Gaston v. Ghosh et al

Filing 124

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable James B. Zagel on 5/23/2016. Mailed notice (ao,)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
JAMES GASTON,
Plaintiff,
No. 11 C 6612
Judge James B. Zagel

v.
PARTHASARATHI GHOSH, et al.,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Defendants Saleh Obaisi and Wexford Health Sources, Inc.’s
Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). For the following reasons, Defendant’s
Motion is granted in part and denied in part.
I. BACKGROUND
On May 11, 2009, Plaintiff James Gaston (“Plaintiff” or “Gaston”), an inmate at
Stateville Correctional Center, was treated in the Stateville Health Care Unit for left knee pain
and swelling. The Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”) contracted with Wexford Health
Sources, Inc. (“Wexford”) to provide health services to inmates throughout Illinois. Plaintiff was
given Motrin, a cloth knee brace and ice for his knee, but it continued to swell and cause him
pain. Over the next two years, Plaintiff continued to seek medical attention for his left knee and,
eventually, his right knee. He underwent an operation on his left knee on August 2, 2011 at the
UIC Medical Center but alleges he was never provided with proper follow-up care or the
physical therapy his doctor had ordered. On October 2, 2012, Plaintiff underwent an operation on
his right knee at UIC Medical Center, which he also alleges was improperly treated postoperation. Finally, Plaintiff alleges he has been unable to receive adequate medical attention for

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an abdominal hernia and left side sciatica that developed in November 2013 and January 2015
respectively.
Plaintiff initiated this lawsuit on August 27, 2015 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
alleging that Wexford and several physicians including Saleh Obaisi, M.D. (“Dr. Obaisi”)
(collectively “Defendants”) committed deliberate indifference and reckless disregard of his
serious medical needs. Specifically, Plaintiff alleged an Eighth Amendment violation (Count I); a
Monell theory of liability against Wexford (Count II); a respondeat superior theory of liability
against Wexford based on the actions and/or inactions of Defendants and Stateville-employed
physicians Parthasarathi Ghosh (“Dr. Ghosh”), Liping Zhang (“Dr. Zhang”) and Imhotep Carter
(“Dr. Carter”) (Count III); and a deliberate indifference claim against Dr. Obaisi for delaying
treatment of Plaintiff’s back pain and hernia (Count IV).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) does not test the merits of a claim,
but rather the sufficiency of the complaint. Gibson v. City of Chicago, 910 F.2d 1510, 1520 (7th
Cir. 1990). In deciding a 12(b)(6) motion, the court accepts all well-pleaded facts as true and
draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Id. at 1521. To survive a 12(b)(6)
motion, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “A complaint
should not be dismissed for failure to state [a] claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the
plaintiff is unable to prove any set of facts which would entitle the plaintiff to relief.” Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 546 (2007).

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III. DISCUSSION
A. Respondeat Superior Claim
Defendants argue that the respondeat superior claim against Wexford (Count III)
should be dismissed because Wexford, a private corporation contracting with the government, is
immunized from respondeat superior liability under § 1983. See Monell v. Dept. of Social
Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (holding that a municipal corporation is not vicariously liable
under respondeat superior for the constitutional torts of its employees); Iskander v. Village of
Forest Park, 690 F.2d 126, 128 (7th Cir. 1982) (extending Monell to private corporations as well
as municipalities). However, in 2014 the Seventh Circuit indicated that it was willing to
reconsider its application of Monell to private corporations. In Shields v. Illinois Dept. of
Corrections, the Seventh Circuit noted that Supreme Court precedent does not require the
extension of Monell to the private context. 746 F.3d 782 (7th Cir. 2014). Indeed, the Supreme
Court has applied respondeat superior to private corporations in Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co.,
398 U.S. 144 (1970), which remains good law. Thus, the Seventh Circuit conceded:
we should not foreclose respondeat superior liability against private
corporations under § 1983. Private prison employees and prison medical
providers have frequent opportunities . . . to violate inmates’
constitutional rights . . . respondeat superior liability for the employer
itself is likely to be more effective at deterring such actions.
Shields, 746 F.3d at 794.
The Court went on to question why the Seventh Circuit (and all the other circuits that
have considered the question) extended Monell to the private corporation context, even though
the Supreme Court has not spoken on the issue and there are compelling reasons to limit Monell
to municipal corporations.
Ultimately, however, since the plaintiff in Shields did not ask the Seventh Circuit to
overrule Iskander and its progeny, the Court declined to rule on that issue, concluding, “For now,
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this circuit’s case law still extends Monell from municipalities to private corporations.” Id. at 796
(citations omitted). As the Seventh Circuit is binding on this Court, I must follow Seventh
Circuit precedent, which immunizes private corporations like Wexford from § 1983 respondeat
superior liability like the claim asserted here. Therefore, Count III is dismissed.
B. Improper Joinder Claim
Defendants’ second argument is that Count IV, which added a new party defendant, Dr.
Obaisi, was improperly joined pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 18 and 20. Rule 20 permits joinder of
multiple defendants in one action only if claims are asserted jointly or severally, or if the claims
“aris[e] out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and any
question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 20.
Here, Plaintiff added claims against Dr. Obaisi alleging failure to properly care for Plaintiff’s
right knee after the 2012 operation as well as new allegations about Plaintiff’s subsequent hernia
and back pain. Although the hernia and back pain are distinct and separate injuries from
Plaintiff’s knee issues, the narrative of Plaintiff’s attempt to seek medical care for his knees is
closely intertwined with the narrative of his patient relationship with Dr. Obaisi. Because these
incidences of alleged deliberate indifference share sufficient questions of law and fact and arise
out of the same series of transactions or occurrences, judicial economy is best served by joining
the claims as Plaintiff has done in the Third Amended Complaint. Thus, Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss Count IV is denied.

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IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion is granted in part and denied in part.
Count III of the Third Amended Complaint is dismissed.
ENTER:

James B. Zagel
United States District Judge
DATE: May 23, 2016

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