Jones v. Regional Transportation Authority
Filing
77
MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order signed by the Honorable Edmond E. Chang. For the reasons stated in the Opinion, Defendant RTA's motion for summary judgment 59 is granted. A separate AO-450 judgment shall be entered on the docket. The status hearing of 01/27/2015 is vacated. Civil case terminated. Emailed notice(slb, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
CHRISTINE MARY JONES,
Plaintiff,
v.
REGIONAL TRANSPORTATION
AUTHORITY,
Defendant.
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No. 11 C 04924
Judge Edmond E. Chang
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Christine Mary Jones has brought suit against Defendant Regional
Transportation Authority (RTA), alleging that the RTA, which oversees public
transportation in the Chicago region, discriminated against her in violation of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and the
Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq.1 Jones suffers from schizophrenia, and
she charges that the RTA unlawfully denied her application to receive paratransit
service, which provides door-to-door transportation for qualifying individuals with
disabilities as required by federal law. The RTA now moves for summary judgment.
R. 59, Mot. Summ. J.2 For the reasons stated below, the RTA’s motion is granted.
1This
Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
to the docket is “R.” followed by the entry number and, when necessary,
the page/paragraph number. Citations to the parties’ Local Rule 56.1 Statements of Fact
are “DSOF” (for the RTA’s Statement of Facts) [R. 62]; “PSOF” (for Jones’ Statement of
Additional Facts) [R. 69 at 12-13]; “Pl.’s Resp. DSOF” (for Jones’ response to the RTA’s
Statement of Facts) [R. 69 at 1-12]; and “Def.’s Resp. PSOF” (for the RTA’s Response to
Jones’ Statement of Additional Facts) [R. 74].
2Citation
I. Background
For purposes of deciding this motion for summary judgment, the following
facts and evidence are presented in the light most favorable to Jones as the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587
(1986).
A. Jones’ Paratransit Application and Finding of Ineligibility
The RTA is a municipal corporation that coordinates public transportation
operations in a handful of counties in and around Chicago. DSOF ¶ 2. Although it
does not actually operate the mass transit in its jurisdiction, such as Chicago
Transit Authority subways and buses, Pace Suburban Bus Service, and Metra
commuter rail, the RTA oversees the certification process for ADA paratransit
eligibility for CTA and Pace riders. Id. ¶¶ 2, 8. ADA paratransit service provides ondemand, door-to-door transportation for eligible individuals whose disabilities
prevent them from using fixed-route public transit like bus and rail. Id. ¶ 7.
Jones lives in Oak Park, Illinois and suffers from schizophrenia. Id. ¶¶ 1, 5.
On April 29, 2010, she submitted an application to receive ADA paratransit services
from the RTA on the basis of her schizoaffective disorder. Id. ¶ 14; R. 62-5, Jones
Application ¶ II. (A previously unsuccessful application was filed by Jones in 2008,
but that denial is not at issue in the present lawsuit. DSOF ¶ 13.) On the
application, Jones checked boxes stating that she could “get to and from bus stops or
[subway] stations if the distance is not too great,” “can ride the buses or [ ] trains
when [ ] feeling well” but not when her “disability or health condition worsens,” and
2
“can use fixed route buses or [ ] trains if it’s someplace [she goes] all the time.”
Jones Application ¶ III. Jones also wrote, in a section asking for more information
about her disability, that she sometimes became “confused on the directions and
would get lost,” and was “not familiar with the area” of the suburbs where she now
lived. Id. ¶ IV.
As part of the screening process, Jones was interviewed in person by an
employee of a third-party contractor about her disorder and its symptoms, as well
as the effects of her medication and her ability to use public transportation. Id. ¶ 17.
According to notes taken at the interview, the authenticity of which Jones does not
dispute, Jones had suffered from schizoaffective order for ten years, taken
medications regularly to keep the condition in control, and reported chronic
confusion, troubles with problem solving, and focusing. R. 62-5, Main Interview
Guide at R/Jones 0026. The notes also indicated that Jones was using fixed-route
service daily and was capable of making transfers. Id. The interviewer commented
that Jones “has bad days with increased confusion but she is still able to use public
transportation if she has to.” Id. at R/Jones 0029. In particular, the interviewer
observed that Jones had learned how to complete fixed-route travel by calling trip
assistance or by being shown how to make the trip first; this travel included trips by
public transit to the library, a college, her doctor’s office, relatives in Chicago, and
the Social Security Administration office. Id. at R/Jones 0032.
At the evaluation, Jones was also administered a Mini-Mental State
Examination (or MMSE), on which she scored 29 out of a possible 30 (higher scores
3
indicating less impairment). DSOF ¶ 18. Based on a review of Jones’ application
and the documentation completed by the interviewer, an RTA ADA Certifier
determined that Jones was not eligible for paratransit service. Id. ¶ 19. The RTA
explained to Jones by letter that based on the information obtained, Jones’
disability did not prevent her from using fixed-route public transportation. Id. ¶ 20.
Jones appealed this determination to the RTA’s Eligibility Review Board,
which resulted in an administrative review, but that review arrived at the same
finding of ineligibility. Id. ¶¶ 21-22. In September 2010, a three-member panel of
the review board later held a hearing to consider Jones’ application. At the hearing,
Jones appeared and submitted an additional document, a statement from her
doctor, Dr. Jagannath Devulapally. Id. ¶¶ 23-24. Dr. Devulapally, in a short
handwritten note, opined that Jones “needs additional assistance (paratransit) in
her ability to self transport due to symptoms of confusion which have limited her
ability to use [public transit].” R. 68-1, Note dated 08/13/2010. In October 2010, the
review board notified Jones in writing that it was upholding the finding that she
was ineligible for paratransit service based on her application documents, the
results of her evaluation, her doctor’s note, and her statements at the hearing.
DSOF ¶ 25.
B. Procedural History
Jones commenced this lawsuit pro se in August 2011, naming as defendants
the RTA and an individual member of the review board panel that heard Jones’
appeal, Lillian Wallace. R. 8, Compl. After Defendants moved to dismiss Jones’ first
4
amended complaint, the Court dismissed Jones’ claims against Wallace as
redundant, because the RTA, for which Wallace was acting as agent in her official
capacity, was already a defendant. R. 34, Mem. Op. and Order dated July 16, 2012
at 14. The Court also dismissed Jones’ purported cause of action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 for civil-rights violations, finding that the comprehensive remedial scheme
provided by the ADA precluded a § 1983 claim for the harm Jones alleged. Id. at 1314 (applying reasoning of Seventh Circuit precedent deeming § 1983 claims
precluded where remedial procedures available under Title VI and Title VII).
Although Jones’ cause of action under the ADA was dismissed as
insufficiently pled, the Court rejected the two legal contentions that the RTA
advanced against the viability of her claims—namely, that no private right of action
exists under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act, and that failure to provide
paratransit services can only be actionable where there is system-wide
discrimination as opposed to individualized harm. Id. at 5-9. The Court instead gave
leave for Jones to amend her complaint to state a private cause of action for alleged
individualized discrimination. Id. at 11. Jones filed a second amended complaint
with the benefit of recruited pro bono counsel, raising claims under the ADA and
the Rehabilitation Act, as enforceable through Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. R. 35, Second Am. Compl. The parties having completed discovery on those
remaining claims, the Court now considers whether the claims survive the
summary-judgment stage in light of a developed record.
5
II. Standard of Review
Summary judgment must be granted “if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine issue of material fact exists if “the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In evaluating
summary judgment motions, courts must view the facts and draw reasonable
inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Scott v. Harris, 550
U.S. 372, 378 (2007). They may not weigh conflicting evidence or make credibility
determinations, Omnicare, Inc. v. UnitedHealth Grp., Inc., 629 F.3d 697, 704 (7th
Cir. 2011), and must consider only competent evidence of a type otherwise
admissible at trial, Gunville v. Walker, 583 F.3d 979, 985 (7th Cir. 2009). The party
seeking summary judgment has the initial burden of showing that there is no
genuine dispute and that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Carmichael v. Village of Palatine, 605 F.3d 451, 460 (7th Cir. 2010); see also Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Wheeler v. Lawson, 539 F.3d 629, 634 (7th
Cir. 2008). If this burden is met, the adverse party must then “set forth specific
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256.
III. Discussion
The RTA contends that Jones’s impairment did not prevent her from using
the fixed-route system, and thus she is ineligible for paratransit service. R. 61,
Def.’s Br. at 4-11. Despite Jones’ attempts to characterize the record to the contrary,
6
and even with the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to her, the Court
agrees that summary judgment is appropriate on this basis.
A. The ADA, Rehabilitation Act, and Access to Paratransit Services
Title II of the ADA outlaws discrimination against individuals with
disabilities in the areas of “public services” and “programs and activities.” Wisc.
Cmty. Servs., Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 465 F.3d 737, 750 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing 42
U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165). To impose liability under Title II, a plaintiff must prove “[1]
that he is a ‘qualified individual with a disability,’ [2] that he was denied ‘the
benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity’ or otherwise
subjected to discrimination by such an entity, and [3] that the denial or
discrimination was ‘by reason of’ his disability.” Love v. Westville Corr. Ctr., 103
F.3d 558, 560 (7th Cir. 1996) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12132). The Rehabilitation Act
similarly forbids discrimination against individuals with disabilities, that is, denial
of benefits solely by reason of that disability, but specifically by “any program or
activity that receives federal financial assistance.” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). The elements
of a Rehabilitation Act claim are identical to the elements of an ADA claim, with the
exception of the further requirement that the defendant have received federal
funding. See, e.g., Jackson v. City of Chicago, 414 F.3d 806, 811 n.2 (7th Cir. 2005).
As an obligation under both the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, a public
entity that operates a fixed-route transit system must provide “paratransit and
other special transportation services to individuals with disabilities … that are
sufficient to provide to such individuals a level of service” that is “comparable to
7
public transportation services available to individuals without disabilities.” 42
U.S.C. § 12143. An eligible recipient of paratransit services includes “any individual
with a disability who is unable, as a result of a physical or mental impairment … to
board, ride, or disembark from any vehicle on the [fixed-route] system,” or “any
individual with a disability who has a specific impairment-related condition which
prevents such individual from traveling to a boarding location or from a
disembarking location on such system.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 12143(c)(1)(A)(i), (iii). An
impairment that merely makes an individual’s ability to get to and leave the
boarding/disembarking location “more difficult” but does not actually prevent the
travel does not trigger paratransit eligibility. 49 C.F.R. § 37.123(e)(3)(i); see also 49
C.F.R. § Pt. 37, App. D (specifying that “prevented travel” occurs “where the
difficulties are so substantial that a reasonable person with the impairment-related
condition in question would be deterred from making the trip”). According to the
Department
of
Transportation’s
interpretation,
the
applicable
regulations
specifically envision “a lack of cognitive ability to remember and follow directions”
as an eligible impairment-related condition. 49 C.F.R. § Pt. 37, App. D.
B. Jones Cannot Establish She was Paratransit Eligible
At the outset, the RTA asserts that the Court owes “great deference” to its
determination that Jones was ineligible for paratransit because it was an
administrative action taken by a state agency. Def.’s Br. at 5. The authority relied
on by the RTA for this proposition does not directly support that deference. The
Illinois appellate case cited by RTA, PACE, Suburban Bus. Div. of Reg’l Transp.
8
Auth. v. Reg’l Transp. Auth., advanced the proposition that certain administrative
actions, in particular budgetary decisions, should be respected unless arbitrary or
capricious. 803 N.E.2d 13, 27 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003). True enough, but the present case
does not call into question, as PACE did, the propriety of an agency’s exercise of
statutorily delegated discretion, like budgeting; instead, at issue here is whether
the RTA independently violated federal anti-discrimination laws. In other words,
the Court does not review the RTA review board’s conclusions of law and findings of
fact concerning Jones’ application as it would in hearing an administrative appeal
(as with, say, a decision by the Commissioner of Social Security finding a claimant
ineligible for Social Security disability benefits), but rather must weigh—as with
any other discrimination claim—whether the plaintiff has sufficiently presented the
elements of a cause of action under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act.3 It might be a
different matter if Jones had sought review of the RTA’s decision via an appeal in
the state-court system, see Sell v. N.J. Transit Corp., 689 A.2d 1386, 1390 (N.J. Sup.
Ct. App. Div. 1997) (treating denial of paratransit application as agency decision
governed by state administrative procedural law), but instead she brought a private
3Under
applicable regulations, an entity like the RTA must establish “an
administrative appeal process through which individuals who are denied eligibility” for
paratransit “can obtain review of the denial” (which the RTA has done). 49 C.F.R.
§ 37.125(g). But there is no provision for judicial review of the outcome of this appeals
process—in contrast, for example, to the express grant of jurisdiction to federal district
courts to hear appeals (under a deferential, “substantial evidence” standard) of Social
Security disability determinations. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Thus, in bringing the present
case, Jones does not appeal an administrative decision; rather, she exercises an
independent, statutory right of action that makes no mention of any kind of a deferential
standard of review—even if the defendant is a municipal corporation approximating the
role of administrative agency. See Mem. Op. and Order dated July 16, 2012 at 5-6 (outlining
basis for private cause of action to enforce paratransit provision under ADA and RA
through Title VI of the Civil Rights Act).
9
right of action under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. The RTA does not point
to any federal statute or federal regulation likening the claims to an administrative
appeal akin to, for example (again), a review of a denial of Social Security benefits.
Even without the benefit of any deference, however, it is evident from the
discovery record that the RTA is correct in its contention that Jones cannot
establish that she was eligible for paratransit service, even viewing the evidence in
her favor. In considering her application, the RTA’s review board was presented
with ample evidence that Jones could functionally navigate public buses and trains.
There was Jones’ own characterization on her application that she could use public
transit for trips she took frequently, Jones Application ¶ III, and, as stated during
her screening interview, that despite some instances of confusion she traveled daily
on fixed-route transportation, including making transfers, with the help of trip
assistance, Main Interview Guide at R/Jones 0026. These trips were to a varied list
of locations, including relatives’ homes in Chicago, the Social Security office, her
doctor, and her college. Id. at 32. The review board also knew that Jones had scored
a near-perfect 29 on her mental state evaluation, indicating that she had normal
cognitive functioning. DSOF ¶ 18.4
By contrast, objective evidence in support of Jones’ contention on her
application that she could not use public transit when her condition worsened,
Jones Application ¶ III, was limited to Dr. Devulapally’s short note concluding that
4The
characterization of a score of 29 on the Mini-Mental State Examination as
indicating “normal cognitive functioning” is the RTA’s. Def.’s Br. at 7. The parties have not
submitted any detailed guide to understanding the scoring system of the MMSE but Jones
does not dispute this characterization or other descriptions about the test presented by the
RTA in its briefing.
10
Jones required paratransit assistance “due to symptoms of confusion,” Note dated
08/13/2010. The problem is that this one-sentence statement merely makes a legal
conclusion without providing any probative context about the nature and severity of
Jones’ condition; absent “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial,” such an opinion, even from a claimant’s treating physician, is not enough to
withstand summary judgment. Moore v. J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc., 221 F.3d 944, 952
(7th Cir. 2000) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)) (physician’s conclusory testimony that
plaintiff is disabled in the “duration, manner, or condition” specified by the ADA
insufficient); see also Scheerer v. Potter, 443 F.3d 916, 919 (7th Cir. 2006) (“Specific
facts are required” to survive summary judgment in Rehabilitation Act claim and
“conclusory allegations will not do.”).
Nor has discovery in this litigation produced evidence that might shed
additional light on the issue. Despite Jones’ reliance on it, Dr. Devulapally’s
deposition testimony is not helpful to her case. To be sure, Devulapally testified
that
an
individual
like
Jones,
when
experiencing
greater
symptoms
of
schizophrenia, would have difficulty in navigating fixed-route schedules, R. 68-1,
Exh. B, Devulapally Tr. at 27, as “her interpretation of information [would be] no
longer reliable” and “written and verbal instructions … not always comprehended,”
id. at 26. Yet Devulapally’s opinions were limited to his recollections of Jones’
“general problems,” id. at 13, explaining that actually she “generally was
functioning well … when she was stable” and “could be mostly independent, but
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there were periods of time … that she was more symptomatic and less stable.” Id. at
19.
Crucially, although the doctor discussed in broad terms how Jones’ illness
had become severe in the past to the point of requiring hospitalization, id. at 35, he
never identified whether she was in a period of instability, of any degree, at or
around the time of her paratransit application. Instead, the only concrete timeframe
he provided was when he conjectured that, following the death of her brother, she
may have been symptomatic in “maybe [the] middle or late part of 2011,” that is,
the year after Jones’ application. Id. at 34. Indeed, when asked specifically about
Jones’ mental state when he wrote his note, Devulapally conceded that “it’s hard for
me to remember the details of what kind of cognitive problems she may have been
exhibiting at this time.” Id. at 13. The most precise that Devulapally could be about
her mental state in the relevant period was that Jones “probably” had a global
assessment functioning score of around 50, id. at 37, a score that, according to him,
“suggests someone who is probably able to manage in an outpatient capacity,” even
if “doing so with some impairments,” id. at 29-30.
In sum, Devulapally provided no more concrete information about Jones’
actual condition than he did in his one-sentence note. His deposition testimony,
which was an opportunity to explain the reasoning behind his opinion, still
amounted to a reiteration of the same conclusory statement, at best speculating
about impairments that Jones could have experienced at any time. A medical
opinion that “speaks predominantly in terms of hypotheticals, not [a claimant’s]
12
actual experiences” does not establish the existence of a disability.5 Moore, 221 F.3d
at 952; see also Homeyer v. Stanley Tulchin Assocs., Inc., 91 F.3d 959, 962 (7th Cir.
1996) (finding of disability under the ADA requires individualized review of the
varying degree of impairment present in specific claimant, including stage of the
disorder).
Finally, Jones argues that the RTA review board failed to ask for additional
pertinent medical information from Devulapally and, on this incomplete record,
evaluated her based on her physical and not mental capabilities. R. 68, Pl.’s Br. at
5. These unsupported contentions fail on their face. As discussed, there was ample
objective evidence gathered through Jones’ application, screening interview, and
mental state evaluation to indicate specifically that her cognitive abilities did not
merit paratransit eligibility. As for whether the review board should have sought
additional information from Jones’ doctor, Jones does not contend that she was
limited in the medical evidence she could submit before her hearing. Jones points to
no legal authority placing an onus on the RTA to then request more from
Devulapally than the note he drafted when he was free to submit any other
documentation he wished (indeed, the limited details in his deposition testimony
5It
may well be the case that Jones has suffered periods of being symptomatic,
including in 2011 as alluded to by Devulapally, since the time that she filed the present
lawsuit. If so, notwithstanding the outcome of this case, Jones is free to reapply for
paratransit services, as the RTA acknowledges. PSOF ¶ 22; Def.’s Resp. PSOF ¶ 22. The
Court also notes that although the factual record is insufficient to establish any eligible
disability at the time of her 2010 application, to the extent that the nature of Jones’
impairment may have since resulted in sporadic periods of disability, the RTA recognizes a
category of “conditional eligibility” when an individual qualifies for paratransit services
only for “some trips.” DSOF ¶ 9. The RTA is obliged, of course, to consider the merits of any
further application by Jones and grant the appropriate category of eligibility that is
supported by documentation submitted by Jones.
13
suggest that there was likely not much more probative evidence he could have
provided). If, in fact, such documentation about Jones’ current condition now exists,
Jones is free to submit a new paratransit application at any time. See supra n.5.
Accordingly, this attempt to create a genuine issue of material fact around Jones’
disability is unfounded and, for the reasons given, RTA has shown that it is entitled
to summary judgment.6
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, RTA’s motion for summary judgment is granted in
its entirety.
ENTERED:
s/Edmond E. Chang
Honorable Edmond E. Chang
United States District Judge
DATE: December 8, 2014
6In
the interest of completeness, the Court notes that Jones makes a passing
reference to RTA’s “policy and practice” of denying ADA paratransit services. Second Am.
Compl. ¶ 29. To rebut the allegation of any such policy, RTA presents numerous statistics
(including a survey showing that only 1-2% of over 65,000 paratransit eligibility decisions
between 2008 and 2012 were denials and a random sample of applicants who were
administered MMSEs indicating that those found ineligible also garnered high scores, like
Jones). Def.’s Br at 10-11. In any event, it appears that Jones merely framed the denial of
her application as a discriminatory “policy and practice” against her individually, see
Second Am. Compl. ¶ 29; she adduced absolutely no evidence about any pattern or other
instances of discrimination against individuals with schizophrenia generally. Summary
judgment is also therefore appropriate for a claim of a broader discriminatory policy, to the
extent that Jones even raises one.
14
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