Williams, Jr. v. Raheel Foods, Inc.

Filing 21

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Milton I. Shadur on 10/18/2011:Mailed notice(srn, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
TORIANO WILLIAMS JR.,
Plaintiff,
v.
RAHEEL FOODS INC. d/b/a KFC,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

No.

11 C 4965

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Despite its short history (somewhat less than three months),
this Title VII action has had an extraordinarily checkered
history.

Initially Raheel Foods, Inc. (“Raheel”) responded to

the Complaint brought against it by its ex-employee Toriano
Williams, Jr. (“Williams”) in a bizarre way:

Its Office Manager,

nonlawyer F.M. Nazar Khan (“Khan”), filed a two-page document
that set out a purported explanation of Raheel’s actions, coupled
with a few attached documents that did not at all respond to
Williams’ allegations as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. (“Rule”)
8(b).
That in turn led to the filing by Williams’ counsel of a
motion for entry of a default judgment.

In turn Khan (still

acting on his own and not through counsel) tendered a purported
response and a motion to dismiss the motion for default judgment,
each reflecting a total lack of understanding of what the Rules
and federal practice called for.

This Court promptly (on

September 6) struck all of Khan’s efforts and ordered that an

answer be filed by Raheel by September 27.
When Raheel (this time acting through counsel) then filed
its Answer, its counsel violated both (1) the provisions of this
District Court’s LR 5.2(f) and (2) the boldface initial paragraph
of this Court’s own website reinforcing that LR by nondelivery of
a hard copy to this Court’s chambers.

That resulted in the

imposition of a modest fine as presaged by the website and,
because the Answer was unsatisfactory, also caused the striking
of the Answer and the granting of leave to file an Amended Answer
by October 17.
On that date Raheel’s retained lawyers1 filed both (1) what
was again captioned as an Answer (not an Amended Answer),
including affirmative defenses (“ADs”), and (2) a document
captioned “Defendants [sic] Rule 26(a)(1) Initial Disclosures.”
Then, after this Court had already dictated this memorandum
opinion and order addressing the numerous flaws in those filings,
Raheel’s counsel proceeded to deliver another version of the
Answer to this Court’s chambers this morning--this one curing
what had been a violation of LR 10.12 but retaining all of the
other defects that this Court had already noted as to the

1

This sentence speaks in plural terms as a sheer guess
because, believe it or not, the Answer was totally unsigned!
2

Even that simple task did not come off without a
mistake--counsel repeated Complaint ¶33 a second time as
Complaint ¶34, omitting the actual Complaint ¶34 entirely.
2

original filing.
Unfortunately, although Raheel’s counsel have done somewhat
better than their legally unlettered client, their own filings
betray a serious lack of knowledge and understanding of the
operative standards established both by the Rules and this
District Court’s LRs.

Both filings are also stricken, and

Raheel’s counsel must go back to the drawing board immediately.
As for the “Initial Disclosures” document, Rule 26(a)(1)(A)
specifies what each party must provide to the other parties at
the outset, but it does not call for filing with the court.

And

consistently with that provision, LR 26.3 expressly prohibits the
court filing of discovery materials except as permitted by that
LR (of course, the placement of Rule 26 within the Rules--it is
part of Title V captioned “Disclosures and Discovery”--brings
such advance disclosure within the prohibition imposed by LR
26.3).
To turn to the Answer, it too flouts several of the
applicable provisions of the Rules and LRs.

Although what

follows has made no attempt to be exhaustive, and Williams’
counsel is free to interpose whatever other objections she notes,
this opinion will tick off a series of deficiencies on the part
of Raheel’s counsel.
First, though this Court has made no effort to parse the
entirety of Raheel’s Answer, several of its paragraphs pose

3

obvious problems.

For one thing, it is extraordinarily doubtful

that Raheel can deny the allegations of Complaint ¶¶1 through 3,
as it has, in the objective good faith (or perhaps even the
subjective good faith) demanded by Rule 11(b).

For another

thing, the denials in Answer ¶¶7 and 24 are patently
nonsensical.3
Next, Raheel’s efforts to invoke the Rule 8(b)(5) disclaimer
to obtain the benefit of deemed denials (Answer ¶¶4 and 34)
depart fatally from the plain path marked out by that Rule.
Moreover, even if the Rule’s route had been followed faithfully,
counsel’s coupling of a disclaimer with a denial of the
corresponding Complaint allegations is oxymoronic--how can a
party that asserts (presumably in good faith) that it lacks
knowledge (or, as Rule 8(b)(5) requires, even enough information
to form a belief) as to the truth of an allegation then proceed
to deny it in accordance with Rule 11(b)?
Lastly, Raheel’s addition of no fewer than ten ADs does
violence to the concept of an AD as admitting a plaintiff’s
allegations but explaining why a defendant is nonetheless not
liable (or perhaps is liable for less than plaintiff claims, as

3

Indeed, except for a few admitted paragraphs and a couple
of responses (next discussed) that violate Rule 8(b)(5), every
one of the Complaint’s allegations is denied. This Court is of
course not in a position to pass any substantive judgment on the
issues posed by the parties’ conflicting positions, but it is
hoped that Raheel’s counsel will be constantly mindful of the
Rule 11(b) requirements on returning to the drawing board.
4

in the case of comparative negligence)--see the uniform caselaw
applying Rule 8(c) and, as well, App’x ¶5 to State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Riley, 199 F.R.D. 276, 279 (N.D. Ill. 2001)).
Thus once a plaintiff’s version of the facts is controverted by
its denial in an answer, any purported AD that sets out
defendant’s different version of events plays no part in the
pleadings.4

Hence most of the purported ADs are inappropriate

and should be omitted from Raheel’s new pleading.5

In addition,

the three purported ADs that do not fit the just-stated criticism
are problematic on their own.
1.

Here are their shortcomings:

AD 1 is the equivalent of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion

and does not fit comfortably in the Rule 8(c) category.
Moreover, it is simply wrong in substantive terms and must
be omitted from Raheel’s rewrite.
2.

AD 2 is a model illustration of the inappropriate

use of ADs.

That type of laundry list is totally

uninformative, wholly at odds with the concept of notice
pleading that is incumbent on defendants as well as
plaintiffs in the federal system.

If Raheel has any bona

fide basis for asserting any of the listed ADs, that must be

4

There may be rare exceptions, but the text states the
virtually universal principle.
5

AD 7 should be singled out as particularly troublesome.
It demonstrates a total lack of understanding of the law of
employment discrimination.
5

done is a way that apprises Williams’ counsel (and this
Court) of Raheel’s actual basis for advancing its
contention.
3.

AD 10 makes no sense at all.

There is of course no

way in which a party can “waive” a presently unknown AD.
Raheel’s purported reservation of rights is meaningless--if,
as and when it learns of another claimed AD, it must bring
the subject on through an appropriate motion.
In summary, it is really astonishing that any federal
practitioner can go wrong in so many ways in a comparatively
short space.6

With both of the currently filed documents having

been stricken, Raheel is ordered to file a self-contained Amended
Answer on or before October 31, 2011, failing which all of the
allegations of Williams’ Complaint will be deemed to have been
admitted.
Because all of the items set out here (save Khan’s initial
aborted efforts) are the fault of counsel rather than of the
client, no charge is to be made to Raheel by its counsel for the
added work and expense incurred in correcting counsel’s errors.

6

It may well be that Raheel’s lawyers have little
familiarity with federal practice, so that the extended
criticisms here may be attributable to sheer ignorance. In that
regard, this Court notes that the Answer contains a verification
by Khan (something totally unnecessary in the federal practice)
that refers not to the Rules but to “Section 1-109 of the Code of
Civil Procedure”--the code that governs Illinois state court
practice and is inapplicable in this District Court.
6

Raheel’s counsel are ordered to apprise their client to that
effect by letter, with a copy to be transmitted to this Court’s
chambers as an informational matter (not for filing).
It is frankly regrettable that the only sanction here should
be the noncollection of any fee for spending the time to correct
one’s own mistakes.

If this District Court had a mandatory and

meaningful continuing legal education program, some compulsory
enrollment and attendance would be very much in order.

________________________________________
Milton I. Shadur
Senior United States District Judge
Date:

October 18, 2011

7