Weston v. Saddler et al

Filing 10

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 4/16/2012.(tsa, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
)
THEODORA WESTON
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
v.
)
)
ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN
)
SERVICES, Michael Saddler, Secretary and
)
H.V. BAKARE, caseworker, MS.
)
WITHSRSPOON, her supervisor, in their
)
individual and official capacities, and ILLINOIS )
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTHCARE AND
)
11 C 8792
FAMILY SERVICES Division of Child Support )
Enforcement, Therea Eagleson, Secretary and
)
Judge Virginia M. Kendall
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, and
)
BRENDAN KELLY, State Attorney for St. Clair )
County, Illinois
)
)
Defendants.
)
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
I. Background
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion to Reconsider. (Doc. 8). Plaintiff
Theodora Weston brought a pro se suit in this Court against Michelle Saddler, H.V. Bakare, Therea
Eagleson, Brendan Kelly, someone identified only as Ms. Witherspoon, the Illinois Department of
Family Services, and the United States of America. (Doc. 1) The Court found that all of Weston’s
claims, as alleged, failed as a matter of law. (Doc. 6; Order of December 19, 2011). The Court
therefore dismissed Weston’s case. (Id.) The Court also denied Weston’s Motion to Proceed In
Forma Pauperis. (Id.) Weston moves this Court to reconsider it prior ruling, or in the alternative,
grant here leave to amend her Complaint. For the reasons stated below, Westons’s Motion for
Reconsideration is denied. In addition, construing her Motion as one to amend, that too is denied
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because any amendment to her Complaint would be futile.
II. Motion to Reconsider Under Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b)
Weston titles her new filing as a Motion to Reconsider. Under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure a “Motion to Reconsider” does not exist. See Mares v. Busby, 34 F.3d 533, 535 (7th Cir.
1994); GHSC Assocs. Ltd. P'ship. v. Wal-Mart Stores, 29 Fed. Appx. 382, 384 (7th Cir. 2002).
Thus, a motion that seeks to challenge the merits of a ruling by a district court will automatically be
considered as having been filed under Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. See Id. Whether to characterize a motion as arising under Rule 59(e) or 60(b) depends
on the nature of the motion. See Obriecht v. Raemisch, 517 F.3d 489, 493 (7th Cir. 2008) (“...it is
the substance, rather than the form, of a post-judgment motion that determines the rule under which
it should be analyzed.”
A motion filed under Rule 59(e) is one to alter or amend a judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e).
“A motion to alter or amend a judgment under Rule 59(e) may be granted to correct a manifest error
of law or fact.” Duran v. Town of Cicero, 653 F.3d 632, 642 (7th Cir. 2011), citing Harrington v.
City of Chicago, 433 F.3d 542, 546 (7th Cir. 2006). On the other hand, Rule 60(b) provides that
“[o]n a motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party...from a final judgment, order, or
proceeding for...mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1).
Rule 60(b) is an extraordinary remedy “designed to address mistakes attributable to special
circumstances and not merely to erroneous applications of law.” Eskridge v. Cook County, 577 F.3d
806, 809 (7th Cir. 2009). Rule 60(b) motions are not vehicles to correct legal errors made by the
district court. See Marques v. Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, 286 F.3d 1014, 1017-18 (7th Cir.
2002) (“A legal error by the district court is not one of the specified grounds for [] a [Rule 60(b)]
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motion. In fact it is a forbidden ground.”) (internal citations omitted).
Weston’s Motion does not fall into either Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b). Weston does not
contend–nor could she–that the Court committed a manifest error of law or fact in deciding her
Complaint. Similarly, she does not contend that the Court should alter its prior judgment due to
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. Weston claims that the Court incorrectly
“concluded that, in order to proceed in forma pauperis, it must be proven, not stated, that a claim
has relief that may be granted.” This is not a proper ground for reconsideration under either 59(e)
or 60(b). Furthermore, the Court did not hold that in order to proceed in forma pauperis, it must be
proven that a claim has relief that may be granted. Rather, the Court analyzed Weston’s Complaint
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), as it is authorized and required to do by Congress. The statute
provides that “the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that...the action...is
frivolous...fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or seeks monetary relief against a
defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii) (emphasis supplied).
When performing this analysis courts apply the same standard that they apply when considering a
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). See Marshall v. Knight, 445 F.3d 965, 968 (7th Cir. 2006);
Zimmerman v. Tribble, 226 F.3d 568, 571 (7th Cir. 2000). The Court thoroughly reviewed and gave
due consideration to each of the claims asserted by Weston in her Complaint. The Court concluded
that all of these claims failed as a matter of law. Therefore, Weston’s Motion to Reconsider, to the
extent that it falls under either Rule 59(e) or 60(b), is denied.
III. Motion to Amend Under Rule 15(a)
Putting aside the language that Weston uses to frame her Motion, it is not really a motion to
reconsider at all. Rather, the Court construes Weston’s Motion as one to amend her Complaint,
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presumably under Rule 15. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). Weston says that “given an opportunity to
amend, [she] can state and later prove that the United States of America can be held accountable to
the procedural and substantive requirements of due process by virtue of the Bill of Rights.” She
claims that “the federal government may not be reachable via the Fourteenth Amendment, but it
surely can be reached by virtue of the Fifth Amendment...” Weston therefore claims that she “should
be allowed to amend the petition against the United States of America on the basis of the taking of
private property without just compensation...” What Weston essentially seeks is to amend her
Complaint to include a claim arising under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
More precisely, she seeks to replead Count II of her Complaint to proceed upon the Fifth
Amendment, rather than the Fourteenth Amendment, as she did initially.
“Although leave to amend should be freely given...that does not mean it must always be
given. District courts have broad discretion to deny leave to amend where there is undue delay, bad
faith, dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure deficiencies, undue prejudice to the defendants, or
where the amendment would be futile.” Hukic v. Aurora Loan Servs., 588 F.3d 420, 432 (7th Cir.
Ill. 2009), citing Arreola v. Godinez, 546 F.3d 788, 796 (7th Cir. 2008) (internal quotations omitted).
Denying an amendment on futility grounds is the functional equivalent of allowing for the proposed
amendment and then dismissing it under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See
Townsel v. DISH Network L.L.C., 668 F.3d 967, 969 (7th Cir. 2012). Futility exists where an
amended complaint would not survive a motion to dismiss. See Arlin-Golf, LLC v. Village of
Arlington Heights, 631 F.3d 818, 823 (7th Cir. 2011); London v. RBS Citizens, N.A., 600 F.3d 742,
747 n.5 (7th Cir. 2010). To withstand a motion to dismiss, Weston must allege facts that, when
“accepted as true ... ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
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662, 678 (2009), quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)
From the facts alleged in Weston’s Complaint the Court is at pains to see how the federal
government is involved in her case for purposes of a Fifth Amendment takings claim. Weston
alleges that The Illinois Department of Healthcare and Human Services failed to collect child support
payments due to her for roughly twenty years. After waiting over twenty years for the Department
to collect child support payments that were by then in arrears, Weston decided to initiate a petition
against her ex-husband for the overdue payments. For reasons that she does not explain, she never
went through with the petition. According to Weston, sometime in 2010 she called Brendan Kelly,
the Illinois State’s Attorney for St. Clair County, and he allegedly told her that “the FEDS” had
instructed him not to collect on the child support payment and “to reduce arrearages to zero.”
Notably, this is the only time that the federal government appears anywhere in Weston’s
Complaint–that is, the hearsay comment allegedly made by Kelly, the State’s top law enforcement
official for St. Clair County, is the sole basis for Weston’s claim that the federal government has
played any role in her efforts to obtain child support payments. According to Weston, this call with
Kelly resulted in the State bringing some sort of action against her ex-husband–Weston does not say
what the action was for, what court it was in, etc. But apparently it resulted in a court order on
November 21, 2011, in which the State obtained a judgment against the ex-husband. Weston does
not supply the Court with this alleged order, and the Court–having undertaken an independent
investigation to discover it–has been unable to locate it.
In spite of her obligation to set forth clear and concise claims pursuant to Rule 8 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Weston’s Complaint is unclear and not an easy one to understand.
Among the claims made in Count II are “that the respondent, Il. Dept. of Healthcare & Family
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Services is a state agency responsible for the prosecution of child support obligations along with
respondent, Brendan Kelly, St. Clair County, Il. State’s Attorney and an unknown branch of the
United States of America as a respondent.” Weston alleges that “during the 1990's, [she] registered
her 1987 Dissolution of Marriage Decree with the non-afdc division of child support enforcement
@ $500 monthly for two minors.” She claims that “from 1990 to the present, the respondents have
failed to collect any child support whatsoever from [her] ex-husband.” She claims “that after twenty
years of not collecting child support, respondent, Il. Dept. of Healthcare and Human Services,
notified [her] that it will not enforce her child support order because the children are now over the
age of eighteen years.” According to Weston, “during 2010, [she], via the St. Clair County State
Attorney’s office and later, Brendan Kelly, initiated a petition for entry of judgment against [her] exhusband, but never finalized said petition nor collected any monies.” Furthermore, Weston claims
that she “contacted the downstate office of the respondent and was informed by Brendan Kelly that
‘the FEDS had told them not to collect on the child support and to reduce arrearages to zero’; said
conversation culminating in a court order entered November 21, 2011, in which the State entered a
judgment against [her] ex-husband on its own behalf for more than $38,000, but nothing on behalf
of [Weston], whose arrearages totaled more than $197,000.”
Amending her Complaint would be futile because Weston’s Complaint and all of her claims
do not belong in federal court. First, this case is within the “domestic relations” exception to federal
jurisdiction. See Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 715 (1992) (federal courts lack jurisdiction
over actions seeking “divorce, alimony, and child custody”); Elk Grove Unified School Dist. V.
Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 12 (2004). Federal courts have long declined to exercise jurisdiction over
issues related to divorce and child support, as “the whole subject of the domestic relations of
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husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the States and not to the laws of the
United States.” Newdow, 542 U.S. at 12, quoting In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-594 (1890); see
also Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582, 584 (1858) (“we disclaim altogether any jurisdiction
in the courts of the United States upon the subject of divorce, or for the allowance of alimony.”).
The Seventh Circuit held that Ankenbrandt “re-affirmed the longstanding rule that domestic disputes
involving divorce, custody or alimony issues are the province of state courts and emphasized that
this rule was a limitation on federal jurisdiction.” Allen v. Allen, 48 F.3d 259, 261 (7th Cir. 1995);
see also Jones v. Brennan, 465 F.3d 304 (7th Cir. 2006) (emphasizing that the “domestic relations”
exception to federal jurisdiction applies equally to diversity cases as it does to cases invoking a
federal question); see also Lloyd v. Loeffler, 694 F.2d 489, 492 (7th Cir.1982) (“The typical divorce
decree provides for...child support payments...[C]hild support...often entail[s] continuing judicial
supervision... The federal courts are not well suited to this task...When a case must begin in state
court, as a divorce or custody case must, retention of any ancillary litigation...is within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the state courts.”). This Court therefore lacks jurisdiction to determine whether
Weston has properly received her child support payments. Weston’s right to child support payments
flows from her divorce decree. The enforcement of any child support payments that may be due to
her is the province of state courts and agencies.
Additionally, leave to amend would be futile because Weston’s Complaint is barred by the
statute of limitations. The statute of limitations in Illinois for a claim arising under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, as Weston’s purports to, is two years. See Kelly v. City of Chicago, 4 F.3d 509, 511 (7th Cir.
1993). This means that Weston’s claims must have accrued within two years of filing of the
Complaint–which means after December 12, 2009. According to Weston’s allegations, the actors
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responsible for withholding her child support have been doing so for over twenty years. The claims
accrued when Weston knew, or should reasonably have known, that her constitutional rights were
being violated. See Id. Any argument that this was a continuing violation or an ongoing
conspiracy–which may toll the statute of limitations–must be soundly rejected. See Galloway v.
General Motors Serv. Parts Operations, 78 F.3d 1164, 1167 (7th Cir. 1996). A continuing violation
requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that because of the continuing nature of the acts alleged, no
cause of action accrued until a pattern of behavior became established because no cause of action
would have accrued upon the first few instances of the inappropriate action. See Galloway v.
General Motors Serv. Parts Operations, 78 F.3d 1164, 1167 (7th Cir. 1996); Selan v. Kiley, 969 F.2d
560, 565-66 (7th Cir. 1992). That is, a continuing violation requires a pattern of activity that alerts
the plaintiff to a cause of action over a duration of time, rather than at the time of each discrete act.
From the claims alleged in Weston’s Complaint it is clear that she became aware of the conduct
which she complains of as early as 1990–the time that she claims the respondents failed to collect
any child support from her ex-husband. A cause of action for a civil conspiracy–which from the
allegations it appears Weston believes this was–does not accrue at the time of the last act in
furtherance of the conspiracy, but rather at the time the plaintiff “becomes aware that [she] is
suffering from a wrong for which damages may be recovered in a civil action.” Scherer v. Balkema,
840 F.2d 437, 439-440 (7th Cir. 1988). If Weston believed that the allegations in the Complaint
amounted to unconstitutional activity under Section 1983–which this Court has painstakingly
established did not–she must have brought it to the attention of a court within two years of the first
occurrence.
In her initial Complaint, Weston claimed that the State of Illinois, St. Clair County State’s
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Attorney Brendan Kelly, and the United States of America violated the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution. She claimed that the State, Kelly, and the United States interfered
with her legitimate property interest in child support payments and basic civil rights such that they
had a duty to compensate her. She further claimed “that the State of Illinois and the Federal
Government have violated substantive due process in the economic sphere by eliminating her
$197,000 in back child support; and by never ever having intended to collect [her] child support.”
She alleged “that as a direct and proximate cause of the respondents’ intentional refusal to enforce
her child support order, [she] has suffered extreme emotional distress, loss of property, loss of civil
rights, along with approximately One Hundred and Ninety Seven Thousand Dollars ($197,000) in
back child support.” She also claimed that she is entitled to no less than $500,000.00 in punitive
damages.
The Court originally ruled that:
[T]here is no Fourteenth Amendment right to child support payments that any of the
named entities could violate. Furthermore, Illinois is immune from liability by virtue
of the Eleventh Amendment and Brendan Kelly enjoys prosecutorial immunity from
suit alleging a constitutional violation. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890);
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976). Finally, Weston has pled the United States
out of the case because the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply to the United
States.
(Doc. 6; Order of December 19, 2011, Page 2).
Any amendment of Weston’s Complaint is also futile because she does not have a property
interest in the child support payments that is protected by the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, and therefore the claim that the United States took her property without just
compensation cannot stand. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that
“private property” shall not “be taken for public use, without just compensation.” U.S. Const.,
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Amdt. V. The Clause restricts the government “from forcing some people alone to bear public
burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.” Armstrong v.
United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). For a Takings Clause claim to lie, the petitioner must have
a “property interest” in that which they claim the government has confiscated from them. See
Muscarello v. Ogle County Bd. of Comm'rs, 610 F.3d 416, 423 (7th Cir. 2010), citing Memphis
Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 9 (1978). “The ‘private property’ upon which the
Clause traditionally has focused is a specific interest in physical or intellectual property.” Eastern
Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 554 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting). The concept, however,
extends beyond mere physical or tangible property, and has been held to include trade secrets
protected under state law, Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984), rights of access to
property, e.g., PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980), Kaiser Aetna v. United
States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979), rights to affix cables on structures, Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 441 (1982), and the economically beneficial use of property, Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992). However, the protections of the Fifth
Amendment do not extend to “mere unilateral expectations” of economic benefits. See Webb's
Fabulous Pharms. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161 (1980). Thus, the right to social service benefits,
Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 608-611 (1960), future pension benefits, United States v. Willow
River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499 (1945), and welfare benefits, Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 266
(1970), are not protected as “property” within the meaning of the Clause. But whatever the “property
interest” in question, the State must take it for a Takings Clause action to exist, and the State must
transfer the property either to itself or to a private party by virtue of its eminent domain power. See
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 484 (2005).
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Courts must rely on an ad hoc, factual inquiry to determine whether a taking arises in a
particular case. See Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, 475 U.S. 211, 224 (1986).
The Supreme Court has identified three factors that are applied as guideposts in determining whether
state action has affected a taking. These are: (1) “the economic impact of the regulation on the
claimant”; (2) “the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed
expectations”; and (3) “the character of the governmental action.” See Penn Central Transportation
Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). As the Court in Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587,
607 (U.S. 1987), instructed, in applying the first factor it is critical to remember that the economic
impact in question when considering child support payments is the impact on the child. Here the
relevant children have reached the age of majority without the aid of any child support that may have
been due to them in the past. It is Weston who is seeking the arrearages–and she is not the primary
beneficiary of child support payments. This is not a case about past-due spousal maintenance.
Therefore, the first factor weighs against finding that Weston has a property interest subject to a
taking in child support payments. Accord Bowen, 483 U.S. at 607. In applying the second factor,
the Court noted that “the child receiving support payments holds no vested protectable expectation
that his or her parent will continue to receive identical support payments on the child’s behalf, and
that the child will enjoy the same rights with respect to them.” Bowen, 483 U.S. at 607. Under
Illinois law, support obligations are always subject to modification by law. See In re Marriage of
Petersen, 955 N.E.2d 1131, 1134 (Ill. 2011) (“The Act also recognizes that because circumstances
do not always remain the same as they were on the date a judgment of dissolution is entered,
modifications may be necessary. 750 ILCS 5/510.”). Support may be modified by courts,
legislatures, and even Congress. See Bowen, 483 U.S. at 607. Thus, the second factor militates
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heavily against Weston. Third, there has been no government action here. That may be one of
Weston’s complaints, but it is up to her–perhaps with the aid of Illinois’s courts and agencies–to
enforce any child support obligations that are supposedly due to her. This is certainly not a case in
which a minority of people are being forced to bear a financial responsibility that ought to be born
by the public at large. See Bowen, 483 U.S. at 607, citing Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49 . Therefore, no
property interest exists in child support payments and as a result the Takings Clause is not triggered.
See generally Bowen , 483 U.S. at 607; accord Johnson v. Cohen, 836 F.2d 798, 807 (3d Cir. 1987)
(“As we have noted above, the Supreme Court conclusively decided that no property interest existed
in the child support payments, and thus that the protections of the takings clause were not
triggered.”).
To the extent property of Weston’s–in this case a right to child support payments–was taken
from her, it was taken either by her ex-husband, via his refusal to make the payments–or by the State
of Illinois, when it refused to enforce the support decree, or obtained a judgment against the husband
and thereby improperly obtained rights to the ex-husband’s property ahead of Weston’s rights. As
the private citizen husband and the State of Illinois are the parties responsible for paying Weston,
it is these parties with whom she would have privity of suit. To the extent the State of Illinois
received any direction from the federal government, it is the State of Illinois’s burden to raise this
alleged direction as a cross-claim for contribution for any amounts it is found to owe to Weston.

IV. Conclusion
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Weston’s Motion for Reconsideration and to Proceed In Forma Pauperis is denied. Her
Motion, construed as one to amend her Complaint, is also denied.

________________________________________
Virginia M. Kendall
United States District Court Judge
Northern District of Illinois
Date: April 16, 2012

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