Willoughby v. Astrue
Filing
27
MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo on 7/12/2012:Mailed notice(tlp, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
AARON M. WILLOUGHBY,
Plaintiff,
v.
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of
Social Security
Defendant.
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No. 11 C 7854
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Aaron Willoughby (“Willoughby”) brought this
action against Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner of the Social
Security Administration (the “Commissioner”), seeking review of
the denial of his application for disability insurance benefits.
The parties have filed cross motions for summary judgment.
For
the reasons that follow, Willoughby’s motion is granted and this
case is remanded to the Social Security Administration for
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I.
A. Procedural History
In January 2009, Willoughby applied for Disability Insurance
Benefits (“DIB”) pursuant to Title II of the Social Security Act,
42 U.S.C. §§ 416(I), 423.
Willoughby contended that he had been
disabled since Aug. 3, 2001, as a result of gastroparesis1 and
pyloric stenonis.2
His claim was denied on April 6, 2009.
He filed for
reconsideration, which was denied on Aug. 26, 2009.
He then
requested a hearing, which was held on April 8, 2010.
Administrative Law Judge Marlene R. Abrams issued her ruling
denying Willoughby’s claim on May 15, 2010.
Willoughby filed a
request for review, which was denied by the Social Security
Administration’s Appeals Council on Sept. 30, 2011.
Accordingly,
ALJ Abrams’ ruling is the final decision in this case.
B. Hearing Testimony
Willoughby is a 39-year-old man who last worked in 2001 as a
self-taught auto mechanic for his father’s business.
He also
briefly worked as the manager of a video game store for six
months in 1999 and 2000.
He was last insured on Dec. 31, 2006.
Willoughby testified at the April 8, 2010, hearing that he
vomits after eating and that he did so all the time from August
of 2001 to the end of 2006.
Although he has been diagnosed with
1
Gastroparesis is a condition that reduces the ability of
the stomach to empty its contents. It causes nausea, vomiting,
and dehydration and can lead to excessive weight loss.
Gastroparesis, PubMed Health, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
pubmedhealth/PMH0001342/ (last visited July 5, 2012).
2
Pyloric stenosis is the narrowing of the opening from the
stomach into the small intestine. Pyloric stenosis, PubMed
Health, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmedhealth/PMH0001965/
(last visited July 5, 2012).
2
gastroparesis and pyloric stenois, doctors have not determined
the cause of his inability to keep food down.
Willoughby testified that he weighed about 195 pounds in
2000, but his weight dropped to 160 or 170 pounds in 2001, and
dropped to 135 pounds in 2003, when he had his first feeding tube
surgically inserted.
because of pain.
to 130 pounds.
It was removed three or four months later
In 2004, Willoughby said, he weighed about 125
At the time of the hearing, Willoughby, who is
five feet, nine inches tall, weighed about 130 pounds.
After the feeding tube was removed, Willoughby had a
subclavian mediport implanted to receive IV fluids.
He gets
fluids through the tube about once a week, depending on his
potassium levels.
Willoughby had another feeding tube inserted
in 2010, but it had to be removed two weeks later because it was
causing him pain.
Describing his symptoms from 2001 to 2006, Willoughby
testified that he usually went all day without eating and ate at
night when his wife got home because he has no sense of taste and
cannot tell if food is rotten.
He had a colonoscopy in 2000, and
since then, he is never hungry and will not eat unless someone
tells him to eat.
His bowel movements became unpredictable after
his gall bladder was removed in 2001.
He said he was extremely
weak and fatigued, and took naps of two to three hours each day.
3
Willoughby said he could walk only about 200 feet before
having to sit down and take a break and he experienced dizziness
upon standing.
Although he was fatigued, he was able to take
care of his personal grooming most of the time.
There were times
when he became so dehydrated he could not function at all.
Willoughby said he would not have been able to do a totally
sedentary job for eight hours a day because he was too fatigued
and because if he ate anything, he would be in pain.
The Commissioner’s medical examiner, Dr. Ashok Jilhewar,
testified that he disagreed with the diagnosis of gastroparesis
and pyloric stenosis, and did not believe that any of
Willoughby’s doctors knew what was really causing his symptoms.
Dr. Jilhewar pointed out that Willoughby had a normal gastric
emptying study on May 10, 2002, which in Dr. Jilhewar’s opinion
ruled out a diagnosis of gastroparesis.
Dr. Jilhewar opined that the cause of Willoughby’s disorders
was psychiatric rather than physical, but his doctors diagnosed
him with physical ailments because insurance companies do not pay
toward treatment for psychiatric diseases.
Dr. Jilhewar pointed
out that Willoughby was considered bulimic at one time,
apparently by doctors at the Mayo Clinic.
Willoughby testified
that doctors at the Mayo Clinic did suggest that he was making
himself vomit, but he denied being bulimic and said he vomited
because the food in his stomach was causing him pain.
4
Willoughby
said he had seen several psychiatrists over the years, but denied
having any psychiatric disorders.
ALJ Abrams inquired of Dr. Jilhewar as to whether
Willoughby’s history of weight loss would meet or equal a
listing.
Dr. Jilhewar testified that Willoughby did not fall
under Listing 5.083 for weight loss due to a digestive disorder
because he did not fall below 115 pounds and his body mass index
(“BMI”) did not fall below 17.5.4
Dr. Jilhewar said that if
Willoughby’s BMI was consistently low, then his opinion would be
different. Dr. Jilhewar testified that beginning in August 2009,
Willoughby experienced persistently low levels of serum
potassium, or hypokalemia, which can cause cardiac arrhythmia.
The medical records did not reveal the cause of this ailment, Dr.
Jilhewar said.
Dr. Jilhewar said that ailment would have equaled
listing 5.08 for malnutrition at that time.
Dr. Jilhewar opined that from 2001 through the end of 2006,
Willoughby was capable of sedentary work with certain
restrictions, including certain postural limitations.
Dr.
3
Listing 5.08 is as follows: “Weight loss due to any
digestive disorder despite continuing treatment as prescribed,
with BMI of less than 17.50 calculated on at least two
evaluations at least 60 days apart within a consecutive 6–month
period.” 20 CFR Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1.
4
In fact, as will be discussed below, Dr. Jilhewar erred in
determining that Willoughby’s body mass index never fell below
17.5.
5
Jilhewar also opined that Willoughby should avoid machinery and
heights because of his bouts of dizziness.
Thomas Dunleavy, the vocational expert, testified that
Willoughby was not able to perform his past work as an auto
mechanic.
ALJ Abrams asked Dunleavy questions based on the
physical residual functional capacity assessment performed by
state agency doctor Solfia Saulog.
Dr. Saulog determined that
Willoughby could occasionally lift 20 pounds, could frequently
lift 10 pounds, and could stand or walk for two hours in an
eight-hour workday.
Dr. Saulog did not place any postural
limitations on Willoughby’s ability to work.
Dunleavy testified
that there were unskilled light or sedentary positions in the
Chicago metropolitan area that Willougby could perform, including
as an assembler, sorter, and visual inspector.
Dunleavy
testified that even with the additional limitations suggested by
Dr. Jilhewar, Willoughby could perform these jobs.
Willoughby’s attorney and ALJ Abrams inquired as to some
limitations placed on Willoughby by his treating physician, Dr.
M.K. Harney.
Dunleavy testified that if Willoughby would have to
miss two days of work each month, as Dr. Harney predicted, that
would be “inconsistent with the acceptable standards for
unskilled work.”
Additionally, if Willoughby was required to
take two 20 minute breaks at unpredictable times, that would
6
require a special accommodation.
The same was true of
Willoughby’s need for frequent and quick access to a restroom.
C.
The ALJ’s Ruling
In ruling on Willoughby’s claim, ALJ Abrams employed the
five-step evaluation process for determining whether a claimant
is disabled.
This requires a determination of: (1) whether the
claimant is presently employed; (2) whether the claimant’s
impairments or combination of impairments are severe; (3) whether
the claimant’s impairments meet or medically equal a listed
impairment that the Social Security Administration has found to
be disabling; and if not (4) whether the claimant has the
residual functional capacity to perform his past work; and if not
(5) whether the claimant is unable to perform any other work in
the national economy.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). An affirmative
answer at step three or step five results in a finding that the
claimant is disabled.
(7th Cir. 1990).
Stein v. Sullivan, 892 F.2d 43, 44 n.1
A negative answer at any point, other than step
three, ends the inquiry and means the claimant is not disabled.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
The claimant has the burden of
proof through step four; it then shifts to the Commissioner at
step five.
Knight v. Chater, 55 F.3d 309, 313 (7th Cir. 1995).
ALJ Abrams found that Willoughby was last insured on Dec.
31, 2006.
He did not work from the alleged onset date of Aug. 3,
2001, through Dec. 31, 2006.
Through his date last insured, he
7
had the following ailments: gastroparesis/gastrointestinal
disorder of an unknown cause, pyloric stenosis, and bulimia.
Through the date last insured, ALJ Abrams found, Willoughby
did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met
the criteria of a listing.
ALJ Abrams determined that no
treating or examining physician had found that Willoughby
suffered disorders equivalent in severity to a listed impairment.
In particular, as to Listing 5.08, weight loss due to any
digestive disorder, ALJ Abrams relied on Dr. Jilhewar’s opinion
that the medical records showed that Willoughby had not had a BMI
of less than 17.5, calculated on at least two occasions 60 days
apart within a consecutive 6-month time period.
She also cited
Dr. Jilhewar’s testimony that Willoughby’s BMI was 19.4.
It
appears, however, that the ALJ interpreted this testimony to mean
that Willoughby’s BMI was higher than 19.4 throughout the
relevant period, while Dr. Jilhewar based the 19.4 figure on
Willoughby’s weight at the time of the hearing.
(Admin R., 21,
95.)
Considering all the evidence in the record, ALJ Abrams found
that Willoughby had the residual functional capacity to lift,
carry, push, and pull 10 pounds frequently and 20 pounds
occasionally.
He could stand or walk for a total of two hours in
an eight-hour work day, and sit for the remaining hours.
8
ALJ Abrams then recounted Willoughby’s testimony and
acknowledged that under Social Security regulations, a claimant’s
statements about the intensity and severity of his ailments could
not be discounted solely because they are not substantiated by
the objective medical evidence.
7p.
See Social Security Ruling 96-
ALJ Abrams then added:
After careful consideration of the evidence, I find the
claimant’s medically determinable impairments could
reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms;
however, the claimant’s statements concerning the
intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these
symptoms are not credible to the extent they are
inconsistent with the above residual functional capacity
assessment.5
(Admin R., 22.)
ALJ Abrams then recounted various portions of the medical
record.
ailments
These
have
records,
puzzled
essentially,
doctors.
show
Although,
that
as
Willoughby’s
Dr.
Jilhewar
testified, gastric emptying studies have been normal or borderline
normal, doctors have suggested that Willoughby might be suffering
from idiopathic gastroparesis.6
At other times, however, doctors
5
As will be discussed, this cryptic and unhelpful bit of
boilerplate has been the subject of sharp criticism by the
Seventh Circuit. See Bjornson v. Astrue, 671 F.3d 640, 645–46
(7th Cir. 2012).
6
On July 8, 2002, Dr. Robert Mosley informed Dr. Harney
that despite the fact that Willoughby’s gastric emptying study
was unremarkable, his symptoms and the endoscopic findings were
highly suggestive of gastoparesis. (Admin. R., 494.)
9
suggested the problem might be psychiatric in nature.7
She noted
that Dr. Harney completed an assessment of Willoughby in April
2009.
In it, Dr. Harney said that Willoughby suffered from
gastroparesis,
which
interfered
with
his
ability
to
perform
routine, repetitive tasks and meet deadlines. Dr. Harney said that
Willoughby could sit for more than two hours at time, stand for one
hour at a time, and perform both activities for a total of about
four hours in a workday.
He opined that Willoughby could lift up
to 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently, but would need
to take about three unscheduled bathroom breaks each day, as well
as two additional twenty minute breaks per day in order to lie down
and rest.
ALJ Abrams gave “minimal weight” to Dr. Harney’s assessment
because the evaluation form indicated that he began treating
Willoughby on his date last insured, and it was not clear from the
assessment whether Dr. Harney believed that Willoughby had those
limitations from 2001 through 2006.
She added, “moreover, the
claimant’s medical records from that time period do not support Dr.
Harney’s
findings
with
regard
to
7
the
claimant’s
mental
work
Gastroenterologist Richard Rotnicki, for example,
suggested a “functional” or psychiatric origin for the disorder
in August 2003, given that a physical cause seemed to have been
excluded. (Admin R., 244.) On one of Willoughby’s frequent
emergency room visits, on Feb. 27, 2007, Dr. Paul Toofan
concluded that Willoughby “clearly ha[d] psychiatric issues”
after Willougby told him he was afraid he was going to stop
breathing on his own, so he could not sleep. (Admin. R., 297.)
10
limitations, and those records do not even clearly establish that
the claimant suffered from gastroparesis, or pyloric stenosis, as
he claims.”
(Admin. R., 24.)
ALJ Abrams then summarized Dr. Jilhewar’s testimony and noted
his
belief
that
Willoughby’s
psychological disorder.
symptoms
were
caused
by
a
She noted, however, that there was only
minimal evidence in the record to support this, and “[a]s such I do
not find that the claimant has any medically determinable mental
impairment.” (Admin. R, 25.) The ALJ additionally found, however,
that although Willoughby had consistently complained of abdominal
pain and vomiting from 2001 through 2006, “numerous diagnostic
tests
during
diagnoses.”
those
(Id.)
years
have
not
yielded
especially
severe
She noted the unremarkable gastric emptying
studies, and pointed out that Willoughby had instances of noncompliance, which detracted from his credibility.8
ALJ Abrams gave significant weight to the portion of Dr.
Jilhewar’s testimony dealing with the diagnostic findings in the
medical record, although she disagreed with his conclusion that
Willoughby was capable only of sedentary work.
he was capable of light exertion.
Instead, she found
While he could not longer
perform his past work, there were a significant number of unskilled
8
This is apparently a reference to a treatment note made
by Dr. Joseph Kokoszka, who said Willoughby had exhibited “poor
compliance” because he failed to follow-up with recommended small
intenstine mobility studies. (Admin R., 319.)
11
jobs which Willoughby could perform, including as an assembler,
visual inspector, or sorter.
Even if Dr. Jilhewar’s suggested
limitations were taken into account, Willoughby would still be able
to perform this jobs, the ALJ found.
II.
In reviewing the Commissioner’s final decision, I must
determine whether it is
“supported by substantial evidence and
based on the proper legal criteria.” Briscoe v. Barnhart, 425
F.3d 345, 351 (7th Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted).
Substantial evidence is that which a reasonable mind might accept
to support a conclusion. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401
(1972).
The Seventh Circuit applies a deferential standard of
review to the ALJ’s ruling, meaning that I should not substitute
my judgment for that of the ALJ or re-weigh the evidence. Haynes
v. Barnhart, 416 F.3d 621, 626 (7th Cir. 2005).
The ALJ is not
required to address every piece of evidence, but must provide a
“logical bridge” between the evidence and conclusions so that I
may address the validity of the agency's findings and provide
meaningful review.
Jones v. Astrue, 623 F.3d 1155, 1160 (7th
Cir. 2010).
III.
On appeal, Willoughby argues that ALJ Abrams erred in her
step two finding when she found that he had bulimia, but did not
find that he has hypokalemia or was underweight.
12
He also argues
that the ALJ erred in not finding him disabled at step three.
Specifically, he asserts that Willoughby should have been
assessed as equaling
Listing 5.06 for involuntary weight loss9
and Listing 5.08 for weight loss due to a digestive disorder.
Willoughby additionally argues that the ALJ erred in finding that
he was capable of performing work in the national economy.
I
will address each argument in turn.
A.
Step Two and Three Findings
Willoughby argues — and the Commissioner agrees — that Dr.
Jilhewar erred when he said that Willoughby never had a BMI of
less than 17.5 on at least two evaluations at least 60 days apart
within a consecutive 6-month period.
In fact, Willoughby’s BMI
fell below 17.5 on at least four occasions: on Nov. 25, 2003;
Oct. 22, 2004; Jan. 4, 2005; and Oct. 5, 2006.
Willoughby’s BMI
was at 17.0 on Oct. 22, 2004, and at 17.3 on Jan. 4, 2005, and
both sides agree that at that point in time Willoughby satisfied
the requirement for Listing 5.08.
Additionally, although Dr.
Jilhewar testified that Willoughby’s BMI was 19.4 based on his
9
Listing 5.06 is for inflammatory bowel disease (IBD) and
can be met in several ways, including by involuntary weight loss
of at least 10 percent from baseline and the need for
supplemental daily enteral nutrition via a gastrostomy or daily
parenteral nutrition via a venous catheter. 20 CFR Pt. 404,
Subpt. P, App. 1. Willoughby argues that he equaled this listing
because of his involuntary weight loss and his periodic need for
nutritional supplementation, but he fails to adequately develop
this argument.
13
stated weight at the time of the hearing, it was in fact below
19.4 on numerous occasions between late 2002 and mid-2006.
Nonetheless, the Commissioner contends that Dr. Jilhewar’s
misreading of the record was harmless error. The Commissioner
argues that even if Willoughby met Listing 5.08 as of Jan. 4,
2005, he cannot argue that he met the listing at any time after
that date.
This dooms his claim, the Commissioner contends,
because Willoughby must show that he was continuously disabled
from his date last insured, Dec. 31, 2006, until twelve months
before he applied for benefits, or Jan. 27, 2008.10
The
Commissioner, however, does not elaborate on his reasons for
believing that Willoughby cannot meet this requirement.
Willoughby must satisfy several statutory requirements in
order to receive benefits.
First, he must show that he was
disabled prior to the expiration of his coverage on Dec. 31,
2006.
Martinez v. Astrue, 630 F.3d 693, 699 (7th Cir. 2011)
(citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.140)).
Additionally, the statutory
scheme requires that Willoughby’s condition be continuously
disabling from the time of onset during insured status to the
time of application for benefits, if the individual applies for
benefits for a current disability after the expiration of insured
10
The record is unclear as to Willoughby’s filing date,
but he apparently completed his application for benefits on Jan.
27, 2009. (Admin R., 161).
14
status.
Flaten v. Sec. of Health and Human Servs., 44 F.3d 1453,
1460 (9th Cir. 1995); see Henry v. Gardner, 381 F.2d 191, 195–96
(6th Cir. 1967).
Combined with the rule that benefits may be
paid only for the twelve months immediately before the
application is filed, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.621(a)(1), this means
that Willoughby must show that he was continuously disabled
either before or beginning on Dec. 31, 2006, through Jan. 27,
2008. See Ryan v. Barnhart, No. 04 C 0584, 2004 WL 2038848, at *1
n.1 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 27, 2004).
ALJ Abrams, however, did not consider the issue of
continuous disability.
Rather, she considered whether Willoughby
could establish that he was disabled prior to his date last
insured.
ALJ Abrams focused on Willoughby’s treatment records
from Aug. 3, 2001, through Dec. 31, 2006, and concluded that he
was not under at disability at any time during that time period.
Based on that conclusion, she denied his application for
benefits.
This was, as the Commissioner concedes, error, and
given the significant weight ALJ Abrams placed on Dr. Jilhewar’s
opinion, I cannot find that it was harmless.
The doctrine of
harmless error applies only when “it is predictable with great
confidence that the agency will reinstate its decision on remand
because the decision is overwhelmingly supported by the record
though the agency’s opinion failed to marshal that support.”
Spiva v. Astrue, 628 F.3d 346, 353 (7th Cir. 2010).
15
Here, I am not confident that ALJ Abrams would have found
that Willoughby could not meet the continuous disability
requirement had she properly found that Willoughby met a listing
prior to the expiration of his coverage.
The ALJ would have been
required to consider whether Willoughby’s disability ended
because of medical improvement.
See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(b)(1)
(noting that medical improvement is a decrease in the severity of
the impairment based on improvements in the symptoms or
laboratory findings); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(f)(listing the
evaluation steps for determining medical improvement).
It is not
clear on this record that it did; for example, on Oct. 5, 2006,
Willoughby weighed 118 pounds and had a BMI of 17.4.
To the
extent the Commissioner is arguing that Willoughby waived any
argument that he was continuously disabled on or before Dec. 31,
2006, and through Jan. 27, 2008, I cannot make such a finding on
this record.
Willoughby’s testimony was that he has not worked
since 2001 and that in 2007 and 2008, he weighed about 115
pounds.
He did not contend there had been significant
improvement in his condition since 2005, nor did ALJ Abrams
consider that issue.
Further, she may have viewed other
evidence, including Willoughby’s own testimony as to the severity
of his symptoms, differently had she realized that he did in fact
meet a listing during his coverage period.
16
Dr. Jilhewar himself
testified that if Willoughby’s BMI were consistently low, his
opinion would have been different.
Because ALJ Abrams erred in her step three determination
that Willoughby did not met or equal a listing through his date
last insured, I cannot find her ruling to be supported by
substantial evidence.
See Barry v. Barnhart, No. 03 C 7239, 2004
WL 2092005, at **11–12 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 14, 2004)
(remanding
where the ALJ relied on a medical expert opinion that was based
in part on mischaracterization
of the record).
Willoughby asks
that I find him disabled and grant him benefits based on the
record.
When the ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial
evidence, a remand for further proceedings is the proper remedy
unless the evidence before me compels an award of benefits.
Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 355 (7th Cir.
2005) (internal citations omitted).
An award of benefits is
appropriate only when all the factual issues have been resolved
and the record can yield but one conclusion.
Id.
Here,
significant questions remain as to whether Willoughby remained
disabled after meeting Listing 5.08 in early 2005.
ALJ Abrams
did not develop the record to address this question because she
erroneously found that Willoughby was never disabled at any time
prior to the expiration of his insurance.
appropriate.
17
As such, remand is
B. Residual Capacity Finding
Willoughby makes several contentions of error in regard to
the ALJ’s residual capacity assessment, two of which have at
least some merit and are worth addressing in light of the remand.
As noted above, ALJ Abrams employed empty boilerplate as
part of her finding that Willoughby was not credible to the
extent his description of his symptoms was “inconsistent with the
above residual functional capacity assessment.”
As the Seventh
Circuit has held, this wrongly suggests that the ability to work
is determined first, and then used to assess credibility.
Bjornson, 671 F.3d at 645–46 (7th Cir. 2012).
It also is in
tension with Social Security Ruling 96-7p, which provides that a
claimant’s statements about the intensity and persistence of pain
and symptoms or the effect those symptoms have on the ability to
work cannot be disregarded solely because they are not
substantiated by the medical evidence.
Id. at 646.
ALJ Abrams did support her credibility finding with
citations to the medical record.
However, it appears that she
based her conclusion that Willoughby’s descriptions of his
limitations were not credible in part on Dr. Jilhewar’s erroneous
opinion.
The ALJ should reevaluate Willoughby’s credibility in
light of the fact that his weight loss was so significant that he
met a listing in early 2005.
18
Additionally, in reaching her functional capacity
assessment, ALJ Abrams gave little weight to the opinion of
treating physician Dr. Harney, in part because she found, based
on what appears to be an error on a medical assessment form, that
Dr. Harney did not begin treating Willoughby until Dec. 31, 2006.
ALJ Abrams then concluded that she could not tell whether Dr.
Harney believed that Willoughby had certain limitations during
the relevant time period before his date last insured.
Dr. Harney had treated Willoughby since 2001.
In fact,
ALJ Abrams
additionally found that the medical records did not support Dr.
Harney’s findings with regard to Willoughby’s mental work
limitations, nor did they clearly establish that Willoughby
suffered from gastroparesis or pyloric stenonis.
The ALJ of course, is not required to accept Dr. Harney’s
suggested limitations if they are inconsistent with the medical
evidence.
A treating physician's opinion is entitled to
“controlling weight” only if it is “well-supported by medically
acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is
not inconsistent with other substantial evidence” in the record.
Punzio v. Astrue, 630 F.3d 704, 710 (7th Cir. 2011); 20 C.F.R. §
404.1527(c)(2).
The ALJ may discount opinions based solely on
the claimant’s subjective complaints, see Ketelboeter v. Astrue,
550 F.3d 620, 625 (7th Cir. 2008), but must minimally articulate
her reasons for doing so.
Skarbek v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 500, 503
19
(7th Cir. 2004).
Nonetheless, given that the ALJ erred in
finding that Dr. Harney had not treated Willoughby during the
relevant time period, and given that she viewed the record
through the lens of Dr. Jilhewar’s erroneous opinion, she should
re-evaluate the credibility of Dr. Harney’s findings.
IV.
For the reasons stated, the Commissioner’s motion for
summary judgment (Dkt. No. 22) is denied.
Willoughby’s motion
for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 19) is granted to the extent this
case is remanded to the Social Security Administration for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
ENTER ORDER:
____________________________
Elaine E. Bucklo
United States District Judge
Dated: July 12, 2012
20
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