Rodriguez Bey v. City of Berwyn Police Department et al
Filing
38
MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Harry D. Leinenweber on 1/10/2013:Mailed notice(wp, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
EVERARDO RODRIGUEZ-BEY,
Case No. 11 C 7288
Plaintiff,
v.
Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber
OFFICER GALIGER,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant Officer Galiger’s Motion for
Summary Judgment.
For the reasons stated herein, the Motion is
granted.
I.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On October 14, 2011, the Plaintiff, Everardo Rodriguez-Bey
(“Plaintiff”), filed a Complaint against Defendant City of Berwyn
Police Department and Defendant Officer Galiger, individually,
alleging Defendants violated Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights,
which entitled Plaintiff to relief under 42 U.S.C. 1983.
Specifically, Plaintiff alleged that Defendants did not have
probable
cause
March 24, 2011.
to
seize
three
of
Plaintiff’s
automobiles
on
On November 7, 2011, Defendant City of Berwyn
Police Department filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing that it was
not a suable entity.
The Court agreed and on November 17, 2011
dismissed it from the case. [See Dkt. 14].
Subsequently, at a status hearing on September 18, 2012,
Defendant Officer Galiger (“Defendant”) requested that the Court
set
a
briefing
schedule
anticipated filing.
Court
ordered
for
a
summary
[See Dkt. 32.]
Defendant
to
file
judgment
motion
he
In light of this request, the
his
dispositive
motion
by
October 23, 2012, and ordered Plaintiff to respond by November 20,
2012.
The Court also granted Defendant until December 4, 2012 to
file a reply.
[See id.].
Pursuant to the Court’s order, Defendant filed his summary
judgment motion on October 18, 2012.
However, to date, Plaintiff
has failed to respond to Defendant’s motion, and failed to file any
other motions requesting additional time to respond.
Court
will
proceed
with
its
ruling
without
the
As such, the
benefit
of
Plaintiff’s response.
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate if the moving party “shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and [it]
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV . P. 56(a).
If the moving party satisfies its burden, the non-movant must
present facts to show a genuine dispute exists to avoid summary
judgment.
(1986).
See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323–24
The Court construes all facts and draws all reasonable
inferences
in
favor
of
the
non-moving
DeStefano, 129 S.Ct. 2658, 2677 (2009).
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party.
Ricci
v.
Local Rule 56.1(a)(3) instructs that a party “moving for
summary judgment must provide a statement of material facts, which
the moving party asserts contains no genuine factual dispute.”
Aukstuolis v. Harrah's Ill. Corp., No. 99-C-3593, 2002 WL 31006128
at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 5, 2002).
It is within the Court’s
discretion to either insist on strict compliance of the local rules
or to overlook transgressions.
Stevo v. Frasor, 662 F.3d 880, 887
(7th Cir. 2011).
III.
ANALYSIS
In his Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendant contends he is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law because he had probable
cause to seize Plaintiff’s automobiles and because he is entitled
to qualified immunity.
At the outset, the Court notes that both parties have failed
to abide by Local Rule 56.1.
First, it is clear Plaintiff failed
to comply not only with Rule 56.1, but also failed to provide any
response at all to Defendant’s motion.
consequences of this failure.
The Court will address the
Before doing so, however, the Court
points out that Defendant also failed to adhere to the Local Rules,
as Defendant failed to include with his summary judgment motion a
statement of undisputed material facts.
The Local Rules requires a movant to submit a statement of
undisputed material facts that the movant claims entitle it to
judgment as a matter of law.
Malec v. Sanford, 191 F.R.D. 581, 583
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(N.D. Ill. 2000).
The statement of facts shall consist of short
numbered paragraphs,
including
within each
paragraph specific
references to the affidavits, parts of the record, and other
supporting material relied upon to support the facts set forth in
that paragraph.
L.R. 56.1(a)(3).
This Court has the discretion to deny Defendant’s Motion for
failure to abide by the Local Rules because of his failure to
provide a statement of undisputed material facts.
See Ford v.
Lumbermens, 197 F.R.D. 365 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (defendants’ failure to
abide by local rules warranted denial of his summary judgment
motion.)
However, it is also within the Court’s discretion to
overlook transgressions of the Local Rules.
887.
Frasor, 662 F.3d at
Because in this case, Defendant included with his Motion a
supporting memorandum of law and an affidavit, the Court will
consider its merits.
See id. (holding that litigants should not
expect that they are entitled to strict enforcement of Local Rules
because the “decision whether to apply the rule strictly” is a
decision left to the district court.)
In the future, the Court
suggests that Defendant familiarize himself with the Local Rules
prior to filing motions in this District.
Plaintiff’s failure to provide any response to Defendant’s
motion is a different matter however.
“[W]hen a party fails to
respond to a motion for summary judgment, its failure “constitutes
an admission . . . that there are no disputed issues of genuine
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fact warranting a trial.”
Terrell v. Am. Drug Stores, 65 F.App’x.
76, 77 (7th Cir. 2003) citing Flynn v. Sandahl, 58 F.3d 283, 288
(7th Cir. 1995).
As such, the Court deems admitted those facts
contained in Defendant’s affidavit and finds summary judgment
appropriate.
Moreover, in addition to the binding Seventh Circuit precedent
that dictates the effect of Plaintiff’s failure to respond, the
Court
also
meritorious.
immunity
finds
Defendant’s
qualified
immunity
Defendant points out that the doctrine of qualified
generally
protects
a
government
official
liability when he performs discretionary functions.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
Supreme
argument
Court
and
Seventh
Circuit
have
from
civil
Harlow v.
Additionally, both the
held
that
government
officials are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to their
probable cause determinations even if these determinations turn out
to be mistakes.
See Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228-29 (1991);
Fleming v. Livingston Cnty., 674 F.3d 874, 879 (7th Cir. 2012).
In this case, Plaintiff’s Complaint purports to allege a 1983
claim against Defendant based on the fact that Defendant did not
have probable cause to seize the Plaintiff’s three vehicles. After
examining Defendant’s affidavit and his alleged reasons for finding
probable cause, the Court finds Defendant’s determination, while
not necessarily correct, was objectively reasonable and therefore
entitles him to qualified immunity. See generally Hunter, 502 U.S.
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at 228-29.
Accordingly, the Court grants Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, the Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment is granted.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge
United States District Court
DATE: 1/10/2013
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