Logwood v. City Of Chicago et al
Filing
69
MEMORANDUM Opinion Signed by the Honorable Samuel Der-Yeghiayan on 4/4/2013: Mailed notice (mw, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
SIDNEY LOGWOOD,
)
)
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)
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)
)
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Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF CHICAGO, et al.,
Defendants.
No. 11 C 4932
MEMORANDUM OPINION
SAMUEL DER-YEGHIAYAN, District Judge
This matter is before the court on the parties’ motions in limine. For the
reasons stated below, the motions are granted in part and denied in part.
DISCUSSION
I. Logwood’s Motions in Limine
Plaintiff Sydney Logwood (Logwood) has brought nine motions in limine.
A. Logwood’s Motion in Limine Number 1
Logwood requests in motion in limine number 1 (Logwood Motion Number 1)
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that the court bar Defendants from using the Chicago Police Department CLEAR
system or the Illinois State Police LEADS system to investigate the backgrounds of
jurors or to initiate new investigations of witnesses and jurors after the trial begins.
Logwood asserts that the use of such systems would give Defendants an unfair
advantage in this case. Defendants agree not to run background checks on jurors
once a panel has been selected, (Ans. L Mot. 1), and the parties are barred from
conducting background checks for jurors once a panel of jurors has been selected.
Defendants argue, however, that performing background checks on potential jurors
prior to final selection will help Defendants to identify potential biases by jurors not
disclosed during the voir dire process. Logwood cites no controlling precedent that
holds that parties are barred from running background checks on potential jurors.
Therefore, the request to bar such background checks is denied. However,
Defendants have also failed to cite any controlling precedent that holds that they are
entitled to conduct such background checks. Thus, while such background checks
are not barred, the parties are warned that jury selection will proceed in an efficient
manner, and no delays will be permitted to conduct background checks for
prospective jurors. In addition, if either side discovers during the voir dire process
that a prospective juror has been dishonest regarding his or her criminal history, that
side is required to immediately seek a side bar to inform the court and opposing
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counsel, and the court will entertain a motion to strike the prospective juror for
cause.
Logwood also argues that Defendants may run background checks only for
jurors of a certain race and violate the principles set forth in Batson v. Kentucky, 476
U.S. 79 (1986). The running of background checks for prospective jurors does not
necessarily increase the likelihood that prospective jurors will be stricken based on
their race and to the extent that Logwood has Batson concerns, Logwood will still
have the same ability to raise objections based on Batson to any peremptory
challenges exercised by Defendants, and the court will rule on such objections. See,
e.g., Harris v. Hardy, 680 F.3d 942, 949 (7th Cir. 2012)(explaining three-step
inquiry for Batson objections).
In regard to running background checks for witnesses, Logwood cites no
controlling precedent barring such background checks, and the request is therefore
denied. Both sides are permitted to conduct background checks on witnesses. Based
on the above, Logwood Motion Number 1 is granted in part and denied in part.
B. Logwood’s Motion in Limine Number 2
Logwood requests in motion in limine number 2 (Logwood Motion Number 2)
that the court bar Defendants from arguing that a verdict against Defendant Officer
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Rodriguez, Defendant Officer Chen, Defendant Officer Williams, and Defendant
Officer Clay (collectively referred to as “Defendant Officers”) would be a blemish
upon an otherwise distinguished record of service. Defendants indicate that they do
not intend to make such an argument. (Ans. L Mot. 4). Therefore, Logwood Motion
Number 2 is denied as moot. The court notes that Defendants do correctly point out
that evidence concerning the prior performance record of Defendant Officers may
become relevant if Logwood opens the door by attempting to introduce evidence
concerning such matters.
C. Logwood’s Motion in Limine Number 3
Logwood requests in motion in limine number 3 (Logwood Motion Number 3)
that the court bar argument or the introduction of evidence “that attempts to heorize
police officers generally.” (L Mot. 3, 1). Logwood seeks to bar Defendants from
arguing that police officers do not falsely arrest people for no reason, that police
officers do not maliciously prosecute people for no reason, that police officers do not
use excessive force against people for no reason, that police officers are heroes, that
police officers risk their lives every day, that police officers serve and protect the
public, that police officers face dangerous situations every day, or that police officers
would never risk their careers by engaging in misconduct. Defendants indicate that
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they do not intend to make any such generalized arguments and indicate that they
will limit arguments to the course of conduct taken by Defendant Officers in this
case and the reasonableness of such conduct. (Ans. L Mot. 4-7). Defendants
correctly point out that some evidence concerning the prior professional experiences
of Defendants Officers may be relevant in assessing the reasonableness of their
conduct. Therefore, Logwood Motion Number 3 is denied.
D. Logwood’s Motion in Limine Number 4
Logwood requests in motion in limine number 4 (Logwood Motion Number 4)
that the court bar argument or the introduction of evidence that Defendant Officers
received commendations, awards, or other professional honors. Defendants indicate
that they do not intend to make such arguments or introduce such evidence. (Ans. L
Mot. 7). Therefore, Logwood Motion Number 4 is denied as moot. The court notes
that, as with Logwood Motion Number 2, evidence concerning the prior performance
records of Defendant Officers may become relevant if Logwood opens the door by
attempting to introduce evidence concerning such matters.
E. Logwood’s Motion in Limine Number 5
Logwood requests in motion in limine number 5 (Logwood Motion Number 5)
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that the court bar argument or the introduction of evidence regarding Defendant
Officers’ financial status, including suggestions that they will endure financial
hardship as a result of an award of compensatory damages in a verdict against them.
Logwood recognizes that Defendants can introduce such evidence specifically as it
relates to an award of punitive damages. (L Mot. 5, 1). Defendants indicate that
they do not intend to make such arguments or present such evidence relating to an
award of compensatory damages. (Ans. L Mot. 8). Therefore, Logwood Motion
Number 5 is denied as moot.
F. Logwood’s Motion in Limine Number 6
Logwood requests in motion in limine number 6 (Logwood Motion Number 6)
that the court bar argument or the introduction of evidence relating to the
circumstances under which Logwood’s attorneys were employed or retained,
including fee arrangements agreed to by Logwood. Defendants indicate that they do
not intend to make such argument or introduce such evidence. (Ans. L Mot. 8).
Therefore, Logwood Motion Number 6 is denied as moot. Defendants do argue that
in the event that Logwood introduces evidence to show that his attorneys’ fees are
part of the “measure of damages,” Defendants should be allowed to introduce
evidence relating to such fees. (Ans. L. Mot. 8). However, the court notes that this
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is a Section 1983 case in which attorneys’ fees may be sought by a prevailing party
pursuant to a fee-shifting statute after the conclusion of the trial. See, e.g., Zessar v.
Keith, 536 F.3d 788, 795 (7th Cir. 2008); Hill v. Richardson, 7 F.3d 656, 657 (7th
Cir. 1993). Thus, attorneys’ fees will not be at issue at trial.
G. Logwood’s Motion in Limine Number 7
Logwood requests in motion in limine number 7 (Logwood Motion Number 7)
that the court bar argument or the introduction of evidence indicating that a verdict
against Defendants would place a burden upon the public as a whole, cause taxes to
be increased, and increase the City of Chicago’s (City) budget deficit. Defendants
indicate that they do not intend to make such argument or introduce such evidence.
(Ans. L Mot. 8). Therefore, Logwood Motion Number 7 is denied as moot.
H. Logwood’s Motion in Limine Number 8
Logwood requests in motion in limine number 8 (Logwood Motion Number 8)
that the court bar argument or the introduction of evidence indicating that Defendant
Officers acted in conformity with general orders, City policies, use of force models,
or any other guidelines that are not in the U.S. Constitution. Logwood contends that
such evidence is not relevant and is overly prejudicial. Defendants indicate that they
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do not intend to introduce evidence concerning specific City general orders, rules, or
regulations in a vacuum. Defendants indicate, however, that they will introduce
testimony concerning Defendant Officers’ training relating to the proper use of force,
which may touch indirectly upon orders, rules or regulations. Such evidence is
relevant and would not be overly prejudicial to Logwood. Therefore, Logwood
Motion Number 8 is denied.
I. Logwood’s Motion in Limine Number 9
Logwood requests in motion in limine number 9 (Logwood Motion Number 9)
that the court bar argument or the introduction of evidence relating to Logwood’s
criminal record. Defendants agree not to introduce evidence concerning Logwood’s
arrest record unless Logwood opens the door to such maters. (Ans. L Mot. 10). In
regard to Logwood’s prior convictions, Defendants indicate that they intend to
introduce evidence of a 2012 felony conviction for possession of a firearm by a
felon, and two 2004 felony convictions for possession of cannabis. Defendants argue
that such evidence is relevant to the credibility of Logwood when testifying.
Evidence of a witness’s prior criminal conviction can be introduced pursuant to
Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a)(1), which provides the following:
(a) In General. The following rules apply to attacking a witness’s character for
truthfulness by evidence of a criminal conviction: (1) for a crime that, in the
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convicting jurisdiction, was punishable by death or by imprisonment for more
than one year, the evidence: (A) must be admitted, subject to Rule 403, in a
civil case or in a criminal case in which the witness is not a defendant; and (B)
must be admitted in a criminal case in which the witness is a defendant, if the
probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to that
defendant; and (2) for any crime regardless of the punishment, the evidence
must be admitted if the court can readily determine that establishing the
elements of the crime required proving--or the witness’s admitting--a
dishonest act or false statement.
Fed. R. Evid. 609(a).
Defendants indicate that Logwood’s credibility will be a key issue in this case,
and that the jury should be allowed to fully assess his credibility based upon his prior
convictions. Federal Rule of Evidence 403 provides that “[t]he court may exclude
relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of
one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the
jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Fed.
R. Evid. 403. In regard to the prior convictions of Logwood at issue, none of the
crimes involved any inherent untruthfulness. In addition, two of the convictions
occurred almost ten years ago. However, the 2012 conviction for possession of a
firearm by a felon is a recent conviction. The record indicates that Defendants’
defense is premised upon Defendant Officers’ version of events when Logwood was
arrested in contrast to Logwood’s version of events, as testified to by Logwood.
Thus, an assessment of the credibility of Logwood’s testimony will be key to the
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jury’s verdict in this case, and evidence that is related in any fashion to Logwood’s
credibility will have a high probative value. Therefore, the court will bar the
admission of Logwood’s convictions for cannabis possession and will admit the
conviction for possession of a firearm by a felon. The admission of the 2012
conviction for possession of a firearm by a felon will not be overly prejudicial to
Logwood. In addition, to limit any prejudice to Logwood, Defendants have agreed
to only present evidence of the date of conviction, the crime charged, and the
sentence imposed. (Ans. L Mot. 13). Therefore, Logwood Motion Number 9 is
granted in part and denied in part. The court also notes that if Logwood presents
evidence or argument at trial concerning his alleged emotional distress resulting from
his contact with police, Logwood will open the door to the introduction of additional
evidence by Defendants relating to his prior convictions.
II. Defendants’ Motions in Limine
Defendants have brought fourteen motions in limine.
A. Defendants’ Motion in Limine Number 1
Defendants request in motion in limine Number 1 (Defendant Motion Number
1) that the court bar argument that the jury should send the City a message with its
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verdict or that the jury should punish the City with a verdict. Logwood does not
oppose the motion. (Ans. D Mot. 1). Therefore, Defendant Motion Number 1 is
granted.
B. Defendants’ Motion in Limine Number 2
Defendants request in motion in limine number 2 (Defendant Motion Number
2) that the court bar non-party witnesses from the court room. Logwood does not
oppose the motion. (Ans. D Mot. 1). Therefore, Defendant Motion Number 2 is
granted.
C. Defendants’ Motion in Limine Number 3
Defendants request in motion in limine number 3 (Defendant Motion Number
3) that the court bar argument or evidence regarding improper conduct by police
officers that are not parties in this case. Logwood does not oppose the motion.
(Ans. D Mot. 1-2). Therefore, Defendant Motion Number 3 is granted.
D. Defendants’ Motion in Limine Number 4
Defendants request in motion in limine number 4 (Defendant Motion Number
4) that the court bar argument or evidence regarding a “Code of Silence” or a “Blue
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Wall,” or any suggestion that Chicago Police Officers generally cover up for other
officers. Logwood agrees not to make any generalized arguments regarding such
matters or use phrases such as “Code of Silence.” (Ans. D Mot. 1-4). Therefore,
Defendant Motion Number 4 is granted. The court notes that Logwood indicates that
he intends to argue and present evidence to show that certain officers were biased in
favor of their fellow officers in this case. Such arguments and evidence relating to
the conduct of specific officers involved in this case are permitted.
E. Defendants’ Motion in Limine Number 5
Defendants request in motion in limine number 5 (Defendant Motion Number
5) that the court bar argument or evidence regarding violations of City Police
Department rules, policies, regulations, and general orders. Defendants argue that
such evidence is not material to establishing a constitutional violation or willful and
wanton conduct. Logwood opposes the motion, contending that in evaluating the
reasonableness of Defendant Officers’ conduct, facts relating to their training are
relevant. As the court found above in regard to Logwood Motion Number 8,
evidence relating to Defendant Officers’ training is admissible. At trial, Defendants
will be able to cross-examine witnesses and present evidence to show that the mere
fact that a rule, policy, regulation, or general order was not followed does not
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establish that a constitutional violation occurred or that Defendant Officers acted in a
willful and wanton fashion. Therefore, Defendant Motion Number 5 is denied.
F. Defendants’ Motion in Limine Number 6
Defendants request in motion in limine number 6 (Defendant Motion Number
6) that the court bar argument or evidence regarding other civil lawsuits and/or the
disciplinary histories of Defendant Officers. Logwood indicates that he does not
object to the motion, as long as Defendants do not argue that a verdict against
Defendant Officers would tarnish an otherwise unblemished history. (Ans. D Mot.
4). As indicated in regard to Logwood Motion Number 2, Defendants indicate that
they do not intend to make such an argument. (Ans. L Mot. 4). Therefore,
Defendant Motion Number 6 is granted.
G. Defendants’ Motion in Limine Number 7
Defendants request in motion in limine number 7 (Defendant Motion Number
7) that the court bar evidence or argument relating to the Independent Police Review
Authority investigation, including the nature and quality of the investigation.
Logwood does not oppose the motion. (Ans. D Mot. 5). Therefore, Defendant
Motion Number 7 is granted.
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H. Defendants’ Motion in Limine Number 8
Defendants request in motion in limine number 8 (Defendant Motion Number
8) that the court bar evidence or argument relating to City Police Department
personnel being paid by the City to appear in court and testify. Logwood does not
oppose the motion. (Ans. D Mot. 5). Therefore, Defendant Motion Number 8 is
granted.
I. Defendants’ Motion in Limine Number 9
Defendants request in motion in limine number 9 (Defendant Motion Number
9) that the court bar Logwood’s counsel from creating adverse publicity against
Defendants. Logwood does not oppose the motion. (Ans. D Mot. 5). Therefore,
Defendant Motion Number 9 is granted.
J. Defendants’ Motion in Limine Number 10
Defendants request in motion in limine number 10 (Defendant Motion
Number 10) that the court bar evidence or argument indicating that Defendant
Officers may be indemnified by the City for a compensatory damages award.
Logwood does not oppose the motion. (Ans. D Mot. 5-6). Therefore, Defendant
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Motion Number 10 is granted. The court notes that Logwood argues that if
Defendants open the door by arguing that Defendant Officers are financially unable
to pay a compensatory damages award, evidence relating to indemnification will
become relevant. If Defendants open that door, Logwood may raise the issue at a
sidebar and the court will revisit this issue.
K. Defendants’ Motion in Limine Number 11
Defendants request in motion in limine number 11 (Defendant Motion
Number 11) that the court bar evidence or argument indicating that the City
improperly trains or disciplines officers or improperly investigates the misconduct of
officers or has improper polices and procedures. Logwood does not oppose the
motion. (Ans. D Mot. 6). Therefore, Defendant Motion Number 11 is granted.
L. Defendants’ Motion in Limine Number 12
Defendants request in motion in limine number 12 (Defendant Motion
Number 12) that the court bar evidence or argument relating to settlement
negotiations in this case. Logwood does not oppose the motion. (Ans. D Mot. 6).
Therefore, Defendant Motion Number 12 is granted.
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M. Defendants’ Motion in Limine Number 13
Defendants request in motion in limine number 13 (Defendant Motion
Number 13) that the court bar evidence or argument indicating that non-party
officers engage in misconduct. Logwood does not oppose the motion. (Ans. D Mot.
7). Therefore, Defendant Motion Number 13 is granted.
N. Defendants’ Motion in Limine Number 14
Defendants request in motion in limine number 14 (Defendant Motion
Number 14) that the court bar evidence or argument indicating that Defendants had a
racial motivation. Logwood does not oppose the motion. (Ans. D Mot. 7).
Therefore, Defendant Motion Number 14 is granted.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis, Logwood Motion Numbers 1 and 9 are
granted in part and denied in part. Logwood Motion Numbers 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8
are denied. Defendant Motion Numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14
are granted. Defendant Motion Number 5 is denied.
___________________________________
Samuel Der-Yeghiayan
United States District Court Judge
Dated: April 4, 2013
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