Shoffner v. Astrue

Filing 41

MEMORANDUM Opinion Signed by the Honorable Samuel Der-Yeghiayan on 6/12/2014. (td, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
CHARLES M. SHOFFNER,

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Plaintiff,
v.
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,
Defendant.

No. 11 C 5427

MEMORANDUM OPINION
SAMUEL DER-YEGHIAYAN, District Judge
This matter is before the court on Plaintiff Charles M. Shoffner’s (Shoffner)
motion for summary judgment. For the reasons stated below, the motion is granted
in part and this matter is remanded to Defendant Social Security Administration
(SSA) for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

BACKGROUND
The record reflects that in May of 1999 Shoffner, who is married and a father
of three children, had been working as a machinist for twenty years, and did
landscape work on the side. Shoffner was returning from a job to the main base and
was a passenger in a landscaping truck when an accident occurred, causing the truck
to tip onto its side. During the accident, the driver was thrown onto Shoffner,

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causing serious spinal injuries to Shoffner. Shoffner also alleges that he suffers from
certain mental impairments. Shoffner alleges that he was disabled beginning in May
of 1999. In May of 2009, Shoffner applied for Supplemental Security Income (SSI).
Shoffner’s application was denied, and then denied again on reconsideration.
Shoffner then requested an evidentiary hearing before an Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ). After a hearing (Hearing), the ALJ denied the claim for SSI, and the Appeals
Council subsequently denied Shoffner’s request for review. Shoffner subsequently
filed the instant action on August 10, 2011. Shoffner has filed a motion for summary
judgment, seeking to have the ALJ’s decision reversed and remanded for an award of
benefits, and seeking in the alternative to have this case remanded to the ALJ for
further proceedings to correct errors made by the ALJ. SSA opposes the motion for
summary judgment and requests that the court affirm the ALJ’s decision.

LEGAL STANDARD
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §405(g), a party can seek judicial review of
administrative decisions made under the Social Security Act. When an ALJ’s
decision is deemed to be “the final action of the Social Security Administration, the
reviewing district court examines the ALJ’s decision to determine whether
substantial evidence supports it and whether the ALJ applied the proper legal
criteria.” Allord v. Astrue, 631 F.3d 411, 415 (7th Cir. 2011).

DISCUSSION
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An ALJ examines a claim of disability under a five-step process. Craft v.
Astrue, 539 F.3d 668, 673-74 (7th Cir. 2008). In step one, the ALJ “considers
whether the applicant is engaging in substantial gainful activity.” Id. In step two,
the ALJ “evaluates whether an alleged physical or mental impairment is severe,
medically determinable, and meets a durational requirement.” Id. In step three, the
ALJ “compares the impairment to a list of impairments that are considered
conclusively disabling.” Id. If the applicant’s impairment satisfies “or equals one of
the listed impairments, then the applicant is considered disabled” and the inquiry
ends. Id. If the inquiry continues, in step four, the ALJ “assesses an applicant’s
residual functional capacity (RFC) and ability to engage in past relevant work.” Id.
In step five, the ALJ “assesses the applicant’s RFC, as well as her age, education,
and work experience to determine whether the applicant can engage in other work”
and “[i]f the applicant can engage in other work, he is not disabled.” Id.
In the instant appeal, Shoffner argues: (1) that the ALJ erred in his step three
analysis, (2) that the ALJ erred in his RFC determination, (3) that the ALJ erred in
evaluating the credibility of Shoffner, and (4) that the ALJ erred in his step five
analysis.

I. Step Three Analysis
Shoffner argues that the ALJ erred in his step three analysis, when he was
required to compare the impairment to a list of impairments that are considered
conclusively disabling, and determine whether Shoffner’s impairment satisfies or
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equals one of the listed impairments. Craft, 539 F.3d at 673-74. The ALJ concluded
that Shoffner’s “impairments do not meet or medically equal any listed impairment. .
. .” (AR 11). Shoffner points to medical evidence in the record that appears to
indicate that Shoffner met the requirements for Listing 1.04. While an ALJ does not
need to point to every portion of the record upon which the ALJ relied, the ALJ must
do more than provide conclusory statements and must build a logical bridge from the
record to his conclusions. See Pepper v. Colvin, 712 F.3d 351, 362 (7th Cir.
2013)(stating that “[i]n rendering a decision, an ALJ must build a logical bridge from
the evidence to his conclusion”)(internal quotations omitted)(quoting Schmidt v.
Barnhart, 395 F.3d 737, 744 (7th Cir. 2005)). The ALJ in considering the criteria of
any section in category 1.01, such as Listing 1.04, concluded that Shoffner’s
“musculoskeletal injuries and residuals of surgery do not satisfy the criteria. . . .”
(AR 11). The ALJ further states that “[t]he required objective and neurological
findings are not demonstrated by the evidence of the record.” (AR 11). However, as
Shoffner points out there is medical evidence in the record that pertains to listings in
category 1.01 such as Listing 1.04. (AR 331, 395-96). Listing 1.04 includes
“[d]isorders of the spine (e.g., herniated nucleus pulposus, spinal arachnoiditis, spinal
stenosis, osteoarthritis, degenerative disc disease, facet arthritis, vertebral fracture),
resulting in compromise of a nerve root (including the cauda equina) or the spinal
cord. . . .” 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. The record includes evidence that
showed that after Shoffner was seriously injured in the truck accident while working,
a cervical laminectomy and L-S laminectomy were subsequently performed. (AR
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395-96). There is also evidence in the record indicating, for example, that Shoffner
had a herniated disc C6-C7, and “nucleus pulposus and fibrocartilage tissues with
ragged fraying and fibular degenerative changes.” (AR 331). Shoffner also correctly
points out that, based on the medical record, the ALJ should have addressed listings
such as Listing 1.03, which deals in part with “[r]econstructive surgery or surgical
arthrodesis of a major weight-bearing joint, with inability to ambulate effectively”
and Section 4.00, which deals with the cardiovascular system. 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404,
Subpt. P, App. 1. There is no indication that the ALJ adequately considered such
listings.
Shoffner also argues that the ALJ failed to properly consider his psychiatric
impairments when determining whether his impairments met the requirements for
Listing 12.04, which deals with Affective Disorders. Shoffner argues that although
the ALJ considered paragraph B criteria for Affective Disorders, which deals with a
set of impairment-related functional limitations, the ALJ erred by not considering
paragraph A criteria for Affective Disorders, which deals with a set of medical
findings. Id. The ALJ specifically addressed the paragraph B criteria and paragraph
C criteria finding that the criteria for paragraph B were not met and the criteria for
paragraph C were met. (AR 11-12). Although the ALJ adequately addressed the
paragraph B criteria and paragraph C criteria, since this case will be remanded for
further proceedings, the ALJ on remand should address the paragraph A criteria as
well.

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Shoffner has also shown that Dr. Larry Kravitz (Kravitz) mistakenly testified
at the Hearing that Shoffner’s alcohol dependence was in partial remission. (AR 49).
The ALJ relied upon such information provided by Kravitz and stated in his findings
that Shoffner’s alcohol dependence was in “partial remission.” (AR 11). SSA
admits that Kravitz misstated the diagnosis of Shoffner at the Hearing. (Ans. 7).
SSA argues, however, that there was no significant prejudice to Shoffner by such
mistake. The ALJ indicated that in formulating his decision, he took the testimony of
Kravitz into consideration, and thus the ALJ may have relied in part on inaccurate
information. (AR 15). On remand, the ALJ should ensure that his findings are
premised only on accurate information concerning Shoffner’s limitations.
Finally, Shoffner correctly points out that the ALJ failed to specify whether he
considered the effect of the combination of Shoffner’s physical and mental
impairments at step three. In determining whether a claimant has a disability, “[a]n
ALJ must also analyze a claimant’s impairments in combination.” Arnett v. Astrue,
676 F.3d 586, 592 (7th Cir. 2012). SSA argues that it can be implied from the
content of the ALJ’s decision that he considered the effect of such a combination of
impairments. (Ans. 8). On remand, the ALJ should specifically address the effect of
the combination of impairments so as to make his findings clear and unambiguous in
this regard.
SSA also argues that Shoffner cannot show that he meets the durational
requirement in Listing 12.04. (Ans. 4). However, Shoffner argues, and SSA does
not dispute, that the ALJ never addressed the statutory durational requirement when
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conducting the Hearing or in making his decision at step three. Thus, it is improper
to consider such an argument on review at this juncture. Steele v. Barnhart, 290 F.3d
936, 941 (7th Cir. 2002)(stating that ”principles of administrative law require the
ALJ to rationally articulate the grounds for her decision and confine [court] review to
the reasons supplied by the ALJ”).
Although Shoffner has not shown at this juncture that he meets all of the
requirements for any particular listing, Shoffner has shown that the ALJ failed to
provide a logical bridge between the record and his conclusions, and failed to address
pertinent listings and criteria at step three. On remand, the ALJ should address all
pertinent listings criteria, and should adequately explain his conclusions at step three.

II. RFC Determination
Shoffner argues that the ALJ erred in his RFC determination. The RFC
determination “is an assessment of what work-related activities the claimant can
perform despite her limitations.” Young v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 995, 1000-01 (7th Cir.
2004). The ALJ must base the RFC determination “on all the relevant evidence in
the record.” Id.; see also Arnett v. Astrue, 676 F.3d 586, 591 (7th Cir. 2012)(stating
that an ALJ is not required to “mention every snippet of evidence in the record,” but
an ALJ “must analyze a claimant’s impairments in combination” and “may not
ignore entire lines of contrary evidence”). The ALJ concluded that Shoffner “has the
residual functional capacity to perform light unskilled work . . . not requiring more
than occasional overhead reaching, kneeling, stooping, crouching, crawling; or
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climbing of ladders ropes and scaffolds; and with only occasional contact with the
general public.” (AR 12). The ALJ in determining Shoffner’s RFC considered facts
such as Shoffner’s gait and ability to walk without support, limitations in performing
tasks such as overhead reaching, kneeling, stooping, and crouching, and Shoffner’s
mental limitations. (AR 14).
Shoffner argues that the ALJ failed to discuss his congestive heart disease and
coronary artery disease or the limitations resulting from his pain stemming from his
spinal condition. (Mot. 9). Although the ALJ referenced Shoffner’s “congestive
heart failure,” the ALJ’s decision does not indicate that the ALJ gave any meaningful
consideration to the full extent of Shoffner’s heart condition or the limiting effects of
pain relating to his spinal condition. (AR 12-15). On remand, the ALJ must
adequately consider and discuss such issues when making the RFC determination.

III. Credibility Evaluation
Shoffner argues that the ALJ erred in evaluating the credibility of Shoffner.
Credibility assessments made by an ALJ are given “special, but not unlimited,
deference.” Shauger v. Astrue, 675 F.3d 690, 696 (7th Cir. 2012)(stating that “[t]he
ALJ must consider a number of factors imposed by regulation, . . . and must support
credibility findings with evidence in the record”). The ALJ concluded that
Shoffner’s “statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of
[the] symptoms, when compared against the objective evidence and evaluated using
factors listed in Social Security Ruling 96-7p, w[ere] not credible in view of
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especially the lack of supporting findings in the documentary records along with the
use of medication, pursuit of treatment and activities that include two jobs lasting
three months after his alleged onset of disability.” (AR 13). The ALJ also stated that
Shoffner’s “testimony was inconsistent such as that he could not walk even 50 feet
but also that he walks the dog.” (AR 13).
Shoffner correctly points out that the ALJ’s credibility assessment contains
vague generalities that fail to identify the meaning of such statements or sufficient
basis for the credibility finding. For example, the ALJ fails to explain what he meant
by his reference to Shoffner’s “use of medication” as a basis to find Shoffner’s
testimony lacking in credibility. (AR 13). Also, to the extent that the ALJ faulted
Shoffner for his “pursuit of treatment,” the record does not indicate that the ALJ ever
questioned Shoffner in this regard and gave Shoffner a chance to explain any gaps in
treatment. (AR 13). As to the ALJ’s conclusion that because Shoffner stated he
could walk his dog, he was not credible as to his limitation in walking no more than
50 feet, the ALJ again failed to adequately develop the record. At the very least, the
ALJ should inquire whether walking the dog entailed walking more than 50 feet.
Nor did the ALJ explore in detail other relevant evidence in the record relating to
walking the dog such as the testimony of Shoffner’s wife indicating that Shoffner
“tried walking the dogs,” but “ends up turning back around.” (AR 13, 44). The ALJ
stated in his decision that Shoffner “walks the dogs but turns around after a block.”
(AR 13). However, Shoffner’s wife did not specifically testify as to how far
Shoffner was able to walk the dog without needing to turn back. (AR 44). The ALJ
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also faulted Shoffner for attempting to work for three months after the onset of his
disability, finding that it was a basis to conclude that Shoffner was exaggerating his
symptoms. However, the ALJ again failed to adequately develop the record as to
such employment and assess whether such failed employment actually supported
Shoffner’s disability claim. Shoffner contends, for example, that the ALJ did not
consider facts such as that the employment was only part-time and that Shoffner was
ultimately terminated from such employment due to his physical limitations.
Shoffner did not testify at the Hearing that he was fully capable of working those
three months. He testified that he “had to force [him]self,” and that he “couldn’t
tolerate the pain after [he] got home. . . .” (AR 37). Shoffner testified that the
employment ended because he “couldn’t tolerate the pain.” (AR 28). The ALJ failed
to adequately explain why Shoffner’s apparent attempt to test his limitations to see if
he was able to engage in gainful employment should have been held against Shoffner
as evidence of a lack of a disability. Thus, while Shoffner has not established his
credibility at this juncture, on remand the ALJ should properly develop the record
and provide a logical bridge between the evidence in the record and any conclusion
by the ALJ as to Shoffner’s credibility as to his symptoms and their effects.

IV. Step Five Analysis
Shoffner argues that the ALJ erred in his step five analysis, when he was
required to assess the applicant’s RFC, as well as his age, education, and work
experience to determine whether the applicant could engage in other work. Craft,
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539 F.3d at 673-74. Shoffner argues that the ALJ did not pose an appropriate
hypothetical question to the vocational expert (VE). See Steele, 290 F.3d at 942
(stating that “[h]ypothetical questions posed to vocational experts ordinarily must
include all limitations supported by medical evidence in the record”)(emphasis in
original). SSA argues that the hypothetical questions that the ALJ presented to the
VE was proper because it included “all credible limitations as found by the ALJ.”
(Ans. 11). However, as discussed above, the ALJ erred in certain credibility
determinations. Thus, on remand, the ALJ should reformulate the hypothetical
questions posed to the VE accordingly. Based on the above, Shoffner’s motion for
summary judgment is granted in part and the instant action is remanded to the SSA
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis, Shoffner’s motion for summary judgment is
granted in part and this matter is remanded to the SSA for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.

___________________________________
Samuel Der-Yeghiayan
United States District Court Judge
Dated: June 12, 2014

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