Goldman v. Gagnard et al

Filing 109

WRITTEN Opinion entered by the Honorable John W. Darrah on 11/29/2012: Ruling on motion hearing held. Plaintiff moves for an indicative ruling regarding the turnover of an inherited individual retirement account. For the reasons set out below, Plaintiff's Motion 96 is denied. See opinion. Mailed notices (For further details see opinion).(pcs, )

Order Form (01/2005)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois
Name of Assigned Judge
or Magistrate Judge

John W. Darrah

CASE NUMBER

11-cv-8843

CASE
TITLE

Sitting Judge if Other
than Assigned Judge

DATE

11/29/2012

Goldman v. Gagnard

DOCKET ENTRY TEXT

Ruling on motion hearing held. Plaintiff moves for an indicative ruling regarding the turnover of an inherited
individual retirement account. For the reasons set out below, Plaintiff’s Motion [96] is denied. See statement
below.

O[ For further details see text below.] 00:05

Docketing to mail notices.

STATEMENT
Plaintiff Susan R. Goldman filed this supplemental action in the Northern District of Illinois on
December 13, 2011, in order to issue citations to discover the assets of Defendants James R. Gagnard and
Michelle Gagnard. The citations seek to discover assets to satisfy an award issued in a real estate contract
dispute, arising out of the Northern District of California. Plaintiff was awarded damages, fees, and costs at
the conclusion of arbitration proceedings between Plaintiff and Defendants. Defendants moved to dismiss the
citations in this District; this motion was denied. Defendants’ subsequent motion to reconsider the dismissal
of citations was also denied on June 21, 2012, and Defendants have appealed that ruling. Defendants’ appeal
is currently pending before the Seventh Circuit. Now, Plaintiff moves for an indicative ruling, pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 62.1(a), as to whether or not the Court, but for the pending appeal, would order Michelle
Gagnard to turn over the proceeds of an inherited individual retirement account (“IRA”). Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 62.1(a) permits a court to issue an order stating how it would rule, if the matter was not
pending appeal. Specifically, the rule provides: “If a timely motion is made for relief that the court lacks
authority to grant because of an appeal that has been docketed and is pending, the court may: (1) defer
considering the motion; (2) deny the motion; or (3) state either that it would grant the motion if the court of
appeals remands for that purpose or that the motion raises a substantial issue.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 62.1(a).
On May 23, 2012, Plaintiff’s counsel conducted a citation examination of Michelle Gagnard to
determine what assets were in her possession and control. Plaintiff determined during the course of the
examination that Michelle Gagnard inherited an IRA from her father’s estate. In Plaintiff’s motion, Plaintiff
argues that Michelle Gagnard “admitted that she does not intend for the Inherited Account to serve as a
retirement fund” and will instead use the money to buy a house. (Mot. at 3.) However, upon review of the
citation examination transcript, it is apparent that Plaintiff mischaracterizes the record, and her citations of the
record fail to support her position.
Plaintiff contends that because of some vague and general statements Michelle Gagnard made about
using the inherited IRA to go “into the house that I thought maybe some day I could buy . . .,” Gagnard
destroys the exempt status of the inherited IRA. (Tr. 126:4 - 126:5.) It is futile to issue an indicative ruling
on this issue based on the general assertions and comments made by Ms. Gagnard (and incorrectly cited to in
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STATEMENT
Plaintiff’s motion). Moreover, Plaintiff concedes in her motion that the substantive question of whether or
not an inherited IRA account is exempt is presently before the Seventh Circuit. (Mot. at 6 n.4.) Moreover,
Plaintiff fails to demonstrate any practical benefit of such a ruling while the issue is before the Seventh
Circuit.
Plaintiff’s motion for an indicative ruling is premature, unsupported by the record, and an inefficient
use of the parties’ and the Court’s time and resources. It is therefore denied.

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