Cockle v. Astrue
Filing
31
MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order, Signed by the Honorable Maria Valdez on 6/26/2013. (ea, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
ADRIENNE COCKLE,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security,1
Defendant.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
No. 11 C 6689
Magistrate Judge
Maria Valdez
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This action was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to review the final decision
of the Commissioner of Social Security denying plaintiff Adrienne Cockle’s claim for
Supplemental Security Income and Disability Insurance Benefits. The parties have
consented to the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 636(c). For the reasons that follow, Cockle’s motion for summary judgment
[Doc. No. 19] is granted in part and denied in part, and the matter is remanded to
the Commissioner for further proceedings.
Carolyn W. Colvin is substituted for her predecessor Michael J. Astrue pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d).
1
BACKGROUND
I.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Cockle originally applied for Supplemental Security Income and Disability
Insurance Benefits on May 24, 2006, alleging a disability since August 5, 2004.2 (R.
122-23, 143.) Her application was denied on July 21, 2006 and upon reconsideration
on March 2, 2007. (R. 78-89.) Cockle filed a timely request for a hearing by an
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), which was held on May 6, 2009. (R. 92, 102-09.)
Cockle personally appeared and testified at the hearing and was represented by
counsel. (R. 28-77.) A vocational expert also testified. (Id.)
On May 20, 2009, the ALJ issued a decision denying Cockle’s claim for
benefits, finding her not disabled under the Social Security Act. (R. 11-23.) The
Social Security Administration Appeals Council denied Cockle’s request for review
on July 28, 2011, (R. 1-6), leaving the ALJ’s decision as the final decision of the
Commissioner and therefore reviewable by the District Court under 42 U.S.C. §
405(g). See Haynes v. Barnhart, 416 F.3d 621, 626 (7th Cir. 2005).
During the ALJ hearing, Plaintiff’s attorney amended the onset date to November
1, 2006, in light of evidence of drug and alcohol use through October 31, 2006. (R. 33.)
2
2
II.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A.
Background
Cockle was born on February 4, 1982. (R. 122.) She did not graduate from
high school but was enrolled in a GED prep course at the time of the hearing. (R.
37-38.) She lives alone in a subsidized apartment. (R. 55-57.) Cockle’s work history
was very limited and sporadic; as of the date of the hearing, she had been working
part-time as an inventory clerk, making only a total of $297.11 in wages from
December 2008 through March 2009. (R. 16, 190.) Cockle claims disability due to leg
pain stemming from an August 6, 2004 car accident, as well as mental disorders. (R.
79.)
B.
Testimony and Medical Evidence
1.
Cockle’s Testimony
Cockle testified that at her current job, she counts products by scanning a
barcode. (R. 37.) She stated that she often gets in trouble for miscounting, moving
too slowly, sitting on the floor, and wandering around. (R. 37-39, 58-60, 75-76.) She
would not be able to work a job where she had to stand up for long periods of time
due to leg pain. (R. 39-41.) She does not have a problem with sitting, and she can
lift up to fifteen pounds. (R. 44-45.) Cockle has the physical ability to type despite
difficulty turning her hand, but her typing speed is poor, at ten words per minute.
(R. 61-62.)
Cockle twice attempted suicide, including the car accident that caused her leg
injury. (R. 50-51.) Cockle had been receiving mental health treatment for several
3
years, and she testified that she continued to have feelings of depression. She
described various incidents in which she had great difficulty dealing with her anger
and was attending outpatient counseling for anger management. (R. 47-49, 52-53.)
She said that she holds her feelings in a lot, “until the point I just burst out.” (R.
48.) Cockle has a problem with concentration when people talk to her for a long
time. (R. 46.) Cockle is often anxious and fearful when she is around a lot of people,
and in those situations, she has trouble concentrating and understanding. (R. 49-50,
61.)
2.
Medical Evidence3
Dr. Piyush C. Buch completed an Advocate Christ Medical Center admission
assessment for Cockle on August 24, 2004, following her August 6 car accident,
which caused multiple fractures, multiple blunt trauma, and head injury. (R. 207.)
He reported that there was “evidence of significant deterioration in her cognitive
functioning” and that her “[i]nsight and judgment were impaired.” (Id.) Dr. Buch
diagnosed Cockle with an adjustment disorder and diminished cognitive functioning
secondary to head injury, finding no current evidence of depression. He further
stated that active psychiatric intervention was not feasible at that time. (Id.)
On December 26, 2004, Cockle was taken from the Regal Health nursing
home, where she had been staying for post-accident rehabilitation, to the emergency
3
The summary of the medical record discusses only the evidence of Cockle’s mental
limitations because the evidence relating to Cockle’s physical limitations is not relevant for
purposes of this appeal. Plaintiff does not dispute the ALJ’s finding that she retains the physical
RFC for sedentary work with a fifteen-pound lifting restriction.
4
room for psychological evaluation after she exhibited an altered mental status and
combative behavior, along with alcohol and drug abuse. (R. 380-81.) She swore at
other residents and was found naked from the waist down behind the nurse’s
station. (R. 381.) Notes from Regal Health reveal that Cockle had a history of being
combative, threatening, and aggressive with other residents and staff. (See, e.g., R.
418-23.)
Cockle was admitted to Loretto Hospital on May 31, 2005 with an admitting
diagnosis of schizoaffective disorder unspecified, a principal diagnosis of psychosis,
and a secondary diagnosis of cannabis abuse unspecified. (R. 473.) She was referred
to the hospital after becoming physically aggressive at Community Care Center,
attempting to hit and bite the nursing staff. (Id.) As a result of her aggressive and
hostile behavior, she was also unable to function or care for herself. (Id.) Cockle
spent eleven days in the hospital and was treated with medication and
psychotherapy before being discharged back to the nursing facility. (R. 474.)
On October 31, 2006, Plaintiff was admitted to St. Anthony Hospital with
depression, feelings of hopelessness, intense anxiety, and recent intoxication on
cocaine and cannabis. (R. 619.) She was discharged on November 20, 2006 following
treatment including individual counseling and medication management. (Id.)
On January 9, 2007, Dr. John W. O’Donnell completed a psychiatric
evaluation for the Bureau of Disability Determination Services (“DDS”) after
interviewing Cockle for sixty minutes. (R. 648-54.) She appeared for the evaluation
appropriately groomed and clothed. She had a slight limp with her left leg, but she
5
did not use a cane. (R. 648.) Plaintiff’s attitude and degree of cooperation were fair,
and her posture varied from sitting normally to lying halfway over the arm of her
chair, looking down at the floor. (Id.)
Cockle reported to Dr. O’Donnell she had been moved to four or five nursing
homes in the previous year as a result of her attitude, and she also described her
difficulty with people as well as the mood swings caused by her bipolar disorder. (R.
649.) Her down periods lasted three or four days, and her up periods lasted one to
two days at most. (Id.) Plaintiff had a history of substance abuse, including alcohol,
marijuana, and cocaine, but she stopped using all three substances in October 2006
following her hospitalization at St. Anthony. (R. 650.) Dr. O’Donnell diagnosed
Cockle with Bipolar Disorder NOS, with polysubstance abuse in early sustained
remission, and Personality Disorder NOS, with a guarded prognosis. (R. 654.)
On February 14, 2007, the DDS interviewed Edward Turner, Cockle’s
caseworker at the time. (R. 174-75.) Turner reported that Cockle had resided at the
Community Mental Health Council Acute Care Program for almost three months
and spent her days in a structured day treatment program. (R. 174.) She was
diagnosed with depression and bipolar, with evident mood swings. (Id.) She cried
about twice a week with depression, and when depressed, she withdrew and did not
want to be around others. (R. 174.) Approximately once a week, Cockle heard voices
that would tell her she could go and get a job, and they would question why she was
at the facility; the voices interfered with conversations and disoriented her. (Id.)
She did not follow instructions well, had a short attention span, and became
6
frustrated with any task she did not understand. (Id.) During her depressive
periods, Cockle did not get along with anyone and would often get into verbal
arguments. (Id.) When she was not depressed, she was generally cooperative,
talkative, could carry on an appropriate conversation, and got along with other
residents. (Id.) She was frequently fearful of going outside with staff, because she
thought someone might try to rob her or hit her. (R. 174-75.)
Dr. Carl Hermsmeyer, Ph.D., completed a Psychiatric Review Technique
(“PRT”) on February 27, 2007. (R. 655-68.) He reviewed Cockle’s medical record
based upon the categories of Affective Disorders (Listing 12.04), Personality
Disorders (Listing 12.08), and Substance Addiction Disorders (Listing 12.09). (R.
655.) Under the “B” criteria of the listings, he found mild limitations in her
activities of daily living; moderate limitations in maintaining social functioning and
maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace; and no episodes of decompensation.
(R. 665.) Dr. Hermsmeyer also found that the evidence did not establish the
presence of the “C” criteria. (R. 666.) He concluded that Dr. O’Donnell’s report and
Plaintiff’s daily activities indicate that the severity of her mental impairments do
not meet or equal any mental listing, but they are more than non-severe. (R. 667,
679.)
Dr. Hermsmeyer also completed a mental Residual Functional Capacity
(“RFC”) form, in which he concluded that Cockle was moderately limited in her
ability to understand, remember, and carry out detailed instructions but had no
other limitations in understanding and memory, sustained concentration and
7
persistence, social interaction, or adaptation. (R. 677-78.) Dr. Hermsmeyer found
that despite her moderate limitations, she retained the mental capacity to perform
simple one-and two-step tasks at a consistent pace. (R. 667, 679.)
Cockle received treatment from Cornerstone Services, Inc. from February 1 to
April 29, 2008. (R. 711-28.) At Plaintiff’s initial mental health assessment, the
examiner noted a history of depression as well as injurious and suicidal behavior.
(R. 719-20.) Cockle denied experiencing depression at the time but stated that she
had difficulty reacting to stress around her and experienced inappropriate and
excessive worry. (R. 719-20.) At the interview, Cockle appeared neat and clean and
was alert and calm. (R. 723-24.) Her thought content was appropriate and she
denied hallucinations, delusions, or violent ideation. (R. 724.) The examiner noted
that Plaintiff’s periodic depression, chronic worry, and history of suicidal behavior
were clinically significant, but her inability to get sufficient information about her
problems and her limited insight made it difficult to identify a particular mood or
anxiety disorder. (R. 726.) The initial diagnosis was Anxiety Disorder NOS, subject
to revision with further information, and she was also found to have characteristics
consistent with Borderline Personality Disorder. (R. 726.)
3.
Illinois Dep’t of Human Services - Office of Rehabilitation
Services
The DHS referred Cockle to Karen Kupina, an Employment Evaluator and
Qualified Mental Retardation Professional, who evaluated Cockle from May
through August 2008 and completed a Facility Evaluation Report focusing on
8
Plaintiff’s vocational interests, work aptitudes, level of vocational functioning, and
work temperament. (R. 805-09.) Kupina administered the Wide Range Achievement
Test - Revised which showed that Cockle could read at the high school level but
performed at the third-grade level in spelling and math. (R. 807.) To measure her
level of vocational functioning, Kupina administered the Valpar Multi-Level Sorting
Test, which relates to the intensity of supervision an individual requires on various
tasks, particularly those requiring the use of tools. (Id.) She performed in the 80th
percentile in errors committed but in the 15th percentile in time for completion of
the tasks, for a total performance at 33% of the norm. (Id.)
The report also included three situational assessments, the first in a clerical
position, another as a receptionist, and the last as a ticket taker/lobby attendant at
a movie theater. The first assessment involved Cockle working for two hours at the
Will County Development Office folding and stacking brochures. (R. 796.) The
quality of her work was found to meet requirements, she was self-reliant, and her
total production rate was moderate, or 50 to 75% of the norm. (R. 798.) Plaintiff’s
work speed increased as the assessment progressed, she folded the brochures
neatly, and she responded to direction. (R. 796.) Cockle worked alone and did not
have contact with coworkers during the assessment beyond an introduction and
thus was not rated in her ability to cooperate with others. (R. 797-98.)
Kupina found that Cockle would benefit from coaching to become acclimated
to a new position, to understand workplace policies and procedures, to work more
efficiently, and to maintain appropriate professional behavior. (R. 796.) Kupina
9
concluded that she would recommend Cockle for that type of work, which involved a
“quite simple” task. (R. 799.) Plaintiff also indicated that if she were assigned to do
that type of work she would do it. (Id.) Kupina stated that other assessments would
be necessary to explore Cockle’s clerical skills and how marketable she would be in
the field. (Id.)
In the second assessment, on August 1, 2008, Cockle worked as a receptionist
for two hours at Cornerstone Services. (R. 800-04.) She was asked to alphabetize six
file folders that all have last names starting with the letter S; she filed papers in an
accordion file; and she worked with the building receptionist, answering incoming
calls. (R. 800.) Cockle had great difficulty alphabetizing the file folders despite
several additional explanations of the task and being given a printed-out alphabet
for reference. (Id.) She had similar problems when asked to file papers in folders
within an accordion file. (Id.) Plaintiff answered the phone in a courteous manner,
and she used an appropriate volume and pleasant tone of voice when paging, but
she needed assistance throughout the assessment in transferring calls. (Id.)
Cockle was found to be punctual, motivated, courteous, polite, and
cooperative. (R. 801-02.) However, she needed substantial help to perform tasks, the
quality of work was frequently below requirements, and her production rate was
moderate, or 50 to 75% of norm. (R. 802-03.) Kupina concluded that despite
Plaintiff’s pleasant and cooperative demeanor, she was not recommended that kind
of work. (R. 804.)
10
Kupina’s report concluded that Cockle had a number of strengths, that she
was friendly, polite, wants to work, and will work hard even if it is not a preferred
task. (R. 808.) Kupina also noted several weaknesses, however, including Cockle’s
confusion with schedules, difficulty retaining new information, and lack of skills in
her vocational interest area of clerical work. (Id.) Kupina recommended that Cockle
pursue volunteer work on a consistent schedule for six consecutive months;
continue attending sessions with her outpatient counselor; pursue being put on the
waiting list for the Psychosocial Rehabilitation Program at Cornerstone; obtain an
eye examination; attend AA meetings; continue utilizing an appointment book; and
pursue obtaining her GED. (R. 808-09.) The report concluded that Cockle was not
recommended for community employment at that time, encouraging her to instead
complete the recommendations before seeking employment in the future. (R. 809.)
On August 29, 2008, Cockle worked in her third and final situational
assessment as a ticket taker/lobby attendant at a movie theater. (R. 810-15.) Cockle
worked directly with only two other employees, one at each of the jobs, and she had
brief contact with a manager. (R. 810.) As a ticket taker, Plaintiff was pleasant and
friendly to patrons and worked at good speed. In performing the job as a lobby
attendant, which involved cleaning lobby floors, tables, and counters, she was
thorough. (Id.) She appeared to be working cooperatively with her coworker at each
job and was respectful in her dealings with a supervisor. (R. 810, 812.) Plaintiff
maintained a high output of work completed, at 76-89% of the norm. (R. 812.)
Kupina concluded that Cockle is very personable and cooperative as long as there is
11
no conflict in a given situation; however, she fails to maintain a professional
manner when she disagrees on an issue. (Id.) Kupina would recommend Cockle for
that type of work with job coaching. She was concerned that Plaintiff’s method of
handling conflict situations could be problematic in the workplace, and it was
recommended that she work on those skills before seeking community employment.
(R. 813.)
The DHS record also includes an August 29, 2008 addendum to the trial work
report, which describes Cockle’s behavior in the week before the final assessment at
the movie theater. (R. 814-15.) The addendum states that on August 25, 2008,
Cockle left a more than four-minute long voice mail for Kupina’s supervisor
complaining that the clothing closet door was locked; she left another long voice
mail for the Director of Employment Services disputing decisions made in her first
two assessments; and she came into the office unannounced and without an
appointment on August 27 with the intention of talking to Kupina about clothing
for the August 29 assessment. (R. 814.) The addendum concluded with several
recommendations from the earlier assessment as well as the suggestion that Cockle
adhere to certain listed guidelines regarding her phone and in-person professional
interactions for a period of three consecutive months. (R. 814-15.) The addendum
stated that Cockle could reapply for employment services after she fulfilled the
recommendations. (R. 815.)
A September 25, 2008 DHS conference report also summarized Cockle’s
difficult interactions with co-workers during her assessments as well as with the
12
employment services staff. (R. 816.) The report noted that Plaintiff would become
angry with the staff when she was told to wait to seek employment, and that she
felt the evaluator’s recommendation against employment was a personal judgment.
(Id.) Her DHS file was closed on October 31, 2008, with the agency’s finding that
Cockle was not eligible for work in the community. (R. 817.)
4.
Vocational Expert’s Testimony
James Breen testified at the hearing as a Vocational Expert (“VE”). Breen
testified that a hypothetical person limited to sedentary, unskilled work, with the
additional limitation of carrying no more than fifteen pounds, could work as an
eyeglass assembler (approximately 2,000 jobs), small products sorter
(approximately 16,000 jobs), and printed circuit board assembler (approximately
6000 jobs). (R. 64.)
When the ALJ asked the VE to consider the additional limitation of having
only superficial contact with supervisors, co-workers, and the general public, the VE
responded that all of those jobs would still be available, as the assembler jobs
involve working in proximity to people but not with people. (R. 64-65.) However, if
the person was limited to having no contact with supervisors, other employees, or
the general public, she could not perform any of those jobs. (R. 65.) Similarly, if
superficial contact with others would cause concentration problems resulting in
being off task for an average of fifteen minutes out of every hour, none of the listed
jobs would be available. (R. 65-66.)
13
C.
ALJ Decision
The ALJ found that Cockle had not engaged in substantial gainful activity
since her application date of May 24, 2006. (R. 16.) At step 2, the ALJ concluded
that Cockle had the following severe impairments: residuals of multiple fractures
with rod in left leg, bipolar disorder, and dependent personality disorder. (Id.) At
step 3, the ALJ found that none of Cockle’s impairments, alone or in combination,
met or equaled a Listing. (R. 17-19.)
The ALJ next determined that Cockle had the RFC to perform sedentary
work, subject to the following limitations: a fifteen-pound lifting and carrying
restriction and only simple, unskilled work. (R. 19.) The ALJ then concluded that
given her RFC, age, and education, Cockle could perform significant numbers of
jobs in the national economy, and therefore she was not disabled under the Social
Security Act. (R. 21-22.)
DISCUSSION
I.
ALJ LEGAL STANDARD
Under the Social Security Act, a person is disabled if she has an “inability to
engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of a medically determinable
physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which
has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve
months.” 42. U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(a). In order to determine whether a claimant is
disabled, the ALJ considers the following five questions in order: (1) Is the claimant
presently unemployed? (2) Does the claimant have a severe impairment? (3) Does
14
the impairment meet or medically equal one of a list of specific impairments
enumerated in the regulations? (4) Is the claimant unable to perform his former
occupation? and (5) Is the claimant unable to perform any other work? 20 C.F.R. §
416.920(a)(4) (2008).
An affirmative answer at either step 3 or step 5 leads to a finding that the
claimant is disabled. Young v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 957 F.2d 386, 389
(7th Cir. 1992). A negative answer at any step, other than at step 3, precludes a
finding of disability. Id. The claimant bears the burden of proof at steps 1-4. Id.
Once the claimant shows an inability to perform past work, the burden then shifts
to the Commissioner to show the ability to engage in other work existing in
significant numbers in the national economy. Id.
II.
JUDICIAL REVIEW
Section 405(g) provides in relevant part that “[t]he findings of the
Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence,
shall be conclusive.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Judicial review of the ALJ’s decision is
limited to determining whether the ALJ’s findings are support by substantial
evidence or based upon legal error. Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d. 863, 869 (7th Cir.
2000); Stevenson v. Chater, 105 F.3d 1151, 1153 (7th Cir. 1997). Substantial
evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Skinner v.
Astrue, 478 F.3d 836, 841 (7th Cir. 2007). This Court may not substitute its
judgment for that of the Commissioner by reevaluating facts, reweighing evidence,
15
resolving conflicts in evidence, or deciding questions of credibility. Skinner, 478
F.3d at 841.
The ALJ is not required to address “every piece of evidence or testimony in
the record, [but] the ALJ’s analysis must provide some glimpse into the reasoning
behind her decision to deny benefits.” Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 889 (7th
Cir. 2001). In cases where the ALJ denies benefits to a claimant, “he must build an
accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to his conclusion.” Clifford, 227 F.3d
at 872. The ALJ “must at least minimally articulate the analysis for the evidence
with enough detail and clarity to permit meaningful appellate review.” Boiles v.
Barnhart, 395 F.3d 421, 425 (7th Cir. 2005); Murphy v. Astrue, 498 F.3d 630, 634
(7th Cir. 2007) (“An ALJ has a duty to fully develop the record before drawing any
conclusions, and must adequately articulate his analysis so that we can follow his
reasoning.”).
Where conflicting evidence would allow reasonable minds to differ, the
responsibility for determining whether a claimant is disabled falls upon the
Commissioner, not the court. Herr v. Sullivan, 912 F.2d 178, 181 (7th Cir. 1990).
However, an ALJ may not “select and discuss only that evidence that favors his
ultimate conclusion,” but must instead consider all relevant evidence. Herron v.
Shalala, 19 F.3d 329, 333 (7th Cir. 1994).
16
III.
ANALYSIS
Cockle argues that the ALJ’s decision was in error because: (1) he improperly
evaluated her credibility; and (2) he failed to consider the DHS employment
assessments in his decision.
A.
Credibility
An ALJ’s credibility determination is granted substantial deference by a
reviewing court unless it is “patently wrong” and not supported by the record.
Schmidt v. Astrue, 496 F.3d 833, 843 (7th Cir. 2007); Powers v. Apfel, 207 F.3d 431,
435 (7th Cir. 2000). However, an ALJ must give specific reasons for discrediting a
claimant’s testimony, and “[t]hose reasons must be supported by record evidence
and must be ‘sufficiently specific to make clear to the individual and to any
subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the individual’s statements
and the reasons for that weight.’” Lopez ex rel. Lopez v. Barnhart, 336 F.3d 535,
539-40 (7th Cir. 2003) (quoting Zurawski, 245 F.3d at 887-88).
In evaluating Cockle’s credibility, the ALJ found that her “medically
determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged
symptoms; however, the claimant’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence
and limiting effects of these symptoms are not credible to the extent they are
inconsistent with the above residual functional capacity assessment.” (R. 19.) This
boilerplate credibility template has been sharply criticized by the Seventh Circuit,
which has noted that although “the assessment of claimant’s ability to work will
often . . . depend heavily on the credibility of her statements concerning the
17
‘intensity, persistence and limiting effects’ of her symptoms,” the template “implies
that the ability to work is determined first and is then used to determine the
claimant’s credibility.” Bjornson v. Astrue, 671 F.3d 640, 645 (7th Cir. 2012). The
template is thus inconsistent with SSR 96-7p(4),4 which states that a claimant’s
statements about the intensity or persistence of symptoms cannot be disregarded
solely because they are not substantiated by objective medical evidence. Id. at 646.
The mere inclusion of the boilerplate language does not by itself invalidate a
credibility finding, but “[n]ot supporting a credibility determination with
explanation and evidence from the record does.” Adams v. Astrue, 880 F. Supp. 895,
906 (N.D. Ill. 2012). The ALJ in this case relied solely on the template, making no
effort to explain which of Cockle’s statements about her limitations were
inconsistent with any particular portion of the record. Indeed, it is not even clear
from the decision whether his credibility finding related to her physical limitations,
mental limitations, or some combination of both. The ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff
lacks credibility is especially puzzling given his statement at the end of the hearing
that “No[,] I don’t think there’s any malingering.” (R. 77.) The Court therefore finds
that the matter must be remanded for a more complete analysis of Cockle’s
credibility. See Punzio v. Astrue, 630 F.3d 704, 709 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[T]o read the
ALJ’s boilerplate credibility assessment is enough to know that it is inadequate and
Interpretive rules, such as Social Security Regulations (“SSR”), do not have the
force of law but are binding on all components of the Agency. 20 C.F.R. § 402.35(b)(1);
accord Lauer v. Apfel, 169 F.3d 489, 492 (7th Cir. 1999).
4
18
not supported by substantial evidence. That is reason enough for us to reverse the
judgment.”).
B.
Incomplete RFC Analysis
Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ erred in not discussing evidence from the
DHS regarding her readiness for the workforce. According to Plaintiff, the Office of
Rehabilitation Services’ conclusion that she was not eligible for work in the
community was relevant to her RFC and should have been considered by the ALJ.
The government responds that the ALJ was not required to address every piece of
evidence in the record, and moreover, Cockle has not shown that the DHS reports
undermine the ALJ’s RFC finding.
SSR 06-03p provides that evidence in the record may include “information
from other ‘non-medical sources,’” which include “[p]ublic and private social welfare
agency personnel, [and] rehabilitation counselors.” SSR 06-03p. The ruling
emphasizes that information from these non-medical sources “cannot establish the
existence of a medically determinable impairment. Instead, there must be evidence
from an ‘acceptable medical source’ for this purpose. However, information from
such ‘other sources’ may be based on special knowledge of the individual and may
provide insight into the severity of the impairment(s) and how it affects the
individual’s ability to function.” Id.
Thus, the government is correct that the ALJ was not required to accord
significant weight to the DHS’s ultimate conclusions that Cockle was not ready for
employment. However, those ultimate conclusions are not the only relevant
19
evidence contained in the DHS assessments. To the contrary, the DHS reports
contain substantial insight about Cockle’s ability to relate to others in a work
setting and are consistent with other evidence in the record that Cockle may have
significant limitations in her ability to work in conjunction with (or even near)
others and/or take direction from supervisors. But the ALJ failed to address any of
this evidence, which includes Plaintiff’s testimony, mental health records, and the
DHS reports. The ALJ’s RFC also included no limitation on interaction with coworkers or supervisors, nor did it explain why such a limitation is unnecessary. It is
possible that the ALJ gave controlling weight to the RFC opinion of Dr.
Hermsmeyer, which found no limitations on social interaction, but that is mere
speculation. The decision does not explain the ALJ’s rationale at all and thus the
Court is unable to review the RFC finding.
The failure to even mention the issue is perplexing not only because of the
record evidence suggesting the limitation, but because the ALJ’s questioning of the
VE was substantially taken up by questions related to it. The VE’s responses also
demonstrate why the ALJ’s error was not harmless and a full analysis of the
limitation is necessary. The VE testified that there would be no jobs available for a
person with Plaintiff’s RFC and the additional limitation of no contact with
supervisors, co-workers, or the general public. A person for whom contact would be
so difficult that she would be off-task for fifteen minutes per hour would also be
unemployable. On remand, the ALJ should more fully consider and discuss any
20
potential RFC limitations on dealing with co-workers and supervisors and, if
necessary, the effect of any such limitation on Plaintiff’s ability to perform work.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff Adrienne Cockle’s motion for summary
judgment [Doc. No. 19] is granted in part and denied in part, and the matter is
remanded to the Commissioner for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
SO ORDERED.
ENTERED:
DATE:
___________________________
HON. MARIA VALDEZ
United States Magistrate Judge
June 26, 2013
21
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?