Golla v. Circuit Court of Cook County Illinois

Filing 149

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Signed by the Honorable Harry D. Leinenweber on 6/18/2015:Mailed notice(wp, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

FRANCIS JOSEPH GOLLA,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 11 C 8149
v.
Judge Harry D. Leinenweber
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF JUDGE
OF COOK COUNTY and COOK
COUNTY, ILLINOIS,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This

case

concerns

Plaintiff

Joseph

Golla’s

(“Golla”)

reverse discrimination claim against the Office of the Chief
Judge of Cook County and Cook County itself (collectively, the
“Defendants”).

Before

the

Court

Summary Judgment [ECF No. 132].

is

Defendants’

Motion

for

For the reasons stated herein,

the Motion is granted.
I.
The

following

indicated.
of

the

BACKGROUND

facts

are

in

unless

otherwise

Golla is a white male who was employed by the Office

Chief

Judge

of

Cook

approximately twenty years.
began

undisputed

1983.

Although

County

(the

“Office”)

for

Golla’s employment with the Office
the

Office

terminated

Golla’s

employment on March 16, 1995, Golla was reinstated less than a

year later as the result of a Settlement Agreement resolving
claims that the Office had discriminated against Golla based on
a

medical

condition.

Pursuant

to

the

Settlement

Agreement,

Golla was placed into the position of Law Clerk I at a Grade 14
pay

level.

In

2004,

Services Department.
retained

the

title

Golla

was

transferred

to

the

Social

According to his personnel record, Golla
of

“Law

Clerk

I”

and

continued

receiving

Grade 14 pay until he resigned from the Office on May 31, 2013.
Prior

to

his

responsibility

was

transfer

to

conducting

Social

Services,

Golla’s

legal

research.

In

main

Social

Services, however, Golla carried out administrative duties, such
as

data

entry,

report routing.

intake

processing,

case

initialization,

and

These duties involved SCERTS, intake forms that

must be completed for defendants who fail to report to Social
Services as ordered.
One of Golla’s colleagues in Social Services was Deotis
Taylor (“Taylor”), an African American male who initially began
working for the Office in 1978.
for state senate.

In 1999, Taylor resigned to run

The parties dispute Taylor’s status at the

time of his 1999 resignation.

According to Defendants, Taylor

was a Jury Room Manager receiving Grade 20 pay.

According to

Golla, Taylor was receiving Grade 22 pay and served as a Jury
Room Manager, a Probation Officer 4, and possibly a Community

- 2 -

Liaison.

According to his personnel record, Taylor was a Jury

Room Manager as of July 5, 1998 and was receiving Grade 22 pay.
In 2005, Taylor reapplied for employment with the Office.
Ultimately, Bruce Wisniewski (“Wisniewski”), the Office’s human
resources

administrator,

informed

assigned to Social Services.

Taylor

that

he

would

be

The parties disagree as to what

role Taylor assumed upon his return.

According to Defendants,

and as reflected on his personnel record, Taylor returned to the
Office in 2005 as a Legal Systems Analyst.

According to Golla,

Taylor had no formal job title upon his return.

The parties do

not dispute that Taylor was receiving Grade 22 pay.
Both Golla and Taylor were listed in the Social Services
staff

directory

under

the

title

of

Administrative

Assistant.

Defendants claim that, despite having the same job title in the
directory, Golla and Taylor had different job duties, although
Taylor’s duties were still administrative in nature.

Defendants

have also submitted evidence that other African American and
Caucasian employees in the Social Services Department performed
administrative and clerical duties similar to Golla’s, but at a
lower pay grade.
Vanessa Whitehead (“Whitehead”), who is African American,
is the Deputy Director of Management Services for the Social
Services

Department

and

supervised

both

Golla

and

Taylor.

However, the parties dispute whether Whitehead had authority to
- 3 -

set pay grades for Social Services employees.
deposition
employee

what
pay

her

role

levels,

was

with

Whitehead

respect

replied:

When asked at
to

determining

“None

at

all.”

(Whitehead Dep., Ex. D. to Defs.’ L.R. 56.1 Stmt., ECF No. 1335, at 7:23–8:1.)
At some point in 2009, Golla learned that Taylor received
pay

above

Grade

14.

On

May

29,

2009,

Golla

filed

a

discrimination complaint with the Illinois Department of Human
Rights and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”).
The EEOC closed the case on August 18, 2011 and issued Golla a
Right to Sue letter.

Three months later, on November 15, 2011,

Golla filed the instant case.

A single claim under Title VII

remains, in which Golla claims that the pay disparity between
him and Taylor is the result of racial discrimination.
asked

to

state

the

basis

for

his

race

discrimination

When
claim,

Golla replied:
Deotis and I did predominantly the same or certainly
similar work. I have a high school education. I have
a college education.
I have a law degree.
I have a
law license. I have 30 years of legal experience. He
has nothing equivalent to that and he was being paid —
we were both with Cook County approximately the same
length of service, and he was being paid substantially
more, eight grades more than I was for doing the exact
same or similar work.
And the only other difference
is he is African-American and I am Caucasian.
(Golla Dep., Ex. B to Defs.’ L.R. 56.1 Stmt., ECF No. 133-3,
at 43:15–44:2.)

- 4 -

At deposition, Golla was also asked whether anyone at the
Office made racial comments to him, to which he responded:
No.
You know, nothing direct racial.
Now, Vanessa
had on numerous occasions said that all my life people
have been standing in my way, and they all looked
exactly like you.
Is that racial?
Is that gender?
Is that age?
That’s what she would say, you are a
nobody, you are a nothing, you are not an attorney.
She would say it repeatedly, loudly, and to anybody
who was around her that would hear it.
But is that
racial? No. It’s demeaning. It’s disgusting. It’s
degrading.
But no, not directly racial.
No nooses
hanging anywhere.
(Id. at 44:3–17.)
II.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.”
facts

are

those

that

affect

FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).
the

outcome

of

the

Material
lawsuit.

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

A

genuine

a

dispute

exists

“if

the

evidence

is

such

that

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”
Id.

The moving party may meet its burden by showing “there is

an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.”
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986).

If the

moving party satisfies its initial burden, the non-moving party
must demonstrate with evidence “that a triable issue of fact
remains on issues for which [it] bears the burden of proof.”
Knight v. Wiseman, 590 F.3d 458, 463–64 (7th Cir. 2009).
- 5 -

The

judge’s

role

at

summary

judgment

is

not

credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.
Haupert, 481 F.3d 543, 550 (7th Cir. 2007).
whether

a

construes

genuine
all

issue

evidence

nonmoving party.

of

material

in

the

fact

light

most

to

make

Washington v.
In determining

exists,

the

favorable

Court

to

the

Bellaver v. Quanex Corp., 200 F.3d 485, 491-92

(7th Cir. 2000).
III.

ANALYSIS

Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating against
“any

individual

conditions

or

with

respect

privileges

of

to

his

compensation,

employment,

because

terms,

of

such

individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”
42

U.S.C.

§

2000e-2(a)(1).

A

plaintiff

may

establish

discrimination under Title VII directly or indirectly.
v. Perry, 520 F.3d 662, 671 (7th Cir. 2008).

Atanus

Defendants argue

that Golla cannot show discrimination under either method.
A.

Direct Method

Under the direct method of proof, a plaintiff must present
“direct or circumstantial evidence that creates a ‘convincing
mosaic of discrimination’ on the basis of race.”

Winsley v.

Cook Cnty., 563 F.3d 598, 604 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Troupe v.
May

Dep’t

Stores

Circumstantial

Co.,

evidence

20
in

F.3d

734,

employment

737

Cir.

discrimination

typically falls into one of three categories:
- 6 -

(7th

1994)).
cases

(1) suspicious timing, ambiguous oral or written
statements, or behavior toward or comments directed at
other employees in the protected group; (2) evidence,
whether or not rigorously statistical, that similarly
situated
employees
outside
the
protected
class
received systematically better treatment; [or] (3)
evidence that the employee was qualified for the job
in question but was passed over in favor of a person
outside the protected class and the employer’s reason
is a pretext for discrimination.
Sun v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill., 473 F.3d 799, 812 (7th Cir.
2007) (citation omitted).

A plaintiff may survive a motion for

summary judgment based solely on circumstantial evidence only if
the evidence “points directly to a discriminatory reason for the
employer’s action.”
670,

675

(7th

Good v. Univ. of Chi. Med. Ctr., 673 F.3d

Cir.

2012)

(citation

and

internal

quotations

omitted).
Absent in this case, Defendants argue, is any evidence that
Golla’s Grade 14 pay was based on his race.
appear

to

lacking.

dispute

that

direct

evidence

of

Golla does not
discrimination

is

Instead, he argues that discrimination is established

based upon “an abundance of circumstantial evidence.”
Resp., ECF No. 143, at 13.)

(Pl.’s

The key piece of evidence on which

Golla relies is Whitehead’s comment to him:

“[A]ll my life

people have been standing in my way, and they all looked exactly
like you.”

(Golla Dep., Ex. B to Defs.’ L.R. 56.1 Stmt., ECF

No. 133-3, at 44:3–17.)

According to Golla, this comment, in

the broader factual context of this case — in which the Office

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never investigated the reasons for the pay disparity — could
lead

a

reasonable

jury

to

conclude

that

the

pay

disparity

between him and Taylor was based on race.
Pieced together and viewed in the light most favorable to
Golla, the circumstantial evidence on which Golla relies does
not create a “convincing mosaic” from which a reasonable jury
might infer discrimination.
Whitehead’s

statement.

In

There are several problems with
general,

isolated

remarks

in

the

workplace are insufficient to establish that a particular action
was

motivated

by

discriminatory

animus.

Merillat

Spinners, Inc., 470 F.3d 685, 694 (7th Cir. 2006).

v.

Metal

This rule

gives way, however, when a remark is made by a decision maker
around the time of, and in reference to, the adverse employment
action of which a plaintiff complains.

Id.

Here, Golla has not

presented evidence sufficient to support that Whitehead was the
decision

maker

as

to

pay

grades.

At

deposition,

Whitehead

testified that she played no role in determining employee pay
grades.

To counter this testimony, Golla offers excerpts from

Wisniewski’s deposition in which he (1) states that a person
with a law license would not be entitled to a Grade 16 position,
but “would have to be recommended by the person that supervised
them” and (2) guesses that the Director of Social Services and
all

of

grades.

Golla’s

supervisors

would

have

set

his

previous

pay

(Wisniewski Dep., Ex. E to Defs.’ L.R. 56.1 Stmt., ECF
- 8 -

No. 133-6, at 32:7–15, 109:23–110:8.)

Wisniewski, however, goes

on to say that he lacks personal knowledge as to who set Golla’s
pay at Grade 14. (Id. at 110:9–12.)

A reasonable jury could not

conclude that Whitehead was the decision maker based on these
statements.
Even assuming that Whitehead set pay grades — which is not
supported by the record — there is no evidence that she made her
comment around the time the pay disparity arose, or in reference
to it.

Moreover, there is nothing inherently discriminatory

about Whitehead’s remark and no evidence to suggest that she was
referring to Golla’s race.

Indeed, in pondering the statement

at his deposition, Golla stated:
demeaning.

It’s

directly racial.”
ECF

No.

133-3,

disgusting.

“[I]s that racial?
It’s

degrading.

But

No. It’s
no,

not

(Golla Dep., Ex. B to Defs.’ L.R. 56.1 Stmt.,
at

44:3–17.)

Because

there

is

no

apparent

connection between Whitehead’s allegedly discriminatory comment
and the pay disparity, Golla fails to establish reverse racial
discrimination under the direct method of proof.
B.
Under

the

indirect

Indirect Method
method

of

proof,

a

plaintiff

in

a

reverse discrimination case must establish a prima facie case of
racial discrimination under a modified version of the McDonnell
Douglas test.

See, Mills v. Health Care Serv. Corp., 171 F.3d

- 9 -

450, 457 (7th Cir. 1999).

Specifically, the plaintiff must show

the following:
(1) [B]ackground circumstances that demonstrate that a
particular employer has reason or inclination to
discriminate invidiously against whites or evidence
that there is something ‘fishy’ about the facts at
hand; (2) that she suffered an adverse employment
action; and (3) that she was treated less favorably
than similarly situated individuals who are not
members of the protected class.
Good,

673

omitted).

F.3d

at

678

(citation

and

internal

quotations

If a plaintiff satisfies his or her initial burden,

the burden then shifts to the defendant to present a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for its decision.

Id. at 679.

If the

defendant does so, the burden returns to the plaintiff to prove
that the defendant’s explanation was mere pretext.

Id.

Defendants argue that Golla cannot establish the first or
third elements of a reverse discrimination claim.
begins

by

addressing

the

third

element.

This

The Court

prong

of

the

analysis determines whether “all things are in fact equal” and
“eliminate[s]
race.

other

Id. at 675.

possible

explanatory

variables”

besides

Determining whether an employee is similarly

situated requires the Court to undertake a “‘flexible, commonsense’ evaluation of the relevant factors.”

Coleman v. Donahoe,

667 F.3d 835, 847 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Henry v. Jones, 507
F.3d 558, 564 (7th Cir. 2007)).

These factors typically include

whether the comparators (1) “dealt with the same supervisor,”

- 10 -

(2) “were subject to the same standards,” and (3) “engaged in
similar

conduct

circumstances
employer’s

without

as

such

would

treatment

differentiating

distinguish

of

their

them.”

Id.

or

mitigating

conduct

(quoting

or

the

Gates

v.

Caterpillar, Inc., 513 F.3d 680, 690 (7th Cir. 2008)) (internal
quotations

omitted).

“Whether

a

comparator

is

similarly

situated is usually a question for the fact-finder, and summary
judgment

is

appropriate

only

when

no

reasonable

fact-finder

could find that plaintiffs have met their burden on the issue.”
Id. at 846–47 (citation and internal quotations omitted).
Here, Golla has presented sufficient evidence from which a
reasonable jury might conclude that he and Taylor were similarly
situated.

Golla notes that Whitehead was supervisor to both him

and Taylor, (Pl.’s L.R. 56.1 Stmt. of Addt’l Facts, ¶¶ 10, 14),
that

the

staff

Assistants

directory

(even

though

listed

their

both

official

men

as

Administrative

job

titles

differed),

(id. ¶ 1), and that the completion of SCERTS was an “all day
job” for both Golla and Taylor, who testified about the specific
SCERTS-related

duties

they

performed,

(id.

¶

30;

see,

Pls.’

Resp., ECF No. 143, at 9).

This constitutes sufficient evidence

from

find

that

however,

is

which

a

jury

could

Golla

and

Taylor

were

similarly situated.
The

first

element,

more

problematic.

The

contours of the first element — background circumstances — “are
- 11 -

not precise.”

Mills, 171 F.3d at 457.

To establish background

circumstances, a plaintiff must demonstrate “that a particular
employer has reason or inclination to discriminate invidiously
against whites” or provide evidence that “there is something
fishy about the facts at hand.”

Phelan v. City of Chi., 347

F.3d 679, 684 (7th Cir. 2003) (quoting Mills, 171 F.3d at 455)
(internal
stances

quotations
included

omitted).

the

fact

In

that

Mills,

women

background

dominated

circum-

supervisory

positions and, over a seven-year period, nearly all promotions
were

awarded

to

women.

In

Hague,

background

circumstances

included the fact that an African American supervisor fired and
replaced five white employees with four African American ones.
Hague v. Thompson Distribution Co., 436 F.3d 816, 822 (7th Cir.
2006).

In

Lupescu,

circumstances

based

the

on

court

“the

found

sufficient

predominance

of

background

African–American

supervisors plus evidence of a racially charged environment and
[a] lack of evidentiary support for [plaintiff’s] termination.”
Lupescu v. Napolitano, 700 F.Supp.2d 962, 976 (N.D. Ill. 2010).
Ultimately, background circumstances must “support an inference
that

the

defendant

is

one

of

those

discriminates against the majority.”

unusual

employers

who

Mills, 171 F.3d at 455

(citation and internal quotations omitted).
The background circumstances Golla recites can be broken
down

into

four

categories.

First,
- 12 -

Golla

states

that

the

supervisors responsible for setting pay grades, Whitehead and
Jesus

Reyes

(“Reyes”),

the

former

director

Services Department, are minorities.

of

the

Social

Second, Golla indicates

that there is no evidence supporting Taylor’s Grade 22 pay, and
that

the

Office

failed

to

conduct

a

job

audit

or

otherwise

investigate the pay disparity between him and Taylor, which was
Cook County policy.
suggestion

that

Third, Golla contends there was a “fair

Whitehead

had

racial

animus

against

Whites,”

(Pl.’s Mem., ECF No. 143, at 5) — namely, her comment that
people who “looked like” Golla had been standing in her way all
her life.

Finally, Golla questions various aspects of Taylor’s

history with the Office, such as the fact that “his job title
and work history were vague and ambiguous,” and that there was
no written job description for Taylor’s role as a Legal Systems
Analyst.

(Id.)

The Court first addresses Golla’s contention that Whitehead
and Reyes set pay grades.
Wisniewski’s

deposition

The Court has already concluded that

testimony

does

not

create

a

triable

issue of fact as to whether Whitehead set pay grades.

The

additional evidence Golla relies on here fares no better.

One

piece of evidence is simply a statement from Golla’s affidavit
that “Jesus Reyes is Hispanic and was at all relevant times the
Director of the Social Services Department.”

(Golla Aff., Ex. B

to Pl.’s L.R. 56.1 Stmt., ECF No. 142-2, ¶ 6.)
- 13 -

Another is the

quotation

from

Golla’s

deposition

Whitehead made to him.

reciting

the

comment

that

(Golla Dep., Ex. B to Defs.’ L.R. 56.1

Stmt., ECF No. 133-3, at 44:7–9.)

Unfortunately for Golla, this

evidence does little to rebut Whitehead’s deposition testimony
in which she disavows any involvement in setting pay grades.
The

Court

finds

Golla’s

evidence

insufficient

to

create

a

triable issue of fact as to whether Whitehead and Reyes set pay
grades.
The Court next examines the second background circumstance
Golla identifies — the lack of any reasonable basis for Taylor’s
Grade 22 pay and the Office’s failure to investigate the pay
disparity between Taylor and Golla.

Golla claims that it was

the policy of Cook County to conduct job audits to determine
appropriate

pay

levels,

and

that

it

would

be

prudent

to

determine pay grades based on whether employees shared similar
duties.
However,

(Pl.’s

L.R.

Wisniewski

56.1

Stmt.,

responded

“I’ve

ECF

No.

heard

of

142,
it”

¶¶

23–24.)

when

asked

whether job audits were Cook County policy, and stated “I don’t
know if it would be prudent” when asked whether a job audit
should have been conducted in Golla’s case.

(Ex. E to Defs.’

L.R. 56.1 Stmt., ECF No 133-6, at 35:14–17, 46:8–16.)
What remains then, is some evidence suggesting that neither
Wisniewski

nor

Whitehead

knew

what

experiences

or

duties

justified Taylor’s pay grade, (see, Pl.’s L.R. 56.1 Stmt. of
- 14 -

Addt’l Facts, ECF No. 142, ¶¶ 9, 12), Whitehead’s comment, and
various

facts

related

to

Taylor’s

employment,

such

as

the

apparent lack of a written job description for his position.
Defendants’ main objection to this evidence is that much of it
revolves around a single African American employee — Taylor.
For instance, there is no evidence, as in Mills or Hague, that
there

was

a

pattern

of

promoting

a

certain

race

or

the

replacement of a set of white employees with African American
ones.

Taken together and construed in the light most favorable

to Golla, the Court finds the evidence presented insufficient to
“support an inference that the defendant is one of those unusual
employers who discriminates against the majority.”

Mills, 171

F.3d at 455 (citation and internal quotations omitted).
Golla

has

element

of

failed
a

to

present

reverse

evidence

racial

establishing

discrimination

Because

the

case,

first

summary

judgment in favor of Defendants is appropriate.
Even assuming that Golla had presented evidence sufficient
to

establish

a

prima

facie

case

of

reverse

racial

discrimination, Defendants have come forward with a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory

reason

for

the

pay

disparity

—

Golla

and

Taylor’s pay grades were already established at different levels
when they entered the Social Services Department, and employees
retained the pay grades they had previously achieved.
Defs.’ L.R. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 14–15, 29, 33.)
- 15 -

(See,

Under the Settlement

Agreement, Golla’s employment with the Office was reinstated in
1996 at Grade 14 pay.

(See, Ex. 2 to Golla Dep., Ex. B to

Defs.’ L.R. 56.1 Stmt., ECF No 133-3, ¶ 1.)

Golla was still at

Grade 14 when he transferred to the Social Services Department
in

2004.

Taylor,

on

the

other

hand,

left

the

Office

at

a

Grade 20 or 22, gained additional experience working for the
Secretary of State, and was rehired into the Social Services
Department in 2005 at Grade 22.

(See, Wisniewski Dep., Ex. E to

Defs.’ L.R. 56.1 Stmt., ECF No. 133-6, at 72:1–13.)
Golla

has

not

produced

any

evidence

showing

that

Defendants’ basis for the pay disparity — retention of previous
pay

grades

—

was

pretext

for

racial

discrimination.

“Pretext . . . means a lie, specifically a phony reason for some
action.”

Helland v. S. Bend Cmty. Sch. Corp., 93 F.3d 327, 330

(7th Cir. 1996) (citation and internal quotations omitted).
show

pretext,

employer's
the

Cir.

plaintiff

non-discriminatory

employer’s

intent.”

a

true

reason

must

establish

reason
was

was

based

that

“(1)

dishonest[,]
on

a

and

To
the
(2)

discriminatory

Stockwell v. City of Harvey, 597 F.3d 895, 901 (7th

2010).

Pretext

concerns

whether

an

employer

“honestly

believes in the reasons it offers, not whether it made a bad
decision.”

Rand v. CF Indus., Inc., 42 F.3d 1139, 1145 (7th

Cir. 1994) (citation and internal quotations omitted).

- 16 -

Even assuming Golla had set forth evidence sufficient to
establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination, and shift
the burden back to Defendants — which he has not — he has failed
to

show

that

Defendants’

reason

for

the

pay

disparity

was

pretextual.

“The argument that Taylor’s and Plaintiff’s pay

grades

in

were,

essence,

permanent

is

not

supported

by

the

evidence or common sense,” Golla contends, noting that a job
audit was never performed to assess the pay disparity.
Resp., ECF No. 143, at 10.)

(Pl.’s

Yet, even if Defendants’ policy did

not represent sound business judgment, Golla has provided no
evidence suggesting that Defendants’ rationale was a lie.
IV.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, the Defendants’ Motion for
Summary

Judgment

[ECF

No.

132]

is

granted,

and

the

case

dismissed with prejudice.

is

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge
United States District Court
Dated: June 18, 2015

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