Lucas v. Chandler et al
Filing
19
MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Entered by the Honorable Harry D. Leinenweber on 3/3/2014.(gcy, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ex
rel. Shaun Bentley Lucas,
Case No. 11 C 9111
Petitioner,
Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber
v.
NEDRA CHANDLER, Warden, Dixon
Correctional Center,
Respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before this Court is Shaun Bentley Lucas’ (hereinafter, the
“Petitioner”
or
“Lucas”)
Petition
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
for
Writ
of
Habeas
Corpus
For the reasons stated herein, the
Petition is denied.
I.
BACKGROUND
In April 1999, Lucas entered into a negotiated plea agreement
in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, to one count of
predatory
criminal
sexual
assault
relationship he had with a minor.
trial
court
addition,
imposed
the
Court
a
stemming
a
sexual
Pursuant to that agreement, the
twelve-and-a-half
admonished
from
Lucas
year
that
he
sentence.
In
would
be
also
subjected to three years of mandatory supervised release (“MSR”):
The nature of the charge, the age of the
complainant, and your age, makes this a
Class X felony under Illinois law.
It’s a
minimum of 6 years to a maximum of 30 years in
the state penitentiary, a nonprobational
offense.
After you serve the penitentiary
sentence there’s something called [MSR], it’s
commonly known as parole. And that would be
for 3 years. That’s the penalty of what could
happen in terms of the maximum penalty.
ECF No. 1 at PageID #12-13 (emphasis added). Lucas acknowledges in
his Petition that he received this admonishment.
Id. at PageID #8
(“[The court] explained that 3 years of mandatory supervised
release [MSR], commonly known as parole, could happen.”).
Lucas later sought to withdraw his guilty plea on the grounds
it was coerced.
The trial court denied Lucas’ petition to do so,
and on November 20, 2000, the Illinois Court of Appeals rejected
his arguments and affirmed his conviction and sentence.
Lucas did
not file a Petition for Leave to Appeal (“PLA”) to the Illinois
Supreme Court.
In
November
1999,
Lucas
filed
a
postconviction
petition
pursuant to 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/122-1, et seq., in Illinois
state court claiming that the statute establishing the sentencing
range for his crime violated the Illinois Constitution’s singlesubject rule.
The Illinois trial court dismissed that petition on
February 15, 2000, and it appears that Lucas did not appeal that
decision.
Ten years later, in March 2009, Petitioner filed another
petition in
Illinois
state
court,
this
time for
relief
judgment pursuant to 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/2-1401.
from
In that
petition, he attacked his MSR term on several grounds, including:
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(1) the addition of the MSR term violated his due process rights;
(2) the
trial
court’s
admonition
regarding the
MSR
term was
ambiguous; (3) the imposition of MSR constituted double jeopardy
and a breach of contract law.
The Illinois trial court denied that
petition in May 2009, and Lucas appealed, again arguing that the
addition of the three-year MSR term to his negotiated sentence
violated due process.
In May 2011, the Illinois appellate court
affirmed the trial court’s denial of relief from judgment.
Lucas then filed a PLA in the Illinois Supreme Court on in
August 2011, again arguing that his sentence was vague, the MSR
term violated his rights under the state and federal constitutions,
and that the trial court’s admonitions regarding MSR led him to
believe he could earn up to a three year early release from prison.
The Illinois Supreme Court denied Lucas’ PLA on November 30, 2011.
Lucas
then
filed
December 17, 2011.
his
habeas
Petition
in
this
Court
on
In it, he alleges three grounds for relief:
(1) that he was not informed by the trial court that he would be
subject
to
a
three-year
MSR
term
as
part
of
his
negotiated
sentence; (2) that the MSR term is void because it was imposed by
prison officials without a judicial hearing; and (3) that despite
the state court rulings, he is entitled to the benefit of his plea
bargain. Lucas’ MSR term expired on January 20, 2012, just a month
after he filed the present habeas Petition.
the Petition on March 29, 2012.
Respondent answered
Lucas did not reply.
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II.
ANALYSIS
Respondent claims that Lucas’ Petition must fail for three
reasons.
First, Respondent argues that Lucas’ Petition is moot.
Second, he claims that it is untimely.
Third, he claims that
Lucas’ MSR contentions are meritless.
A.
Lucas’ Petition Is Not Moot
Lucas’ MSR term ended in January 2012. Respondent argues that
because his MSR term has already concluded, Lucas’ Petition is moot
because the Court cannot grant him the only relief he seeks:
elimination of, or a reduction in length of, his MSR term.
the
See,
e.g., Kashula v. Manier, Civ. No. 08—413-MJR-CJP, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 50003 at *3 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 30, 2010) (finding that because
petitioner attacked only the validity of an MSR term that “has
expired,
there
is
no
relief
that
this
Petitioner, and the case is moot”).
consequences”
doctrine
provides
an
Court
could
give
to
However, the “collateral
exception
to
the
mootness
doctrine.
“The Supreme Court has held that the ‘collateral consequences’
that flow from a criminal conviction, such as the loss of certain
civil
rights,
transforms
a
case
that
otherwise justiciable controversy.’”
would
be
moot
into
an
United States v. Chavez-
Palacios, 30 F.3d 1290, 1293 n.3 (10th Cir. 1994) (citing Sibron v.
New York, 392 U.S. 40, 49 (1968)) (finding appellant’s appeal not
moot
because
it
could
affect
a
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two-year
term
of
supervised
release).
Respondent argues that “petitioner has not identified
any collateral consequences of the expired MSR term that would
prevent this case from becoming moot.”
Resp’t Answer at 8, ECF
No. 14.
Although the pro se Petitioner did not use the specific phrase
“collateral consequence” in his Petition, he has listed at length
certain restrictions he faces as a registered sex offender:
Illinois law requires me to register as a
child sex offender for 10 years, beginning
within 3 days of my release from prison.
Under the Illinois Sex Offender Registration
Act and the Illinois Sex Offender Community
Notification Act, I will be restricted in
where I live, work and associate. The jobs I
cannot work are too numerous to list. While
registering as a child sex offender in
Illinois: I’m obligated under time constraints
to
personally
appear
at
specific
law
enforcement offices, profusely, to notify
those
offices
of
both
permanent
and
impermanent residence locations/changes, job
location/changes, any intention to leave the
State and where I intend to go, pay $100 fees
regularly, and any additions/changes of my
identifying information (such as tag numbers
of newly registered vehicles); similar to a
prisoner, I suffer a lesser expectation of
privacy as a constitutional right due to my
obligation
to
report
my
identifying
information to the public; I’m restricted from
associating with unescorted unrelated children
in public, from contracting with the State for
profit, from changing my name, and even from
being present in certain public areas at
certain times or under certain variable
circumstances.
Failure
to
meet
these
obligations and/or obey these restrictions,
and more, is a felony crime in Illinois.
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Pet’r’s Facts in Supp. of All Grounds at 4, ECF No. 1, PageID #8.
Petitioner contends that, as a result of what he views as an
unconstitutional extension of three years to his incarceration,
these ten years of mandatory restrictions will also necessarily
extend three years beyond the point when they otherwise would have
expired.
The Court is not convinced Petitioner’s exact date
calculations are correct, but the premise is sound: if Plaintiff
had gotten out of prison three years earlier, his ten-year sex
offender registration requirements would expire three years earlier
as well.
The Supreme Court has held that such restrictions,
including
restrictions on
“collateral
consequences”
considered moot.
potential
that
employment,
preclude
a
do constitute
case
from
being
See, e.g., Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234,
237-38 (1968) (limitations on the types of business in which
petitioner
can
engage
stemming
from
a
conviction
constitute
collateral consequences that render a case not moot).
The Court recognizes its obligations to construe a pro se
habeas petition liberally.
See, Wyatt v. United States, 574 F.3d
455, 459 (7th Cir. 2009).
As such, it finds that while Lucas
failed to use the specific phrase “collateral consequences,” he has
argued that he may suffer such potential consequences in the
future.
As such, the Court finds that his Petition is not moot.
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B.
While
Lucas’
Lucas’ Petition Is Untimely
Petition
may
not
be
moot,
it
is
untimely.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244, there is a 1-year statute of
limitations for filing an application for a writ of habeas corpus.
Id. § 2244(d)(1).
The limitation period runs from the latest of:
(1) the date the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct
review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; (2)
the date on which the impediment to filing an application created
by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the
United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from
filing
by
such
State
action;
(3)
the
date
on
which
the
constitutional right asserted was recognized initially by the
Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized and made
applicable retroactively; or (4) the date on which the factual
predicate of the claim presented could have been discovered through
the exercise of due diligence.
Id. § 2244(d)(1)(A-D).
Lucas does not allege any facts indicating a state-created
impediment to filing his application, nor does he identify a newly
recognized and retroactive constitutional right.
The statute of
limitations for his Petition thus runs from the later of his
judgment becoming final by the conclusion of direct review or the
date on which the factual predicate could have been discovered.
The Court will first examine which scenario provides Lucas with the
later accrual date.
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As the Respondent points out, the Illinois Court of Appeals
affirmed Lucas’ conviction and sentence on November 22, 2000.
Under Illinois law at that time, Lucas had twenty-one days to file
a
PLA
in
the
Illinois
R. 315(b)(West 2000).
Supreme
Court.
See.
He failed to do so.
Ill.
Sup.
Ct.
The Supreme Court has
made it clear that when a habeas petitioner chooses not to appeal
to a state’s highest court, “his judgment became final when his
time for seeking review with the State’s highest court expired.”
Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641, 654 (2012).
conviction became final on December 13, 2000.
As such, Lucas’
Pursuant to § 2244,
his habeas Petition would thus be due in this Court on December 13,
2001.
Section 2244(d)(1)(D) does not provide Lucas with a later
deadline. Lucas states in his Petition that “[i]n January of 2009,
I was informed by other IDOC officials that I could never be
eligible for
parole
under
Illinois
law,
and
moreover,
I
was
required to serve 3 more years called MSR after serving my full 12
½ years at 85%.”
Pet. at 9.
Lucas may argue that this revelation
should provide him with a later start date to his statute of
limitations.
As
Under these circumstances, however, it does not.
noted
earlier,
when
§
2244(d)(1)(D)
applies,
the
limitations period commences “on the date on which the factual
predicate of the claim . . . presented could have been discovered
through the exercise of due diligence.”
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Id.
The Seventh Circuit
has explained that under this provision, “[t]ime begins when the
prisoner knows (or through diligence could discover) the important
facts, not when the prisoner recognizes their legal significance.”
Owens v. Boyd, 235 F.3d 356, 359 (7th Cir. 2000).
It is clear,
based on the record before the Court, that the “important facts”
were known to Lucas well before 2009.
As noted earlier, the trial
judge admonished Lucas a decade earlier in April 1999 that “[a]fter
you serve the penitentiary sentence, there’s something called
mandatory supervised release, it’s commonly known as parole.
that would be for 3 years.”
ECF No. 1 at PageID #12-13.
And
Lucas
does not contest this, admitting that the court “explained that 3
years of mandatory supervised release [MSR], commonly known as
parole, could happen.”
Pet. at 8.
The postconviction petition Lucas filed just a few months
later, in November 1999, also indicates he was aware that an MSR
term would follow his sentence.
Indeed, in that petition, Lucas
attacked Public Act 80-1099 on the grounds that the legislation
violated Illinois’s single subject rule.
C000113-14.
See, Resp. Ex. E at
Specifically, Lucas contended that Public Act 80-1099
was unconstitutional for violating the single subject rule, and
that he was sentenced under unconstitutional provisions of the
statute.
Id.
Lucas argued that the Act encompassed too many
different provisions into a single bill, and cited as an example of
an unrelated provision that part of the Act that “modifi[ed] the
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length of parole and mandatory supervised release.”
118.
Indeed, Public Act 80-1099 created MSR.
Id. Ex. E at
See, People v.
Anderson, 838 N.E.2d 978, 979 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005).
In light of the trial judge’s admonishment regarding the MSR
term, as well Petitioner’s challenge just months later of the very
legislation that created MSR, the Court concludes that Lucas’
contention that he was unaware of important facts until IDOC
officials informed him of the MSR term in January 2009 is not
likely or credible.
Lucas was aware of the important facts
regarding his claim as far back as April 1999 and at the latest in
November of 1999.
Since both of those dates are earlier than when
Lucas’ conviction became final on December 30, 2000, that date
provides the starting date for the one year statute of limitations.
See, 28 U.S.C. §2244(d)(1).
Lucas’ Petition may still be viable if there were either
statutory
or
limitations.
grounds.
equitable
bases
for
tolling
the
statute
of
A review of the record, however, shows no such
It is true that 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) tolls the
limitations period while a “properly filed application for State
post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the
pertinent judgment or claim is pending. . . .”
Id.
However, the
proceedings on Lucas’ postconviction petition ended in February
2000 when the Illinois trial court dismissed that petition and
Lucas
chose
not
to
appeal
it.
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Thus,
the
relevant
state
postconviction proceedings had terminated before Lucas’ habeas
limitation period had even commenced.
The state court petition
Lucas filed in March 2009 does nothing to help him, either, as by
that time the limitations period had been expired for more than
seven years.
The Seventh Circuit has made it clear that state
court proceedings that commence after the habeas limitations period
do not “reset the federal clock.”
941, 943 (7th Cir. 2009).
De Jesus v. Acevedo, 567 F.3d
“[W]hat [§ 2244(d)(2)] does is exclude
particular time from the year, not restart that year. . . . It
follows that a state proceeding that does not begin until the
federal year has expired is irrelevant.”
Id.
Lucas thus has no
statutory basis to toll the limitations period set forth in § 2244.
The Court finds no equitable basis for tolling the statute,
either.
The Supreme Court has held that § 2244(d) is subject to
equitable tolling.
(2010).
See, Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2562
However, “[e]quitable tolling is an extraordinary remedy
and so is rarely granted.”
(7th Cir. 2013).
Obriecht v. Foster, 727 F.3d 744, 748
A petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling
only if he shows “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights
diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in
his way” and prevented him from filing timely.
Holland, 130 S.Ct.
at 2562 (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)).
The Court finds that Lucas meets neither requirement for equitable
tolling.
Lucas
cannot
be
said
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to
have
pursued
his
rights
diligently when he waited years after being admonished of his MSR
term to file his petition challenging it.
See, Pace, 125 S.Ct. at
1815. The Court also sees nothing in the record or Lucas’ detailed
Petition that would constitute “extraordinary circumstances” for
tolling purposes.
The
Court
thus
concludes
that,
pursuant
to
§
2244,
the
limitations period for Lucas to file a habeas petition challenging
his MSR term was due to be filed in this Court on December 13,
2001, one year after his conviction became final.
Lucas’ Petition
is thus untimely, and as such, the Court dismisses it.
Having
reached a resolution of the Petition based on its untimeliness, the
Court declines to examine or rule with respect to the merits of its
arguments.
C.
Certificate of Appealability
Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases provides
that the district court “must issue or deny a certificate of
appealability
applicant.”
when
it
enters
a
final
order
U.S.C. § 2254 Cases R. 11.
adverse
to
the
When a petition is
dismissed as untimely, a certificate of appealability should issue
only if reasonable jurists would find the petition’s timeliness
‘debatable.’”
Page v. Anglin, No. 13 C 4298, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
162810 at *9-10 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 15, 2013) (quoting Slack v.
McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)).
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Because the untimeliness of
Lucas’ petition is not debatable, a certificate of appealability is
denied.
Id.
III.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, the Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus pursuant to § 2254 is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge
United States District Court
Date: 3/3/2014
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