Jones v. Regional Transportation Authority

Filing 34

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Edmond E. Chang on 7/16/2012:Mailed notice(slb, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
CHRISTINE MARY JONES,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
v.
REGIONAL TRANSPORTATION
AUTHORITY, and
LILLIAN G. WALLACE, in her official
capacity,
Defendants.

No. 11 C 04924
Judge Edmond E. Chang

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Christine Mary Jones alleges that the Regional Transportation
Authority and Lillian G. Wallace, in her official capacity, discriminated against her in
violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12143, and the
Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794.1 Jones also brings a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Defendants move to dismiss [R. 20] all claims in Jones’ first amended complaint [R. 19]
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For the reasons explained more
fully below, Defendants’ motion is granted, but Jones may file an amended complaint
by July 30, 2012.
I.
In evaluating a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept as true the complaint’s
factual allegations. Christine Mary Jones is a resident of Oak Park, Illinois. R. 19 (Am.

1

This Court has subject matter jurisdiction in this federal-question case under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1331.

Compl.) ¶ 5. She has a psychological impairment that substantially limits her in “the
major life activity of caring for herself,” particularly in her ability to independently
locate and use public transportation, to comprehend public transportation schedules
and fixed routes, and to travel to a boarding location or from a disembarking location.
Id.
Defendant Regional Transportation Authority is a public entity that receives
federal funding and operates a fixed-route bus service throughout Cook, DuPage, Kane,
Lake, McHenry, and Will counties. Id. ¶ 6. The RTA is responsible for the financial
oversight of the region’s three public transit operators: the Chicago Transit Authority,
the Metra commuter rail, and the Pace Suburban Bus Service. Id.; see also R. 22-1
(Defs.’ Exh. 1) at 1. The RTA also operates a paratransit system for people with
disabilities pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act. Id. The RTA oversees the
eligibility determination process for paratransit services. Id. ¶¶ 7, 8.
In May 2010, Jones applied for paratransit services. Id. ¶ 7. The RTA decided
Jones was not eligible. Id. ¶ 8. Jones appealed the decision within the agency’s internal
review system, see 70 ILCS 3615/2.30(c)(9), but her appeal was denied. Id. ¶ 9. Jones
now alleges that the RTA’s denial of paratransit services violates the ADA and the
Rehabilitation Act. Jones also claims that although she is qualified to receive
paratransit services, the RTA has “implemented a policy and practice” that denies her
services, and she tries to bring this claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. ¶¶ 12, 21.

2

II.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a complaint generally need only
include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This short and plain statement must “give the
defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell
Atl. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quotation and citation omitted). The
Seventh Circuit has explained that this rule “reflects a liberal notice pleading regime,
which is intended to ‘focus litigation on the merits of a claim’ rather than on
technicalities that might keep plaintiffs out of court.” Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 580
(7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002)).
“A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the complaint to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted.” Hallinan v. Fraternal Order of Police of
Chicago Lodge No. 7, 570 F.3d 811, 820 (7th Cir. 2009). “[W]hen ruling on a defendant’s
motion to dismiss, a judge must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained
in the complaint.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 555-56); McGowan v. Hulick, 612 F.3d 636, 637 (7th Cir. 2010) (courts accept factual
allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in plaintiff’s favor). “[A]
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). These allegations “must be enough to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The allegations that are

3

entitled to the assumption of truth are those that are factual, rather than mere legal
conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79.
III.
Jones’ complaint must be dismissed in its entirety. First, although the Court
agrees with Jones that there does exist a private right of action under Title II of the
ADA, the allegations in the amended complaint are insufficient, as a matter of law, to
state a claim of disability discrimination. Second, Jones cannot rely on § 1983 as a
procedural vehicle for remedying a violation of a statutory right covered by Title II of
the ADA. Finally, even if Jones could rely on § 1983 to bring a claim against
Defendants, the complaint inadequately alleges a basis for municipal liability against
the Regional Transportation Authority and is completely devoid of any allegations as
to Defendant Wallace in her official capacity as an agent of the RTA.
A.
As explained below, on the threshold matter of the cause of action’s existence,
the Court holds that there does exist a private right of action to enforce Title II of the
ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12143(a).2 But whether a federal private right of action exists is a
separate matter from whether Jones has sufficiently pled her claims. Here, Jones’
amended complaint inadequately alleges a case of discrimination under the ADA.

2

The portion of the implementing regulations, 49 C.F.R. § 37.123(e)(1), cited by Jones
is identical to 42 U.S.C. § 12143(c). Since a private right of action exists under the statute,
there is no need to rely on the regulations for an identical private right of action.

4

1.
The ADA “forbids discrimination against persons with disabilities in three major
areas of public life: employment, which is covered by Title I of the statute; public
services, programs, and activities, which are the subject of Title II; and public
accommodations, which are covered by Title III.” Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 51617 (2004). Generally speaking, public transportation is among the public services
covered by Title II’s non-discrimination provision. In particular, 42 U.S.C. § 12143
defines discrimination to include the failure to provide disabled individuals with
paratransit services that are comparable to those received by non-disabled persons:
It shall be considered discrimination for purposes of section 12132 of [Title 42]
and section 794 of Title 29 for a public entity which operates a fixed route
system . . . to fail to provide with respect to the operations of its fixed route
system, in accordance with this section, paratransit and other special
transportation services to individuals with disabilities . . . that are sufficient to
provide to such individuals a level of service (1) which is comparable to the level
of designated public transportation services provided to individuals without
disabilities using such system . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 12143(a). The category of eligible individuals includes: “any individual with
a disability who has a specific impairment-related condition which prevents such
individual from traveling to a boarding location or from a disembarking location on
such system[.]” Id. § 12143(c)(1)(A)(iii).
On the question of how Title II may be enforced, the RTA argues that no private
right of action exists, that is, an individual plaintiff may not bring suit to enforce Title
II. To answer the question, the starting point is 42 U.S.C. § 12133, which is the
statutory section within Title II entitled, “Enforcement.” Section 12133 directs that the
5

“remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in section 794a of Title 29,” which is the
enforcement provision of the Rehabilitation Act, applies to Title II discrimination. 42
U.S.C. § 12133 (applying Rehabilitation Act enforcement to Title II discrimination
under 42 U.S.C. § 12132). But the Rehabilitation Act is not the final destination of the
inquiry, because the Rehabilitation Act adopts (as pertinent to enforcement outside of
the employment context) the “remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.” 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(2) (referring to Title VI, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000d et seq.). Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 bars recipients of federal
financial assistance from discriminating on the basis of race, color, or national origin
in covered programs and activities. And there is a private right of action to enforce
Title VI’s statutory provisions. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 280 (2001)
(explaining that private right of action exists to enforce Title VI’s statutory provisions,
but not to enforce regulations that go beyond statutory ban on intentional
discrimination). So to complete the chain of references: there is a private right of action
to enforce Title II’s statutory non-discrimination provisions, see Barnes v. Gorman, 536
U.S. 181, 185 (2002) (using same chain of references based on § 12132, § 12133, the
Rehabilitation Act, and Title VI), and an eligible individual may have a private right
of action to enforce § 12143’s paratransit provision, see Abrahams v. MTA Long Island
Bus, 644 F.3d 110, 118 (2d Cir. 2011) (§ 12143 enforceable through § 12132).3

3

Although the case will be moving forward if Jones files a sufficient amended complaint,
it is not yet clear what, if any, administrative law principles might apply to the RTA’s decision.
Perhaps none will apply because § 12143 does not seem to refer to deference to the
administrative agency (nor does it mention other typical administrative-law principles, such

6

Defendants offer a second line of defense: even if there is a private right of
action, Defendants contend that the action has a limited scope. Specifically, Defendants
argue that, at most, only system-wide failures to provide paratransit services can form
the basis of a lawsuit: as Defendants put it, “discrimination in violation of the ADA
only occurs if a public entity that operates a fixed-route system does not provide a
paratransit service that is (1) comparable to fixed-route service, or (2) in accordance
with the plan for paratransit service submitted to the Secretary.” R. 22 (Defs.’ Br.) at
5 (citing § 12143(c)(1)(A)(i), (iii)). In essence, Defendants argue that so long as the RTA
operates a paratransit service, the RTA meets the ADA requirements under
§ 12143—even if the RTA does not actually provide paratransit service to those who
are truly eligible.
But this interpretation of the non-discrimination command of § 12143 does not
square with the statute’s text. Section 12143(a) explicitly states that it is
discrimination when a public entity that operates a fixed-route system does not provide
paratransit services “to individuals with disabilities” (emphasis added) that is
comparable to the level of service provided by the fixed-route system. Section 12143(c)
further directs the Secretary of Transportation to issue regulations implementing the

as exhaustion). And the Illinois statute regulating paratransit services—which adopts the
federal regulations regarding eligibility, see 49 CFR § 37.125—simply requires the RTA to
“develop a plan for the provision of ADA paratransit services” that “provide[s] for a process of
determining eligibility for ADA paratransit services that complies with the [ADA] and its
implementing regulations.” 70 ILCS 3615/2.30(c)(9). In other words, the certification process’s
existence is mandated by federal and state regulations, but the certification procedures and
decision-making do not, it appears, to be set forth in regulations. In any event, either party (or
both) may raise this issue if and when this litigation moves forward.

7

non-discrimination ban, and subsection (c) instructs in detail that “any individual”
with certain disabilities is eligible for paratransit services. In other words, the RTA is
required to operate paratransit services at a level comparable to its fixed-route service,
and must also actually provide such paratransit services to individuals with
disabilities. Any individual who qualifies for paratransit services has a private cause
of action under the text of subsection (a). There is no text in § 12143(a) that limits the
definition of discrimination to system-wide discrimination.4
With no textual support in § 12143(a) itself, Defendants rely on subsection (e)
of § 12143, which lists examples of the term “discrimination” as used in subsection (a).
Defs.’ Br. at 5. Those examples relate to the creation and implementation of
paratransit plans (which are specifically required by other subsections of § 12143) and
the provision of services in accordance with those plans. But § 12143(e) does not
purport to limit the term “discrimination” to the particular examples; the prefatory
language of the subsection states, “[a]s used in subsection (a) of this section, the term
‘discrimination’ includes” the listed examples. § 12143(e) (emphasis added). In other
words, subsection (e) is an inclusive rather than exclusive listing. What subsection (e)
4

Nor is it clear what “system-wide” discrimination means. Defendants do not explain
what needs to occur in order for an individual to state a claim based on a system-wide failure
to provide paratransit services. Does this mean that a person only has a claim against the RTA
if the RTA fails to provide paratransit services to anyone? Or, similarly, is the RTA in
compliance with § 12143 so long as the RTA has some sort of plan for paratransit service in
place, even if that plan does in fact deny comparable service to disabled individuals? How many
disabled individuals must a “system-wide” failure affect before crossing the threshold to
comprise “system-wide” discrimination? The lack of any textual clues to the answer to these
questions suggests that discrimination against a particular, qualified individual is sufficient
to comprise a denial of “the benefits of the [transportation] services” offered by the RTA, which
runs afoul of the protections afforded by Title II of the ADA. See § 12132.

8

does is ensure that certain directives sprinkled throughout the other subsections of
§ 12143 are included within the “discrimination” barred by § 12143(a). So an individual
may bring an action to enforce the non-discrimination command of § 12143(a), that is,
for failing to provide that individual with paratransit service comparable to the level
of service enjoyed by non-disabled persons.5
2.
Although Jones can maintain a private right of action against the RTA under §
12143(a), Jones’ amended complaint fails to state a claim for discrimination under the
ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.6 To state a claim for discrimination, Jones must
adequately plead that: (1) she is disabled as defined under the statutes; (2) she is
qualified for the benefits sought; (3) she was denied these benefits because of her
disability; and (4) the defendant is a public entity that (for the Rehabilitation Act
claim) receives federal funding. See Hale v. Pace, 2011 WL 1303369, at *4 (N.D. Ill.
Mar. 31, 2011) (citing Torrence v. Advanced Home Care, Inc., 2009 WL 1444448, at *3
(N.D. Ill. May 21, 2009)). The RTA does not contest the fourth element—it is a public

5

This conclusion is consistent with the Second Circuit’s decision in Abrahams v. MTA
Long Island Bus, 644 F.3d 110, 118 (2d Cir. 2011). Abrahams held that a private right of action
does exist to enforce the statutory commands in § 12143. Id. at 118. To be sure, Abrahams did
reject an attempt by a plaintiff to enforce a regulation that went beyond § 12143 itself. Id. at
119-20. In this case, however, Jones may enforce the statutory requirement of comparable
paratransit services found in § 12143 itself.
6

The requirements for stating a claim for discrimination under Title II of the ADA and
the Rehabilitation Act are identical with two significant exceptions. Washington v. Ind. High
Sch. Athletics Ass’n, Inc., 181 F.3d 840, 845 n.6 (7th Cir. 1999) (the Rehabilitation Act applies
only to federally-funded entities and requires that the defendant acted “solely” by reason of
disability). In this case, the RTA does not argue that either exception applies, so the standards
for stating a claim under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act are discussed concurrently.

9

entity that receives federal funding. Defs.’ Br. at 6 n.3. However, Jones has not
sufficiently pled the first, second, and third elements.
First, the amended complaint alleges that Jones has a “psychological
impairment” that substantially limits her in the major life activity of caring for herself.
Am. Compl. ¶ 5. This is merely a near-quotation of the legal definition of the term
“disability” under the ADA: “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
one or more major life activities of such individual[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A). Iqbal
and Twombly make clear that legal conclusions “must be supported by factual
allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The amount of factual
detail required in order to sufficiently plead a claim is context-specific and relies on
common sense. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663-64. Here, Jones does not identify her mental
impairment, and even if there is no diagnosed disorder, she does not allege any facts
that would put Defendants on notice as to what type of “psychological impairment” she
suffers from.7 The lack of factual allegations requires the Court to conclude that, for
now, Jones has insufficiently pled that she has a disability as defined under the ADA.
Second, and relatedly, Jones alleges that she is qualified for paratransit services
and that the RTA unlawfully denied her eligibility for paratransit services because of
her disability. Am. Compl. ¶ 12. Those allegations depend on the first element, namely,

7

Attached to Jones’ pro se complaint is a letter from Defendant Lillian Wallace, which
states that Jones has schizophrenia and becomes “confused when traveling on fixed route
transportation.” See R. 1. However, the Court may not rely on the Wallace letter because it was
not included in the first amended complaint (which is currently the only operative complaint
in this case).

10

a sufficient allegation of “disability.” If Jones is not “disabled” as defined by the ADA,
she cannot be qualified for paratransit services and the RTA would correctly have
denied her eligibility. Without additional factual allegations, these statements are
nothing more than “unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation[s].”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Thus, the Court must grant Defendants’ motion to dismiss the ADA and
Rehabilitation Act claims. But for now the dismissal is without prejudice, based on two
reasons. First, Jones commenced this lawsuit pro se, and the complaint has been
amended only once since her appointed counsel appeared in the case. Second, it is
possible that further amendments could permit the complaint to survive a motion to
dismiss. It is also significant that, in her response brief, Jones requested leave to
amend the complaint if the Court deemed it insufficient. See R. 25 (Pl.’s Resp.) at 8.
Thus, in accordance with Rule 15(a)(2)’s generous amendment policy, the dismissal is
without prejudice. On or before July 30, 2012, Jones may file an amended complaint.
If she does not do so by that date, the dismissal will automatically convert to a
dismissal with prejudice.
B.
Jones also attempts to assert a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim
under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that: “(1) he was deprived of a right secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States; and (2) the deprivation was visited upon him
by a person or persons acting under color of state law.” Kramer v. Vill. of N. Fond du
Lac, 384 F.3d 856, 861 (7th Cir. 2004). Section 1983 does not itself grant individuals
11

constitutional or statutory rights, but instead provides a procedural vehicle for
bringing suit to remedy violations of a right independently premised on the
Constitution or on federal law. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989).
Congress can choose to foreclose reliance on § 1983 for remedying statutory violations,
and congressional intent may be demonstrated by the existence of a comprehensive
remedial scheme provided by the statute that is the source of the substantive right.
Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 423 (1987); Middlesex
Cnty. Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 14 (1981); Alexander v.
Chicago Park Dist., 773 F.2d 850, 856 (7th Cir. 1985) (“Generally, where a statute
provides its own comprehensive enforcement scheme, that scheme may not be bypassed
by pleading an underlying violation of the statute and bringing suit directly under §
1983.”).
In this case, Jones cannot rely on § 1983 to bring a claim against the RTA,
because (1) no constitutional-right violation is alleged, and (2) Congress has
established a comprehensive remedial scheme that forecloses reliance on § 1983 for
remedying ADA or Rehabilitation Act violations.
The first amended complaint does not allege a constitutional violation—only
statutory violations are alleged. Am. Compl. ¶ 21. Specifically, Jones claims that the
Regional Transportation Authority implemented “a policy and practice” that violates
Title II of the ADA, its implementing regulations, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act. Id. No reference to a constitutional right violation is found in Jones’ first amended
complaint.
12

With regard to the alleged statutory-rights violation, the Seventh Circuit has not
yet decided whether the extensive remedial scheme under Title II of the ADA precludes
using § 1983 to enforce the ADA. Discovery House, Inc. v. Consol. City of Indianapolis,
319 F.3d 277, 281 (7th Cir. 2003) (plaintiff based § 1983 claim on Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); see Zachary M. v. Bd. of Educ. of Evanston
Twp. High Sch. Dist. No. 202, 829 F. Supp.2d 649, 662-63 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (neither the
Supreme Court nor the Seventh Circuit has expressly ruled on the issue of whether the
ADA’s enforcement scheme precludes a § 1983 claim). Several other circuits have held
that the ADA’s remedial scheme forecloses § 1983 relief. For example, the Eleventh
Circuit in Holbrook v. City of Alpharetta, reasoned that the Rehabilitation Act and the
ADA’s comprehensive remedial schemes already addressed all of the plaintiff’s claims,
so allowing the § 1983 claims would effectively “provide the plaintiff with two bites at
precisely the same apple.”8 112 F.3d 1522, 1531 (11th Cir. 1997); see also Vinson v.
Thomas, 288 F.3d 1145 (9th Cir. 2002); Lollar v. Baker, 196 F.3d 603 (5th Cir. 1999);
Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle, 184 F.3d 999 (8th Cir. 1999).
The Seventh Circuit has applied similar reasoning to other statutes. For
instance, in Alexander v. Chicago Park District, the Seventh Circuit reiterated that
Title VII violations may not be brought under § 1983. 773 F.2d at 856. The opinion
went on to hold that § 1983 could not be used to bring a claim based solely on Title VI

8

The Eleventh Circuit adopted the district court’s reasoning in Holmes v. City of
Chicago, 1995 WL 270231 (N.D. Ill. 1995). Holmes held that Section 504 and Title II of the
ADA preclude § 1983 claims that are based on the same alleged injuries.

13

violations, because Title VI contains “its own administrative enforcement procedure
which would be bypassed” otherwise. Id. Here, as discussed above, Title II of the ADA
offers the comprehensive remedial scheme set forth in Title VI.9 And Jones’ § 1983
claim alleges a violation of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. Thus, the Court concludes
that Jones cannot invoke § 1983 to enforce the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. The
§ 1983 claim is dismissed with prejudice.
C.
For the sake of completeness, the Court also notes the redundancy in bringing
the suit against Defendant Wallace in her official capacity. Naming Wallace in that
capacity, that is, as an agent of the Regional Transportation Authority, is in reality
merely naming the RTA. See Richman v. Sheahan, 270 F.3d 430, 439 (7th Cir. 2001)
(a suit against a public official in his official capacity is a suit against the government
entity of which he is an agent). Since the RTA is already a defendant, any official
capacity allegations are redundant. The official capacity claim against Wallace is also
dismissed with prejudice.
IV.
For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ motion to dismiss [R. 20] is granted,
but the complaint is dismissed, for now, without prejudice. Consistent with the
discussion above, Jones has leave to file an amended complaint as to the claims alleged

9

As noted above, 29 U.S.C. 794a(a)(2) provides that “[t]he remedies, procedures, and
rights set forth in title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . . shall be available to any person
aggrieved by any act or failure to act by any recipient of Federal assistance or Federal provider
of such assistance under section 794 of this title.”

14

under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act. She must do so
by July 30, 2012, or else the dismissal will automatically convert to a dismissal with
prejudice. To track the case a status hearing is set for August 2, 2012, at 9:30 a.m.
ENTERED:
__________________________
Honorable Edmond E. Chang
United States District Judge
DATE: July 16, 2012

15