Armstrong v. Hayden

Filing 63

WRITTEN Opinion signed by the Honorable Charles P. Kocoras on 5/24/2012: Armstrong's petition for habeas relief is denied with prejudice. All pending motions are denied as moot. (For further details see minute order.) Case Terminated Mailed notice(sct, )

Order Form (01/2005)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois
Name of Assigned Judge
or Magistrate Judge

Charles P. Kocoras

CASE NUMBER

11 C 6196

CASE
TITLE

Sitting Judge if Other
than Assigned Judge

DATE

May 24, 2012

US ex rel. Armstrong vs. Circuit Court of DuPage County

DOCKET ENTRY TEXT

Armstrong’s petition for habeas relief is denied with prejudice. All pending motions are denied as moot.

O[ For further details see text below.]

Docketing to mail notices.
*Mail AO 450 form.

ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on Petitioner Craig Armstrong’s (“Armstrong”) petition for a writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. For the reasons set forth below, Armstrong’s petition is denied with
prejudice.
On December 3, 2010, Armstrong pleaded guilty in the Circuit Court of DuPage County to operating an
uninsured vehicle and driving on a suspended license. He was sentenced to thirty days imprisonment and one
year of conditional discharge. Armstrong appealed his conviction and sentence to the Second District Appellate
Court of Illinois (the “Appellate Court”). On May 12, 2011, the Appellate Court entered an order advising
Armstrong that he must withdraw his guilty plea to proceed with his appeal. On November 2, 2011, Armstrong
had yet to withdraw his guilty plea, and the Appellate Court dismissed his appeal. Armstrong did not seek review
from the Illinois Supreme Court.
On September 6, 2011, Armstrong filed a petition for habeas relief with this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254. Armstrong has been released from custody with respect to the underlying convictions, although he is
currently incarcerated at DuPage County Jail for unrelated matters. Armstrong’s release from custody on the
challenged convictions does not divest him of standing to bring his petition because his convictions carry postcustody collateral consequences. See Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1998). Particularly, Armstrong’s
convictions will presumably affect his ability to have his driving privileges reinstated in the future. See 730 Ill.
Comp. Stat. 5/5-5-5(d).
A district court may entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a state prisoner who
is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Prior to assessing
the merits of a habeas petition, the Court must consider whether the petitioner has procedurally defaulted his
claims. The procedural default doctrine precludes a federal court from reaching the merits of a habeas claim if
the claim was not presented to the state courts and the state courts would now hold the claim procedurally barred.
Perruquet v. Briley, 390 F.3d 505, 514 (7th Cir. 2004).

11C6196 US ex rel. Armstrong vs. Circuit Court of DuPage County

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ORDER
Respondent contends that Armstrong’s claims are procedurally defaulted because he did not exhaust his
state court remedies. Despite having pleaded guilty to the underlying offenses, Armstrong attempted to appeal
his conviction and sentence. On May 12, 2011, the Appellate Court notified Armstrong that his appeal would
be dismissed if he did not withdraw his guilty plea in a timely manner. Nearly six months later, Armstrong had
not withdrawn his plea, and the Appellate Court dismissed his appeal on November 2, 2011.
Armstrong had thirty-five days thereafter, until December 7, 2011, to request discretionary review from
the Illinois Supreme Court. See Ill. Sup. Ct. Rule 315(b). He failed to do so and is time-barred from doing so
in the future. Armstrong has thus failed to exhaust his available state court remedies, and his habeas petition is
procedurally defaulted.
Nonetheless, a district court may excuse a petitioner’s procedural default if
he demonstrates either: (1) cause for the default and resulting prejudice, or (2) that a miscarriage of justice will
result if the court fails to consider the claim on the merits. Perruquet, 390 F.3d at 514. To establish cause for
his default, Armstrong must show “that some external impediment blocked him from asserting his federal claim
in state court.” Id. at 314-15. Armstrong contends that the DuPage County Circuit Court, Appellate Court,
State’s Attorney, and public defender conspired to prevent him from withdrawing his guilty plea, resulting in the
dismissal of his appeal. Even if these far-fetched allegations were true, Armstrong has failed to offer any
explanation for his failure to present his claims to the Illinois Supreme Court. Therefore, Armstrong has failed
to establish cause for his default.
Nor has Armstrong convinced the Court that our refusal to address the merits of his claim would result
in a miscarriage of justice, which requires a showing that “he is actually innocent of the crime for which he was
convicted.” Id. at 515. Armstrong pleaded guilty to the underlying traffic violations in the first instance and does
not claim that he did not commit these violations. He has yet to withdraw his guilty plea and has offered no
evidence to support his allegations of a conspiracy between state court officials to bar him from doing so.
Therefore, we decline to excuse Armstrong’s procedural default, and his habeas petition is denied. Because
Armstrong is time-barred from exhausting his state court remedies, the denial is with prejudice.
As a final matter, Armstrong cannot use his habeas petition as a vehicle to assert civil claims against the
DuPage County Jail or to collaterally attack other convictions. Armstrong has filed nearly forty documents in
this case, some of which include allegations of wrongful conduct by prison officials. These matters are not
appropriately resolved on a Section 2254 petition. Should Armstrong seek to pursue these grievances, he must
do so through the appropriate administrative and legal channels. Armstrong has also filed documents challenging
his convictions in unrelated matters. Because a habeas petition brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 may only attack
a single criminal judgment, the Court declines to consider Armstrong’s additional claims. See Boriboune v.
Berge, 391 F.3d 852, 852 (7th Cir. 2004).
In light of the foregoing, Armstrong’s petition for habeas relief is denied with prejudice. All pending
motions are denied as moot.

Date: May 24, 2012
CHARLES P. KOCORAS
U.S. District Judge

11C6196 US ex rel. Armstrong vs. Circuit Court of DuPage County

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