Juhasz v. Groupon, Inc.

Filing 20

MEMORANDUM Order Signed by the Honorable Milton I. Shadur on 11/4/2011:Mailed notice(srn, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
DANA JUHASZ, etc.,
Plaintiff,
v.
GROUPON, INC.,
Defendant.

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No.

11 C 6577

MEMORANDUM ORDER
Groupon, Inc. (“Groupon”) has filed its Answer and
Affirmative Defenses (“ADs”) to the Complaint brought against it
by one of its “Deal Vetters,” Dana Juhasz, advanced on her own
behalf and on behalf of all other persons who assertedly were or
are similarly situated.

This memorandum order is issued sua

sponte because of some problematic aspects of Groupon’s
responsive pleading.
For one thing, the use of denials by Groupon’s counsel is
out of sync with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rules”)
or, more generally, the federal concept of notice pleading that
is incumbent on defendants and plaintiffs alike.

For example,

the second sentence in the Answer reads:
Groupon denies each and every allegation, matter or
thing in Plaintiff’s Complaint, except as specifically
admitted or qualified herein.
But the second sentence of Rule 8(b)(3) permits that locution
only as an alternative to the specific denial of designated
allegations--specifics that the rest of the Answer sets out

chapter and verse.

Here the sentence quoted earlier in this

paragraph adds nothing but uncertainty to the mix, and it is
stricken.
To turn to those specifics, many of the answering paragraphs
contain denials that are meaningless and are once again a
potential source of confusion.

For example, there are a large

number of Answer paragraphs that begin with particularized
admissions or denials as called for by Rule 8(b)(1)(B) and then,
after having dealt exhaustively with Juhasz’s allegations in that
manner, go on to say:
Groupon denies the remaining allegations of
Paragraph -- of the Complaint.
But the problem is that there are no “remaining allegations” in
those Complaint paragraphs that are left to be denied (see Answer
¶¶2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 21, 23, 25 and 31).

Groupon’s counsel should go

back to the drawing board to see whether those assertions can and
should be deleted from its Answer.1
As indicated earlier, Groupon’s counsel has followed the
detailed Answer with ADs--a host of them, eight in number.
Whenever this Court encounters such a grab bag, its experience
suggests that at least some of them are problematic.

1

This Court

While counsel is at it, a sharp look ought to be taken at
Answer ¶¶2 (does Groupon really deny Juhasz’s allegation there?)
and 3 (as to which a simple admission would appear to be in
order). These are just examples spotted by this Court’s
threshold examination--Groupon’s counsel would do well to take a
hard look at the entire Complaint.
2

will however leave it to Juhasz’s counsel to challenge any of the
ADs as inconsistent with the concept embodied in Rule 8(c) and in
the caselaw construing it (see also App’x ¶5 to State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Riley, 199 F.R.D. 276, 279 (N.D. Ill. 2001)) or
as challengeable on any other basis.

________________________________________
Milton I. Shadur
Senior United States District Judge
Date:

November 4, 2011

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