Harris v. Village of Calumet Park et al

Filing 47

MEMORANDUM Opinion Signed by the Honorable Samuel Der-Yeghiayan on 2/28/2013: Mailed notice (mw, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
SHARON HARRIS,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
VILLAGE OF CALUMET PARK, et al., )
)
Defendants.
)

No. 11 C 8435

MEMORANDUM OPINION
SAMUEL DER-YEGHIAYAN, District Judge
This matter is before the court on Defendant Village of Calumet Park’s
(Village), Defendant Joseph Dupar’s (Dupar), and Defendant Mark Davis’ (Davis)
motion for summary judgment. For the reasons stated below, the motion for
summary judgment is granted in its entirety.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Sharon Harris (Harris) was allegedly hired by the Village in 1995 as a
patrol officer with the Village police department (Department). Harris contends that
over the course of the following fifteen years she received promotions and was

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ultimately promoted to the Commander position. In 2002, Davis was allegedly hired
as the Police Chief for Department. Harris claims that Davis harassed her and
discriminated against her because she is a woman. Harris also claims to have
overheard a conversation on a speaker phone in which Davis referred to Harris by a
certain derogatory term.
Harris contends that she complained about the alleged harassment and
discrimination to DuPar, the Village mayor, and that afterwards she was subjected to
increased discrimination and retaliation by Davis. Davis allegedly divested Harris of
her job responsibilities and assigned them to subordinate male officers. Harris
contends that in further retaliation for her complaint, her Commander position was
eliminated and she was demoted to patrol officer in September 2010.
Harris includes in her complaint a gender discrimination claim brought under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.
(Count I), a Title VII hostile work environment claim (Count I), a claim alleging a
violation of her constitutional equal protection rights brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983 (Section 1983) (Count II), a Title VII retaliation claim (Count III), and a
Section 1983 Monell claim (Count IV). The court notes that the complaint filed by
Harris inaccurately lists the retaliation claim as Count V and the Monell claim as
Count XI, but that it is clear from the allegations and numbered paragraphs in the

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complaint that there are only four counts being brought by Harris. Defendants move
for summary judgment on all claims.

LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate when the record, viewed in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party, reveals that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Smith v. Hope School, 560 F.3d 694, 699 (7th Cir. 2009). A
“genuine issue” of material fact in the context of a motion for summary judgment is
not simply a “metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Rather, a genuine issue
of material fact exists when “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return
a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
248 (1986); Insolia v. Philip Morris, Inc., 216 F.3d 596, 599 (7th Cir. 2000). In
ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must consider the record as a
whole, in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; Bay v.
Cassens Transport Co., 212 F.3d 969, 972 (7th Cir. 2000).

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DISCUSSION
I. Local Rule 56.1
Harris, in responding to Defendants’ statement of material facts, makes certain
objections, contending that Defendants failed to comply with Local Rule 56.1.
Harris argues that the paragraphs provided by Defendants are not sufficiently
concise. However, Local Rule 56.1 does not specifically limit each paragraph to one
or two allegations as proposed by Harris (Ans. SJ 8), and Harris has not cited any
controlling precedent that supports such a conclusion. Defendants’ statement of
material facts is sufficiently concise and unambiguous that Harris should have been
able to properly respond in accordance with Local Rule 56.1 and Defendants’
statement of material facts complies with Local Rule 56.1. The court also notes that
although Harris argues that a paragraph in a statement of facts should be limited to
one or two allegations, ironically, Harris’ own statement of additional facts failed to
follow her own arguments. (SAF Par. 12, 16, 19).

II. Title VII Gender Discrimination Claim
Defendants argue that Harris has not pointed to sufficient evidence to prevail
on her Title VII gender discrimination claim. A plaintiff bringing a Title VII
discrimination claim can defeat a defendant’s motion for summary judgment under

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the direct or indirect methods of proof. Naficy v. Illinois Dept. of Human Services,
697 F.3d 504, 509-10 (7th Cir. 2012).

A. Direct Method of Proof
Harris argues that she has pointed to sufficient evidence to proceed on her
Title VII gender discrimination claim under the direct method of proof. Under the
direct method of proof, a plaintiff must “present ‘direct or circumstantial evidence
that creates a convincing mosaic of discrimination on the basis of’” the protected
characteristic. Good v. University of Chicago Medical Center, 673 F.3d 670, 674-75
(7th Cir. 2012)(quoting Winsley v. Cook County, 563 F.3d 598, 604 (7th Cir. 2009));
see also Naficy, 697 F.3d at 509-10 (explaining that under the “‘direct method,’ a
plaintiff must marshal sufficient evidence, either direct or circumstantial, that an
adverse employment action was motivated by discriminatory animus,” and that
“[c]ircumstantial evidence may be sufficient to make out a direct claim of
discrimination when the plaintiff presents enough evidence to allow a reasonable
factfinder to conclude that the adverse employment action was taken as a result of the
plaintiff’s” protected characteristic).
Harris points to no direct evidence of discrimination and relies on several
pieces of circumstantial evidence that she contends supports her case under the direct

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method of proof. Harris contends that DuPar testified that the Personnel Action
form completed when Harris was moved from the Commander position back to the
patrol officer position was used as part of a “corrective action” or “disciplinary”
action. (SAF Par. 14). Harris also contends that such an admission is an admission
that DuPar used the Personnel Action form to discriminate and retaliate against
Harris. However, Harris mischaracterizes DuPar’s testimony. Harris selectively
quotes the words “corrective action” and “disciplinary” used by Dupar when
discussing the various reasons a Personnel Action form might be used, and Harris
takes the words out of context. No reasonable analysis of DuPar’s deposition
testimony would indicate that DuPar admitted to signing the Personnel Action form
for Harris to discriminate against her because of her gender or retaliate against her.
DuPar clearly testified that a Personnel Action form is used if there is a personnel
action such as a “change in pay” or an issue that must be addressed with the union.
(DuPar Dep. 89-90). DuPar merely indicated in response to an inquiry by Harris’
counsel that such a form may be needed when there is a disciplinary action taken
against an employee. (DuPar Dep. 89-90). DuPar was not specifically asked
whether the Personnel Action form used to move Harris from the Commander
position to the patrol officer position was a disciplinary action. In fact, DuPar
ultimately indicated at his deposition that Harris was removed from the Commander

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position because the position had been eliminated by the Village Board, not because
Harris was being disciplined. (DuPar Dep. 93).
Harris also asserts that Davis made certain remarks about her that indicate an
animus against her because she is a woman. Harris contends that on one occasion,
Davis told another officer on a speaker phone to “stay out of that b---’s office,” and
Harris contends that Davis called her “baby girl,” which made her feel embarrassed.
(SF Par. 25); (SAF Par. 5). However, such allegations, even if true, fail to create a
convincing mosaic of discrimination. Nor does Harris tie the use of the phrase “baby
girl” to any alleged discriminatory conduct. Harris also contends that she can
proceed under the direct method of proof based on the fact that during Davis’
absence, DuPar appointed Gerald Corrigan (Corrigan) to act in his place instead of
Harris. (Ans. SJ 13). Harris argues that she outranked Corrigan. However, as will
be explained below, the undisputed facts show that there were ample reasons to
conclude that Harris was failing to properly perform her job as Commander. It is
also undisputed that Corrigan had been a Sergeant for six years and that Harris had
failed the Sergeant’s exam on three occasions. (R SF Par. 19, 44, 46). Based on the
above, Harris has failed to point to sufficient evidence, even when viewed in its
totality, to proceed under the direct method of proof.

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B. Indirect Method of Proof
Harris also argues that she has pointed to sufficient evidence to proceed on her
Title VII gender discrimination claim under the indirect method of proof. Under the
indirect method of proof, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case by
showing: (1) that the plaintiff “is a member of the protected class,” (2) that the
plaintiff “met her employer’s legitimate job expectations,” (3) that the plaintiff
“suffered an adverse employment action,” and (4) that “similarly situated employees
outside of the protected class were treated more favorably.” Naficy, 697 F.3d at 51112. If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, “the burden shifts to” the defendant
“to introduce a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employment action.” Id.
If the employer introduces such a reason, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to
show that the reason is a pretext for unlawful discrimination. Id. Defendants argue
that Harris has not shown that she met her employer’s legitimate job expectations or
that similarly situated employees outside of the protected class were treated more
favorably.

1. Failure to Meet Employer’s Legitimate Job Expectations
Defendants argue that Harris has not pointed to sufficient evidence to show
that she was meeting the legitimate job expectations of the Village.

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a. Performance Deficiencies
Harris admits to several deficiencies in her work performance. Harris admits
that from 2003 to 2012, she “periodically received reprimands.” (R SF Par. 65).
Harris does not dispute, pursuant to Local Rule 56.1, that such reprimands were
because of her failure to “follow[] department policies with regard to tardiness.” (R
SF Par. 65). Harris also admits that the reprimands did not all come from Davis, and
that they were also given by two other officers, including Assistant Chief Susan
Rockett (Rockett), another woman. (R SF Par. 65). Harris also admits that on June
5, 2010, when Harris was in the Commander position, Davis was off duty when
Davis observed an unattended squad car in a hotel parking lot and a house party in
the Village that was getting out of control, and there were no officers in sight. (R SF
Par. 24). It is undisputed that when Davis went to the station, he heard Harris and
another officer talking and laughing in the office, oblivious to the problems
discovered by Davis. (R SF Par. 24). It is also undisputed that Davis was angry that
Harris had failed to keep in contact with the officers out in the field and failed to
keep track of the events going on in the Village. (R SF Par. 24).
Harris also does not dispute that, in 2009, due to her failure to competently
field public questions at a Village Board meeting, the “Trustees felt that Harris was
unprepared for the public meetings and unknowledgeable as to what was going on in

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the Village.” (R SF Par. 38-39). Harris also admits that the Village Trustees
“received complaints from members of the public about Harris’ inability to answer
their questions,” and that a Trustee requested that another member of the Department
be sent to Village Board meetings to answer questions. (R SF Par. 39). Thus, the
undisputed facts indicate that Harris failed to show up for work on time, failed to
properly monitor her subordinates, and failed to properly prepare to represent the
Department at Village Board meetings.

b. Complaints from Other Officers
Harris, as second-in-command was placed in a leadership role, and part of her
job responsibilities were to properly lead and supervise other officers. (SF Par. 1415). The undisputed facts show that Davis had a legitimate justification to doubt
Harris’ ability to act in a leadership role in the Commander position. (R SF Par. 1517). It is undisputed that Davis received complaints from officers about Harris’
improper supervision “on a weekly basis.” (R SF Par. 15). It is also undisputed that
several officers, including Kurtisa Curtis (Curtis), a female officer, told Davis “that
they did not feel comfortable working under Commander Harris.” (R SF Par. 15).
Harris admits that Davis received complaints that Harris disciplined officers for
minor transgressions, that Harris acted unprofessionally, and that Harris favored her

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friends at the Department. It is also undisputed that in July 2009, a female dispatcher
complained to Davis on multiple occasions about Harris’ “unfair treatment,” and
about Harris’ “unprofessional behavior.” (R SF Par. 16). It is also undisputed that in
2009, Curtis, a female officer, complained to Davis that Harris had changed Curtis’
official reports after she submitted them. (R SF Par. 16). Harris also admits that
another officer complained to Davis in July 2010 about intimidation, harassment, and
discrimination by Harris. (R SF Par. 17). Harris attempts to diminish the admitted
“problems” with her work performance in supervising officers by contending that
Davis “had even more problems” with other officers in the Department. (R SF Par.
15). However, pointing at other officers who likewise may not have been doing their
jobs correctly does not alter the fact that Harris was failing to meet her employer’s
legitimate non-discriminatory expectations. Finally, to the extent that Harris
contends that the complaints made about her were part of a conspiracy against her
because she is a woman, Harris fails to point to evidence to explain why the
complaints by her female subordinates were based on an animus against women.

c. Promotions and Qualifications to be Second-In-Command
Harris contends that she worked her way up “through the ranks” and was
promoted during her employment at the Department. (Compl. Par. 14). Harris began

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as a patrol officer in 1995 and moved to a investigator position in 2002. (SF Par. 67). However, the undisputed facts indicate that Harris was the only qualified
applicant and obtained the open investigator position by signing her name to the
posting. (R SF Par. 7); (Davis Dep. 89); (Ans. SJ 2). Harris did not have to pass a
test or go through an interview in order to get the investigator position. (R SF Par.
7). It is also undisputed that when the Commander position was created, Harris was
chosen because DuPar insisted that an internal candidate be chosen even though
Davis believed that there was no qualified internal candidate. (R SF Par. 12). As
indicated above, the undisputed facts also show that once Harris was placed in the
Commander position, she failed to properly perform her job. In addition, although
Harris asserts that she was qualified to act as the second-in-command at the
Department, it is undisputed that in 2009 Harris took the Sergeant’s exam and failed
all seven categories on the exam. (R SF Par. 19). It is also undisputed that Harris
had failed the exam on two prior occasions. (R SF Par. 19). Based on the above, in
light of the performance deficiencies by Harris, including her failure to properly
supervise subordinates, no reasonable trier of fact could conclude that Harris was
meeting the legitimate job expectations of the Village.

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2. Similarly-Situated Employees
Defendants argue that Harris has failed to point to similarly situated
employees outside the protected class that were treated more favorably. Harris has
failed to point to any officer that held the Commander position who received more
favorable treatment. Harris points to male officers who were Sergeants, asserting
that they were paid more than her. (R SF Par. 62-63). However, it is undisputed
that Harris repeatedly failed the Sergeant’s exam and thus such officers are not
similarly situated to Harris. (R SF Par. 19, 62-63). Harris also points to Mark Smith
(Smith) in the Coordinator position, who she contends was a similarly situated
employee, but the undisputed facts show that the responsibilities for the Coordinator
position and the Commander position were not the same. (R SF Par. 41, 43, 45, 47).
Harris also contends that Smith was treated more favorably because he was not
disciplined for misconduct, but the undisputed facts indicate that the alleged
misconduct referred to by Harris was merely based on rumors without any
documented evidentiary support, and no complaint against Smith had ever been filed.
(R SF Par. 46). Thus, Harris has failed to point to similarly situated employees
outside the protected class that were treated more favorably. Based on the above,
Harris has failed to establish a prima facie case under the indirect method of proof.

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3. Pretext
Defendants indicate that Harris was disciplined due to poor work performance
and that certain organizational changes were made at the Department to enable the
Department to operate more effectively. Harris has failed to show that the given
reasons for such decisions and actions were a pretext for unlawful discrimination.
Harris acknowledges that she was ultimately promoted to the Commander position at
the Department, which indicates a desire to promote female officers instead of
discriminating against them. It is also undisputed that Harris’ predecessor in the
Commander position was Rockett, another woman, and that Rockett became the
Assistant Chief for Operations at the Department. (R SF Par. 10). Harris fails to
offer evidence to explain why Rockett was promoted to high level administrative
positions if there was a hidden animus against women at the Department. The
undisputed facts show that Harris’ poor work performance was documented by a
variety of sources other than Davis. Harris points only to one isolated instance when
Davis referred to Harris using a certain derogatory term. However, it is undisputed
that the remark was made during a time when Davis was angry that Harris was not
doing her job properly. One isolated remark is not sufficient to show that Harris was
discriminated against because of her gender. Therefore, based on the above,
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the gender discrimination claim is

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granted.

III. Title VII Hostile Work Environment Claim
Defendants argue that Harris has failed to point to sufficient evidence to show
that she was subjected to a hostile work environment. For a Title VII hostile work
environment claim, a plaintiff must establish: “(1) that her work environment was
both objectively and subjectively offensive; (2) that the harassment was based on her
[protected characteristic]; (3) that the conduct was either severe or pervasive; and (4)
that there is a basis for employer liability.” Vance v. Ball State University, 646 F.3d
461, 469 (7th Cir. 2011).
In the instant action, Harris points to only one isolated remark where Davis
used a pejorative term when referring to Harris. Such evidence does not indicate the
type of pervasive harassment that can support a hostile work environment claim. In
addition, it is undisputed that Davis did not even intend Harris to hear the remark. In
Passananti v. Cook County, 689 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2012), the Seventh Circuit
specifically addressed whether the use of the pejorative term used by Davis when
referring to Harris on the speaker phone is a basis to automatically conclude that
there is harassment based on gender. Id. at 665-67. The court acknowledged that the
term had various contemporary meanings that did not necessarily reflect an animus

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against someone because of their gender. Id. at 665. The court also emphasized that
the context of the use of the term is important in evaluating whether the term was
indicative of an animus against someone because of their gender. Id. at 666-67. In
the instant action, the undisputed facts reflect that Davis made the isolated remark
when he was angry because he had discovered that Harris had not been doing her job
properly, not because he harbored some hidden animus against Harris because of her
gender. (SF Par. 24-25). When Davis discovered Harris was failing to properly
supervise officers in the field, Davis called the male officer who Davis had heard
laughing with Harris in her office, and told the male officer to stay out of Harris’
office. (SF Par. 24-25).
Harris also contends that she was harassed and embarrassed based on a series
of perceived slights relating to decisions concerning the assignment of job duties, use
of flex-time, pulling time cards, attending certain meetings, attending parades,
posting of pictures on walls, and the assignment of equipment such as squad cars.
However, Harris’ claimed subjective embarrassment and distress, even if true, falls
far short of indicating the type of objectively pervasive hostile work environment
that would interfere with a reasonable person’s ability to do her job. In addition,
Harris has not shown that any of the above mentioned decisions related in any way to
the fact that she is a woman. Therefore, based on the above, Defendants’ motion for

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summary judgment on the hostile work environment claim is granted.

IV. Title VII Retaliation Claim
Defendants argue that Harris has not pointed to sufficient evidence to prevail
on her Title VII retaliation claim. A plaintiff bringing a Title VII retaliation claim
can defeat a defendant’s motion for summary judgment under the direct or indirect
methods of proof. Hoppe v. Lewis University, 692 F.3d 833, 841 (7th Cir. 2012).

A. Direct Method of Proof
Harris argues that she has pointed to sufficient evidence to proceed on her
Title VII retaliation claim under the direct method of proof. Under the direct
method of proof, a plaintiff must show: (1) that “‘she engaged in a statutorily
protected activity,’” (2) that “‘she suffered a materially adverse action by her
employer,’” and (3) that “‘there was a causal link between the two.’” Id. (quoting
Benuzzi v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chi., 647 F.3d 652, 664 (7th Cir. 2011))(internal
quotations omitted). Harris has failed to point to sufficient evidence to proceed
under the direct method of proof, pointing only to various circumstantial evidence
that is insufficient to create a causal link that would enable her to proceed under the
direct method of proof.

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B. Indirect Method of Proof
Harris also argues that she has pointed to sufficient evidence to proceed on her
Title VII retaliation claim under the indirect method of proof. Under the indirect
method of proof, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case by showing: (1)
that “he engaged in a statutorily protected activity,” (2) that “he met his employer’s
legitimate expectations, i.e., he was performing his job satisfactorily,” (3) that “he
suffered a materially adverse action,” and (4) that “he was treated less favorably than
some similarly situated employee who did not engage in the statutorily protected
activity.” Harper v. C.R. England, Inc., 687 F.3d 297, 309 (7th Cir. 2012). If the
plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, “the burden shifts to the defendant to
articulate a non-discriminatory reason for” the adverse action. Id. If the defendant
provides such a reason, “the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that a genuine
issue of material fact exists as to whether the defendant’s proffered reason was
pretextual.” Id.
As explained above, the undisputed facts show that Harris was failing to meet
her employer’s legitimate non-discriminatory expectations and Harris had problems
with her work performance, even after she complained about her perceived
discrimination and harassment. For example, Harris was counseled for her failure to
comply with the Department sick-time policy in June 2011. (SF Par. 73); (Harris

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Dep. 122-23). Harris further admits that in 2009 as Commander, she created a policy
that required officers to submit a notification form upon receiving a subpoena to
testify in order to ensure that there was adequate personnel available for duty at the
Department, and that in 2012, Harris failed to comply with her own policy when
working in her patrol officer position. (R SF Par. 66-67). Harris has also failed to
point to similarly-situated employees that were treated more favorably than her. As
explained above, neither Corrigan nor Smith were similarly situated to Harris.
Harris contends that Davis created two new Coordinator positions at the
Department in order to divest Harris of her responsibilities in retaliation for Harris’
complaints about the alleged discrimination. However, it is undisputed that if Harris
desired to perform the responsibilities associated with the newly-created Coordinator
positions, Harris could have applied for the Detective Division Coordinator position,
but did not do so. (R SF Par. 45). It is also undisputed that if Harris had passed the
Sergeant’s exam, she would have also qualified to apply for the Patrol Operations
Coordinator position. (R SF Par. 44). Harris also asserts that she was demoted from
the Commander position to the patrol officer position in retaliation for complaining
about discrimination. However, the undisputed facts show that in September 2010,
the Village eliminated the Commander position and merged the Coordinator
positions at the Department. (R SF Par. 61). Harris’ position was then changed from

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Commander to patrol officer in accordance with her contract, which provided that
she was to be returned to her previous civil service rank. (R SF Par. 57-58, 61).
Harris has failed to point to evidence to indicate that the decision to eliminate the
Commander position was made in retaliation for Harris complaining about
discrimination. Harris admits that the Village’s policy provides that appointed
positions can be eliminated at any time. (R SF Par. 61). The Village also provided
legitimate administrative reasons for its decision, and Harris has not shown such
reasons to be a pretext for retaliation. DuPar testified, for example, that the
Commander position was eliminated as part of an effort to reduce costs, to enable the
Department to operate more efficiently, and to meet the budget requirements, and
Harris has not offered evidence to genuinely dispute that assertion. (DuPar. Dep. 9495). It is also undisputed that Harris actually earned more in the patrol officer
position than she had been earning in the Commander position. (R SF Par. 64).
Thus, there is insufficient evidence to show that the elimination of the Commander
position was done in retaliation against Harris. Therefore, based on the above,
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the Title VII retaliation claim is
granted.

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V. Section 1983 Claims
Defendants argue that Harris has not pointed to sufficient evidence to prevail
on her Section 1983 claims. In analyzing Section 1983 equal protection claims in the
employment discrimination context, the courts generally follow the same type of
analysis used for Title VII claims. See, e.g., Smith v. Bray, 681 F.3d 888, 899 (7th
Cir. 2012); Swearnigen-El v. Cook County Sheriff’s Dept., 602 F.3d 852, 860 n.6
(7th Cir. 2010). Harris acknowledges that the proper analysis in this case for her
Section 1983 claims parallels that of her Title VII claims. (Ans. SJ 21).
As explained above, Harris has failed to point to sufficient evidence to succeed on
her Title VII discrimination claims. The undisputed facts show that Harris failed to
properly perform her job. Harris fails to point to sufficient evidence for a reasonable
trier of fact to conclude that Harris’ equal protection rights were violated by Davis or
DuPar, or that Harris was discriminated against in retaliation for protected activities.
In addition, even if Harris had shown that Davis violated Harris’ constitutional
rights, Harris has failed to show that DuPar would be liable under Section 1983 for
turning a blind eye to Davis’ alleged conduct. Harris admits that, at her request,
DuPar met with Harris to hear her complaints about Davis. (R SF Par. 29). Harris
also admits that at that meeting she promised DuPar that she would later provide him
with evidence of discrimination by Davis, and that Harris never provided such

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evidence. (R SF Par. 29). Finally, even if Harris had pointed to sufficient evidence
of a constitutional violation, Harris has failed to point to evidence indicating that
there was any Village policy or practice that was the moving force behind any
constitutional deprivation or that any individual with final policy-making authority
made a decision that violated Harris’ constitutional rights. See Milestone v. City of
Monroe, Wis., 665 F.3d 774, 780 (7th Cir. 2011)(explaining the requirements for a
Monell claim). The undisputed facts in this case indicate that two woman have
recently been promoted to high positions in the Department, which actually suggests
a policy to promote woman instead of discriminating against them. Therefore, based
on the above, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the Section 1983 claims
is granted.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is
granted in its entirety.

___________________________________
Samuel Der-Yeghiayan
United States District Court Judge
Dated: February 28, 2013

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