Woodland v. Hardy et al

Filing 29

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order.For the foregoing reasons, Woodland's claims are procedurally defaulted, barred from re-litigation by 2254(d), and are not cognizable on federal habeas review. Accordingly, Woodland's 2254 petition is denied, and the Court also denies a certificate of appealability for any of the claims in the petition. Civil case terminated. Signed by the Honorable Thomas M. Durkin on 1/6/2014:Mailed notice(srn, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
Albert Woodland,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Petitioner,
v.
Michael Lemke, Warden,
Stateville Correctional Center, 1
Respondent.

No. 12 C 0015
Judge Thomas M. Durkin

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Petitioner Albert Woodland, an Illinois state prisoner serving a 65-year
prison term for the first degree murder of Lamont Winters, seeks a writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. R. 11. Respondent Michael Lemke answered
the petition, arguing that the petition should be denied because the claims raised in
it are procedurally defaulted, not cognizable on federal habeas review, or barred
from re-litigation by § 2254(d). R. 25. The habeas petition is denied, and the Court
declines to issue a certificate of appealability.
Background
The factual findings made by the last state court to adjudicate the claims
raised in the § 2254 petition on the merits are presumed correct unless those
Michael Lemke is the warden of Stateville Correctional Center where Woodland
currently resides. Accordingly, Warden Lemke is substituted as the proper
respondent. See Rule 2(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases; Rumsfeld v.
Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 435 (2004) (“[T]he proper respondent is the warden of the
facility where the prisoner is being held.”); see also Bridges v. Chambers, 425 F.3d
1048, 1049 (7th Cir. 2005).
1

1

findings are rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see
Morgan v. Hardy, 662 F.3d 790, 797-98 (7th Cir. 2011). Woodland has not
attempted to rebut the state court’s factual findings. Accordingly, the following sets
forth those facts and the procedural background of Woodland’s state criminal and
postconviction proceedings as recounted by the state courts.
Prior to trial, Woodland filed a motion to quash his arrest and suppress
evidence from it. R. 24-1 at 4-5. At the suppression hearing, Detectives Louis Munoz
and William Whalen testified about their investigation into the April 29, 2001
murder of Lamont Winters. On October 25, 2001, Detective Munoz heard from an
informant that Kenneth Winters (Lamont’s uncle) was planning to kill Andre
Williams because Kenneth thought Williams was involved in Lamont’s murder. Id.
at 5. Munoz, however, believed Kenneth was mistaken because Munoz had been
informed that Williams was in custody at the time of the shooting so he could not
have been involved. Id. Munoz then compiled a photo array of individuals he
believed to have been involved in the murder. Id. The array did not include
Williams or Woodland. Nearly two months later, on December 19, 2001, Munoz
interviewed Kenneth who did not identify anyone from the photo array but did
confirm that Lamont was shot by two black males. Id. Kenneth also described to
Munoz the direction the shooters fled after the shooting, and his subsequent chase
of them. Id.
In January 2002, Munoz interviewed Antwan Alcorn, who was standing near
Lamont the night he was killed. Id. at 5-6. Alcorn was able to provide a physical

2

description of the two shooters, and further provided a possible motive for the
shooting. Id. at 6. According to Alcorn, Lamont was murdered because he had shot
and killed another member of the Gangster Disciplines. Id.
Munoz continued with his investigation by speaking with Ken Popovitz, a
special agent in the Department of Housing and Urban Development. Id. Based on
that conversation, Munoz then interviewed Williams who, it turned out, was not
actually in custody at the time of the shooting but had information regarding the
shooting. Id. Williams identified Gilbert Harris and Woodland—fellow members of
the Gangster Disciples—as the shooters, and said that Lamont was murdered
because he had killed another Gangster Disciple. Id. Williams negotiated an
immunity agreement with the State where in exchange for his testimony against
Woodland, he agreed to serve an eight-year sentence on a reduced robbery charge
and to cooperate with police in other criminal cases. Id. at 6-7. At a subsequent
interview with Munoz, Williams again named Harris and Woodland as the shooters
and also discussed his own involvement in the shooting, detailing where the
shooting was ordered, how he provided the guns for the shooting, how he
accompanied them to the location where Lamont was known to hang out and
pointed Lamont out to them, the red vehicle used in the shooting, the location the
vehicle was parked beforehand, and the escape routes taken afterwards. Id. at 7.
Munoz also interviewed Kenneth’s girlfriend Doris Clark, who corroborated
some of the information Munoz had gathered during the investigation, including the
direction the shooters fled and a description of the red car used to escape. Id.

3

In July 2002, Detective Whalen separately interviewed Angelina and
Shawnee Donahue, individuals who were related to Lamont, who provided
additional descriptions of the two shooters and corroborated information gathered
from other witnesses such as the direction the shooters fled and the motive for the
killing. Id. A couple of weeks later, Woodland was arrested and identified as one of
the shooters in separate lineups by Kenneth and the Donahue sisters. Id.
Based on the evidence presented at the hearing, the state trial court denied
the motion to quash and suppress, finding that the information supplying the basis
for the arrest was sufficient to satisfy probable cause. Id. at 7-8.
At Woodland’s bench trial, the State presented the testimony of Williams,
Kenneth, and the Donahue sisters, who all testified to similar evidence provided
during the hearing on Woodland’s motion to quash arrest. Id. at 8. Williams
testified that Lamont had killed a fellow Gangster Disciple and that he had given
Woodland and Harris the guns used for the shooting. Id. He stated that on the night
in question, he drove with Woodland and Harris to Lamont’s location, he pointed
out Lamont to them, and he saw them walk towards him and then heard gunshots.
Id. Williams further testified that the next day, he saw Woodland who told him that
Lamont was dead and that he had shot him “in the head and in the face.” Id.
The state trial court found Woodland guilty of first degree murder and
further found that he had personally discharged a firearm during the murder. Id. at
9. The trial court sentenced Woodland to 45 years of imprisonment based on the
murder conviction and 20 additional years for the firearm discharge. Id. at 1, 4.

4

Woodland appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing that: (1) the evidence was
insufficient to find him guilty; (2) the police lacked probable cause to arrest him; (3)
trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present evidence that another witness,
Antwan Alcorn, had identified another individual as the shooter; (4) the prosecutor
violated due process by vouching for Andre Williams’s credibility; and (5) the trial
court considered improper factors when sentencing Woodland. Id. at 35-69; see also
id. at 4, 9-18. The state appellate court affirmed. Id. at 18. Woodland then filed a
petition for leave to appeal (“PLA”) in the state supreme court, alleging that: (1) the
police lacked probable cause for his arrest; (2) he was not proven guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt; and (3) the prosecutor improperly vouched for the credibility of
Williams. R. 24-3 at 12-19. The state supreme court denied the PLA. Id. at 40.
In 2009, Woodland filed a pro se postconviction petition under the Illinois
Post-Conviction Hearing Act, 725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq., raising numerous claims but
two that are relevant here: that (1) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move
to suppress the eyewitnesses’ identifications on the basis that Andre Williams had
been present in the police station during the lineups and had “pointed out
[Woodland]” to them; and (2) appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise in
Woodland’s direct appeal that his trial counsel was ineffective. See R. 24-1 at 1-3.
The state circuit court dismissed the petition as frivolous and patently without
merit, and Woodland appealed, raising the same aforementioned claims. Id. at 1-2.
The state appellate court rejected these claims on the merits. Id. at 2-3. Woodland’s
ensuing appeal to the state supreme court re-raised the same relevant claims, and

5

the state supreme court denied Woodland leave to appeal. R. 24-5 at 18-24; id. at
42.
This Court received Woodland’s § 2254 petition on January 3, 2012. R. 1. In
that petition, Woodland alleged that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his
conviction; (2) his arrest violated the Fourth Amendment because the police lacked
probable cause to arrest him; (3) the prosecutor violated his due process rights by
vouching for Andre Williams’s credibility; and (3) trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to move to suppress the eyewitnesses’ identifications. The Warden answered
the § 2254 petition, arguing that: (1) Woodland’s improper vouching claim was
procedurally defaulted; (2) his sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim was barred from relitigation by § 2254(d); (3) his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim was
similarly barred by § 2254(d); and (4) his Fourth Amendment claim was not
cognizable on federal habeas review. 2 R. 25.
Analysis
I.

Improper Vouching Claim
Woodland claims that that the State violated his due process rights when,

during trial, the prosecutor made comments that improperly vouched for the
credibility of one of the State’s key witnesses, Andre Williams. The Warden says
that Woodland procedurally defaulted this claim for purposes of federal habeas
review because the state appellate court, when adjudicating the claim, declined to

The Warden concedes that Woodland’s claims are timely and that they are not
barred by non-retroactivity or non-exhaustion principles. R. 25 at 3.

2

6

review the merits of the claim based on independent and adequate state law
grounds. The Warden is correct.
“To preserve a question for federal collateral attack, a person must present
the contention to every level of the state judiciary.” Bland v. Hardy, 672 F.3d 445,
449 (7th Cir. 2012); see also O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 848 (1999). Even
when a habeas petitioner has presented a claim to the state courts, that claim will
be considered procedurally defaulted if the state courts declined to reach the merits
of the claim “on independent and adequate state procedural grounds.” Coleman v.
Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 730 (1991); see also Perruquet v. Briley, 390 F.3d 505, 51415 (7th Cir. 2004). In other words, “[w]hen a state court resolves a federal claim by
relying on a state law ground that is both independent of the federal question and
adequate to support the judgment, federal habeas review of the claim is foreclosed.”
Kaczmarek v. Rednour, 627 F.3d 586, 591 (7th Cir. 2010). A state court decision
rests on such independent state grounds when the state court “refuses to reach the
merits of a [habeas] petitioner’s federal claims because they were not raised in
accord with the state’s procedural rules,” id., and the decision does not depend upon
a federal constitutional ruling on the merits, see Szabo v. Walls, 313 F.3d 392, 395
(7th Cir. 2002). See also Smith v. McKee, 598 F.3d 374, 382 (7th Cir. 2010). State
court decisions are adequate to bar federal habeas review only when they rest upon
firmly established and regularly followed state practice. Smith, 598 F.3d at 382.
Here, Woodland’s claim that the State violated due process when the
prosecutor vouched for Williams’s credibility is procedurally defaulted because the

7

state appellate court’s decision that Woodland failed to comply with Illinois rules
regarding preservation of errors rested on an independent and adequate state law
ground. Specifically, when presented with Woodland’s due process claim, the state
appellate court on direct appeal declined to consider the merits of the claim,
explaining that by failing to object to the allegedly improper statements by the
prosecutor at trial and by further failing to include the claim of error in a post-trial
motion, Woodland had waived his claim of error. R. 24-1 at 15-17. Then, reviewing
Woodland’s due process claim for plain error, the state appellate court concluded
that none of the prosecutor’s comments rose to the level of plain error. Id. Woodland
contends that this review for plain error was a decision on the merits, but the
Seventh Circuit has explicitly rejected this argument. Indeed, the Seventh Circuit
has “repeatedly explained that where a state court reviews [a] claim for plain error
as the result of a state procedural bar such as the Illinois doctrine of waiver, that
limited review does not constitute a decision on the merits.” Gray v. Hardy, 598
F.3d 324, 329 (7th Cir. 2010) (collecting cases).
Because the state appellate court clearly and expressly relied on Illinois’s
well-established doctrine of waiver when it rejected Woodland’s claim and its
subsequent consideration of the claim for plain error review did not constitute a
merits review, the state court’s rejection of Woodland’s claim rested on an
independent and adequate state law ground. 3 Woodland’s claim is therefore

Woodland has wisely refrained from arguing that the Illinois waiver rule is not a
firmly established and regularly followed state practice. See Miranda v. Leibach,
394 F.3d 984, 992 (7th Cir. 2005).
3

8

procedurally defaulted. See, e.g., Aguallo v. Atchison, No. 12 C 48, 2013 WL
6009262, at * 8 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 12, 2013).
When a habeas petitioner has defaulted his federal claim in state court
pursuant to an independent and adequate state procedural rule, federal habeas
review of the claim is barred unless the petitioner can demonstrate cause and
prejudice to excuse the default, or demonstrate that he is actually innocent, so that
the failure to consider the defaulted claim will result in a fundamental miscarriage
of justice. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750, see also Kaczmarek, 627 F.3d at 591. Neither
exception is applicable here because Woodland makes no attempt to invoke one.
Accordingly, the Court will not consider either manner of excusing his default. See
Crockett v. Hulick, 542 F.3d 1183, 1193 (7th Cir. 2008); Bell v. Pierson, 267 F.3d
544, 555 n. 6 (7th Cir. 2001). Nor does the record, in any event, support the
application of either exception.
II.

Sufficiency-of-the-Evidence Claim
Woodland claims that the evidence presented at his trial was insufficient to

prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Because the state courts adjudicated
Woodland’s fully and fairly presented sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim, this Court is
constrained from granting habeas relief unless Woodland can demonstrate that the
state appellate court’s rejection of the claim “was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of” clearly established Supreme Court precedent, 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000), or “resulted in a
decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of

9

the evidence presented in the State court proceeding,” § 2254(d)(2); Harrington v.
Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 785 (2011). In applying the § 2254(d) standard, the federal
habeas court reviews “the decision of the last state court that substantively
adjudicated each claim.” Gonzales v. Mize, 565 F.3d 373, 379 (7th Cir. 2009). The
last state court to adjudicate Woodland’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim on the
merits was the state appellate court in Woodland’s direct appeal, so that is the
decision this Court must review.
A state court decision involves an “unreasonable application” of Supreme
Court precedent within the meaning of § 2254(d)(1) when the “state court identifies
the correct governing legal principle from th[e Supreme] Court’s decisions but
unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Williams,
529 U.S. at 413. “For purposes of § 2254(d)(1), an unreasonable application of
federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.” Richter, 131 S.
Ct. at 785 (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original). “A state court’s
determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as
fairminded jurists could disagree on the correctness of the state court’s decision.” Id.
at 786 (internal quotation marks omitted). Put another way, to obtain relief under
the “unreasonable application” prong of § 2254(d)(1), “a state prisoner must show
that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so
lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended
in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Id. at 786-87.
“This is a difficult standard [for habeas petitioners] to meet; ‘unreasonable’ means

10

something like lying well outside the boundaries of permissible differences of
opinion.” Jackson v. Frank, 348 F.3d 658, 662 (7th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation
marks omitted); Schultz v. Page, 313 F.3d 1010, 1015 (7th Cir. 2002) (“The state
court decision is reasonable if it is minimally consistent with the facts and
circumstances of the case.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Richter,
131 S. Ct. at 786 (“[E]ven a strong case for relief does not mean the state court’s
contrary conclusion was unreasonable”).
In rejecting Woodland’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge, the state
appellate court reasoned:
[Woodland] primarily argues that the testimony of Williams was
inherently unreliable because he received leniency from the State as
well as State-sponsored relocation. Here, the trial court heard
Williams’ testimony which detailed with great specificity [Woodland’s]
involvement in Lamont’s shooting. He was subjected to multiple crossexaminations, and the trial court was fully informed by both the
defense and the State regarding Williams’ criminal background, the
evidence implicating him as an accomplice in the underlying case, as
well as the terms of his negotiated plea agreement. The other
witnesses that testified corroborated various portions of his account,
motives for the shooting, with three of those witnesses separately
identifying [Woodland] in lineups subsequent to his arrest. It is also
important to note that [the trial judge] presided over both the hearing
to quash the arrest and the trial, and on multiple occasions, stated the
need to highly scrutinize Williams’ testimony and that reliance on it
should be cautious. After carefully reviewing the record, we find that
Williams’ testimony was sufficiently detailed to sustain [Woodland’s]
conviction, and that despite the alleged infirmities of Williams’
testimony, eyewitnesses identified [Woodland], and further
corroborated Williams’ account of [Woodland’s] actions. Accordingly,
we find that the trial court had sufficient evidence before it to support
a finding of guilt.
R. 24-1 at 10-11.

11

The state appellate court’s holding was neither contrary to, nor an
unreasonable application of, Supreme Court precedent. Sufficiency-of-the evidence
claims are governed by the standard set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, which held
that due process is satisfied if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the prosecution, “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (emphasis in
original); see also Cavazos v. Smith, 132 S. Ct. 2, 6 (2011) (per curiam).
The state appellate court correctly recognized and articulated this standard.
See R. 24-1 at 10 (“When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to
support his conviction, this court must determine, after viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the State, whether any rational trier of fact could have found
the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.”). Because the
state appellate court correctly articulated the governing legal standard, its decision
was not contrary to clearly established federal law. McFowler v. Jaimet, 349 F.3d
436, 446 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding state court’s decision was not contrary to clearly
established federal law where court recognized Jackson standard).
Nor was the state appellate court’s rejection of Woodland’s sufficiency-of-theevidence claim an unreasonable application of the Jackson sufficiency standard. It
is axiomatic that the testimony of a single eyewitness suffices for a conviction. See
Hayes v. Battaglia, 403 F.3d 935, 938 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[I]t is black letter law that
testimony of a single eyewitness suffices for conviction even if 20 bishops testify
that the eyewitness is a liar.”). Here, Williams provided detailed testimony

12

regarding Woodland’s involvement in Lamont’s shooting, various parts of which
were corroborated by other witnesses. To be sure, Williams received leniency in
exchange for his testimony implicating Woodland. But Williams was subject to
multiple cross-examinations at trial, and the trial court was fully aware of his
criminal background, the evidence demonstrating his involvement as an accomplice
in the shooting, and the terms of the negotiated plea agreement. Even without
Williams’s

testimony,

the

evidence

against

Woodland

was

ample.

Three

eyewitnesses—who corroborated salient details of Williams’s account of the
shooting—positively identified Woodland as one of the shooters in lineups after
Woodland was arrested and further identified Woodland at trial. In all, Williams’s
testimony, along with the testimony of the other eyewitnesses, was more than
sufficient to convict Woodland of first degree murder.
Woodland challenges the trial court’s treatment of Williams’s testimony, but
this challenge was made to the state appellate court, and based on the Court’s
review of the record, the Court cannot say that the state court’s rejection of
Woodland’s challenge was objectively unreasonable. Woodland further challenges
the identifications made by the eyewitnesses. The state appellate court, however,
rejected these challenges too, finding that the lineup identifications were sufficient
to corroborate Williams’s testimony. Under Jackson, it is the responsibility of the
trier of fact to “resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw
reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” 443 U.S. at 319. And when
responding to a sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim, “[t]he State is entitled to every

13

reasonable inference that may be drawn from the record,” provided that the
inference has “some support in the facts.” McFowler, 349 F.3d at 451-52 (state
appellate court’s holding that evidence was sufficient to prove habeas petitioner
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt was reasonable, even though there were
irreconcilable inconsistencies in key witness’s testimony; credibility and reliability
of eyewitness testimony is question for fact-finder).
In all, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, and
drawing all reasonable inferences from the “basic facts” presented, the state
appellate court reasonably concluded that despite Woodland’s challenges to the
credibility of Williams and the other eyewitnesses, any rational trier of fact could
still have found Woodland murdered Lamont Winters beyond a reasonable doubt.
The trial court was responsible for resolving any weaknesses in the witnesses’
testimony and evaluating the weight and credibility to give that testimony. See
Garrett v. Acevedo, 608 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1017 (N.D. Ill. 2009). Thus, affording the
state court’s decision the deference required by § 2254(d), in addition to the
deferential review already afforded to the state court under the Jackson standard,
Cavazos, 132 S. Ct. at 6, the Court is compelled to deny habeas relief on this claim
under § 2254(d)(1).
Woodland fleetingly states that the state appellate court’s adjudication of his
sufficiency-of-the evidence claim resulted in a decision that was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts warranting habeas relief under §
2254(d)(2). R. 28 at 13. A habeas petitioner cannot succeed on challenge to a state

14

court decision based on a factual determination under § 2254(d)(2) unless the state
court committed an “unreasonable error.” Morgan, 662 F.3d at 798 (internal
quotation marks omitted). Section 2254(e)(1) provides the mechanism for proving
unreasonableness. Id. “If a petitioner shows that the state court determined an
underlying factual issue against the clear and convincing weight of the evidence,
the petitioner has gone a long way towards proving that it committed unreasonable
error.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “A state court decision that rests
upon a determination of fact that lies against the clear weight of the evidence is, by
definition, a decision ‘so inadequately supported by the record’ as to be arbitrary
and therefore objectively unreasonable.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Woodland claims that the state appellate court failed to consider the
“unimpressive credibility issues surrounding the prosecution’s key witnesses.” R. 28
at 13. Not true. The state appellate court gave careful consideration to the questions
surrounding Andre Williams’s credibility but found that the testimony of the other
eyewitnesses, who the court necessarily found to be credible, corroborated
Williams’s account of the events. Woodland has failed to demonstrate how the state
court committed unreasonable error, and accordingly, cannot demonstrate
entitlement to habeas relief under § 2254(d)(2).
In sum, the state appellate court’s rejection of Woodland’s sufficiency-of-theevidence claim was eminently reasonable, rendering habeas relief inappropriate.

15

III.

Ineffective Assistance Claim
Woodland contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to

suppress the lineup identifications of him as the shooter. According to him, the
lineup identifications were unduly suggestive because at the police station where
the lineups were conducted, Andre Williams pointed out Woodland to the witnesses
who then identified him in the lineup. Because the state appellate court in
Woodland’s postconviction appeal adjudicated the merits of this claim, habeas relief
on that claim is foreclosed unless that court’s decision was contrary to, or an
unreasonable application of, Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). See 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 4 Woodland has failed to satisfy these criteria, so his claim is
barred under § 2254(d)(1).
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance, Woodland must demonstrate
that (1) counsel provided deficient performance, meaning his representation fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors or omissions, there is a reasonable probability the result of
the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
“Surmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task,” but on habeas
review establishing that a state court’s application of Strickland was unreasonable
under § 2254(d) “is all the more difficult.” Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 788 (internal
Woodland does not seek federal habeas relief for this claim on the alternative
ground that the state court’s adjudication “resulted in a decision that was based on
an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the
State court proceeding.” § 2254(d)(2). The Court therefore restricts its analysis of
Woodland’s ineffective assistance claim to whether Woodland can surmount the
hurdle imposed by § 2254(d)(1).
4

16

quotation marks omitted); see also Murrell v. Frank, 332 F.3d 1102, 1111 (7th Cir.
2003) (“The bar for establishing that a state court’s application of the Strickland
standard was ‘unreasonable’ [under § 2254(d)(1)] is a high one.”). Moreover,
“because the Strickland standard is a general standard, a state court has even more
latitude to reasonably determine that [a habeas petitioner] has not satisfied that
standard.” Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009); see also Yarborough v.
Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 665 (2004) (“[E]valuating whether a rule application was
unreasonable requires considering the rule’s specificity. The more general the rule,
the

more

leeway

courts

have

in

reaching

outcomes

in

case-by-case

determinations.”). When the “highly deferential” standards created by Strickland
and § 2254(d) are applied together, review is “doubly deferential.” Knowles, 556 U.S.
at 123-24. “When § 2254(d) applies, the question is not whether counsel’s actions
were reasonable. The question is whether there is any reasonable argument that
counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard.” Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 788.
Woodland cannot show that the state appellate court either contradicted or
unreasonably applied Strickland. Here, after correctly identifying the applicable
Strickland standard, R. 24-1 at 2, the state appellate court considered the factual
basis of his ineffective assistance claim—that Andre Williams allegedly pointed out
Woodland to the eyewitnesses—and found that it “had no arguable basis either in
law or in fact and was unsupported by affidavit or other documentation.” Id. at 3.
The state appellate court observed that in fact, that factual premise was
“completely contradicted by the record” because the testimony of the three

17

eyewitnesses—Angelina Donahue, Shawnee Donahue, and Kenneth Winters—
specifically negated that factual claim. Id. Angelina testified at trial that when she
viewed the lineup and identified Woodland, she had not been allowed to speak to
anyone before viewing the lineup and that only a detective was present viewing the
lineup with her; Shawnee testified that only a detective was present when she
viewed the lineup and identified Woodland; and Kenneth testified that no one told
him whom to identify, either before or during the lineup. Id.
Given this presumptively correct factual testimony which Woodland has
failed to rebut, see § 2254(e)(1), it was not unreasonable for the state appellate court
to conclude that the basis of Woodland’s ineffective assistance claim had no factual
support. In turn, it would therefore not have been unreasonable for the state
appellate court to conclude that trial counsel was not deficient for failing to file a
motion to suppress that lacked a factual basis. See Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786
(“Under § 2254(d), a habeas court must determine what arguments or theories . . .
could have supported[ ] the state court’s decision; and then it must ask whether it is
possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are
inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of this Court.”), 792; see also Cullen
v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1402 (2011). Nor would it have been unreasonable for
the state appellate court to also conclude that Woodland was not prejudiced by
failing to file what would have been an unsuccessful motion to suppress. See Stone
v. Farley, 86 F.3d 712, 717 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Failure to raise a losing argument . . .
does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.”).

18

In sum, because Woodland has not demonstrated that the state appellate
court’s rejection of Woodland’s ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim was
contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, Strickland, § 2254(d)(1)’s relitigation bar forecloses habeas relief.
IV.

Fourth Amendment Claim
Woodland further brings a claim under the Fourth Amendment, arguing that

the police lacked probable cause for his arrest. When the State has provided an
opportunity for “full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim,” such a claim
is not cognizable on federal habeas review. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494
(1976). A “full and fair” hearing occurs when the habeas petitioner was allowed to
present his case in a proceeding that was not a “sham.” Monroe v. Davis, 712 F.3d
1106, 1114 (7th Cir. 2013); see also Cabrera v. Hinsley, 324 F.3d 527, 531-32 (7th
Cir. 2003) (stating even where petitioner had his day in court on Fourth
Amendment claim, a state court process that amounts to a sham does not constitute
full and fair hearing). “Evaluating the adequacy of the hearing thus requires [the
federal habeas court] to give at least some attention to how the state court dealt
with the merits of the claim.” Monroe, 712 F.3d at 1114 (emphasis in original)
(internal quotation marks omitted). In making this inquiry, the federal habeas
court’s “role is not to second-guess the state court on the merits of the petitioner’s
claim, but rather to assure [itself] that the state court heard the claim, looked to the
right body of case law, and rendered an intellectually honest decision.” Id. A Fourth
Amendment “blunder, no matter how obvious, matters only in conjunction with

19

other circumstances that imply refusal by the state judiciary to take seriously its
obligation to adjudicate claims under the fourth amendment.” Miranda v. Leibach,
394 F.3d 984, 998 (7th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Woodland had the opportunity to present his Fourth Amendment claim to the
state courts, and the state court proceedings were not a sham. The record reflects
that prior to trial, Woodland filed a motion to quash his arrest and suppress
evidence from that arrest. R. 24-1 at 4. The state trial court held a hearing on
Woodland’s Fourth Amendment motion to suppress where Detectives Munoz and
Whalen testified and where Woodland’s counsel was able to thoroughly crossexamine those witnesses and present argument in support of Woodland’s motion. R.
26-1 at 110-70, 186-202; R. 26-2 at 3-10.
After hearing the various officers detail their 15-month murder investigation,
the trial court denied Woodland’s motion, reasoning that although Williams
identified both Woodland and Harris as being involved in the shooting, “we have to
look very cautiously at Mr. Williams’ pointing towards Mr. Harris and Mr.
Woodland in this particular case because as we all know Mr. Williams received
immunity from the government as far as his involvement in the shooting also of
Lamont Winters.” R. 26-2 at 37-38. The trial court observed that Williams was
accountable in the shooting; indeed, with his testimony, he implicated himself, and
but for the immunity deal with the State, Williams could have been charged with
the murder. Id. The court noted that had Williams not been granted immunity for
his testimony, his statements, which were against his penal interests, would have

20

been sufficient to establish probable cause for Woodland’s arrest. Id. at 38. The trial
court, however, concluded that despite the grant of immunity, the totality of the
circumstances demonstrated there was sufficient corroborating evidence from the
police investigation to support Williams’s identification of Woodland and Harris as
the two shooters: (1) the motive for Winters’s murder, which was provided by
Williams, was corroborated by Antwan Alcorn; and (2) specific details of the
shooting provided by Williams were corroborated by other eyewitnesses. Id. at 3841.
The state appellate court affirmed the trial court’s denial, explaining:
Here, Williams’ arrest was the product of a 15-month investigation.
During that investigation, the detectives reviewed police reports,
interviewed witnesses multiple times, and eventually were able to
acquire information from an accomplice to the shooting. We have
already stated that Williams’ testimony and reliability were to be
viewed with caution. It appears that the detectives understood this,
because they did not seek to arrest [Woodland] until three months
after Williams implicated [Woodland]. During that time, the detectives
found that portions of Williams’ account was corroborated by both the
other witnesses and the physical evidence recovered from the crime
scene. Furthermore, it was known that Williams had been working
with federal agents from the Department of Housing and Urban
Development in an undercover investigation prior to [Woodland’s]
arrest. In fact, the information Detective Munoz received concerning
Williams came from Special Agent Popovitz, who believed Williams’
information to be reliable enough to relate to Detective Munoz. We also
note that Williams’ plea agreement was conditional. If it is ever
discovered that he did not tell the truth as to any and all crimes that
he had planned, participated in, or had knowledge of, his plea
agreement will be rendered null and void, and he can be prosecuted for
any of those crimes and his statements could be used against him.
After reviewing the record, we find that Williams’ statement to
Detective Munoz, when viewed with the corroborating statements of
other witnesses and physical evidence, were sufficient to establish
probable cause for [Woodland’s] arrest.

21

R. 24-1 at 12.
In all, the state courts gave full and fair consideration to Woodland’s Fourth
Amendment claim. Stone requires nothing more from the state courts. See Cabrera,
324 F.3d at 531 (when confronted with Stone issue, federal habeas court should not
“examine whether the [state] judge seemed to have done some quality preparation
for the hearing or had a perfect understanding of the fine points of search and
seizure law”). Because the state courts satisfied Stone’s standard by giving
Woodland full and fair consideration to his Fourth Amendment claim, Stone
precludes this Court from considering its merits. See Monroe, 712 F.3d at 1116. The
claim is therefore denied.
V.

Certificate of Appealability
Because Woodland’s claims are procedurally defaulted, are not cognizable on

federal habeas review, or fail to satisfy the standard of § 2254(d), his petition for a
writ of habeas corpus is denied. Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases
provides that the district court “must issue or deny a certificate of appealability
when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” To obtain a certificate of
appealability, a habeas petitioner must make “a substantial showing of the denial of
a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). This demonstration “includes showing
that reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the
petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues
presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Slack v.
McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483-84 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also

22

Lavin v. Rednour, 641 F.3d 830, 832 (7th Cir. 2011). And where a petition is
disposed of based on a procedural bar, without reaching the merits of the
underlying constitutional claims, a certificate of appealability should issue only if
reasonable jurists would find the adjudication of the antecedent procedural ruling
“debatable.” Slack, 529 U.S. at 484-85; see also Lavin, 641 F.3d at 832.
This Court’s denial of Woodland’s improper vouching and Fourth Amendment
claims rests on well-settled precedent governing procedural default and the noncognizability of Fourth Amendment claims in § 2254 proceedings. The Court’s
denial of Woodland’s sufficiency-of-the evidence and ineffective assistance of trial
counsel claims similarly rest on settled precedent regarding the treatment of these
claims on federal habeas review. The application of that law to Woodland’s claims
do not present questions that reasonable jurists could debate should be resolved in a
different manner. Accordingly, certification of these claims for appellate review is
denied.

23

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Woodland’s claims are procedurally defaulted,
barred from re-litigation by § 2254(d), and are not cognizable on federal habeas
review. Accordingly, Woodland’s § 2254 petition is denied, and the Court also denies
a certificate of appealability for any of the claims in the petition.
ENTERED:
__________________________
Thomas M. Durkin
United States District Judge
Dated: January 6, 2014

24