United States of America v Sykes

Filing 16

MEMORANDUM OPINION Signed by the Honorable John F. Grady on 7/11/2012. Mailed notice(cdh, )

12-158.121

July 11, 2012

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
OVERTIS SYKES,
Petitioner,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.

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No. 12 C 158

MEMORANDUM OPINION
The § 2255 petitioner, Overtis Sykes, has filed a motion in
which he seeks this court’s recusal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a).
(He also seeks an order disqualifying Tyler Murray, the Assistant
United States Attorney assigned to this case and the petitioner’s
criminal cases.

That request is addressed below.)

Section 455(a)

requires a federal judge to recuse himself “in any proceeding in
which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” This is an
objective inquiry; the focus is on the appearance of bias from the
perspective of a well-informed, thoughtful observer.

Hook v.

McDade, 89 F.3d 350, 354 (7th Cir. 1996).
Petitioner presents three grounds for recusal.

The first is

that he had filed an administrative tort claim against this court
and government counsel for false imprisonment and denial of due
process and that he had informed the court of that claim on

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November 14, 2007, while the criminal case was pending (we denied
the motion

for

recusal

that

petitioner made at

that

point).

Petitioner argues that the filing of the claim created a conflict
of interest that requires recusal.

As far as we know, nothing came

of the tort claim (petitioner does not tell us of its ultimate
outcome). As the Seventh Circuit has explained, a litigant wanting
to manipulate a judicial assignment could simply sue the assigned
judge and then contend that he must step aside, but “courts do not
allow such easy manipulation.”

In re Specht, 622 F.3d 697, 700

(7th Cir. 2010); see also In re Taylor, 417 F.3d 649, 652 (7th Cir.
2005) (“There is no rule that requires a judge to recuse himself
from a case, civil or criminal, simply because he was or is
involved in litigation with one of the parties. . . . [A] judge
would likely not harbor bias against someone simply because the
person named him in a meritless civil suit.”).

The filing of the

tort claim did not and does not require recusal because it would
not create any appearance of impropriety to a reasonable observer.
The second ground for recusal is the nature of the claims
presented in the pending § 2255 motion; petitioner asserts therein
that this court and government counsel acted in collusion to
circumvent the requirements of the Speedy Trial Act and that this
court “predetermined” the outcome of the dismissal hearing held on
December 20, 2007, in that we dismissed the original indictment
without

prejudice.

But

judicial

rulings

alone

almost

never

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constitute a valid basis for a recusal motion; the exception is
where they reveal an opinion that derives from an extrajudicial
source or such a high degree of favoritism or antagonism as to make
fair judgment impossible.

In re Huntington Commons Assocs., 21

F.3d 157, 158-59 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing Liteky v. United States,
510 U.S. 540 (1994)).

The rulings that petitioner challenges in

his § 2255 petition do not rise to that level; that he labels our
rulings as “collusion” simply because we agreed with the government
and suggests that we had some sort of general bias in favor of
without-prejudice dismissals are insufficient bases for recusal.
The third and final ground for recusal is that “should this
case require an evidentiary hearing,” petitioner would call Mr.
Murray and this court as witnesses.

We doubt that resolution of

the § 2255 petition will require an evidentiary hearing; should we
find it necessary, we will cross that bridge when we come to it.
Petitioner

also

seeks

participating in this case.

an

order

barring

Mr.

Murray

from

He fails to cite any authority that

would permit us to enter such an order, and the request is
therefore denied.
Petitioner has also filed a motion requesting a copy of the
government’s

response

brief

and

asks

that

we

issue

an order

directing the Clerk’s office and the government to address their
mailings to the petitioner in a specific way.

The motion will be

granted in part and denied in part as follows.

The portion of the

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motion that seeks a copy of the government’s response brief is
denied as moot because petitioner has already received the response
(he has filed a reply to it).

We decline to order the government

to label its mail to petitioner in any specific way, but we trust
that government counsel has taken note of petitioner’s requests.
Our own mail to petitioner will be labeled in the requested
fashion.
CONCLUSION
Petitioner’s motion for a prompt ruling on his motion for
recusal [14] is granted.

Petitioner’s motion for recusal of this

court and government counsel [13] is denied.

Petitioner’s motion

for a copy of the government’s response brief and for orders
regarding mailings to petitioner [11] is granted in part and denied
in part.
DATE:

July 11, 2012

ENTER:

___________________________________________
John F. Grady, United States District Judge