Carr et al v. City Of North Chicago et al
Filing
62
MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Arlander Keys on 11/8/2012:(ac, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
GLORIA CARR and DELOREAN
MCKINNEY as CO-Independent
Administrators of the Estate of
DARRIN E. HANNA, deceased,
Plaintiffs,
v.
CITY OF NORTH CHICAGO, et al.,
Defendants.
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No. 11 C 8836
Magistrate Judge Keys
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
On November 6, 2011, North Chicago police officers responded
to a domestic battery call at the home of Darrin E. Hanna.
Hanna left on a stretcher and died seven days later.
Mr.
On December
13, 2011, Mr. Hanna’s mother Gloria Carr and son Delorean
McKinney (“Plaintiffs”)1 filed this suit against the City of
North Chicago (“City”), North Chicago Mayor Leon Rockingham, Jr.,
and former North Chicago Police Chief Michael Newsome
(collectively, “Municipal Defendants”) as well as six North
Chicago police officers and one North Chicago police sergeant
(collectively, “Defendant Officers”).
In their Third Amended
Complaint, Plaintiffs assert 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims for
violations of Mr. Hanna’s Fourth and/or Fourteenth Amendment
rights against the City and Defendant Officers alleging excessive
force (Count I), failure to protect (Count III), and conspiracy
1
Mr. Hanna also has an infant daughter, Rihanna Marie Hanna, who was born
after his death. (3d Amend. Compl. at ¶ 4.)
to interfere with Civil Rights (Count X); state law claims
against the City and Defendant Officers alleging wrongful death
(Count II), survival (Count IV), assault and battery (Count VI),
and negligence (Count VII); a state law claim against the City
for indemnification (Count V); and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims
against the Municipal Defendants alleging a policy and practice
of excessive force (Count VIII) and negligent hiring, training
and supervision (Count IX) (“Monell claims”).
Currently before
the Court is the Municipal Defendants’ motion to bifurcate the
Monell claims and stay discovery and trial on those claims until
the claims against the Defendant Officers are resolved.
For the
reasons explained below, the motion is granted.
Factual Background
On November 6, 2011, Defendant Officers responded to a call
of domestic battery at Mr. Hanna’s home in North Chicago, where
they made a forced entry. (3d Amend. Compl. at ¶¶ 11-12.; Answer
¶¶ 11-12.)
The domestic dispute was apparently between Mr. Hanna
and his girlfriend.
After entering the apartment, Defendant
Officers allegedly Tasered and beat Mr. Hanna repeatedly “before
and/or after he was placed in handcuffs.” (3d Amend. Compl. at ¶¶
15-16.)
The Third Amended Complaint further alleges that Mr.
Hanna was not armed (Id. at ¶ 13), and that no Defendant Officer
attempted to protect him from the beating. (Id. at ¶ 17.)
undisputed that Mr. Hanna left his home on a stretcher.
2
It is
He was
taken to Vista East Memorial Hospital and died seven days later.
The Third Amended Complaint alleges that the conduct of Defendant
Officers constituted excessive force against Mr. Hanna, in
violation of his constitutional right to be free from such force
(Id. at ¶ 19, 21-22), and that the Municipal Defendants
“acquiesced and/or promoted” a pattern and practice of excessive
force and the use of Tasers by the City’s police officers. (Id.
at ¶ 20.)
Discussion
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b) states, in relevant
part, that “[f]or convenience, to avoid prejudice, or to expedite
and economize, the court may order a separate trial of one or
more separate issues, claims, crossclaims, counterclaims, or
third-party claims.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b).
As Rule 42(b)’s
language suggests, courts have broad discretion in deciding
whether to bifurcate issues presented in a case or to try them
separately.
Krocka v. City of Chicago, 203 F.3d 507, 516 (7th
Cir. 2000).
Certain conditions, however, must be met in order to
support a motion to bifurcate.
A court must determine if
separate trials would avoid prejudice to a party or serve the
purpose of judicial economy, though only one of these criteria
need be met.
Houseman v. U.S. Aviation Underwriters, 171 F.3d
1117, 1121 (7th Cir. 1999); MCI Communications v. Am. Tel. & Te.
Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1166 (7th Cir. 1983).
3
This standard also
applies when, as here, a plaintiff brings a § 1983 claim against
a municipality pursuant to Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs. of
City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611
(1978) (authorizing claims for constitutional harms resulting
from a municipality’s customs and policies).
See Treece v.
Hockstetler, 213 F.3d 360, 364-65 (7th Cir. 2000); Medina v. City
of Chicago, 100 F. Supp.2d 893, 894 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (“There is
no question that a district court has the discretion to sever a
Monell claim against a municipality from claims against
individual police officers and stay litigation of the Monell
claim until the rest of the case is resolved.”) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
I.
Convenience and Judicial Economy
Municipal Defendants argue that bifurcation of the Monell
claims against them will promote convenience and judicial
economy, as those claims can only succeed if it is first
determined that the Defendant Officers violated Mr. Hanna’s
constitutional rights. (Def.’s Mot. at 4.)
Applying the three
factors of Thomas v. Cook County Sheriff’s Dep’t., 604 F.3d 293,
(7th Cir. 2009), Municipal Defendants argue that the claims
against it are “wholly contingent on the conduct of Defendant
Officers.” (Def.’s Mot. at 4.)
As a result, Municipal Defendants
opine that a finding that the Defendant Officers did not violate
Mr. Hanna’s rights, but the Municipal Defendants are nonetheless
4
liable for a constitutional harm, would be inconsistent and
contrary to City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 106 S.
Ct. 1571, 89 L. Ed. 2d 806 (1986). (Def.’s Mot. at 8.)
A finding
in favor of Defendant Officers will, therefore, also resolve the
Monell claims.
On the other hand, if the Defendant Officers are
found to have violated Mr. Hanna’s constitutional rights, the
Municipal Defendants argue that their proposed Certification of
Entry of Judgment Against Defendant City of North Chicago will
likewise relieve the Plaintiffs of any need to litigate the
Monell claims. (Id. at 13.)
Therefore, since the Monell claims
will not need to be litigated regardless of who ultimately
prevails, Municipal Defendants assert that bifurcation will allow
both the court and the parties to avoid the time and costs
involved in the Monell discovery and litigation.
Conversely, Plaintiffs argue that bifurcation will encourage
“piecemeal li[ti]gation of individual claims” because the
Defendant Officers could prevail on a qualified immunity defense,
requiring a second trial on the Monell claims. (Id. at 6-7.)
Plaintiffs additionally contend that the Monell discovery will be
limited, and some of that discovery will be needed to litigate
their claims against Defendant Officers. (Id. at 8.)
would therefore not result in any economies.
Bifurcation
Lastly, Plaintiffs
argue that bifurcation would ignore valid non-economic interests
involved in the Monell claims. (Pl.’s Resp. at 5-6.)
5
A.
The Liability Issues
Municipal Defendants correctly point out that Plaintiffs
have not responded to the argument that Plaintiffs can only
prevail on their Monell claims if there is a finding that the
Defendant Officers violated Hanna’s constitutional rights.
This
does imply that Plaintiffs have conceded the argument. MCI
WorldCom Network Services, Inc. v. Atlas Excavating, Inc., No. 02
C 4394, 2006 WL 3542332 *3 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 6, 2006).
Even if
Plaintiffs had squarely addressed the matter, however, Municipal
Defendants would prevail on this point.
The Monell claims are
entirely dependant on the claims against Defendant Officers.
This fact strongly favors bifurcation, as the Monell claims need
not be reached if Defendant Officers prevail on the claims
against them.
Where a plaintiff brings a Monell claim against a
municipality based on the specific conduct of a municipality
employee, the plaintiff cannot prevail on that Monell claim
without first showing that the employee violated the plaintiff’s
constitutional rights. Heller, 475 U.S. at 799.
Although the
Court in Heller did not state that the employee must be liable
for the violation, this became a question in the lower courts.
In Thomas, the Seventh Circuit addressed whether Heller in fact
established a rule that a plaintiff must show that the individual
employee is not merely the instrument of plaintiff’s harm but is
6
also liable for that harm before a Monell claim can succeed.
Thomas concluded that Heller did not establish such a rule.
Rather, the rule in Heller is that “a municipality can be held
liable under Monell, even when its officers are not, unless such
a finding would create an inconsistent verdict.” Thomas, 604 F.3d
at 305.
Thomas set forth three factors to consider in
determining whether a municipality’s liability depends on the
actions of its officers: (1) the nature of the constitutional
violation that the plaintiff alleges; (2) the theory of municipal
liability that supports the Monell claim; and (3) the defenses
that the individual defendants have asserted. Id.
A predicate to recovery under Monell is, of course, a
constitutional injury. Heller, 475 U.S. at 799. (“[N]either
Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services…nor any other of
our cases authorizes the award of damages against a municipal
corporation based on the actions of one of its officers when in
fact the jury has concluded that the officer inflicted no
constitutional harm.” (citation omitted))
In Thomas, a pre-trial
detainee at Cook County Jail died a few days after being
admitted.
The decedent’s mother sued individual correctional
employees under § 1983 for deliberate indifference to her son’s
serious medical needs, and sued the Cook County Sheriff and Cook
County under a Monell policy, practice, and custom theory.
The
constitutional violation in that case required a culpable mental
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state—deliberate indifference—on the part of the individual
defendants.
There, it was possible that the individual
defendants were not deliberately indifferent but rather could not
respond properly because the County’s policies prevented them
from doing so. Thomas, 604 F.3d at 305.
In other words, even if
the individual defendants were not liable, the plaintiff could
have, nonetheless, suffered a constitutional injury inflicted by
the County’s policy.
In contrast, an excessive force claim does
not require proof of a culpable mindset.
As Municipal Defendants
correctly point out, excessive force claims are analyzed under
the Fourth Amendment standard of “objective reasonableness.”
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 104 L. Ed.
2d 443 (1989).
If there was no excessive force, there was no
injury to constitutional rights.
Sallenger v. City of
Springfield, 630 F.3d 499, 505, 2010 WL 5128850, at *5 (7th Cir.
2010); Matthews v. City of East St. Louis, 675 F.3d 703, 709 (7th
Cir. 2012).
Here, all of the claims against the Defendant Officers are
contingent on the claim that they used excessive force against
Mr. Hanna.
If there was no excessive force, Mr. Hanna did not
suffer an injury to his constitutional rights.
If Mr. Hanna did
not suffer an injury to his constitutional rights, then there is
no constitutional harm that the Municipal Defendants could be
held liable for.
Therefore, Plaintiffs’ claims against Municipal
8
Defendants are wholly contingent on the excessive force claim
against Defendant Officers.
If the Monell claims are bifurcated
and the Defendant Officers prevail, the time and expense involved
in litigating the Monell claims will be saved.
The liability
issues in this case therefore favor bifurcating the Monell
claims.
B.
Municipal Defendants’ Certification of Entry of Judgment
In conjunction with their motion to bifurcate, Municipal
Defendants have offered a Certification of Entry of Judgment
Against Defendant City of North Chicago (“certification”).
(Def.’s Mot. App. 6.)
Municipal Defendants argue that the
certification will ensure that Plaintiffs recover any
compensatory damages awarded to them, while allowing Plaintiffs
to avoid the “heavy burden of discovery and proof” that Monell
claims entail. (Def.’s Mot. at 14.)
Plaintiffs counter that the
agreement is “worthless” because North Chicago may have solvency
issues “…and there is no stipulation that the insurance company
will indemnify for the multiple claims of excessive force and
police brutality currently pending including this matter.” (Pl.’s
Resp. at 3, 5.)
In other words, Plaintiffs argue that, because
the City’s insurance company is not a party to the agreement and
may ultimately refuse to pay on a judgment, the certification
guarantees nothing.
They argue that this, and the fact that the
Defendant Officers may prevail on a qualified immunity defense,
9
could mean that bifurcation will result in more litigation rather
than less.
The Court disagrees.
Municipal Defendants concede that North Chicago carries
liability insurance, unlike larger municipalities that may be
self-insured. (Def.’s Reply at 11.)
Plaintiffs do not
demonstrate, however, why this fact counsels against bifurcation.
Plaintiffs assert that “[b]ifurcation could actually promote
additional litigation by way of an insurance indemnification suit
if an officer is found individually liable” (Pl.’s Resp. at 5),
but they fail to explain why the result will be different if the
Monell claims are not bifurcated.
Without any case support or
further explanation, the presence or absence of liability
insurance appears to this Court to be a distinction without a
difference, and immaterial to the bifurcation decision.
The
certification will ensure that a judgment is entered against the
City if an individual defendant is found to have violated Mr.
Hanna’s constitutional rights.
Plaintiffs have given the Court
no reason to believe that the method by which judgment is entered
will alter whether the insurance company decides to pay or
challenge the claim.
If an insurance indemnification suit is a
legitimate concern, it is a concern whether or not this Court
bifurcates the Monell claims.
Next, Plaintiffs’ contention that a second trial will be
needed if the Defendant Officers prevail on a qualified immunity
10
defense overlooks the fact that the certification here does not
require a finding that the Defendant Officers are liable.
As a
preliminary matter, defendants are not likely to prevail on a
qualified immunity defense in the context of excessive force
allegations. See, e.g., Readus v. Dercola, 2012 WL 1533167, at *3
(N.D. Ill. May 1, 2012); Tanner v. City of Waukegan, 10 C 1645,
2011 WL 686867, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 16, 2011) (collecting
cases).
A court in this District has even suggested that
asserting qualified immunity in the context of an excessive force
claim may run afoul of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11.
Readus, 2012 WL 1533167, at *3.
Regardless, if Defendant
Officers do prevail here on a qualified immunity defense,
judgment will nonetheless be entered against the City.
The
certification provides that judgment will be entered “…if the
finder of fact at trial, or the court through a dispositive
motion, finds that any individual defendant violated Plaintiff’s
constitutional rights…” (Def.’s Mot. Ex. 6 at 2.)
The
certification does not require that an individual defendant be
found liable for the injury; it only requires a finding that an
individual defendant violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights,
regardless of any immunity from liability.
Plaintiffs cite Cage v. City of Chicago, 9 C 3078, 2010 WL
3613981 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 8, 2010), for support, but the
certification in that case was quite different.
11
The claims in
Cage centered on an allegation that the City of Chicago had a
policy of withholding exculpatory lab evidence.
At that stage of
the lawsuit, there were still unidentified/unnamed defendants.
The City’s certification agreed to entry of judgment only if a
named defendant was found to have violated Plaintiff’s rights.
Cage, 2010 WL 3613981, at *1.
In fact, the Plaintiff in that
case was prepared to agree to bifurcation “if the City agrees
unequivocally to have judgment entered against it should
Plaintiff prove a constitutional violation by any City employee,
not just the named Defendants.” Id. at *2 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
The City’s certification in Cage was not
invalid, as Plaintiff’s here contend; it was inadequate.
In the Fourth Amendment context of false arrest and
excessive force claims, courts in this District tend to grant
bifurcation of Monell claims where the municipality offers a
certification of entry of judgment.
See, e.g., Castillo v. City
of Chicago, No. 11 C 7359, 2012 WL 1658350 (N.D. Ill. May 11,
2012); Readus, No. 09 C 4063, 2012 WL 1533167 (N.D. Ill. May 1,
2012); Guzman v. City of Chicago, No. 09 C 7570, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 20031 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 1, 2011); Tanner v. City of Waukegan,
No. 10 C 1645, 2011 WL 686867 (N.D. Ill. Feb 16, 2011).
See also
Clarett v. Suroviak, No. 09 C 6918, 2011 WL 37838 (N.D. Ill. Jan.
3, 2011) (where plaintiff’s claim was based on false arrest and
at that stage of discovery it was unclear whether defendants’
12
qualified immunity defense had merit, bifurcation of the Monell
claim was denied but Monell discovery was stayed); Glessner v.
Village of Bartlett, No. 09 C 7917, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42612
(N.D. Ill. Apr. 18, 2011) (not argued under Rule 42(b), but
Village’s motion to waive the protection of Monell and bar
Monell-related discovery granted).
Recent arrest cases where
bifurcation was denied despite the offer of a comprehensive
certification have involved unusual procedural situations that
are not present in this case.
See Bradley v. City of Chicago,
No. 09 C 4538, 2010 WL 432313 (N.D. Ill. Feb 3, 2010) (where a
police officer was the defendant in more than a dozen nearly
identical lawsuits and Monell discovery was underway in at least
one of those suits, bifurcation was denied); Bell v. City of
Chicago, No. 09 C 4537, 2010 WL 432310 (N.D. Ill. Feb 3, 2010)
(same).
Plaintiff’s argument that “there is no guarantee that
MUNICIPAL DEFENDANTS will concede liability under 745 ILCS 10/9102 if a verdict is rendered against the individual officers”
(Pl.’s Resp. at 7) misses the mark.
The certification is in fact
the guarantee that Plaintiffs will have a judgment against the
City for all the compensatory damages that are awarded.
Whether
the Defendant Officers are indemnified will have no impact on the
amount Plaintiff is able to recover because the City will already
be liable for the entire amount.
13
Even without the certification,
the Plaintiff’s further contention that the City might argue that
the Defendant Officers were not acting within the scope of their
employment fails to acknowledge that the City has, in fact,
already admitted that they were acting within the scope of
employment. (Municipal Defendants’ Ans. at ¶¶ 10, 24, 46, 52.)
In sum, the proposed certification ensures that judgment for
compensatory damages will be entered against the City if
Plaintiffs are able to prove that a Defendant Officer violated
Mr. Hanna’s constitutional rights, regardless of whether that
Defendant Officer is himself liable.
As Municipal Defendants
point out, the certification also means that Plaintiffs will be
able to avoid the additional costs that could be involved in
enforcing indemnification rights if “Plaintiffs prevail against
Defendant Officers, but not against the Municipal Defendants.”
(Def.’s Reply at 12.)
Therefore, if the Monell claims are
bifurcated and the Plaintiffs’ prevail, the time and costs
involved in litigating the Monell claims will be saved, and the
Plaintiffs’ compensatory interests will be fully protected.
The
fact that the certification guarantees entry of judgment for
reasonable attorney’s fees only in the event of Defendant Officer
liability is noted by the Court, but the parties have not raised
this as a concern.
14
C.
Monell Discovery Burdens
Monell discovery “can add significant time, effort, and
complications to the discovery process.” Medina v. City of
Chicago, 100 F. Supp.2d 893, 895 (N.D. Ill. 2000).
Even when
Monell claims are not bifurcated from claims against individual
defendants, courts have been willing to stay such discovery.
Clarett, 2011 WL 37838, at *3.
See
Accordingly, Municipal Defendants
ask the Court to stay “the onerous and extensive discovery” on
the Monell claims here. (Def.’s Reply at 10.)
Although
Plaintiffs argue that the Monell discovery will not be burdensome
in this case, because many of the documents already exist and
there would be limited additional discovery, their argument is
unconvincing.
The Court has had the opportunity to review Plaintiffs’
interrogatories and document requests to the City, and they do
include the broad discovery demands so often associated with
Monell claims.
Although Plaintiffs assert that “questioning of
the individual officers’ actions in this matter will necessarily
involve comparing their actions to the training and procedures
they were required to follow” (Pl.’s Resp. at 8), there is simply
no support for such a statement.
As was discussed earlier, an
excessive force claim is evaluated under the Fourth Amendment
standard of objective reasonableness. Graham, 490 U.S. at 397.
This type of claim does not normally involve any inquiry into
15
department training and policy. Medina, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 894.
As an example, Plaintiffs’ request for information concerning
every § 1983 lawsuit or excessive force complaint over the last
ten years (Def. Mot. Ex. C, Plaintiffs’ First Set of
Interrogatories to Defendant City of North Chicago, Question 10),
has no bearing on whether the Defendant Officers used excessive
force against Mr. Hanna in his home on November 6, 2011.
As
another example, whether any of the Defendant Officers or their
families have ever given gifts or campaign contributions to city
officials (Id. Question 5), also has no bearing on whether the
conduct of Defendant Officers was objectively reasonable.
Regardless of whether the latter question could bear on the
Monell claims, it certainly does not bear on the claims against
Defendant Officers.
Therefore, much of the Monell discovery
would not be at all necessary to litigate the claims against
Defendant Officers.
The Plaintiffs contend that, because much of the written
discovery is already being kept by the City pursuant to an
agreement between the City and the NAACP, the burden of producing
the material should be nominal.
The Plaintiffs do not provide
any evidence, however, that their discovery requests actually
track that agreement or what that agreement requires.
Regardless, Municipal Defendants argue that producing such
records will involve a significant burden because they will need
16
to review all of that material and redact as necessary.
Plaintiffs counter by pointing out that much of their request for
written discovery could be made via a Freedom of Information
(FOIA) Request.
The implication is that staying the Monell
discovery in this case will not save Municipal Defendants any
time or money since Plaintiffs could simply compel Municipal
Defendants to provide the information in a different venue.
Although there is some merit to this point, it overlooks the fact
that Defendant Officers would not be involved in a FOIA request
and would not bear the burden of reviewing such material.
As the
Defendant Officers point out, they will need to review the Monell
discovery and attend additional depositions, if additional
depositions are needed.
(Def. Officers’ Mot. to Join at ¶ 7.)2
If the Monell claims are bifurcated, Defendant Officers will not
suffer this additional burden because their interest in the case
will be concluded before discovery on the Monell claims begins.
Unlike the Municipal Defendants, there is no other context in
which the Defendant Officers would bear the burden of reviewing
the material.
Likewise, this Court would not bear the burden of
adjudicating any conflicts that arise in a FOIA request.
As the Court explained when discussing the certification,
Monell claims are most often bifurcated in this district when a
2
Municipal Defendants contend that the Monell discovery will require
additional depositions in order to get the material into evidence. Although
this overlooks the fact that not all discovery must become evidence at trial,
this is not fatal to their argument. The scope of the written discovery alone
demonstrates a significant burden.
17
case is rooted in allegations of excessive force.
Plaintiffs’
cases to the contrary are not on point and do not reflect the
current jurisprudence of this District, where decisions to deny a
motion to bifurcate rarely involve excessive force claims.
e.g.,
See,
Allison v. Gallagher, No. 10 C 6887, 2012 WL 4760863 (N.D.
Ill. Oct. 5, 2012) (bifurcation denied where alleged employee
conduct involves deliberate indifference to medical needs of an
inmate); Warren v. Dart, No. 09 C 3512, 2012 WL 1866372 (N.D.
Ill. May 22, 2012) (same); Awalt v. Marketti, No. 11 C 6142, 2012
WL 1161500 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 9, 2012) (same); Terry v. Cook County
Dept. of Corrections, No. 09 C 3093, 2010 WL 2720754 (N.D. Ill.
Jul. 8, 2010) (same).
But see Demouchette v. Dart, 2011 WL
679914 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 16, 2011) (where the parties had not fully
developed the Thomas arguments, it was clear that the burden of
Monell discovery would be great, and the risk of prejudice to
defendants was high, bifurcation granted in deliberate
indifference context.)
The Monell discovery burdens in this case
are significant and bifurcation is likely to allow some or all of
the parties to avoid those burdens.
If Monell discovery and
litigation is never reached, bifurcation will also serve judicial
economy.
D.
Conclusion on Convenience and Judicial Economy
Because the Monell claims in this case are entirely
dependant on whether Defendant Officers violated Mr. Hanna’s
18
constitutional rights, and because the City has submitted a
certification of entry of judgment against itself if a finder of
fact or the court on dispositive motion determines that they did
so, resolution of the claims against Defendant Officers will
obviate the need to litigate the Monell claims against Municipal
Defendants.
It is also apparent that, at this stage, the Monell
discovery will be a significant burden and that avoiding, or at
least delaying, such discovery will serve both convenience and
judicial economy.
Together, this weighs in favor of the
Municipal Defendants’ motion to bifurcate and stay discovery on
the Monell claims, and is enough for the Court to grant the
motion to bifurcate.
II.
Potential Prejudice to the Parties
Municipal Defendants and Defendant Officers also contend
that failure to bifurcate the Monell issues will seriously
prejudice Defendant Officers.
They argue that extensive evidence
concerning the conduct of non-party officers, the City’s nonimplementation of policies and procedures, and broad problems in
hiring, training, and supervising officers is unrelated to
whether the conduct of the Defendant Officers at issue was
objectively reasonable and “will contaminate the jurors’ minds”
as to the liability of Defendant Officers. (Def.’s Mot. at 13.)
Although Plaintiffs respond only with two quotations from two
inapposite cases (Pl.’s Resp. at 9), they correctly point out
19
that the Municipal Defendants bear the burden of proving that
bifurcation should be granted.
The Court finds that the
Municipal Defendants have met their burden.
As already noted, the Court has had the opportunity to
review pending Monell requests in this case. (Def.’s Mot. Ex.s 3,
4, 5.)
Plaintiffs seek the broad and extensive evidence that is
typical in these cases, including detailed information concerning
over eighty excessive force complaints which presumably include
non-party officers.
If admitted as part of the case against
Municipal Defendants, such evidence could prejudice the Defendant
Officers’ ability to distinguish their own actions from those of
other non-party officers.
This strongly favors bifurcation of
the Monell claims, and Plaintiffs have not provided any argument
to the contrary.
Plaintiffs argue that there are non-economic interests at
stake that can only be served by litigating the Monell claims,
and that their suit is not merely about money damages.
This
Court recognizes that a plaintiff may feel a greater sense of
personal satisfaction in a verdict that holds a municipality
directly liable for the conduct at issue.
However, Plaintiffs
here seek only money damages, and bifurcation will not impede
their ability to recover fully with a proper showing of
constitutional injury.
Since the City will be paying any
compensatory damages, the City may feel an incentive to change.
20
Parker v. Banner, 479 F.Supp.2d 827, 829 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (“[I]f
damages grow too large, then the city will change its policies,
customs, and practices.”).
Plaintiffs are also reminded that
bifurcation is not dismissal.
They may choose to pursue the
Monell claims, if there is anything more to pursue, after the
claims against Defendant Officers are resolved.
Chicago, No. 07 C 203, 2007 WL 3241352, at *8.
Elrod v. City of
However, where
bifurcation strongly serves the interests of convenience and
judicial economy or will reduce the risk of unfair prejudice,
this Court will grant a defendant’s motion to bifurcate.
Here,
all criteria are met.
Conclusion
For the reasons explained above, Municipal Defendants’
Motion to Bifurcate Plaintiffs’ Claims and to Stay Discovery and
Trial on the § 1983 Claims Against Them [45] is GRANTED.
Discovery and trial on Plaintiffs’ Monell claims are stayed until
the remaining claims in this case have been resolved.
Date:
November 08, 2012
ENTER:
___________________________________
ARLANDER KEYS
United States Magistrate Judge
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