Holmes Jr v. McDonough et al

Filing 13

WRITTEN Opinion entered by the Honorable Gary Feinerman on 4/26/2012: Plaintiff's motion to reconsider 9 is denied. The proposed amended complaint is stricken pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The case remains closed. Mailed notice (For further detail see Written Opinion) (nf, )

Order Form (01/2005)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois
Name of Assigned Judge
or Magistrate Judge

GARY FEINERMAN

CASE NUMBER

11 C 7610

CASE
TITLE

Sitting Judge if Other
than Assigned Judge

DATE

4-26-2012

Timothy Holmes, Jr. (#R-56816) vs. Matthew McDonough, et al.

DOCKET ENTRY TEXT:

Plaintiff’s motion to reconsider [9] is denied. The proposed amended complaint is stricken pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A. The case remains closed.

O

[For further details see text below.]

Docketing to mail notices.

STATEMENT
Plaintiff, a state prisoner, brought this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff
claims that Defendants, two Chicago police officers, violated his constitutional rights by entering on private
property without a valid reason for doing so, and by arresting him without probable cause. By Minute Order of
February 16, 2012, the Court dismissed the complaint on initial review. This matter is before the Court for ruling
on Plaintiff’s motion to reconsider. The motion is denied and the proposed amended complaint is stricken, as
the Court remains satisfied that Plaintiff’s claims are untimely.
As discussed more fully in the Court’s Minute Order of January 9, 2012, there is a two-year statute of
limitations for Section 1983 actions in Illinois. See, e.g., Dominguez v. Hendley, 545 F.3d 585, 588 (7th Cir.
2008); 735 ILCS § 5/13-202. The complaint and amended complaint relate to a purportedly illegal trespass and
false arrest in April 2009, but Plaintiff waited until October 2011, more than two years later, to bring suit.
This case does not fall under the relatively small umbrella of cases where success on a false arrest claim
would necessarily imply the invalidity of a prosecution or conviction. As a general rule, “the statute of limitations
upon a § 1983 claim seeking damages for a false arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment, where the arrest
is followed by criminal proceedings, begins to run at the time the claimant becomes detained pursuant to legal
(CONTINUED)

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STATEMENT (continued)
process.” Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 397 (2007); Thomas v. City of Chicago, No. 07 C 4969, 2009 WL
1444439, *3 (N.D. Ill. May 21, 2009) (Dow, J.) (a false arrest claim accrues “no later than [the arrestee’s]
arraignment”); Brooks v. Davey, 572 F. Supp. 917, 918 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (Bucklo, J.) (same). Plaintiff relies on
Dominguez v. Hendley, 545 F.3d 585 (7th Cir. 2008), for the proposition that his right to sue arose when his
conviction was set aside; however, Dominguez involved allegations of police officers’ manipulation of or tampering
with identification and testimonial evidence, which the Court of Appeals found amounted to “more than a Fourth
Amendment claim by another name.” Dominguez, 545 F.3d at 589. The present case is pure Fourth Amendment:
Plaintiff challenges the officers’ justification for entering onto his porch and arresting him.
To the extent that Plaintiff is now attempting to sue Defendants for malicious prosecution, he must do so
in state court. Malicious prosecution claims are not actionable under federal law in Illinois. Avilas v. Pappas, 591
F.3d 552, 553-54 (7th Cir. 2010), citing Newsome v. McCabe, 256 F.3d 747 (7th Cir. 2001) (inter alia). Illinois
state law provides a cause of action to address a malicious prosecution. See, e.g., Smith v. Lamz, 321 F.3d 680, 684
(7th Cir. 2003) (“We begin by noting that . . . [the plaintiff] may not maintain an action under § 1983 for malicious
prosecution”) (citing Newsome, 256 F.3d at 750-51). Because the parties are not of diverse citizenship, any
malicious prosecution claim can be brought only in state court.
Because the Court finds that Plaintiff has no timely cause of action, his amended complaint is summarily
dismissed on preliminary review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. “Although Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) provides that
leave to amend ‘shall be freely given when justice so requires,’ it is not to be automatically granted.” Johnson v.
Cypress Hill, 641 F.3d 867, 871-72 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting Johnson v. Methodist Medical Center of Ill., 10 F.3d
1300, 1303 (7th Cir. 1993)). “[District] courts have broad discretion to deny leave to amend where there is undue
delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure deficiencies, undue prejudice to the defendants, or where
the amendment would be futile.” Johnson, 641 F.3d at 872 (emphasis added), quoting Hukic v. Aurora Loan
Services, 588 F.3d 420, 432 (7th Cir. 2009); see also Arreola v. Godinez, 546 F.3d 788, 796 (7th Cir. 2008), citing
Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Thompson v. Ill. Department of Professional Regulation, 300 F.3d 750,
759 (7th Cir. 2002). Here, it would be futile for Plaintiff file an amended complaint relating to claims that are either
barred by the statute of limitations or not cognizable in federal court.
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration is denied. The case remains closed.

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