Caine v. City Of Chicago et al

Filing 92

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall on 9/14/2012.(tsa, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

ERIC CAINE,
Plaintiff,
v.

JOHN BURGE, JAMES PIENTA,
RAYMOND MADIGAN, WILLIAM
MARLEY, WILLIAM PEDERSON, DANIEL
MCWEENY, CITY OF CHICAGO, and
UNIDENTIFIED EMPLOYEES OF THE
CITY OF CHICAGO,
Defendants.

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11 C 8996
Judge Virginia M. Kendall

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Defendant Eric Caine brings this Motion to Reconsider this Court’s prior Order
dismissing the portion of his claim brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 contained in Count
I of his Complaint alleging that the police officer-Defendants in this case fabricated and
falsified evidence against him in violation of his right to due process of law secured by the
Fourteenth Amendment. See Caine v. Burge, 11 C 8996, 2012 WL 2458640, *5-*6 (N.D. Ill.
June 27, 2012). The facts relied on to decide the previous motion to dismiss are contained
in the Court’s Order of June 27, 2012, and are the same facts relied on to decide the instant
Motion. See Id. at *1-*4. In the Court’s prior Order it dismissed that portion of Count I of
Caine’s Complaint alleging that the Defendants violated Caine’s right to due process of law

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by fabricating and falsifying evidence, relying on a string of Seventh Circuit cases that this
Court held stood for the proposition that such allegations sound in malicious prosecution
and therefore do not give rise to an actionable due process claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
See Id. at *5-*6 (citing Newsome v. McCabe, 256 F.3d 747, 750-751 (7th Cir. 2001); McCann v.
Mangialardi, 337 F.3d 782, 786 (7th Cir. 2003); Brooks v. City of Chicago, 564 F.3d 830, 833 (7th
Cir. 2009); Fox v. Hayes, 600 F.3d 819, 841 (7th Cir. 2010)). Caine brings this Motion for
Reconsideration under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) and this Court’s inherent
authority to amend its interlocutory orders. Caine argues that the Court’s decision to
dismiss the fabrication and falsification portion of Count I is in error given the Seventh
Circuit’s very recent decision in Whitlock v. Brueggamann, 682 F.3d 567 (7th Cir. 2012)
(Wood, J.), which was decided on May 30, 2012, after the parties’ opportunity to brief the
motion to dismiss presently under reconsideration had passed. He argues that this Court
should reconsider its prior Order under Rule 54(b) in light of Whitlock and allow him to
proceed on his claims against the Defendants alleging that they falsified and fabricated
evidence in violation of his right to due process of law as a constitutional tort brought
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For the reasons set forth herein, Caine’s Motion to Reconsider
is denied.
I. The Legal Standard
Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “any order or other

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decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and
liabilities of fewer than all the parties does not end the action as to any of the claims or
parties and may be revised at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the
claims and all the parties’ rights and liabilities.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) (emphasis
supplied). The Court’s prior order was decided on a partial motion to dismiss, so it is not
a judgment subject to reconsideration that falls within Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
59(e), which addresses motions to alter or amend judgments. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). Nor
does the present Motion to Reconsider fall within Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60, which
governs the procedure for seeking relief from a final judgment, order, or proceeding. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60. In fact the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not explicitly provide a
mechanism for this Court to reconsider an order granting in part a motion to dismiss, or
for that matter interlocutory orders of any kind. Nevertheless, courts in this District have
construed motions to reconsider interlocutory orders, which an order on a partial motion
to dismiss is, as arising under Rule 54(b) in addition to the Court’s inherent authority and
the common law. See, e.g., Goldman v. Gagnard, No. 11 C 8843, 2012 WL 2397053, *2 (N.D.
Ill. June 21, 2012) (citing Ramada Franchise Sys., Inc. v. Royal Vale Hospitality of Cincinnati, Inc.,
No. 02 C 1941, 2004 WL 2966948, *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 24, 2004) (collecting cases)).
In addressing a motion to reconsider an interlocutory order, courts in this District
have applied the standard established in Bank of Waunakee v. Rochester Cheese Sales, Inc., 906

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F.2d 1185, 1191 (7th Cir. 1990). See Ramada Franchise Sys., 2004 WL 2966948 at *3. A motion
for reconsideration brought pursuant to Rule 54(b) may be granted where the Court has
obviously misunderstood a party, where the Court’s decision rests on grounds outside the
adversarial issues presented to the Court by the parties, where the Court has made an error
not of reasoning but of apprehension, where there has been a controlling or significant
change in the law since the submission of the issue to the Court, or where there has been
a controlling or significant change in the facts of the case. See, e.g., Goldman, 2012 WL
2397053 at *2 (quoting Ramada Franchise Sys., 2004 WL 2966948 at *3); see also Bank of
Waunakee, 906 F.2d at 1191. Here, Caine argues that reconsideration is appropriate under
Rule 54(b) because, in his view, there has been a controlling or significant change in the law
since the submission of the issue to the Court.
Motions to reconsider should be granted only in rare circumstances. See Bank of
Waunakee, 906 F.2d at 1191 (quoting Above the Belt, Inc. v. Mel Bohannan Roofing, Inc., 99
F.R.D. 99, 101 (E.D. Va. 1983)) (“A further basis for a motion to reconsider would be a
controlling or significant change in the law or facts since the submission of the issue to the
Court. Such problems rarely arise and the motion to reconsider should be equally rare.”)
(emphasis supplied). A party moving for reconsideration bears a heavy burden. See Caisse
Nationale de Credit Agricole v. CBI Industries, Inc., 90 F.3d 1264, 1270 (7th Cir. 1996). A
motion for reconsideration is not an appropriate vehicle for relitigating arguments that the

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Court previously rejected or for arguing issues that could have been raised during the
consideration of the motion presently under reconsideration. See Id. It is well-settled that
a motion to reconsider is not a proper vehicle to advance arguments or legal theories that
could and should have been made before the Court entered its order or to present evidence
that was available earlier. See Sigsworth v. City of Aurora, 487 F.3d 506, 512 (7th Cir. 2007)
(citing LB Credit Corp. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 49 F.3d 1263, 1267 (7th Cir. 1995)); Anderson
v. Flexel, Inc., 47 F.3d 243, 247-48 (7th Cir. 1995); King v. Cooke, 26 F.3d 720, 726 (7th Cir.
1994). Reconsideration of an interlocutory order is committed to the sound discretion of
this Court, and is reviewed very deferentially and will only be reversed upon a showing
that the Court abused its discretion. See, e.g., Finnsugar Bioproducts, Inc. v. Amalgamated
Sugar Co., LLC, 244 F. Supp. 2d 890, 891 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
II. Discussion
In dismissing the falsification and fabrication allegations contained in Count I of
Caine’s Complaint brought as a constitutional tort pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 this Court
relied on Newsome v. McCabe, 256 F.3d at 750-751, and a line of authority derived therefrom,
which holds that allegations of falsification of evidence by police officers sound only in
malicious prosecution, do not give rise to a constitutional tort pursuant to § 1983, and are
redressable only under state law, provided that state law supplies an adequate remedy.
See Newsome, 256 F.3d at 750-751 (the unauthorized activities of police officers in

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conducting an investigation of a potential criminal defendant states a claim for malicious
prosecution and “the existence of a tort claim under state law knocks out any constitutional
theory of malicious prosecution”); McCann, 337 F.3d at 786 (where the plaintiff alleged that
the defendant violated his right to due process by “causing him to suffer a deprivation of
liberty from a prosecution and contrived conviction. . . deliberately obtained from the use
of false evidence” such a claim is one for malicious prosecution, and not a due process
violation); Brooks, 564 F.3d at 833 (allegations of police “not disclosing known exculpatory
evidence, perjuring themselves, submitting false charges as contained in the criminal
complaints, submitting false police reports, and otherwise acting to deny plaintiff a fair
trial” was, in essence, a claim for malicious prosecution, rather than a due process
violation); Fox, 600 F.3d at 841 (plaintiff's due process claim—which included allegations
that the police officers deliberately fabricated false statements, provided false allegations,
and withheld exculpatory evidence—consisted of “nothing more than a hybrid” of his false
arrest and malicious prosecution claims and was barred as a due process claim). The
Seventh Circuit explicitly declined to overrule Newsome in Parish v. City of Chicago, 594 F.3d
551, 553 (7th Cir. 2009), and has consistently reaffirmed the proposition that a federal
constitutional malicious prosecution claim is foreclosed in Illinois because state law
provides an adequate remedy. See Ray v. City of Chicago, 629 F.3d 660, 664 (7th Cir. 2011)
(citing Swick v. Liautaud, 662 N.E.2d 1238, 1242 (Ill. 1996)). Whitlock, the case that Caine

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argues represents a significant change in the controlling law and on which his Motion for
Reconsideration rests, does not address Newsome, McCann, Brooks, or Fox in reaching its
ultimate conclusion that the appellate court lacked jurisdiction to review the police officers’
appeal of the district court’s denial of summary judgment against them. See Whitlock, 682
F.3d at 576.
In Whitlock, 682 F.3d at 571-573, two police officers of the City of Paris, an Illinois
State Police investigator, and a State’s Attorney came together to form “an investigative
team” that allegedly conspired to frame two men for murder, and continued to cover up
their alleged misdeeds over the course of two decades while the two men sat in prison on
murder convictions for which they were later exonerated. The police officer-defendants
in Whitlock allegedly fabricated the testimony of two witnesses who were the “sine qua non
of the State’s case.” Id. at 572 (quoting People v. Whitlock, No. 4–05–0958, 944 N.E.2d 933 (Ill.
App. Ct. Sept. 6, 2007)). In Whitlock, 682 F.3d at 575, the officer-defendants admitted that
“fabricating, withholding, and suppressing material and exculpatory and impeaching
evidence is unconstitutional,” and therefore the Seventh Circuit was not directly confronted
with the issue of whether the fabrication of evidence by police officers can give rise to
liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as a constitutional due process violation.
The Whitlock court did state that the Seventh Circuit has “consistently held that a
police officer who manufactures false evidence against a criminal defendant violated due

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process if that evidence is later used to deprive the defendant of her liberty in some way.”
See Id. As support for this proposition the court cited Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985,
993 (7th Cir. 1988), a decision that not only predates McCann, Brooks, and Fox, but also
Newsome. This statement in and of itself is not particularly controversial, as police officers
may be liable for Brady violations, and the court in Jones held the officers liable on just those
grounds. See Id.; see also Newsome, 256 F.3d at 752 (the obligations of Brady extend to police
officers, who must turn over potentially exculpatory evidence to prosecutors).
The Brady claim alleged in this case, which the Defendants do not contest is properly
brought against them, is distinct from the claim that the Defendants fabricated and falsified
evidence in violation of Caine’s right to due process of law. The former is a constitutional
tort that may be brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the latter is not as fabrication and
falsification of evidence by police officers can only provide the basis for a state law
malicious prosecution claim. See McCann, 337 F.3d at 786; Brooks, 564 F.3d at 833; Fox, 600
F.3d at 841. The Whitlock court further noted that once admitted, the allegedly coerced
witness’s “statement alone precludes summary judgment by supporting plaintiffs’
contention that the police defendants violated their right not to have police officers
manufacture false evidence. See Dominguez v. Hendley, 545 F.3d 585, 589 (7th Cir. 2008)
(‘There was and is no disputing that such conduct [including fabricating evidence] violates
clearly established constitutional rights.’)” Id. at 575 (Wood, J.). The Whitlock court’s

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reliance on Dominguez may be a bit overstated. Although Whitlock described the alleged
misconduct in Dominguez as “fabricating evidence,” 682 F.3d at 575, Dominguez in fact
involved broader allegations of withholding exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady,
orchestrating a show-up identification procedure that caused the criminal trial to be unfair,
in addition to fabricating evidence. See Dominguez, 545 F.3d at 589. Dominguez, like Jones,
held that the officer was liable to the plaintiff for the denial of his right to due process of
law because the officer did not supply the prosecutor, the subsequent decisionmaker in the
case, with truthful information and because he mislead the official who could be expected
to exercise independent judgment and therefore denied the defendant due process by using
this evidence against the defendant to deny him liberty. See Id. at 590. The court in
Dominguez did not rest its conclusion that the police officer-defendant violated the
plaintiff’s right to due process on his falsification of evidence alone, but more fully relied
on the officer’s Brady violation to hold him liable. See Id.
This Court cannot assume that a subsequent panel of the Seventh Circuit can
overrule another prior panel implicitly. See Brooks v. Walls, 279 F.3d 518, 522 (7th Cir. 2002).
To overrule precedent of the Seventh Circuit requires a recognition by the panel of the
previous decision or decisions to be overruled and circulation of the overruling decision
to the full court pursuant to Circuit Rule 40(e). See Id. Whitlock does not address Newsome,
McCann and its progeny, or the issue of malicious prosecution, and was not circulated to

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the entire court as required by Circuit Rule. Therefore, the decision in Whitlock does not
permit this Court to infer that Newsome, McCann, Brooks, or Fox have been overruled. See,
e.g., Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees International Union Welfare Fund v. Billy’s 1870,
No. 03 C 8337, 2004 WL 1879986, *1 n.1 (where a newer case of the Seventh Circuit states
a “potentially contrary rule” to the rule articulated in a prior precedent the court is bound
to follow the prior precedent where the newer case “neither recognized the prior rule. . .nor
was. . .circulated to the full court as required by Circuit Rule 40(e)”). McCann, Brooks, and
Fox, relying on Newsome’s holding that claims for malicious prosecution do not state a due
process violation and are not a constitutional tort redressable under § 1983, each hold that
a claim alleging that police falsified or fabricated evidence sounds in malicious prosecution,
and therefore is not actionable under § 1983 and that an attempt to plead such acts as a
violation of due process is foreclosed. See Newsome, 256 F.3d at 750-751; McCann, 337 F.3d
at 786; Brooks, 564 F.3d at 833; Fox, 600 F.3d at 841. Whitlock did not acknowledge this prior
rule, nor, as has been previously stated, was Whitlock circulated to the entire Court of
Appeals as required by Circuit Rule 40(e). Thus Whitlock does not permit this Court to
reconsider its prior Order holding that Caine’s attempt to plead police falsification and
fabrication of evidence is foreclosed because the cases the Court relied on remain the law
of the Seventh Circuit. See Caine, 2012 WL 2458640 at *5-*6 (citing Newsome, 256 F.3d at 750751; McCann, 337 F.3d at 786; Brooks, 564 F.3d at 833; Fox, 600 F.3d at 841); see also Alexander

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v. McKinney, No. 11-3530, 2012 WL 3194929 (7th Cir. Aug. 8, 2012) (reaffirming McCann and
Brooks and holding that FBI agents’ alleged falsification of evidence did not state a due
process claim).
As the Whitlock court itself acknowledged, “[c]ontext matters in these cases,” 682
F.3d at 579, and the context in which Whitlock arose and the context of this case are quite
dissimilar and show why Whitlock’s discussion of fabricated evidence does not apply in the
instant case. Whitlock arose out of two cases pending in the Central District of Illinois, Steidl
v. City of Paris, No. 05 C 2127, and Whitlock v. City of Paris, No. 08 C 2055. In both cases the
plaintiff sued three sets of defendants: the investigating police officers of the City of Paris,
the State’s Attorney who prosecuted the case, and the Illinois State Police. The court in
Whitlock, 682 F.3d at 571-573, relied heavily on the fact that the police officers and the
prosecutor formed an “investigative team” which allegedly conspired to fabricate,
withhold, and suppress evidence in violation of the plaintiffs’ due process and Brady rights.
The court emphasized “the unusual circumstances of the case,” 682 F.3d at 586, which
included allegations that over the course of several months two inherently unreliable
witnesses were supplied with alcohol and money, in addition to facts about the crime
scene, in order to obtain from them false inculpatory statements which the “investigative
team” allegedly agreed to withhold from the plaintiffs in order to obtain their convictions.
See Id. at 571-572. By contrast, the present case does not involve the actions of a prosecutor,

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nor are there allegations of an “investigative team” conducting misconduct by supplying
unreliable witnesses with false information and incentives to lie and then covering up this
misconduct for many years.
Further, the procedural posture of Whitlock arose out of appeals perfected by the
three sets of defendants from the district court’s denial of their motions for summary
judgment in which they asserted absolute and qualified immunity. See Id. at 570-571. With
respect the police officer’s appeal the court held that there was no appellate jurisdiction.
See Id. at 576. With respect to the prosecutor the Whitlock court held that it could not
resolve the question of absolute immunity because disputed issues of material fact
precluded its jurisdiction. See Id. at 579. The court further found that the prosecutor was
not entitled to qualified immunity for alleged pretrial activities because, if proven, the
plaintiffs’ asserted claims constitute a violation of a clearly established constitutional right.
See Id. at 585-586. Finally, the court held that the Illinois State Police defendants were not
entitled to immunity based on the existence of disputed issues of material fact. See Id. at
588-589. The Defendants in this case, by contrast, have not asserted any form of immunity
from suit so far in these proceedings.
It is significant that Whitlock’s discussion of the interplay between due process and
fabricated evidence does not appear in the court’s discussion of the police officers’ appeal,
but rather appears in the section of the opinion addressed at the prosecutor’s immunity

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claims. See Id. at 581. This case, by way of contrast, does not concern a prosecutor. Thus,
Whitlock is inapposite to the instant case because it concerns suppression of a prosecutor’s
provision of cash payments and alcohol in return for allegedly false inculpatory witness
statements and thus can be said to present a classic Brady claim, whereas allegations that
police officers failed to fully or truthfully disclose their use of coercive tactics during an
interrogation do not, by contrast, give rise to a due process violation. See Harris v. Kuba,
486 F.3d 1010, 1017 (7th Cir. 2007) (the plaintiff “essentially seeks an extension of Brady to
provide relief if a police officer makes a false statement to a prosecutor by arguing that an
officer is ‘suppressing’ evidence of the truth by making false statements. This court has
already foreclosed this extension.”); Sornberger v. City of Knoxville, 434 F.3d 1006, 1029 (7th
Cir. 2006) (“Nor can Brady serve as the basis of a cause of action against the officers for
failing to disclose these circumstances [of a coerced confession] to the prosecutor. . .The
Constitution does not require that police testify truthfully; rather the constitutional rule is
that the defendant is entitled to a trial that will enable jurors to determine where the truth
lies.”) (emphasis in original) (internal quotations omitted); Gauger v. Hendle, 349 F.3d 354,
360 (7th Cir. 2003) (“We find the proposed extension of Brady [to require the police to
render truthful records of interrogations] difficult even to understand. It implies that the
state has a duty not merely to disclose but also to create truthful exculpatory evidence.”);
see also Alexander, 2012 WL 3194929 at *4 (stating that Whitlock held only that the prosecutor

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was liable for the alleged misconduct committed in that case).
In addition to being inapposite on its facts, the comments in Whitlock concerning
police officers’ fabrication of evidence constituting a due process violation are dicta, which
this Court is not bound to follow. Dicta has been “variously defined,” one definition being
“any statement made by a court for use in argument, illustration, analogy, or suggestion.
. .concerning some rule of law or legal proposition that is not necessarily essential to the
decision and lacks the authority of adjudication.” United States v. Cawley, 837 F.2d 291, 292
(7th Cir. 1988) (Posner, J.); see also Clevenger v. Bollingbrook Chevrolet, Inc., 401 F. Supp. 2d
878, 883 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (Kendall, J.) (same, citing Cawley). Dictum is distinguished from
holding insofar as dictum lacks authority and “is part of an opinion that a later court, even
an inferior court, is free to reject.” Cawley, 837 F.2d at 292. There are many reasons for this
Court to refuse to give weight to dictum in a passage found in a previous opinion, such as
when “the issue addressed in the passage was not presented as an issue, hence was not
refined by the fires of adversary presentation.” Id. at 293; see also Clevenger, 401 F. Supp.
2d at 883 (same).
These principles which distinguish dictum from holding apply with ample force to
Whitlock’s passing reference to fabrication of evidence in connection with the police officerdefendants’ appeal. In Whitlock the parties did not address either in their briefs or at oral
argument whether claims that police officers fabricated evidence can state a valid due

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process claim pursuant to § 1983. (See Whitlock, No. 11-1059, Appellate Briefs at Doc. 39-1,
49, 50, 58; oral argument filed October 27, 2011). The court in Whitlock stated that the
defendant officers admitted “that the allegations that they fabricated evidence. . .state a due
process claim,” 682 F.3d at 580, which demonstrates that the issue “was not presented as
an issue” and “was not refined by the fires of adversary presentation.” Cawley, 837 F.2d
at 293; see also Clevenger, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 883. The court rejected the defendants’ appeal
based on a lack of jurisdiction to hear the issue, and not on any substantive ground
concerning the constitutional basis governing a fabrication of evidence claim as a due
process violation. See Whitlock, 682 F.3d at 574-576. Thus, Whitlock’s commentary about the
relationship between fabrication of evidence and due process in relation to police officers
lacked the authority of adjudication and is dicta because it was mere illustration and
analogy used solely to illuminate the issue of the prosecutor’s immunity. See Cawley, 837
F.2d at 292.
Finally, an even more recent decision of the Seventh Circuit, Alexander, 2012 WL
3194929, which was decided on August 8, 2012, casts significant doubt on portions of
Whitlock and reaffirms the principles articulated in McCann and Brooks by holding that the
falsification of evidence by FBI agents does not state a due process violation, but rather
only a malicious prosecution claim redressable under state law and not as a constitutional
tort pursuant to § 1983. The court in Alexander described the holding of Whitlock as

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confined to the prosecutor’s misconduct. After citing to McCann and Brooks for the
proposition that police officers do not violate a defendant’s right to due process by
fabricating evidence, See Id. at *3, the court stated that in Whitlock “we held that a prosecutor
acting in an investigatory capacity who fabricates evidence that is used to obtain a
wrongful criminal conviction violates a convicted defendant's clearly established due
process rights.” See Id. at *4 (emphasis supplied). Thus, Alexander limits Whitlock to its
unique facts, particularly the fact that it was the prosecutor who violated the plaintiffs’
constitutional rights by obtaining false inculpatory witness statements. Furthermore,
Alexander reaffirms the holding of McCann and Brooks by rejecting a due process claim
based on the falsification of evidence by police officers. Opining on the plaintiff’s allegation
that the FBI agents’ falsification of evidence violated his right to due process of law and
therefore presented a constitutional tort under § 1983 the court held “[t]hat is an approach
we have squarely rejected in analogous cases, and we see no reason to depart from our precedent.
See Brooks v. City of Chicago, 564 F.3d 830, 833 (7th Cir.2009) (plaintiff alleging that police
officers failed to disclose exculpatory evidence, perjured themselves, and submitted false
police reports could not state a due process claim ‘by combining what are essentially claims
for false arrest under the Fourth Amendment and state law malicious prosecution into a
sort of hybrid substantive due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment.’) (quoting
McCann v. Mangialardi, 337 F.3d 782, 786 (7th Cir.2003)).” Alexander, 2012 WL 3194929 at

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*3 (emphasis supplied). Thus, McCann and Brooks remain the law of this Circuit as recently
reaffirmed by Alexander, and an attempt to plead a claim that police officers fabricated or
falsified evidence as a due process violation remains foreclosed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, Caine’s Motion to Reconsider is denied. Circuit Rule
40(e) was not followed in Whitlock, so this Court cannot infer that Newsome, McCann, Brooks,
or Fox, each of which clearly holds that claims alleging that police officers falsified or
fabricated evidence sound only in malicious prosecution and therefore are not actionable
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 so long as state law supplies an adequate remedy—which Illinois
does. See Newsome, 256 F.3d at 750-751; McCann, 337 F.3d at 786; Brooks, 564 F.3d at 833;
Fox, 600 F.3d at 841. Whitlock is also inapposite to the present case on its unique set of facts,
as well as the procedural posture in which it arose. Additionally, Whitlock’s passing
references to police falsification and fabrication of evidence is dicta that this Court is not
bound to follow. See Cawley, 837 F.2d at 292. The defendants in Whitlock admitted that
their falsification of evidence constituted a due process violation, and therefore the issue
of whether or not a due process claim redressable under § 1983 even lies for police
falsification and fabrication of evidence was not briefed or argued on appeal, and thus not
subject to the fires of the adversarial process upon which our system of justice relies.
Finally, Alexander, 2012 WL 3194929 at *4, limits the central holding of Whitlock to the

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prosecutor’s misconduct alone, and reaffirms that McCann and Brooks remain the law of
this Circuit—thus foreclosing any attempt to plead police falsification or fabrication of
evidence as a due process violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For these reasons, Caine’s
Motion to Reconsider is denied.

________________________________________
Virginia M. Kendall
United States District Court Judge
Northern District of Illinois
Date: September 14, 2012

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