Gracia v. Sigmatron International, Inc.
Filing
204
MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order signed by the Honorable Edmond E. Chang. For the reasons stated in the Opinion, Defendant's post-trial motions 196 under Rule 50 and 59 are denied. The remittitur motion is granted only insofar as the compensatory damages award is reduced to $50,000 to satisfy the overall statutory cap (punitive damages remain at $250,000). As described in the Opinion, the parties shall file a status report by 04/28/2015. The status hearing of 05/08/2015 is accelerated to 05/01/2015 at 9 a.m. Emailed notice(slb, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
MARIA N. GRACIA,
Plaintiff,
v.
SIGMATRON INTERNATIONAL, INC.
Defendant.
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No. 11 C 07604
Judge Edmond E. Chang
ORDER
After a three-day trial in December 2014, a jury found in favor of Sigmatron
International, Inc. on Maria Gracia’s claim that she had been the victim of
workplace harassment, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. But
the jury did find that Sigmatron had unlawfully retaliated against Gracia by firing
her after she complained about the allegedly discriminatory treatment, and
awarded her $57,000 in compensatory and $250,000 in punitive damages.
Sigmatron now moves for judgment as a matter of law on the retaliation claim
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b), or, in the alternative, for a new trial
under Rule 59(a) and remittitur of the damages award under Rule 59(e). For the
reasons described below, the motions for judgment as a matter of law and new trial
are denied. The remittitur motion is granted only to the extent that the
compensatory damages award is lowered to $50,000 to comply with a statutory cap,
which Gracia does not oppose.
I. Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law
Sigmatron argues that judgment should be granted in its favor as a matter of
law on Gracia’s retaliation claim under Rule 50, which provides such relief where “a
reasonable jury [lacks] a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the
[prevailing] party[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a). In weighing a Rule 50(a) motion, “the
question is simply whether the evidence as a whole, when combined with all
reasonable inferences permissibly drawn from that evidence, is sufficient to allow a
reasonable jury to find in favor of the plaintiff.” Hall v. Forest River, Inc., 536 F.3d
615, 619 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing Hossack v. Floor Covering Assoc. of Joliet, Inc., 492
F.3d 853, 859 (7th Cir. 2007)). A jury’s determination may be overturned only if “no
rational jury could have found for plaintiff,” and there must also be more than “a
mere scintilla of supporting evidence.” Walker v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of
Wisconsin Sys., 410 F.3d 387, 393 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting Millbrook v. IBP, Inc.,
280 F.3d 1169, 1173 (7th Cir. 2002)). The court must “not make credibility
determinations or reweigh the evidence,” and “must disregard all evidence favorable
to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe.” Tart v. Illinois Power
Co., 366 F.3d 461, 472 (7th Cir. 2004).
Sigmatron argues that the evidence showed Gracia was fired for a legitimate
reason: she improperly allowed hand solderers under her watch to use lead-free
instead of leaded solder, in violation of customer specifications. R. 196, Def.’s Br. at
4-5. Sigmatron emphasizes evidence at trial about the importance the company
placed in meeting customer specifications, driven partly by regulatory and industry
2
directives. Id. (citing inter alia testimony about company’s training on proper
soldering and auditing procedures). Gregory Fairhead, Sigmatron’s vice president,
testified that it was Gracia’s involvement in the solder discrepancy that led to her
firing. R. 190, Trial Tr. at 370.1
Sigmatron relies heavily on this mistake in soldering, and it is true that,
standing alone, the problem sounds serious. But Sigmatron does not come to grips
with the fact that the jury had plenty of reason not to believe that the lead-free
solder really drove the company to fire Gracia. The jury heard testimony that, in
reality, Sigmatron did from time to time—indeed even often—use solder types that
did not fit client specifications, without any negative ramifications for the
responsible employees. Gracia unsurprisingly testified to this effect. Trial Tr. at
463. Under the deferential standard applicable here, that testimony alone
undermines Sigmatron’s asserted explanation.
But that is not all. Eduardo Trujillo, a former Sigmatron automation
manager, also testified that this practice occurred “often,” yet nobody had ever been
fired as a result. Id. at 557-59. There is more. Michael Murphy, a former Sigmatron
engineer, also testified that leaded and lead-free solders were used interchangeably
“a lot of [the] time,” irrespective of customer preference, in order to make do with
whatever parts were available as a matter of company policy. Id. at 543-44 (adding
that no one had ever been fired for switching leaded and lead-free solders).
Sigmatron’s reliance on customers’ solder specifications could well have struck the
1The
trial transcript is divided into several docket entries, R. 187-193, but the pages
are (as they are required to be) consecutively numbered. The Court cites only to the page
numbers in question and not the specific docket entry.
3
jury as pretextual in light of the evidence that the company did not really care if
errors were made at least before this lawsuit was filed..
It is true that, even if company managers had shrugged their shoulders at lax
compliance in the past, it is still possible that Sigmatron belatedly chose to clean-up
shop, starting with Gracia. Fairhead testified that when he took over as director of
operations in 2007, he sought to “tighten up … certain things,” including
manufacturing procedure. Id. at 396. But the jury was not obliged to credit that
scenario when weighing the conflicting testimony from Fairhead and management
(that is, the correct-solder rule was life-and-death vital) on the one hand, and from
other managers and employees (that is, the purported rule was not enforced, ever)
on the other.
Indeed, the jury had another reason to doubt Fairhead’s account. Fairhead
testified at length about the events that purportedly led to Gracia’s firing: Trujillo
discovered Gracia’s solder error, noted a cavalier indifference from Garcia when she
was questioned about it, and then went to supervisor Patrick Silverman, all of
which was reported to Fairhead. Id. at 414-15. The problem is that Trujillo denied
having any discussion with Silverman at all about the soldering, let alone a
discussion where Gracia displayed a cavalier attitude toward the mistake. See id. at
556-57. And Trujillo described the conversation with Fairhead as simply saying that
Trujillo was aware of the mistake. Id. at 557. In light of the conflicting testimony, it
was certainly within the province of the jury, relying on its observations of the
various witnesses, to disbelieve Fairhead and his assertion that he terminated
4
Garcia on the basis of the solder inconsistency—a credibility determination that is
reasonable.2 See Tart, 366 F.3d at 472 (court must be “particularly careful in
employment discrimination cases to avoid supplanting [its] view of the credibility or
weight of the evidence for that of the jury”) (citing Hybert v. Hearst Corp., 900 F.2d
1050, 1054 (7th Cir. 1990)).
All told, “the jury heard evidence from which it could infer pretext[, and] just
because [Sigmatron] articulated a non-discriminatory reason, the jury did not have
to believe it.” Emmel v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Chicago, 95 F.3d 627, 633 (7th Cir.
1996). Sigmatron relies entirely on the argument that the evidence could only show
that its asserted rationale for firing Gracia was perfectly legitimate.3 As explained,
2As
much as Sigmatron argues how “critical” it was to the company to meet
customer specifications on solder-types without fail, to say that this assertion was
“uncontroverted” is simply inaccurate. R. 202, Def.’s Reply Br. at 5. Trujillo, Murphy, and
Gracia all controverted it, and directly so. Sigmatron is also incorrect to assert that it was
error for the jury to have “simply disbelieved” Fairhead. Id. “It is the prerogative of a jury
or other trier of fact to disbelieve uncontradicted testimony unless other evidence shows
that the testimony must be true.” E.E.O.C. v. G-K-G, Inc., 39 F.3d 740, 746 (7th Cir. 1994).
No evidence was presented to establish that Fairhead’s version of his motivation had to be
true. Moreover, Fairhead’s testimony was contradicted, giving the jury ample basis to
disbelieve him.
Accordingly, the parties’ brief sparring over whether Gracia could prove retaliatory
motive on a “cat’s paw theory”—that is, whether Fairhead unwittingly acted as the conduit
for another employee’s (namely, Silverman’s) unlawful motive—is not a necessary basis for
decision here. See R. 200, Pl.’s Resp. Br. at 4-5; see also Lust v. Sealy, Inc., 383 F.3d 580,
584 (7th Cir. 2004) (suggesting that “cat’s paw” formula might be “inconsistent with the
normal analysis of causal issues in tort litigation”). Contrary to Sigmatron’s assertion,
Def.’s Reply Br. at 12, the jury did have reason to doubt Fairhead’s credibility and impute
that he himself had been motivated by retaliation.
3In
its reply brief, Sigmatron claims that Gracia somehow admitted in her response
brief that she could not prove a retaliation claim by the McDonnell Douglas “indirect”
method of proof, and that there was insufficient evidence at trial to prove her claim by the
direct method. Def.’s Reply Br. at 1-4. Sigmatron spins its wheels in an irrelevant detour.
The direct/indirect proof analysis applies at the initial, pre-trial stage of determining
whether a prima facie case exists. See, e.g., U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460
U.S. 711, 713-14 (1983). “It is well-established in this circuit that the burden-shifting
5
that is not the case. Accordingly, Sigmatron’s motion for judgment as a matter of
law is denied.
II. Motion for New Trial
Sigmatron moves in the alternative for a new trial under Rule 59(a). “A court
may only order a new trial if the jury’s ‘verdict is against the manifest weight of the
evidence, ... or if for other reasons the trial was not fair to the moving party.’” Willis
v. Lepine, 687 F.3d 826, 836 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Marcus & Millichap Inv. Servs.
v. Sekulovski, 639 F.3d 301, 313 (7th Cir. 2011)). “In ruling on a motion for a new
trial, the judge may consider the credibility of witnesses, the weight of the evidence,
and anything else which justice requires.” Bob Willow Motors, Inc. v. Gen. Motors
Corp., 872 F.2d 788, 798 (7th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted).
In seeking a new trial, Sigmatron points mainly to the same arguments made
in support of its motion for judgment as a matter of law. Def.’s Br. at 9-10. As
already discussed, these arguments are not convincing, even applying the less
verdict-favoring standard of review for new-trial motions. The jury’s determination
that Sigmatron and Fairhead’s explanation for firing Gracia was pretextual was not
against the manifest weight of the evidence, in light of the contradictory testimony
offered not only by Gracia, but other company employees, namely, Trujillo and
methodology should not be used during the jury’s evaluation of evidence at the end of a trial
on the merits: … the only remaining question—the only question the jury need answer—is
whether the plaintiff is a victim of intentional discrimination [or retaliation].” Hennessy v.
Penril Datacomm Networks, Inc., 69 F.3d 1344, 1350 (7th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted).
Sigmatron asserts that Gracia failed to prove such retaliation, but in support of that
contention merely repeats its flawed assertions that its evidence about the proffered reason
for Gracia’s termination was “uncontroverted.” Def.’s Reply Br. at 5-9. Sigmatron offers no
other basis to question the evidence supporting the inference that it was motivated by a
desire to retaliate against Gracia when it fired her.
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Murphy. As a final resort, Sigmatron also identifies instances of inconsistency
between the three that it says “effectively diminished” their credibility and revealed
they were “not truthful” and “incredible.” Def.’s Reply Br. at 9-13. This kitchen-sink
attack is not persuasive.
First, Sigmatron misunderstands the thrust of some of the testimony it
highlights. For instance, Sigmatron asserts that Trujillo and Gracia contradicted
each other about how often the mis-soldering took place, id. at 10, but in fact, they
were materially consistent on the issue. Even if Gracia declined to characterize the
frequency as “often” as Trujillo did, both testified that it occurred at least from time
to time. See Trial Tr. at 463, 557-59. Indeed, on that basis alone, the jury could
deem not credible Sigmatron’s insistence that it took the solder-issue seriously
enough to punish Gracia. Additionally, Sigmatron attacks Murphy’s credibility
because he testified about “how things were done before Mr. Fairhead served as
Sigmatron’s Director of Operations.” Def.’s Reply Br. at 12. This assertion is not
entirely accurate: Murphy testified about his knowledge of Sigmatron’s solder
practices throughout his period of employment, 2006 to 2008, which extended into
Fairhead’s tenure as director of operations, which began in 2007. See Trial Tr. at
396, 541. In any event, Sigmatron’s attitude about solder practices even before
Fairhead took over was a relevant topic, even if Murphy’s testimony had been
limited to that period. If there was rampant mis-soldering before Fairhead took
over, and the mis-soldering was as serious as he said it was, then it would be
7
expected that Trujillo or Murphy would have testified about a sea change in the
practice and its consequences. There was no such testimony.
Where Sigmatron does identify some actual inconsistencies in testimony, the
effect is not nearly as consequential as it argues. Gracia stated that Trujillo raised
the matter of the improper soldering with her on the day of its discovery, while
Trujillo testified he “could not recall” the specific conversation (though, again, there
was no testimony from them conceding that Gracia showed a cavalier attitude
toward it), compare id. at 502 with id. at 568; and Trujillo initially testified that he
did not speak with supervisor Silverman about Gracia’s job in the two months
before her termination, then said that Silverman had warned him to stay away
from her because she was being targeted, “about a month” before her firing, id. at
558, 560. These inconsistencies concern relatively minor details and Sigmatron does
not show how they rise to a level of being so problematic as to make the witnesses
fundamentally unbelievable. They simply do not undercut the main thrust of
Gracia, Trujillo, and Murphy’s testimony, which as a whole suggested that
Fairhead’s account of purported meetings and conversations with Trujillo and
Silverman in response to the solder mistake was not credible.
Finally, Sigmatron labels Gracia as “not worthy of belief” because she did not
produce documentary proof at trial about the harassing communications she
claimed she received and because she was late in forwarding offensive emails and
complaining. Def.’s Reply Br. at 11. This line of attack does not come close to the
new-trial standard even though the Court is free to reweigh evidence.. Whatever
8
impact those arguments have on Gracia’s underlying harassment claim, Sigmatron
fails to connect the arguments to the retaliation claim. Sigmatron offers no
explanation for how the arguments impact Gracia’s (and Murphy’s and Trujillo’s)
testimony refuting Sigmatron’s proffered explanation for the firing, and the proof of
pretext readily supported the finding of retaliation.
In sum, Sigmatron’s effort to cast doubt on the credibility of unfavorable
witnesses is meritless. The jury was presented with the minor inconsistencies (to
the extent there really were inconsistencies) that Sigmatron relied on, but rejected
the arguments. In light of the overall consistency of Gracia, Trujillo, and Murphy’s
testimony and the problems with Fairhead’s own testimony, Sigmatron has not
presented any basis to ignore the “respect for the collective wisdom of the jury.”
Mejia v. Cook Cnty., Ill., 650 F.3d 631, 633 n.1 (7th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).
Because the jury’s finding was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, a
new trial is not warranted.
III. Motion for Remittitur
Finally, Sigmatron moves for a remittitur of the compensatory and punitive
damages awards, arguing that they are excessive and unjustified. Def.’s Br. at 1014. To start, Gracia does not dispute Sigmatron’s assertion that a statutory cap of
$50,000 applies to her compensatory damages award, necessitating a reduction
from the $57,000 awarded by the jury. Id. at 10; Pl.’s Resp. Br. at 9. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981a(b)(3).4 However, this reduction is all that is appropriate.
4The
statute caps total compensation, including compensatory and punitive
damages, at $300,000 for an employer that has more than 500 employees. Sigmatron
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A. Compensatory Damages
First, the compensatory damages award must be weighed with “several
considerations in mind: (1) whether the award is ‘monstrously excessive’; (2)
whether there is no rational connection between the award and the evidence; and
(3) whether the award is roughly comparable to awards made in similar cases.”
Thompson v. Mem’l Hosp. of Carbondale, 625 F.3d 394, 408 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing
Marion County Coroner’s Office v. E.E.O.C., 612 F.3d 924, 931 (7th Cir. 2010)). The
“monstrously excessive inquiry” is “simply … another way of asking whether there
is a rational connection between the award and the evidence.” Harvey v. Office of
Banks & Real Estate, 377 F.3d 698, 714 (7th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). Here, an
award of $50,000 passes muster.
Sigmatron argues that a remittitur to zero is warranted because the only
evidence supporting the extent of Gracia’s emotional injury was her testimony that
she was “just depressed.” Def.’s Br. at 12 (citing Trial Tr. at 493). It is well-accepted,
however, that “[a]n award for nonpecuniary loss can be supported, in certain
circumstances, solely by a plaintiff’s testimony about his or her emotional distress.”
Tullis v. Townley Eng’g & Mfg. Co., 243 F.3d 1058, 1068 (7th Cir. 2001) (citing
Merriweather v. Family Dollar Stores of Ind., Inc., 103 F.3d 576, 580 (7th Cir.
1996)). “It is within the jury’s province to evaluate the credibility of witnesses who
appears to concede that it falls into this category. The jury’s award to Gracia totaled
$307,000. The parties agree that the applicable reduction to fit the cap should be made to
the compensatory damages portion of the award. The Court will follow the parties’
preference.
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testify to emotional distress, and [the courts] shall not disturb those credibility
determinations[.]” Bruso v. United Airlines, Inc., 239 F.3d 848, 857 (7th Cir. 2001).
To be sure, Gracia did not use many words when describing the emotional
impact of being fired in retaliation for reporting alleged harassment. See Trial Tr. at
483 (“It was hard. I was just depressed. I have always been used to working.”). But
not all plaintiffs necessarily possess trial-ready, free-flowing eloquence or speak
with a vocabulary that lends itself to legal briefs—especially on a subject that is as
difficult to articulate and fraught with stigma as the extent and effects of emotional
distress. Indeed, that is one reason to emphasize the importance on the jury’s role to
observe and weigh live, in-court testimony of witnesses, first-hand. Here, the jury,
“as seen by the amount they awarded” Gracia, “must have not believed that [she]
needed to show that [she] sought the help of psychologists or friends for [her]
emotional distress” and did not need “more detail about either [Gracia’s] emotional
distress or the inconvenience that [she] experienced.” Tullis, 243 F.3d at 1068 (“The
jury was able to observe [the plaintiff] when [she] was testifying and they
apparently found [her] testimony to be sincere and sufficient to convince them that
[she] merited the award they gave [her].”). Indeed, the jury could have considered
the impact on Gracia through the lens of other testimony (indeed, her lawyer’s
closing argument emphasized this)—that she had worked continuously since the
age of 16, had been a “spectacular” employee during her time at Sigmatron, and
after her termination was without work despite her efforts to find another job for 16
months during the recession, see Trial Tr. at 166, 289, 428-30—to find that the
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distress and inconvenience to her of losing a valued job “were not minor events.”
Tullis, 243 F.3d at 1068-69 (award not monstrously excessive and rationally
connected where jury assessed plaintiff’s credibility in light of other evidence of
disruptions to life).
The jury’s award is also roughly comparable to other Title VII awards. The
cases on which Sigmatron relies do not suggest otherwise. In David v. Caterpillar,
Inc., for instance, the district court cut compensatory damages from $100,000 to
$50,000 for a plaintiff who described feeling depressed and “cheated” by a
discriminatory failure to promote; in other words, providing for an award for the
same amount at stake here to an employee who, unlike Gracia, at least retained her
job. 185 F. Supp. 2d 918, 923-24 (C.D. Ill. 2002) (noting plaintiff presented no
evidence of counseling or sustained period of depressive symptoms) aff’d, 324 F.3d
851 (7th Cir. 2003). Sigmatron cites Avitia v. Metro. Club of Chicago, Inc., where
the Seventh Circuit reduced a jury’s award of $21,000 to a fired plaintiff by half,
deeming the $21,000 award too much for what the opinion called “a moment’s pang
of distress.” 49 F.3d 1219, 1227 (7th Cir. 1995). But here the jury could reasonably
conclude that the distress suffered by Gracia was not as fleeting as a “moment’s
pang.” The Seventh Circuit also granted a remittitur from $200,000 to $20,000 in
Marion County Coroner’s Office v. E.E.O.C., in the case of a deputy coroner fired in
retaliation for an internal complaint. 612 F.3d 924, 931 (7th Cir. 2010) (reviewing
award set by administrative law judge, not jury). The lower damages award in that
case is also distinguishable in part, however, because the plaintiff there had been
12
working elsewhere part-time, id. at 926-27, whereas Gracia’s sole employment was
with Sigmatron.
In any event, it must be remembered that “[a]wards in other cases provide a
reference point that assists the court in assessing reasonableness[,] … they do not
establish a range beyond which awards are necessarily excessive. Due to the highly
fact-specific nature of Title VII cases, such comparisons are rarely dispositive.”
Lampley v. Onyx Acceptance Corp., 340 F.3d 478, 485 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied,
540 U.S. 1182 (2004). Ultimately, a $50,000 award is in line with a range set by
Seventh Circuit precedent and reflective of the distress described, which the jury
determined to be real (if not particularly long-lasting or accompanied by articulable
physical ailments). See, e.g., Tullis, 243 F.3d at 1067-68 (upholding $80,000 in
emotional distress damages where plaintiff felt “degraded” and “backstabbed”);
Deloughery v. City of Chicago, 422 F.3d 611, 620 (7th Cir. 2005) (setting $175,000
award for mental suffering to “highly motivated” employee denied promotion);
Harvey v. Office of Banks & Real Estate, 377 F.3d 698, 714 (7th Cir. 2004) (“the jury
could have reasonably concluded that awards in the range of $50,000 to $150,000
were necessary” where plaintiffs complained of continuing mental and physical
ailments, frustration at being passed over for promotion). Accordingly, the Court
finds no reason to reduce the award for compensatory damages any further than
required by the statutory cap, that is, to $50,000.
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B. Punitive Damages
The final issue to be addressed is whether the jury’s award of $250,000 in
punitive damages ought to be reduced, which Sigmatron appears to urge on
constitutional grounds. Def.’s Br. at 12-13. The Supreme Court has explained that,
in cases at common law, due process “prohibits the imposition of grossly excessive or
arbitrary punishments on a tortfeasor.” State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell,
538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003); see also BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559
(1996). Specifically, there are “three guideposts to determine whether a punitive
damage award is grossly excessive such that it offends due process: (1) the degree of
reprehensibility of defendant’s conduct; (2) the disparity between the harm or
potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and his punitive damages award; and
(3) the difference between this remedy and the civil penalties authorized or imposed
in comparable cases.” Kapelanski v. Johnson, 390 F.3d 525, 534 (7th Cir. 2004)
(citing Gore, 517 U.S. at 575).
As Gracia hints, Pl.’s Resp. Br. at 10, due-process concerns over punitive
damages, while still applicable even outside common-law trials, have less thrust in
the context of a Title VII award. As the Ninth Circuit recently observed, “[a]n
exacting Gore review, applying the three guideposts rigorously, may be appropriate
when reviewing a common law punitive damages award. However, when a punitive
damages award arises from a robust statutory regime [like Title VII], the rigid
application of the Gore guideposts is less necessary or appropriate.” Arizona v.
ASARCO LLC, 773 F.3d 1050, 1056 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc). Part of this eased
14
approach is the clear notice that Title VII affords potential violators on their
possible exposure in punitive damages, which are statutorily capped. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981a(b)(3); see also Lust, 383 F.3d at 590-91 (“The purpose of placing a
constitutional ceiling on punitive damages is to protect defendants against
outlandish awards[.] … That purpose falls out of the picture when the legislature
has placed a tight cap on total, including punitive, damages and the courts honor
the cap.”).
Sigmatron argues that a remittitur to zero is appropriate because its actions
were not particularly egregious, insisting that Fairhead fired Gracia because he
believed she had violated customer specifications. Def.’s Br. at 13-14. But as
discussed at length already, the jury (supported by sufficient evidence) reasonably
rejected that story as pretense—in other words, a lie offered to obscure the fact that
the company fired Gracia in retaliation after she complained of what she believed to
be unlawful treatment. It is true that the facts here do not rise to level of the most
shocking cases of retaliatory behavior out there. See, e.g., Neal v. Honeywell, Inc.,
191 F.3d 827, 832 (7th Cir. 1999) (manager made threats of physical injury in
addition to retaliatory discharge). But Sigmatron is wrong to argue that its behavior
(as the jury found it) was so innocuous as to merit nothing in punitive damages. See
Kolstad v. American Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 533 (1999) (rejecting argument that
punitive damages only available in “extraordinarily egregious” cases). Even without
other facts in aggravation, the mere act of retaliatory discharge, followed up by an
effort to hide it using the kind of false (again, as the jury found) paper trail a
15
company can create, is the kind of insidious conduct long targeted by civil-rights
laws like Title VII. Indeed, the jury could infer, and apparently did, from the
conflicting testimony that Fairhead went so far as to manufacture details of reports
and meetings involving Trujillo and other managers, in an effort to justify the
company line for why Gracia was fired. The jury could further take into account
that it was a company vice president—upper management—who was involved in
such behavior to send the punitive message that it did.
With all this in mind, the jury’s punitive award is appropriate. “The judicial
function is to police a range, not a point.” Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, Inc., 347
F.3d 672, 678 (7th Cir. 2003). And a punitive damages award that is five times the
amount of the compensatory damages is well within the range covered by precedent.
See, e.g., Kapelanski, 390 F.3d at 534 (3.3 to 1 ratio “easily permissible”); Mathias,
347 F.3d at 678 (affirming 37 to 1 ratio); Lampley, 340 F.3d at 485-86 (punitive
damages of $270,000 compared to $30,000 in compensatory damages, or ratio of 9 to
1, would be acceptable). But see David, 185 F. Supp. 2d at 927 (finding 5 to 1 ratio
“problematic” in retaliation case and setting treble punitive damages).5 The
Supreme Court has noted that “few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between
punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due
process,” State Farm, 538 U.S. at 410 (emphasis added), and the jury’s award does
not approach that suspect order of magnitude. The Court will respect the jury’s
5Sigmatron
cites to Hiatt v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., but that case is inapposite, dealing
with Illinois law standards for when punitive damages may be imposed at all in the context
of retaliatory discharge for pursuing worker’s compensation rights. 26 F.3d 761, 766 (7th
Cir. 1994).
16
within-reason determination of the appropriate punitive message based on the
jury’s review of the evidence. See Lampley, 340 F.3d at 486 (“Reflecting our general
deference to jury verdicts, we have never required the district court to adjust a
jury’s punitive damages verdict so that it is proportional, in the court’s view, to the
defendant’s wickedness. Such proportional adjustments are left to the jury itself.”)
(quoting Caudle v. Bristow Optical Co., 224 F.3d 1014, 1028 (9th Cir. 2000)); see
also Fine v. Ryan International Airlines, 305 F.3d 746, 755 (7th Cir. 2002) (“But
these cases are fact-specific, and we have made it clear that we will not normally
disturb an award of damages in a Title VII case at or under the statutory cap, as
this decision is largely within the province of the jury.”) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted)). The punitive damages award will not be disturbed.
IV. Conclusion
As discussed above, Sigmatron’s motions for judgment as a matter of law and
a new trial are denied. Its motion for remittitur is granted only to the extent that
the jury’s award is adjusted to respect the statutory cap of $300,000, so that the
final result is $50,000 in compensatory damages and $250,000 in punitive damages.
In view of the denial of the Rule 50 and Rule 59 motions, the next step is to
determine equitable relief: back pay, lost benefits, and front pay (if any). The
parties shall confer on whether an in-court evidentiary hearing is required, or
whether instead they believe that a briefing will suffice. The parties shall file a joint
status report explaining their positions by April 28, 2015. The status hearing of
May 8, 2015 is reset to May 1, 2015 at 9 a.m.
17
Finally, the parties are strongly encouraged to engage in settlement
negotiations. The jury has spoken, and the defense should recognize the uphill climb
required to overturn any jury verdict. Sigmatron took the risk (understandably but,
ultimately, mistakenly) that the jury would credit Fairhead and Silverman over
Gracia and Trujillo—but the jury went the other way. And Murphy’s testimony too
ended-up in Gracia’s favor (it does not appear that Murphy was deposed). The jury
could reasonably rely on the evidence to find retaliation, and they did. At the same
time, Gracia must recognize that the litigation could go on and on, even after the
jury verdict. It is time to seriously discuss settlement. The status report to be filed
on April 28, 2015 shall also report on the state of settlement negotiations.
ENTERED:
s/Edmond E. Chang
Honorable Edmond E. Chang
United States District Judge
DATE: April 21, 2015
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