Lucas v. Chandler et al

Filing 19

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Entered by the Honorable Harry D. Leinenweber on 3/3/2014.(gcy, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ex
rel. Shaun Bentley Lucas,
Case No. 11 C 9111

Petitioner,

Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber

v.
NEDRA CHANDLER, Warden, Dixon
Correctional Center,
Respondent.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before this Court is Shaun Bentley Lucas’ (hereinafter, the
“Petitioner”

or

“Lucas”)

Petition

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

for

Writ

of

Habeas

Corpus

For the reasons stated herein, the

Petition is denied.
I.

BACKGROUND

In April 1999, Lucas entered into a negotiated plea agreement
in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, to one count of
predatory

criminal

sexual

assault

relationship he had with a minor.
trial

court

addition,

imposed

the

Court

a

stemming

a

sexual

Pursuant to that agreement, the

twelve-and-a-half

admonished

from

Lucas

year

that

he

sentence.

In

would

be

also

subjected to three years of mandatory supervised release (“MSR”):
The nature of the charge, the age of the
complainant, and your age, makes this a
Class X felony under Illinois law.
It’s a
minimum of 6 years to a maximum of 30 years in

the state penitentiary, a nonprobational
offense.
After you serve the penitentiary
sentence there’s something called [MSR], it’s
commonly known as parole. And that would be
for 3 years. That’s the penalty of what could
happen in terms of the maximum penalty.
ECF No. 1 at PageID #12-13 (emphasis added). Lucas acknowledges in
his Petition that he received this admonishment.

Id. at PageID #8

(“[The court] explained that 3 years of mandatory supervised
release [MSR], commonly known as parole, could happen.”).
Lucas later sought to withdraw his guilty plea on the grounds
it was coerced.

The trial court denied Lucas’ petition to do so,

and on November 20, 2000, the Illinois Court of Appeals rejected
his arguments and affirmed his conviction and sentence.

Lucas did

not file a Petition for Leave to Appeal (“PLA”) to the Illinois
Supreme Court.
In

November

1999,

Lucas

filed

a

postconviction

petition

pursuant to 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/122-1, et seq., in Illinois
state court claiming that the statute establishing the sentencing
range for his crime violated the Illinois Constitution’s singlesubject rule.

The Illinois trial court dismissed that petition on

February 15, 2000, and it appears that Lucas did not appeal that
decision.
Ten years later, in March 2009, Petitioner filed another
petition in

Illinois

state

court,

this

time for

relief

judgment pursuant to 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/2-1401.

from

In that

petition, he attacked his MSR term on several grounds, including:
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(1) the addition of the MSR term violated his due process rights;
(2) the

trial

court’s

admonition

regarding the

MSR

term was

ambiguous; (3) the imposition of MSR constituted double jeopardy
and a breach of contract law.

The Illinois trial court denied that

petition in May 2009, and Lucas appealed, again arguing that the
addition of the three-year MSR term to his negotiated sentence
violated due process.

In May 2011, the Illinois appellate court

affirmed the trial court’s denial of relief from judgment.
Lucas then filed a PLA in the Illinois Supreme Court on in
August 2011, again arguing that his sentence was vague, the MSR
term violated his rights under the state and federal constitutions,
and that the trial court’s admonitions regarding MSR led him to
believe he could earn up to a three year early release from prison.
The Illinois Supreme Court denied Lucas’ PLA on November 30, 2011.
Lucas

then

filed

December 17, 2011.

his

habeas

Petition

in

this

Court

on

In it, he alleges three grounds for relief:

(1) that he was not informed by the trial court that he would be
subject

to

a

three-year

MSR

term

as

part

of

his

negotiated

sentence; (2) that the MSR term is void because it was imposed by
prison officials without a judicial hearing; and (3) that despite
the state court rulings, he is entitled to the benefit of his plea
bargain. Lucas’ MSR term expired on January 20, 2012, just a month
after he filed the present habeas Petition.
the Petition on March 29, 2012.

Respondent answered

Lucas did not reply.

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II.

ANALYSIS

Respondent claims that Lucas’ Petition must fail for three
reasons.

First, Respondent argues that Lucas’ Petition is moot.

Second, he claims that it is untimely.

Third, he claims that

Lucas’ MSR contentions are meritless.
A.

Lucas’ Petition Is Not Moot

Lucas’ MSR term ended in January 2012. Respondent argues that
because his MSR term has already concluded, Lucas’ Petition is moot
because the Court cannot grant him the only relief he seeks:
elimination of, or a reduction in length of, his MSR term.

the
See,

e.g., Kashula v. Manier, Civ. No. 08—413-MJR-CJP, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 50003 at *3 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 30, 2010) (finding that because
petitioner attacked only the validity of an MSR term that “has
expired,

there

is

no

relief

that

this

Petitioner, and the case is moot”).
consequences”

doctrine

provides

an

Court

could

give

to

However, the “collateral
exception

to

the

mootness

doctrine.
“The Supreme Court has held that the ‘collateral consequences’
that flow from a criminal conviction, such as the loss of certain
civil

rights,

transforms

a

case

that

otherwise justiciable controversy.’”

would

be

moot

into

an

United States v. Chavez-

Palacios, 30 F.3d 1290, 1293 n.3 (10th Cir. 1994) (citing Sibron v.
New York, 392 U.S. 40, 49 (1968)) (finding appellant’s appeal not
moot

because

it

could

affect

a

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two-year

term

of

supervised

release).

Respondent argues that “petitioner has not identified

any collateral consequences of the expired MSR term that would
prevent this case from becoming moot.”

Resp’t Answer at 8, ECF

No. 14.
Although the pro se Petitioner did not use the specific phrase
“collateral consequence” in his Petition, he has listed at length
certain restrictions he faces as a registered sex offender:
Illinois law requires me to register as a
child sex offender for 10 years, beginning
within 3 days of my release from prison.
Under the Illinois Sex Offender Registration
Act and the Illinois Sex Offender Community
Notification Act, I will be restricted in
where I live, work and associate. The jobs I
cannot work are too numerous to list. While
registering as a child sex offender in
Illinois: I’m obligated under time constraints
to
personally
appear
at
specific
law
enforcement offices, profusely, to notify
those
offices
of
both
permanent
and
impermanent residence locations/changes, job
location/changes, any intention to leave the
State and where I intend to go, pay $100 fees
regularly, and any additions/changes of my
identifying information (such as tag numbers
of newly registered vehicles); similar to a
prisoner, I suffer a lesser expectation of
privacy as a constitutional right due to my
obligation
to
report
my
identifying
information to the public; I’m restricted from
associating with unescorted unrelated children
in public, from contracting with the State for
profit, from changing my name, and even from
being present in certain public areas at
certain times or under certain variable
circumstances.
Failure
to
meet
these
obligations and/or obey these restrictions,
and more, is a felony crime in Illinois.

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Pet’r’s Facts in Supp. of All Grounds at 4, ECF No. 1, PageID #8.
Petitioner contends that, as a result of what he views as an
unconstitutional extension of three years to his incarceration,
these ten years of mandatory restrictions will also necessarily
extend three years beyond the point when they otherwise would have
expired.

The Court is not convinced Petitioner’s exact date

calculations are correct, but the premise is sound: if Plaintiff
had gotten out of prison three years earlier, his ten-year sex
offender registration requirements would expire three years earlier
as well.

The Supreme Court has held that such restrictions,

including

restrictions on

“collateral

consequences”

considered moot.

potential
that

employment,

preclude

a

do constitute

case

from

being

See, e.g., Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234,

237-38 (1968) (limitations on the types of business in which
petitioner

can

engage

stemming

from

a

conviction

constitute

collateral consequences that render a case not moot).
The Court recognizes its obligations to construe a pro se
habeas petition liberally.

See, Wyatt v. United States, 574 F.3d

455, 459 (7th Cir. 2009).

As such, it finds that while Lucas

failed to use the specific phrase “collateral consequences,” he has
argued that he may suffer such potential consequences in the
future.

As such, the Court finds that his Petition is not moot.

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B.
While

Lucas’

Lucas’ Petition Is Untimely
Petition

may

not

be

moot,

it

is

untimely.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244, there is a 1-year statute of
limitations for filing an application for a writ of habeas corpus.
Id. § 2244(d)(1).

The limitation period runs from the latest of:

(1) the date the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct
review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; (2)
the date on which the impediment to filing an application created
by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the
United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from
filing

by

such

State

action;

(3)

the

date

on

which

the

constitutional right asserted was recognized initially by the
Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized and made
applicable retroactively; or (4) the date on which the factual
predicate of the claim presented could have been discovered through
the exercise of due diligence.

Id. § 2244(d)(1)(A-D).

Lucas does not allege any facts indicating a state-created
impediment to filing his application, nor does he identify a newly
recognized and retroactive constitutional right.

The statute of

limitations for his Petition thus runs from the later of his
judgment becoming final by the conclusion of direct review or the
date on which the factual predicate could have been discovered.
The Court will first examine which scenario provides Lucas with the
later accrual date.

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As the Respondent points out, the Illinois Court of Appeals
affirmed Lucas’ conviction and sentence on November 22, 2000.
Under Illinois law at that time, Lucas had twenty-one days to file
a

PLA

in

the

Illinois

R. 315(b)(West 2000).

Supreme

Court.

See.

He failed to do so.

Ill.

Sup.

Ct.

The Supreme Court has

made it clear that when a habeas petitioner chooses not to appeal
to a state’s highest court, “his judgment became final when his
time for seeking review with the State’s highest court expired.”
Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641, 654 (2012).
conviction became final on December 13, 2000.

As such, Lucas’

Pursuant to § 2244,

his habeas Petition would thus be due in this Court on December 13,
2001.
Section 2244(d)(1)(D) does not provide Lucas with a later
deadline. Lucas states in his Petition that “[i]n January of 2009,
I was informed by other IDOC officials that I could never be
eligible for

parole

under

Illinois

law,

and

moreover,

I

was

required to serve 3 more years called MSR after serving my full 12
½ years at 85%.”

Pet. at 9.

Lucas may argue that this revelation

should provide him with a later start date to his statute of
limitations.
As

Under these circumstances, however, it does not.

noted

earlier,

when

§

2244(d)(1)(D)

applies,

the

limitations period commences “on the date on which the factual
predicate of the claim . . . presented could have been discovered
through the exercise of due diligence.”

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Id.

The Seventh Circuit

has explained that under this provision, “[t]ime begins when the
prisoner knows (or through diligence could discover) the important
facts, not when the prisoner recognizes their legal significance.”
Owens v. Boyd, 235 F.3d 356, 359 (7th Cir. 2000).

It is clear,

based on the record before the Court, that the “important facts”
were known to Lucas well before 2009.

As noted earlier, the trial

judge admonished Lucas a decade earlier in April 1999 that “[a]fter
you serve the penitentiary sentence, there’s something called
mandatory supervised release, it’s commonly known as parole.
that would be for 3 years.”

ECF No. 1 at PageID #12-13.

And

Lucas

does not contest this, admitting that the court “explained that 3
years of mandatory supervised release [MSR], commonly known as
parole, could happen.”

Pet. at 8.

The postconviction petition Lucas filed just a few months
later, in November 1999, also indicates he was aware that an MSR
term would follow his sentence.

Indeed, in that petition, Lucas

attacked Public Act 80-1099 on the grounds that the legislation
violated Illinois’s single subject rule.
C000113-14.

See, Resp. Ex. E at

Specifically, Lucas contended that Public Act 80-1099

was unconstitutional for violating the single subject rule, and
that he was sentenced under unconstitutional provisions of the
statute.

Id.

Lucas argued that the Act encompassed too many

different provisions into a single bill, and cited as an example of
an unrelated provision that part of the Act that “modifi[ed] the

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length of parole and mandatory supervised release.”
118.

Indeed, Public Act 80-1099 created MSR.

Id. Ex. E at

See, People v.

Anderson, 838 N.E.2d 978, 979 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005).
In light of the trial judge’s admonishment regarding the MSR
term, as well Petitioner’s challenge just months later of the very
legislation that created MSR, the Court concludes that Lucas’
contention that he was unaware of important facts until IDOC
officials informed him of the MSR term in January 2009 is not
likely or credible.

Lucas was aware of the important facts

regarding his claim as far back as April 1999 and at the latest in
November of 1999.

Since both of those dates are earlier than when

Lucas’ conviction became final on December 30, 2000, that date
provides the starting date for the one year statute of limitations.
See, 28 U.S.C. §2244(d)(1).
Lucas’ Petition may still be viable if there were either
statutory

or

limitations.
grounds.

equitable

bases

for

tolling

the

statute

of

A review of the record, however, shows no such

It is true that 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) tolls the

limitations period while a “properly filed application for State
post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the
pertinent judgment or claim is pending. . . .”

Id.

However, the

proceedings on Lucas’ postconviction petition ended in February
2000 when the Illinois trial court dismissed that petition and
Lucas

chose

not

to

appeal

it.

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Thus,

the

relevant

state

postconviction proceedings had terminated before Lucas’ habeas
limitation period had even commenced.

The state court petition

Lucas filed in March 2009 does nothing to help him, either, as by
that time the limitations period had been expired for more than
seven years.

The Seventh Circuit has made it clear that state

court proceedings that commence after the habeas limitations period
do not “reset the federal clock.”
941, 943 (7th Cir. 2009).

De Jesus v. Acevedo, 567 F.3d

“[W]hat [§ 2244(d)(2)] does is exclude

particular time from the year, not restart that year. . . . It
follows that a state proceeding that does not begin until the
federal year has expired is irrelevant.”

Id.

Lucas thus has no

statutory basis to toll the limitations period set forth in § 2244.
The Court finds no equitable basis for tolling the statute,
either.

The Supreme Court has held that § 2244(d) is subject to

equitable tolling.
(2010).

See, Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2562

However, “[e]quitable tolling is an extraordinary remedy

and so is rarely granted.”
(7th Cir. 2013).

Obriecht v. Foster, 727 F.3d 744, 748

A petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling

only if he shows “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights
diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in
his way” and prevented him from filing timely.

Holland, 130 S.Ct.

at 2562 (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)).
The Court finds that Lucas meets neither requirement for equitable
tolling.

Lucas

cannot

be

said
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to

have

pursued

his

rights

diligently when he waited years after being admonished of his MSR
term to file his petition challenging it.

See, Pace, 125 S.Ct. at

1815. The Court also sees nothing in the record or Lucas’ detailed
Petition that would constitute “extraordinary circumstances” for
tolling purposes.
The

Court

thus

concludes

that,

pursuant

to

§

2244,

the

limitations period for Lucas to file a habeas petition challenging
his MSR term was due to be filed in this Court on December 13,
2001, one year after his conviction became final.

Lucas’ Petition

is thus untimely, and as such, the Court dismisses it.

Having

reached a resolution of the Petition based on its untimeliness, the
Court declines to examine or rule with respect to the merits of its
arguments.
C.

Certificate of Appealability

Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases provides
that the district court “must issue or deny a certificate of
appealability
applicant.”

when

it

enters

a

final

order

U.S.C. § 2254 Cases R. 11.

adverse

to

the

When a petition is

dismissed as untimely, a certificate of appealability should issue
only if reasonable jurists would find the petition’s timeliness
‘debatable.’”

Page v. Anglin, No. 13 C 4298, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

162810 at *9-10 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 15, 2013) (quoting Slack v.
McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)).

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Because the untimeliness of

Lucas’ petition is not debatable, a certificate of appealability is
denied.

Id.
III.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, the Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus pursuant to § 2254 is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge
United States District Court
Date: 3/3/2014

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