Thomas et al v. City of Chicago et al

Filing 105

Enter Memorandum Opinion and Order signed by the Honorable Edmond E. Chang on 3/29/2013. For the reasons stated in the Opinion, the IPRA Defendants' motion to dismiss 56 is granted. Mailed notice(Chang, Edmond)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
Courtney Thomas and
Jeffrey Nichols,
Plaintiffs,
v.
City of Chicago, IPRA Investigators
James Lukas, Kristi Lyons,
Jeanne Goodwin, and Michael Duffy, et al.,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

No. 11 C 09275
Judge Edmond E. Chang

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiffs Courtney Thomas and Jeffrey Nichols bring this lawsuit against
multiple Chicago Police Department (CPD) officers and detectives (in their individual
capacities) and the City of Chicago, alleging civil rights violations pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983.1 Also named as defendants are four Independent Police Review
Authority (IPRA) investigators: James Lukas, Kristi Lyons, Jeanne Goodwin, and
Michael Duffy (collectively, the IPRA Defendants). In their complaint, Thomas and
Nichols allege that two Chicago police officers, Jason Landrum and John Kennedy, shot
Thomas and illegally detained Nichols and their property following a roadside stop of
their car. R. 54, Am. Compl. They also allege that other Chicago police officers and the
IPRA Defendants conspired to cover up the incident during the ensuing investigation.
Id. at 17-18. Finally, they bring a claim against the City of Chicago, under Monell v.
Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), for maintaining policies, customs,
1

This Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

and practices that enabled the cover-up. Id. at 18-20. The IPRA Defendants have
moved to dismiss all claims against them pursuant to Federal Rule of Procedure
12(b)(6) [R. 56]. For the reasons that follow, the motion is granted.
I. Background
In evaluating this motion to dismiss, the Court accepts as true the complaint’s
factual allegations and draws reasonable inferences in Plaintiffs’ favor. Ashcroft v.
al-Kidd, ––– U.S. –––, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2079 (2011). On January 1, 2010, Nichols and
Thomas drove to Chicago from Michigan to run errands and look at used cars. Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 8-9. At around 11:30 a.m., Officers Landrum and Kennedy pulled Nichols’s
car over on East 75th Street near Prairie Avenue and State Street. Id. ¶¶ 14, 17-19.
Landrum and Kennedy approached the car, opened the driver and passenger doors,
and commanded Nichols and Thomas to get out. Id. ¶¶ 21-22. The officers did not tell
them why they had been pulled over, why they were being asked to get out of the car,
or that they were under arrest. Id. ¶ 23. Instead, Kennedy began putting his hands on
Thomas. Id. ¶ 24.
At this point, the encounter turned violent. After Officer Kennedy put his hands
on Thomas, Officer Landrum yelled at Thomas, “What is your problem?” Id. ¶ 25.
Landrum then grabbed and hit Thomas, put him in a headlock, and threw him to the
ground. Id. ¶¶ 26-27. Landrum then shouted to Kennedy that Thomas was going for
Landrum’s gun—which was holstered and secured—and that Kennedy should “shoot
the motherfucker.” Id. ¶¶ 28, 31, 32. Instead of shooting Thomas at that point,
Landrum and Kennedy brought him over to a storefront’s metal security gate and
2

handcuffed his left arm to the gate. Id. ¶¶ 34-35. Even though Thomas was secured to
the gate and was at no time a threat to the safety of either officer, Landrum told
Kennedy, “Well, if you won’t shoot him, I will.” Id. ¶¶ 36-37. Kennedy was shocked and
jumped out of the way, and then Landrum took a step back, pulled out his gun, and
shot Thomas in the stomach. Id. ¶¶ 38-39.
Meanwhile, Nichols had been taken out of his car and left sitting on the curb,
handcuffed, in the cold without his coat. Id. ¶¶ 51-53. Landrum refused Nichols’s
requests for his coat, and instead forcibly pinched his shoulder and neck painfully. Id.
¶ 53. Then Nichols, despite being told that he was “just a witness,” was placed in a
paddy wagon and kept there for an extended period of time until he was driven to the
police station. Id. ¶¶ 54-56. At the station, he was handcuffed to a wall for over seven
hours. Id. ¶¶ 57, 59. Nichols was kept there even though he complained that the
handcuffing was hurting him because of a previous back injury. Id. ¶ 58. Because he
was not let out to use the bathroom, he had to urinate into a wastebasket. Id. ¶ 60.
Nichols was then questioned and interrogated, held for another ten hours, and then
released well after midnight. Id. ¶¶ 61-63. Without his car and coat—which had been
seized by the police—Nichols had to stay in a 7-11 convenience store and a hotel until
he could catch a train home. Id. ¶¶ 65-66.
Thomas was hospitalized after the shooting. Id. ¶ 70. After multiple surgeries
(that could not save parts of his stomach and intestines), he was incarcerated in Cook
County Jail until September 2011 when he entered a no-contest plea to unlawful
possession of a firearm and resisting arrest. Id. ¶¶ 42, 70.
3

Following these events, Thomas and Nichols filed a five-count complaint. In
Count One, they allege that Landrum and Kennedy used excessive force against
Thomas. Id. at 13-14. In Count Two, they allege that all Defendants (including the
IPRA Defendants) unlawfully seized their persons and property in violation of the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.2 Id. at 15-16. Similarly, in Count Three, they
allege that the seizure of Nichols and Thomas’s property—Nichols’s 1999 Silver
Chrysler Concord and $3,462 of Thomas’s cash—was an unconstitutional taking and
a due process violation. Id. at 16-17. In Count Four, they allege that all Defendants
conspired to cover up the excessive force used against Thomas by falsifying reports and
creating inconsistencies in the witness statements of the civilians on the street during
the morning of the shooting. Id. at 17-18. Finally, in Count Five, they allege that the
City of Chicago had a policy and practice to detain witnesses, seize personal property,
and allow police officers and IPRA investigators to cover up police misconduct. Id. at
18-20. The IPRA Defendants move to dismiss all claims against them.

2

To be sure, the Amended Complaint does not clearly assert an unlawful seizure claim
as to Thomas himself. Compare Am. Compl. ¶ 108 (alleging that Nichols and his car have been
seized), with id. ¶ 109 (alleging only that Thomas’s money was seized). But Plaintiffs’ response
brief does assert a theory of liability for the IPRA Defendants as to Thomas. R. 67, Pl.’s Resp.
Br. at 4. Moreover, the IPRA Defendants do not argue in their reply brief that the Amended
Complaint only asserts a claim for the unlawful seizure of Nichols (which would not make a
lot of sense). To cover all bases, the Court will charitably construe the Amended Complaint as
alleging the unlawful seizure of both Thomas and Nichols themselves in addition to their
property.

4

II. Standard of Review
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a complaint generally need only
include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This short and plain statement must “give the
defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quotation and citation omitted). The
Seventh Circuit has explained that this rule “reflects a liberal notice pleading regime,
which is intended to ‘focus litigation on the merits of a claim’ rather than on
technicalities that might keep plaintiffs out of court.” Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 580
(7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002)).
“A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the complaint to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted.” Hallinan v. Fraternal Order of Police
Chicago Lodge No. 7, 570 F.3d 811, 820 (7th Cir. 2009). “[A] complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at
570). These allegations “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Significantly, the only allegations that are entitled
to the assumption of truth are those that are factual allegations, rather than mere
legal conclusions or formulaic assertions of elements of the asserted claim. Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678-79.

5

III. Analysis
The IPRA Defendants move to dismiss Counts Two, Three, and Four of the
Amended Complaint. For the reasons below, the Court dismisses each count.
A. Count Two (Unreasonable Seizure)
Under Alejo v. Heller, “[a] plaintiff bringing a civil rights action must prove that
the defendant personally participated in or caused the unconstitutional actions.” 328
F.3d 930, 936 (7th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). Accordingly, the IPRA Defendants
contend that they did not personally participate in or cause the seizure of Thomas,
Nichols, or their property; they were not even at the scene when Thomas was shot and
Nichols was detained. R. 57, Defs.’ Br. at 5. Thomas and Nichols respond with a but-for
theory of liability: if the IPRA Defendants had not falsified eyewitness reports,
reviewing police Sergeants or Assistant State’s Attorneys may have released Thomas
and Nichols earlier. R. 67, Pls.’ Resp. at 4. So according to Plaintiffs’ theory, even if the
IPRA Defendants did not actually seize them, the IPRA Defendants are liable for
unconstitutionally prolonging their seizure.
The problem with this theory is that it is not plausibly alleged in the Amended
Complaint. True, it pleads that the IPRA Defendants manipulated statements from
eyewitnesses (Jacqueline House, Ozell Champagne, Antonio Champagne, and Robin
Gibbs) and from Nichols himself. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 79, 85-91. It even alleges that all
Defendants engaged in a “roundtable” to suppress and falsify evidence. Id. at ¶ 92. But
the Amended Complaint does not adequately describe the causal link that Thomas and
Nichols rely upon: it pleads no facts linking the allegedly falsified IPRA reports to any
6

CPD seizure decision. Indeed, it does not allege that anyone in charge of deciding how
long to seize Thomas, Nichols, or their property—a police Sergeant or reviewing
Assistant State’s Attorney—even saw an IPRA investigative report, let alone relied on
those reports as justification to seize them longer. Lacking this factual detail, all that
Plaintiffs can rely upon is conjecture and speculation. See Pls.’ Resp. at 4 (“If . . . the
IPRA investigators ha[d] properly and accurately reported their accounts, the
reviewing Sergeants may very well have decided to release Thomas. Or, the reviewing
Felony Review Assistant State[‘]s Attorney may have suggested that they release him.”
(emphases added)).
Thomas and Nichols’s theory of liability is especially implausible without these
facts in light of IPRA’s function as the “independent police review authority.” City of
Chicago Ordinance § 2-57-020 (emphasis added). Chicago created IPRA in 2007 by
removing the former Office of Professional Standards from the CPD and reorganizing
the internal-affairs function as a separate department reporting directly to the Mayor
of Chicago. Obrycka v. City of Chicago, 2012 WL 601810, at *3 n.2 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 23,
2012); see also City of Chicago Ordinance § 2-57-020 (“The offices of the independent
police review authority shall be located in a facility outside of the department of
police.”). So IPRA is not part of the official chain of command of either the CPD or the
State’s Attorney’s Office. Nor do Chicago’s municipal ordinances contemplate that
IPRA investigative reports will be used to assist, even unofficially, the CPD or the
State’s Attorney’s Office in their own criminal investigations. See City of Chicago
Ordinance § 2-57-040(f) (empowering IPRA to “forward all other complaints filed
7

against members of the department to the department’s internal affairs division”).
Instead, IPRA recommendations of officer discipline are to be considered by the CPD
administration directly, and not rank-and-file CPD officers. See id. § 2-57-060. IPRA’s
independent role and function thus cuts further against Thomas and Nichols’s theory
that CPD decisionmakers relied on falsified IPRA reports—rather than on reports
generated by actual CPD officers investigating the shooting itself—to prolong the
seizure of Plaintiffs and their property.
Ultimately, the allegations in the Amended Complaint, as they stand now, are
too implausible to put the IPRA Defendants on notice of how exactly they are liable for
unconstitutionally seizing Plaintiffs or their property. Brooks, 578 F.3d at 582; see also
McCauley v. City of Chicago, 671 F.3d 611, 618 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[Plaintiff] needed to
allege enough ‘by way of factual content to nudg[e] his claim . . . across the line from
conceivable to plausible.’” (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680) (internal quotation marks
omitted)). But if Thomas and Nichols—after continuing to take discovery from both the
CPD Defendants and the IPRA Defendants, as the Court instructed them to do at the
February 27, 2013 status hearing—actually uncover facts plausibly suggesting that the
IPRA reports prolonged their detention, they are free to move to amend their complaint
accordingly. The Court notes that the Fourth Amendment (via incorporation through
the Fourteenth Amendment) governs the period of confinement between the arrest and
the preliminary hearing at which a determination of probable cause is made, Lopez v.
City of Chicago, 464 F.3d 711, 719 (7th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted), and arrestees
must generally receive that hearing within 48 hours of arrest. Cnty. of Riverside v.
8

McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56-57 (1991). So any amended complaint ought to allege, at
a minimum, that any reviewing CPD officer or prosecutor considered the IPRA
investigative reports within that narrow 48-hour window after Thomas and Nichols’s
detention. Such facts may be hard to come by, but Plaintiffs are welcome to try (but
beware the shifting of costs under Rule 54(d)(1)). In the meantime, the unreasonable
seizure claim (Count Two) is dismissed without prejudice as to the IPRA Defendants.
B. Count Three (Takings and Due Process)
Thomas and Nichols agree that Count Three, the unconstitutional takings and
the due process claim, does not state a claim against the IPRA Defendants upon which
relief may be granted. Pls.’ Resp. at 7. Given that concession, Count Three is dismissed
with prejudice as to the IPRA Defendants.
C. Count Four (Conspiracy)
In Count Four, Thomas and Nichols allege that all Defendants (including the
IPRA Defendants) conspired with each other to cover up the shooting of Thomas, the
illegal seizure of Nichols, and the illegal seizure of their property. Am. Compl. at 17-18.
To establish § 1983 conspiracy liability against the IPRA Defendants, Thomas and
Nichols must plead that (1) the IPRA Defendants and the CPD Defendants reached an
understanding to deprive them of their constitutional rights, and (2) all Defendants
were willful participants in joint activity. Reynolds v. Jamison, 488 F.3d 756, 764 (7th
Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). But if the underlying act does not itself violate the
Constitution, there can be no constitutional violation for any attempt to cover up the
act. Cefalu v. Vill. of Elk Grove, 211 F.3d 416, 423 (7th Cir. 2000) (“The jury’s
9

conclusion that [the plaintiffs] suffered no constitutional injury thus forecloses relief
on the conspiracy claim.” (citations omitted)); Hill v. Shobe, 93 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir.
1996) (“[T]here is no constitutional violation in conspiring to cover up an action which
does not itself violate the [C]onstitution.” (citation omitted)). And as discussed, Thomas
and Nichols do not plausibly plead that the IPRA Defendants unconstitutionally seized
them or their property. So the conspiracy claim (Count Four) is also dismissed without
prejudice as to the IPRA Defendants.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the IPRA Defendants’ motion to dismiss [R. 56] is
granted.

ENTERED:
s/Edmond E. Chang
Honorable Edmond E. Chang
United States District Judge

DATE: March 29, 2013

10