Golla v. Circuit Court of Cook County Illinois
Filing
127
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Count II of Plaintiff's Fourth Amended Complaint 104 is granted. Status hearing set for 12/18/2014 at 09:00 AM. Signed by the Honorable Harry D. Leinenweber on 11/13/2014:Mailed notice(wp, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
FRANCIS JOSEPH GOLLA,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 11 C 8149
v.
Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF JUDGE OF
COOK COUNTY and COOK COUNTY,
ILLINOIS,
Defendants.
ORDER
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Count II of Plaintiff’s Fourth
Amended Complaint is granted.
STATEMENT
Plaintiff
Francis
Joseph
Golla
(“Plaintiff”),
a
male
Caucasian, has been employed in the Office of Chief Judge of the
Circuit Court of Cook County (“Chief”) since 1983.
In 2004 he
was assigned to work in the Department of Social Services.
At
all material times he has been classified as an Administrative
Assistant and has been paid at Grade 14.
Since May 29, 2009,
Deotis Taylor (“Taylor”), an African American male, has also been
employed as an Administrative Assistant in the Department of
Social Services.
The duties assigned to Taylor are the same as
the duties assigned to Plaintiff, which are essentially data
entry clerical work.
Taylor was originally hired in 1994 as a
Court Coordinator V and was given a Grade 20.
In 1998 he was
promoted to Jury Room Manager and given a Grade 22.
He took a
leave of absence in 2007 at which time his job title was Legal
Systems Analyst and was at a Grade 22. When he returned from his
leave of absence, he apparently was assigned to the Department of
Social Services but according to his personnel file he was still
carried as a Legal Systems Analyst at Grade 22.
Because Taylor
was listed as a Grade 22 he was paid more than Plaintiff who was
listed
as
a
Grade
14.
Plaintiff,
in
his
Fourth
Amended
Complaint, claims this pay discrepancy is a violation of Title
VII (Count I), and Section 1983, based on alleged violation of
the Equal Protection Clause and the First Amendment (Count II).
Defendants
have
moved
to
dismiss
the
Section
1983
claim
(Count II).
Plaintiff’s first theory for his Section 1983 claim is that
Taylor was the beneficiary of his higher classification and
higher pay because “he had performed political activities in the
form of ‘door knocking’ on behalf of political candidates . . .”
and that somehow this violates the Plaintiff’s First Amendment
rights.
However, the Complaint does not allege that Plaintiff
was denied anything.
He was hired as a Grade 14 employee and
remained at Grade 14 until he retired in 2013.
The Complaint
does not allege that he attempted to have his grade level
increased nor does it allege that he was denied a high grade
level because of his political activities or lack of political
activities. See, Elrod v. Burns, 96 S.Ct. 2673 (1976) and Branti
v. Finkel, 100 S.Ct. 1287 (1980).
were
limited
to
hiring
These First Amendment cases
practices
and
the
Supreme
Court
specifically declined to extend their reach to normal patronage
practices
related
to
hiring,
rehiring state employees.
promoting,
transferring,
and
However, as pointed out by Plaintiff
in Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 110 S.Ct. 2729 (1990),
the Supreme Court extended the principle of Burns and Branti to
“patronage promotions, transfers, and rehires which were at issue
in that case.
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However, what is missing in this case is any negative
employment decision that was directed specifically at Plaintiff
due to his failure to perform political activities.
was not refused anything.
Plaintiff
He was not the recipient of any
negative action related to his employment. His only complaint is
that Taylor was paid more than him.
This can well be a violation
of Title VII, either under the equal pay provision or as a result
of racial discrimination.
First Amendment.
However, it is not a violation of the
The gist of Burns, Branti and Rutan is that
economic pressure exerted by the government to cause a government
employee to support a political party or cause against his wishes
violates the employee’s First Amendment rights.
The Complaint
does not allege that the Chief Judge demanded or even requested
that he perform political activities.
He could not have felt
pressure because he claims that he did not find out that Taylor
was paid more than him until he learned this in discovery in this
case.
Plaintiff’s last theory as to Section 1983 liability is that
the Defendants’ actions against him violated the Equal Protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Presumably Plaintiff is
contending that paying Taylor more than himself is irrational and
therefore denies him equal protection.
However, the Supreme
Court in Engquist v. Oregon Dept. Of Agriculture, 128 S.Ct. 2146,
2151 (2008) held that there is “a crucial difference, with
respect
to
constitutional
analysis,
between
the
government
exercising ‘the power to regulate or license, as lawmaker,’ and
the government acting ‘ as proprietor, to manage [its] internal
operation.”
The Court went on to point out that the Court has
“never found the Equal Protection Clause implicated in the
specific circumstance where, as here, government employers are
alleged to have made an individualized, subjective personnel
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decision in a seemingly arbitrary or irrational manner.”
It is
for this reason that the Congress and the States have replaced at
will employment with various statutory schemes protecting public
employees.
Id. at 2156.
Plaintiff clearly has failed to show an
equal protection violation.
Defendants argue that the Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim is
barred
by
the
two-year
statute
of
limitations.
However,
Defendants did not raise this argument until their Reply Brief
and it is therefore waived.
The Motion to Dismiss Count II of Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended
Complaint is granted.
Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge
United States District Court
Dated:11/13/2014
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