “Equitable Relief” under § 502(a)(3)
ERISA § 502(a)(3) authorizes a civil action “by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary

(A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this subchapter or the terms of
the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to
enforce any provisions of this subchapter or the terms of the plan.” 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3). The
parties do not dispute that Central States, through one of its trustees, is authorized to bring the
present action. Section 502(a)(3)(B) of ERISA, however, allows only equitable relief, and to
succeed on the merits of its claims Central States must show that the relief it seeks is equitable.
If it is not, the case does not arise under federal law and the court lacks subject matter

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jurisdiction to consider Central States’s claims. See Varco v. Admin. Comm. of the Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. Assocs.’ Health & Welfare Plan, 338 F.3d 680, 686–688 (7th Cir. 2003).
In Great-West Life Annuity Insurance Company v. Knudson, the United States Supreme
Court held that § 502(a)(3) does not authorize a legal claim against a plan beneficiary where the
settlement fund had already been distributed to a Special Needs Trust and were not in the
possession of the beneficiary. 534 U.S. 204, 214, 122 S. Ct. 708, 151 L. Ed. 2d 635 (2002). The
Court distinguished between restitution at law and restitution at equity and concluded that
equitable relief under § 502(a)(3) was unavailable because Great-West was not claiming
“particular funds that, in good conscience, belong to petitioners, but that petitioners are
contractually entitled to some funds for the benefits that they conferred.” Id. at 214. Relief was
therefore unavailable to Great-West under § 502(a)(3). Id. at 220.
In Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Medical Services, Inc., the Supreme Court clarified Knudson,
holding that where an ERISA plan creates an “equitable lien by agreement” a plan fiduciary may
seek equitable relief under § 502(a)(3). 547 U.S. 356, 364–65, 126 S. Ct. 1869, 164 L. Ed. 2d
612 (2006). The plan in Sereboff included an “Act of Third Parties” provision, which required
beneficiaries to reimburse the plan from “[a]ll recoveries from a third party (whether by lawsuit,
settlement or otherwise),” and applied when a beneficiary received benefits due to an illness or
injury resulting from “the act or omission of another person or party.” Id. at 359. The Sereboffs
were involved in an automobile accident and subsequently settled their claims against several
third parties. Mid Atlantic filed a § 502(a)(3) action seeking to recover medical expenses
incurred by the plan on the Sereboffs’ behalf from the settlement fund. Id. at 360. The
Sereboffs’ lawyer had already distributed the settlement proceeds before Mid Atlantic filed suit,

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but the parties agreed to preserve a portion of the fund in an investment account pending the
resolution of the lawsuit. The Court concluded that Mid Atlantic could proceed with its
§ 502(a)(3) claim, noting that “the impediment to characterizing the relief in Knudson as
equitable [was] not present here” because the fund sought by Mid Atlantic was “specifically
identifiable” and “within the possession and control of the Sereboffs.” Id. at 363. The Court
affirmed that Mid Atlantic properly sought “equitable relief” under § 502(a)(3). Id. at 369.
Relying on the Court’s holding in Sereboff, the Seventh Circuit in Gutta v. Standard
Select Trust Insurance Plans affirmed summary judgment in favor of a plan which sought
restitution under § 502(a)(3) where the beneficiary had already dissipated and commingled the
disputed funds. 530 F.3d 614, 621 (7th Cir. 2008). Standard Select sought to recover long-term
disability benefits erroneously paid to Gutta over the course of three years. Id. at 616–17. Gutta
argued that because it was impossible to trace the benefits paid to him by Standard Select,
equitable relief was unavailable under § 502(a)(3). Id. at 620. In rejecting this argument, the
court noted that, as in Sereboff, the plan created an equitable lien by agreement between Gutta
and Standard Select, and that lien was not dependent on the ability to trace particular funds. Id.
at 621. The court concluded that Standard Select could bring its action under § 502(a)(3) “even
if the benefits it paid Gutta are not specifically traceable to Gutta’s current assets because of
commingling or dissipation” of the funds. Id.
Here, the relief Central States seeks is equitable as to Lewis. Defendants do not dispute
that Lewis was a covered individual under the plan and is thus required to reimburse Central
States for “the full amount of the Fund’s Subrogation Rights before [she] receives any Proceeds
in full or partial satisfaction of . . . her Loss Recovery Rights.” (Compl. Ex. A § 11.14(d).) The

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plan defines Loss Recovery Rights to include “all rights based upon . . . [a]ny act or omission by
any person or entity” or “[a]ny policy, contract, plan or other document creating responsibility
for any insurance, indemnity or reimbursement.” (Id. § 11.14(a)(1).) Similar to the language
considered in Sereboff and Gutta, these provisions are sufficient to create an equitable lien by
agreement between Lewis and Central States, which is not dependent on the ability to strictly
trace the settlement fund. As such, the relief sought by Central States as to Lewis is “equitable”
under § 502(a)(3).
The applicability of § 502(a)(3) to Lashgari, however, is not settled in case law. As
Lewis’s lawyer, Lashgari was not a party to the agreement between Lewis and the plan. Under
Harris Trust & Savings Bank v. Salomon Smith Barney Inc., 530 U.S. 238, 249–50, 120 S. Ct.
2180, 147 L. Ed. 2d 187 (2000), however, a plan may seek equitable relief against a nonfiduciary party in interest for engaging in a prohibited transaction under § 406(a), even though
this section, by its terms, only expressly applies to fiduciaries. In so holding, the Court
considered the statutory construction of ERISA and noted that Ҥ 502(a)(3) makes no mention at
all of which parties may be proper defendants–the focus, instead, is on redressing the ‘act or
practice which violates any provision of [ERISA Title I].’” Id. at 246 (quoting 29 U.S.C.
§ 1132(a)(3)). The Court concluded that liability under § 502(a)(3) does not hinge on whether a
particular defendant labors under a duty expressly imposed by the substantive provisions of
ERISA. Id. at 249.4
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This decision may impact the Seventh Circuit’s holding in Trustees of the Central States,
Southeast and Southwest Areas Health and Welfare Fund v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Company, 17 F.3d 1081, 1084 (7th Cir. 1994), where the court ruled that an insurer was not bound to
recognize a plan’s subrogation rights as part of a settlement on behalf of its insured because it was not a
party to the plan. Harris Trust suggests that a non-party such as State Farm may be held liable under
§
502(a)(3) if it engages in an act or practice that violates ERISA.

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Other courts have relied on the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Harris Trust to conclude
that a plan may maintain a § 502(a)(3) action against an attorney who holds a settlement fund
belonging to the plan. For example, in Longaberger Company v. Kolt, the Sixth Circuit held that
a plan sought appropriate equitable relief within the meaning of § 502(a)(3)(B) when it sought to
recover plan funds from a beneficiary’s attorney who was neither a fiduciary nor a beneficiary of
the plan. 586 F.3d 459, 468 (6th Cir. 2009). In Longaberger, the defendant attorney secured
two settlements on behalf of a plan beneficiary after her son was involved in an automobile
accident. Id. at 462. The attorney disbursed the settlement fund and retained a portion of the
money to satisfy his fee. The plan sought to recover medical expenses it had incurred on behalf
of the son through the use of a constructive trust and reimbursement lien on the settlement fund
held by the attorney. Id. at 463–464. Relying on Harris Trust, the Sixth Circuit held that “there
is no statutory barrier that prevents [the attorney] from being a defendant in a suit brought
pursuant to § 502(a)(3) of ERISA, provided that the relief sought lies in equity.” Id. at 468. In
concluding that the relief sought by the plan was indeed equitable, the court explained that the
plan
properly identified a specific fund (i.e., that portion of the settlement funds equaling
the amount [the plan] paid to cover [the son’s] medical expenses) that was in the
possession and legal control of [the attorney], but belonged in good conscience to the
Plan. The fact that [the attorney] chose to disregard [the plan’s] first priority lien and
commingle the settlement funds does not defeat [the plan’s] claim for equitable
relief, because under Sereboff, [the plan] was free to follow a portion of the
settlement funds into [the attorney’s] hands.
Id. at 469. Thus, the court concluded, “the Plan sought and was awarded ‘appropriate equitable
relief’” within the meaning of § 502(a)(3). Id.; see also Comm. for Wal–Mart Stores, Inc.
Assocs. Health & Welfare Plan v. Horton, 513 F.3d 1223, 1229 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding that a

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plan could use § 502(a)(3) to recover settlement proceeds in the possession of a third party,
stating that “the most important consideration is not the identity of the defendant, but rather that
the settlement proceeds are still intact”); Bombardier Aerospace Empl. Welfare Benefits Plan v.
Ferrer, Poirot & Wansbrough, 354 F.3d 348, 350 (5th Cir. 2003) (stating that “the Supreme
Court’s reasoning in Harris Trust influences us to conclude today that § 502(a)(3) authorizes a
cause of action against a non-fiduciary, non-‘party in interest’ attorney-at-law when he holds
disputed settlement funds on behalf of a plan-participant client who is a traditional ERISA
party”); Anderson v. Dergance, No. 08 C 2522, 2009 WL 1702820, at *3 (N.D. Ill. June 18,
2009) (granting equitable relief to a plaintiff plan against a beneficiary and his attorney where
attorney held a portion of beneficiary’s settlement fund in a trust account); but see Crawford &
Co. Med. Benefit Trust v. Repp, No. 11 C 50155, 2012 WL 716921, at *3–4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 6,
2012) (dismissing § 502(a)(3) claim against lawyer where plaintiff failed to plausibly state that
lawyer was in possession of identifiable, non-dissipated funds that were still in his control).
The reasoning of Longaberger is persuasive. Moreover, Gutta, decided in the light of
Harris Trust, ruled that relief was equitable even if the benefits the plan paid to the covered
individual were not specifically traceable to that individual’s current assets because of
commingling or dissipation of the fund. Thus, the funds belonging to the covered individual
could be traced into the attorney’s hands. Indeed, Lashgari had control of Lewis’s money and
chose to pay himself and not to pay Central States. Although payments he may have made to
others (such as for costs and expenses related to preparing the case) are beyond the reach of
equity under Knudson, the portion of the settlement fund that he, acting on behalf of Lewis, paid
himself is not, even if one assumes that the amount Lashgari received has been commingled, a

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fact yet undetermined. The remedy is equitable “because it is indistinguishable from an action to
enforce an equitable lien established by agreement[.]” Sereboff, 547 U.S. at 368.
Although the Seventh Circuit has yet to decide whether, in light of Harris Trust,
§ 502(a)(3) allows a plan to recover funds from a beneficiary’s attorney, Gutta implies that it
would agree with its sister circuits.5 For these reasons, this court concludes that the relief sought
by Central States as to Lashgari is equitable under § 502(a)(3).6
II.

Likelihood of Success on the Merits
To prevail on its motion for injunctive relief, Central States must show some likelihood

of success on the merits. This is a low threshold, requiring only that Central States’s chance of
prevailing is “better than negligible.” Meridian Mut. Ins. Co. v. Meridian Ins. Grp., 128 F.3d
1111, 1114 (7th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted). Central States argues that it is likely to succeed
on the merits of its claims because the plan vests it with subrogation and reimbursement rights to
all present and future rights of recovery that a covered individual, like Lewis, and her attorney
may have. (Compl. Ex. A § 11.14(a).) As such, argues Central States, it is entitled to full
reimbursement for the medical expenses it incurred on Lewis’s behalf from the settlement she
received in her Georgia lawsuit. (Id. § 11.14(d).)

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Crawford & Company Medical Benefit Trust v. Repp, No. 11 C 50155, 2012 WL 716921 (N.D.
Ill. March 6, 2012), reached the conclusion that, Gutta notwithstanding, Varco requires a plan to plead
and prove the following when it brings a claim against a party other than a plan participant: “(1) that the
funds in that person’s possession are identifiable, (2) not dissipated, and (3) in some manner still in the
control of the plan participant.” Id. at *3. This court believes that Lashgari’s identity as Lewis’s lawyer
at the time he received the settlement fund and his exercise of control over the fund places him, as well as
Lewis, in the position of a trustee.
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Jurisdiction is therefore proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question) and 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1132(a)(3) & (e)(1) (ERISA). Venue is proper under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(2) because this is an action
brought under Title I of ERISA in the district court where the plan is administered, Rosemont, Illinois.

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Defendants counter that Central States’s § 502(a)(3) claims must fail because (1) there
was no liability proven for the car accident on October 8, 2008; (2) the funds received by
defendants were for the post-accident tortious conduct of Hanson; and (3) the settlement fund
was disbursed on June 15, 2011. The first argument is unverified and may be disregarded by the
court as such. See 11A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure Civil § 2949
(2d ed.) (“Evidence that goes beyond the unverified allegations of the pleadings and motion
papers must be presented to support or oppose a motion for a preliminary injunction.”); Eyler v.
Babcox, 582 F. Supp. 981, 986 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (declining to issue a preliminary injunction
where the plaintiff’s allegations were “neither contained in a verified pleading nor supported by
affidavit.”). Defendants have not attached a copy of the settlement, nor have they submitted any
documents verifying the terms of the agreement. The scope of the Georgia defendants’ liability,
if any, is unclear from the record.
In support of their second argument, defendants rely solely on the affidavit of Lewis, who
states that she settled her claims against Hanson for his post-accident conduct for $500,000.
(Lewis Aff. ¶ 6.) It is undisputed that a substantial settlement occurred shortly after defendants
voluntarily dismissed the Georgia lawsuit, which was pending for several years. Lewis’s
implication, however, that the Georgia defendants (or their insurance carriers) agreed to pay
anything, much less $500,000, to compensate her for Hanson’s conduct in refusing to let his wife
and children see her during her recovery period is so unlikely that it deserves no weight.
Moreover, with Schwartz & Son’s statement under oath in the Georgia litigation that it did not
violate Lewis’s right of privacy, see Defs.’ Resp. Ex. B, Kruger Aff. ¶ 5, a statement by which
defendants here would be bound, it is equally doubtful that damages would have been paid on

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that claim, particularly where Hanson and Schwartz & Son would have had a right to access
Lewis’s medical records because of her claims in the Georgia lawsuit. As such, the court
declines to consider Lewis’s self-serving statement that the settlement fund relates only to her
post-accident claims. See generally 43A John Bourdeau et al., Corpus Juris Secundum
Injunctions § 329 (updated Mar. 2012) (“The acceptance or rejection of affidavits ordinarily is a
matter within the sound discretion of the trial court.”). Finally, Gutta affirmatively forecloses
defendants’ third argument because Central States may seek equitable relief under § 502(a)(3)
regardless of whether the settlement proceeds are traceable to a specific asset. See Gutta,
530 F.3d at 621. The court therefore concludes that Central States has demonstrated a likelihood
of success on the merits of its claims.
III.

Irreparable Harm and No Adequate Remedy at Law
Central States next must show that traditional legal remedies are inadequate, and absent

injunctive relief it will suffer irreparable harm in the period prior to final resolution of its claims.
Central States argues that traditional legal remedies are inadequate because it may only seek
equitable relief under § 502(a)(3), and absent injunctive relief from this court, it will be
foreclosed from seeking such relief. Defendants note that Central States waited more than six
months after the settlement fund was disbursed before seeking relief, inferring that the harm is
not irreparable or else Central States would have promptly sought such relief. The court agrees
that Central States does not adequately explain the reason for its delay, but defendants cite no
authority for the position that such a delay extinguishes Central States’s right to injunctive
relief.7 Moreover, given that Lashgari distributed the settlement fund to Lewis (and presumably

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In fact, defendants cite no legal authority for any of the positions in their brief.

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himself), the risk of irreparable harm to Central States is increased because defendants may be
inclined to place the funds in the hands of others, who could not be called upon to restore the
fund. As such, the court concludes that these factors favor imposing Central States’s requested
relief.
IV.

Balance of the Harms
Finally, the court must balance the threatened injury to Central States with the threatened

harm the injunction may inflict on defendants. The court also must consider the public interest
in either the grant or denial of the injunctive relief. Here, the threatened injury to Central States
is great. It has paid $180,003.46 in covered medical expenses on behalf of Lewis, and has yet to
recover one cent despite a $500,000 settlement payment to defendants. Central States’s delay in
asserting its right does not defeat the public interest in maintaining the financial soundness of the
plan. Central States depends on beneficiaries such as Lewis to honor their contractual
obligations in order to maintain the solvency of its benefit funds for other covered participants.
It also relies on attorneys such as Lashgari to ensure that their clients fulfill obligations that arise
from their participation in the plan. Defendants do not dispute that they received notice from
Central States of its subrogation rights, which they have thus far refused to honor. As such, the
court believes that the fair result is to grant Central States’s motion for a preliminary injunction,
enjoining Lewis and Lashgari from dissipating $108,033.468 until Central States’s § 502(a)(3)
rights are fully litigated or until the parties’ reach a settlement agreement in this case.

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Lewis does not rebut the itemized charges submitted by Central States as payments related to
the accident other than to generally assert that another (pre-existing) medical problem was the basis for a
portion of the charges. (Lewis Aff. ¶¶ 4–5.) Because this rebuttal evidence is extraordinarily
implausible, the court concludes that Central States has established some likelihood of success on the
merits of its entire claim.

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CONCLUSION AND ORDER
Central States’s motion for preliminary injunction [# 27] is granted. Defendants are
hereby directed as follows:
1.

Defendants Lewis and Lashgari, jointly and severally, and all those acting in concert or
participation with them, are hereby ordered to restore to the settlement fund the amount
of $180,033.46, which is equal to that portion of the fund received under the terms of the
settlement of any and all claims contained in the Lewises’ Bibb County, Georgia
complaint, Civil Action No. 73321, filed October 8, 2009;

2.

The fund shall be placed in a client trust fund account maintained by Lashgari
pending disposition of this litigation; and

3.

Central States shall post a bond in the amount of $90,000 in the registry of this court as
provided in this court’s Local Rule 65.1(b).
ENTERED:

Dated: May 15, 2012

____________________________________
JOAN HUMPHREY LEFKOW
Judge, United States District Court

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