Sweeney v. Burras et al
Filing
82
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Signed by the Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly on 3/16/2014: For the reasons stated in the accompanying Memorandum Opinion and Order, the Court grants summary judgment for defendants on plaintiff's conspiracy claim (Count 2) but otherwise denies defendants' motion for summary judgment [docket no. 61]. (mk)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
LISA SWEENEY,
Plaintiff,
vs.
LAWANDA BURRAS and
DAVID HARRIS,
Defendants.
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Case No. 12 C 564
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
MATTHEW F. KENNELLY, District Judge:
Lisa Sweeney has sued Lawanda Burras and David Harris, two Chicago State
University (CSU) police officers, for false arrest, excessive force, conspiracy, and failure
to intervene pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Sweeney has also made several claims
under Illinois law, including malicious prosecution, intentional infliction of emotional
distress (IIED), battery, and assault. Sweeney's claims arise from an incident at CSU's
Chicago campus on February 7, 2011, while she was attending a class.
Defendants have moved for summary judgment on all of Sweeney's claims
except for the excessive force claim.1 For the reasons discussed below, the Court
denies defendants' motion, except as to Sweeney's conspiracy claim.
Background
On the evening of February 7, 2011, Sweeney was attending a math class at
1
Defendants originally sought summary judgment on all claims, but in their reply brief
they withdrew their motion with respect to the excessive force claim. See Defs.' Reply
at 1 n.1.
Harold Washington Hall on CSU's campus in Chicago. She and another student got
into a verbal disagreement, and the professor called the CSU police. A dispatcher
contacted Harris and Burras and instructed them to report to the professor's classroom.
Upon arriving there, Harris and Burras asked Sweeney to leave the classroom
and then escorted her into the hallway. They asked Sweeney for her CSU student
identification card. She did not provide identification and instead suggested that they
check the professor's class roster to get her identification information.
The parties dispute what happened next. Sweeney alleges that while she was
seated on a bench and calling an attorney, Burras and Harris shouted and cursed at her
and then grabbed her and threw her to the ground. By contrast, Burras and Harris say
that they asked Sweeney to leave the premises and she refused, so they called their
supervisor, who instructed them to bring Sweeney in for trespassing. They then took
her into custody, an effort that they say Sweeney resisted. Each side denies the other's
account of these events.
The parties agree that Burras and Harris arrested Sweeney and that she lost
consciousness shortly after they handcuffed her. They then took Sweeney from Harold
Washington Hall to a CSU police car, which took her to the CSU police station.
Sweeney was held there for several hours before she was transported to the Chicago
Police Department's 5th District station on February 8, 2011. Sweeney was charged
with disorderly conduct and resisting arrest.
On February 12, 2011, Sweeney sought medical attention for injuries that she
allegedly sustained on the night of her arrest. Sweeney claims that she continues to
suffer mental and emotional distress as a result of the attack, arrest, and filing of
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charges against her. She seeks compensatory and punitive damages.
On the day Sweeney went to court on the charges against her, Harris did not
arrive on time. As a result, the court "SOL'd" the case, state-court lingo for a dismissal
with leave to reinstate. The prosecution did not ask for a continuance and never sought
to reinstate the case against Sweeney.
Discussion
"Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine dispute of material fact,
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Herzog v. Graphic
Packaging Int'l, Inc., 742 F.3d 802, 805-06 (7th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks
omitted). A court "tak[es] all facts and reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving
party." Rooni v. Biser, 742 F.3d 737, 740 (7th Cir. 2014).
1.
False arrest
Burras and Harris contend that they had probable cause to arrest Sweeney for
disorderly conduct, resisting arrest, and criminal trespass to state-supported land (CSU
is part of the state university system). "Probable cause exists if at the time of the arrest,
the facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge are sufficient to warrant a
prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown,
that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense."
Mucha v. Village of Oak Brook, 650 F.3d 1053, 1056 (7th Cir. 2011) (internal quotations
omitted). "[A]n arrest may be supported by probable cause that the arrestee committed
any offense, regardless of which crime was charged or which crime the officer thought
had been committed." Gutierrez v. Kermon, 722 F.3d 1003, 1012, n. 3 (7th Cir. 2013).
Burras and Harris argue in the alternative that qualified immunity protects them
3
from Sweeney's false arrest claim. "The probable-cause standard inherently allows
room for reasonable mistakes, but qualified immunity affords an added layer of
protection by shielding officers from suit for damages if a reasonable officer could have
believed [the arrest] to be lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information
the [arresting] officers possessed." Abbott v. Sangamon Cty., 705 F.3d 706, 714 (7th
Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). "This concept is often called arguable probable cause, and
it is sufficient to grant qualified immunity to officers who reasonably but mistakenly
believed they had probable cause to arrest." Williams v. City of Chicago, 733 F.3d 749,
758 (7th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
The Court begins with defendants' argument regarding trespass. Under Illinois
law, a person "commits criminal trespass to State supported land when he or she
remains upon the land or in the building after receiving notice from the State or its
representative to depart, and who thereby interferes with another person's lawful use or
enjoyment of the building or land." 720 ILCS 5/21-5(a). "A person has received notice
from the State within the meaning of this subsection if he or she has been notified
personally, either orally or in writing . . . ." Id.
It is undisputed that defendants asked Sweeney to leave the classroom, and
there is evidence that Sweeney voluntarily went with them to the hallway. See Pl.'s Ex.
C at 44. Defendants say, however, that the professor told Burras (who in turn told
Harris) that she did not want Sweeney to return to her class that evening, and they in
turn told Sweeney that she had to leave the premises. They say that Sweeney refused
to go, and at that point there was probable cause to arrest her for trespass to statesupported land. Sweeney, however, testified that no one instructed her to leave the
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building. Pl.'s Ex. B at 122.
Given Sweeney's testimony that she was never told to leave the building, there is
a genuine factual dispute about whether there was probable cause to arrest her for
trespass. A reasonable fact finder could believe Sweeney's statement that she was not
asked to leave the building and thus could find probable cause lacking. The same
factual dispute precludes a determination that defendants had "arguable probable
cause" to arrest Sweeney for trespass.
The Court next addresses the offense of resisting arrest. Under Illinois law, "[a]
person is not authorized to use force to resist an arrest which he knows is being made
either by a peace officer or by a private person summoned and directed by a peace
officer to make the arrest, even if he believes that the arrest is unlawful and the arrest in
fact is unlawful." 720 ILCS 5/7-7 (2012). Here again, the parties have offered sharply
conflicting testimony regarding what happened. Defendants and at least one
eyewitness say that Sweeney was screaming and flailing when defendants attempted to
take her into custody. Sweeney, however, paints a completely different picture. She
says that after an exchange where the defendants asked her for identification and she
attempted to call her lawyer, "they just grabbed me," and
they were both each holding an arm, and I was saying, "Help," and I
screamed help down in my gut. I was screaming help. It was guttural. It
was with bass and it was just, "Help." . . . It was just like an animal. And
they were pulling and pulling, and she was hitting me and hitting me. And
then all of a sudden, it looked like he was stopping her. Looked like he
had taken her hand off of me, and I thought for a minute, oh, he's
stopping, and then all of a sudden he put his hands both on my shoulders
and just picked me up and slammed me into the concrete, and that was all
I remember. At that point I passed out.
Pl.'s Ex. B at 61, 63-64.
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A reasonable jury would be entitled to believe Sweeney's account, and if so it
properly could conclude that probable cause was lacking to arrest her for resisting. The
same factual dispute precludes a finding of arguable probable cause with regard to
resisting arrest.
Defendants also contend there was probable cause or arguable probable cause
as to the offense of disorderly conduct. Under Illinois law, "a person commits disorderly
conduct when he or she knowingly: (1) Does any act in such unreasonable manner as
to alarm or disturb another and to provoke a breach of the peace . . . ." 720 ILCS 5/261(a)(1) (2012). "Disorderly conduct is loosely defined. As a highly fact specific inquiry,
it embraces a wide variety of conduct serving to destroy or menace the public order and
tranquility. . . . The main purpose of the offense is to guard against an invasion of the
right of others not to be molested or harassed, either mentally or physically, without
justification." People v. McLennon, 2011 IL App (2d) 091299, ¶ 30, 957 N.E.2d 1241,
1249 (2011) (internal quotations omitted).
Defendants' argument on disorderly conduct is a bit scattered in their opening
brief, but they describe it clearly in their reply. They say:
Plaintiff had a verbal altercation with a student, Leniseal Wadley, including
yelling in front of a crowded classroom. Plaintiff was flailing her body, and
Professor Ruiz described the situation as disturbing the classroom
instruction. Indeed, Professor Ruiz was so disturbed by Plaintiff's
behavior that she asked a student to summon the police. When
Defendant Harris arrived and told Plaintiff to be quiet, Plaintiff continued
yelling. As she exited the classroom, Plaintiff threatened Wadley. Thus,
Plaintiff's threats to another student and her loud conduct caused a
disruption within the classroom. And Plaintiff states that she does not
recall her interaction inside the classroom with Professor Ruiz; therefore,
Defendants' version of what happened in the classroom is uncontroverted.
These unrebutted facts are sufficient to find probable cause to arrest
Plaintiff for the crime of disorderly conduct.
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Defs.' Reply at 2 (citations omitted).
Defendants only arrived at the classroom after they were called, and thus to the
extent they premise probable cause or arguable probable cause on what happened
before they arrived, it would have to be based on what they were told. And on that
point, the evidence is not "uncontroverted" as defendants claim. The professor testified
only that she told the officers that there was "disruption in my classroom and at that
point I wanted them to remove Miss Lisa." Pl.'s Ex. C at 42. She did not testify that the
told the officers that Sweeney had made any threats, either physical or verbal.
Nor is it accurate to say, as defendants do, that their version of what happened
after they arrived is uncontroverted. The professor testified that all that happened when
the officers asked Sweeney to leave the classroom is that she said, initially, that she did
not want to leave. According to the professor, the officers waited. She said that after a
few minutes Sweeney got up voluntarily and left the classroom, "and that's it." Id. at 4345. And contrary to defendants' argument, Sweeney did not have a failure of
recollection regarding what happened after defendants came to the classroom. She
testified that the officers asked her to step out. She asked the officers why she was the
one leaving, "[i]t should be both of us," i.e., both her and the other student. Pl.'s Ex. B
at 47. Sweeney said she asked if she could come back the next day, and the professor
said yes. The professor told Sweeney that she wanted to separate her and the other
student, because "I don't know what might happen later." Id. Sweeney went into the
hallway, and Burras said to her that it would all "blow over." Id. at 46, 47. This, read
fairly, is inconsistent with defendants' account that Harris asked Sweeney to quiet down
but she continued to yell and that while leaving, Sweeney threatened the other student.
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In sum, the facts underlying the claim of probable cause or arguable probable
cause to arrest Sweeney for disorderly conduct are genuinely disputed. A reasonable
fact finder could believe that the officers observed Sweeney engaging in disruptive
behavior or were told she had done so, but the fact finder could also reasonably believe
the opposite. This precludes entry of summary judgment.
It is no answer to this discussion to say that Sweeney's testimony cannot create
a genuine factual dispute because it is self-serving. "Deposition testimony, affidavits,
responses to interrogatories, and other written statements by their nature are selfserving . . . . As we have repeatedly emphasized over the past decade, the term
'selfserving' must not be used to denigrate perfectly admissible evidence through which
a party tries to present its side of the story at summary judgment." Hill v. Tangherlini,
724 F.3d 965, 967 (7th Cir. 2013).
In their reply brief, defendants make an additional argument. They contend that
Sweeney refused to show her identification when asked and that this violated the Illinois
stop-and-identify statute, 725 ILCS 5/107-14, providing an independent ground for
probable cause. See Defs.' Reply at 3. Defendants take Sweeney to task for not
addressing this point in her response brief. Id. There is a good reason for that:
defendants did not so much as hint at a reference to the stop-and-identify statute in their
opening brief. Rather, they said this:
Defendants had probable cause to arrest Sweeney for several criminal
offenses: (1) trespass to state supported land for failure to leave the
building upon notice from Defendants, coupled with her disturbance that
prevented students and professors from focusing on their own classes; (2)
resisting arrest; and (3) disturbing the peace.
Defs.' Opening Br. at 5-6 Because defendants raised the stop-and-identify argument
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for the first time in their reply brief, they forfeited the point for summary judgment
purposes. See, e.g., Alam v. Miller Brewing Co., 709 F.3d 662, 668 n.3 (7th Cir. 2013);
United States v. Diaz, 533 F.3d 574, 577 (7th Cir. 2008).
2.
Failure to intervene
In count 3, Sweeney alleges that each defendant is liable for failing to prevent the
constitutional violations committed by the other.
An officer who is present and fails to intervene to prevent other law
enforcement officers from infringing the constitutional rights of citizens is
liable under § 1983 if that officer had reason to know: (1) that excessive
force was being used, (2) that a citizen has been unjustifiably arrested, or
(3) that any constitutional violation has been committed by a law
enforcement official; and the officer had a realistic opportunity to intervene
to prevent the harm from occurring.
Abdullahi v. City of Madison, 423 F.3d 763, 774 (7th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks
omitted). The Seventh Circuit has made clear that the prongs of this analysis almost
always implicate questions of fact for the jury . . . ." Id.
Defendants contest both the occurrence of any constitutional violations the
proposition that there was realistic opportunity to prevent them. Given the existence
genuine factual disputes regarding Sweeney's constitutional claims, defendants have
not carried the day on the first of these points. The Court likewise concludes that a
reasonable jury could find against one or both of the defendants on the second point.
The Seventh Circuit "has implied that a 'realistic opportunity to intervene' may exist
whenever an officer could have 'called for a backup, called for help, or at least
cautioned [the excessive force defendant] to stop.'" Abdullahi, 423 F.3d at 774 (quoting
Yang v. Hardin, 37 F.3d 282, 285 (7th Cir. 1994)). A jury that believed Sweeney's
account of the events reasonably could find that either could have cautioned the other
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to stop. Thus defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff's failure to
intervene claim.
3.
Conspiracy
In count 2 of her complaint, Sweeney alleges that defendants conspired to violate
her constitutional rights. This requires her to establish that the defendants had an
agreement or understanding that they would violate her constitutional rights. See, e.g.,
Reynolds v. Jamison, 488 F.3d 756, 764 (7th Cir. 2007). That said, "a conspiracy need
not be based on an express agreement . . . its existence can be inferred from
circumstantial evidence." Richardson v. City of Indianapolis, 658 F.2d 494, 500 (7th Cir.
1981). Cf. Cefalu v. Vill. of Elk Grove, 211 F.3d 416, 422 (7th Cir. 2000) (quoting a
district judge's ruling that the fact that the defendants met after the incident in question
to "discuss [its] circumstances" amounted to circumstantial evidence from which a jury
reasonably could infer a conspiracy).
Sweeney relies on the following to support of her contention that defendants
reached a common understanding to deprive her of her rights. First, Burras testified
during her deposition that she knew that Harris was on his way to the classroom when
she was making her own way there. Pl.'s Ex. I at 22. Second, Sweeney testified that
after leaving the classroom, she walked downstairs and exited the building before
returning upstairs to wait for a ride. Pl.'s Ex. B at 49. She argues that "[d]efendants
would have had ample time to communicate with each other while Ms. Sweeney [sic]
gone and, coincidentally, Defendants initiated their attack just after Ms. Sweeney
returned." Pl.'s Br. at 8.
Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on this claim. Although a
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conspiracy can be inferred from circumstantial evidence, Sweeney has offered only
evidence of an opportunity to conspire. This is insufficient. See Cooney v. Casady, 735
F.3d 514, 519 (7th Cir. 2013) ("The second defect is that . . . Cooney fails even to argue
that Casady and Sosnowski actually communicated with Magnabosco. Rather, Cooney
suggests that 'there is a possibility' that they could have contacted her.")
4.
Malicious prosecution
Sweeney asserts several claims under state law, including a claim for malicious
prosecution. In Illinois, the elements of malicious prosecution are: 1) the
commencement of criminal proceedings by defendants, 2) the termination of those
proceedings in favor of plaintiff, 3) a lack of probable cause for the proceedings, 4) the
presence of malice, and 5) resulting damages. Williams, 733 F.3d at 759.
Defendants contend that there was probable cause for the criminal charges
against Sweeney; the criminal proceedings did not terminate in Sweeney's favor; and
she suffered no damages as a result of the criminal charges, because she appeared in
court only once.
Defendants' first point lacks merit. As the Court has discussed, there are
genuine dispute of material fact regarding the existence of probable cause on the
disorderly conduct and resisting arrest charges.
The second issue is whether a reasonable jury could find that the criminal
proceedings against Sweeney were terminated in her favor. As indicated earlier, the
charges against her were SOL'd. There is no Seventh Circuit authority concerning
whether and under what circumstances an SOL can satisfy the favorable termination
requirement, and district court decisions go both ways. Illinois has adopted the view of
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the Restatement (2d) of Torts, which states that a "demurrer or its equivalent" may
amount to an adjudication in the plaintiff's favor depending on the circumstances. Cult
Awareness Network v. Church of Scientology Int'l, 177 Ill. 2d 267, 276, 685 N.E.2d
1347, 1352 (1997) (citing Restatement (2d) of Torts § 674 cmt. j (1977)). This is
consistent with the Illinois Supreme Court's determination in Swick v. Liautaud, 169 Ill.
2d 504, 662 N.E.2d 1238 (1996), that
a criminal proceeding has been terminated in favor of the accused when a
prosecutor formally abandons the proceeding via a nolle prosequi, unless
the abandonment is for reasons not indicative of the innocence of the
accused. The abandonment of the proceedings is not indicative of the
innocence of the accused when the nolle prosequi is the result of an
agreement or compromise with the accused, misconduct on the part of the
accused for the purpose of preventing trial, mercy requested or accepted
by the accused, the institution of new criminal proceedings, or the
impossibility or impracticability of bringing the accused to trial.
Id. at 513, 662 N.E.2d at 1243. The burden remains with the plaintiff, however,
and "the circumstances surrounding the abandonment of the criminal
proceedings must compel an inference that there existed a lack of reasonable
grounds to pursue the criminal prosecution." Id. at 513-14, 662 N.E.2d at 1243.
The evidence in this case reflects that Harris arrived late for the initial hearing in
Sweeney's case, the prosecutor moved to SOL the case, and the court entered an order
striking the charges with leave to reinstate. See Pl.'s Ex. N. The prosecutor
presumably could have requested a continuance but did not do so, nor did the state
ever ask to reinstate the case. In addition, there is no indication that Harris, Burras, or
CSU sought reinstatement of the charges against Sweeney. Finally, because
Sweeney's counsel made a demand for trial, the state's ability to reinstate the charges
eventually expired.
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The Court finds persuasive Judge Rebecca Pallmeyer's decision in Montes v.
DiSantis, No. 04 C 4447, 2005 WL 1126556 (N.D. Ill. May 10, 2005), that an SOL in
similar circumstances may amount to a favorable termination for purposes of a
malicious prosecution claim. Judge Pallmeyer noted that in Ferguson v. City of
Chicago, 213 Ill. 2d 94, 820 N.E.2d 455 (2004), in discussing a claim of malicious
prosecution regarding a criminal charge that had been SOL'd, the Illinois Supreme
Court noted that "[n]o one disputes that the circuit court's decision to SOL the charges
against [the plaintiff] represented a favorable outcome for him." Id. at 102, 820 N.E.2d
at 460. Rather, the only question was whether the SOL amounted to a "termination" of
the criminal case. Id. at 102, 820 N.E.2d at 461.
As Judge Pallmeyer noted in Montes, Illinois courts have concluded that
terminations that do not amount to adjudications on the merits still may satisfy the
favorable termination requirement for malicious prosecution, such as an involuntary
dismissal resulting from a failure to comply with discovery or a legal disposition that
permits an inference of the absence of probable cause. In Velez v. Avis Rent A Car
Sys., Inc., 308 Ill. App. 3d 923, 721 N.E.2d 652 (1999), the underlying criminal charge
was SOL'd twice, and the speedy trial period and statute of limitations ultimately
expired. The court upheld the denial of a motion to dismiss the ensuing malicious
prosecution suit, noting that the prosecution had abandoned the criminal charge and
that there was nothing to indicate that this was "the result of an agreement or
compromise with the accused, misconduct on the part of the accused for the purpose of
preventing trial, mercy requested or accepted by the accused, the institution of new
criminal proceedings, or the impossibility or impracticability of bringing the accused to
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trial." Id. at 929, 721 N.E.2d at 656. The same is true here. The Court concludes that a
reasonable jury could find that Sweeney has satisfied this element of a malicious
prosecution claim.
Finally, a reasonable jury could find that Sweeney has satisfied the damages
element of malicious prosecution. In Harmon v. Gordon, 712 F.3d 1044 (7th Cir. 2013),
the court stated that this element requires a plaintiff to have suffered "special injury" or
"special damage beyond the usual expense, time, or annoyance in defending a lawsuit."
Id. at 1056. Sweeney testified during her deposition that she continues to suffer mental
and emotional distress relating to her ordeal, for which she has required medical
treatment. See Pl.'s Ex. B at 88. Defendants overlook this presumably because they
are drawing a distinction between the court proceedings and the underlying arrest and
filing of charges that initiated those proceedings. But Illinois law does not acknowledge
this difference. "In nearly all malicious prosecution cases in which Illinois courts have
found a special injury, the nature of the underlying suit visited upon the plaintiff some
quantifiable damage causing characteristic. . . . These injuries have generally resulted
from an arrest or seizure . . . ." Harmon, 712 F.3d at 1056 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
5.
Sovereign immunity on state-law claims
In addition to her malicious prosecution claim, Sweeney has sued defendants for
IIED, battery, and assault under Illinois law. Defendants argue that sovereign immunity
protects them from liability for all of plaintiff's state law claims.
Sovereign immunity bars claims against the state of Illinois. Determination of
whether a claim against a state employee is considered a claim against the state "does
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not depend simply on whether the employee was acting within the scope of his
employment when he committed the act in question." Fritz v. Johnston, 209 Ill. 2d 302,
310, 807 N.E.2d 461, 466 (2004). Rather, it turns on the source of the duty the
employee is claimed to have breached. Sovereign immunity applies "[w]here the duty is
imposed solely by virtue of the individual's employment with the state." Id. at 310, 807
N.E.2d at 466-47.
Defendants argue that they acted exclusively pursuant their duties as police
officers for a state university. They compare their conduct to defendants' actions in
Richman v. Sheahan, 270 F.3d 430 (7th Cir. 2001). Richman involved claims against
sheriff's deputies who took a witness into custody at the direction of a judge. The
witness, who had a prior disability, died allegedly as the result of the force used during
his seizure. The administrator of the witness's estate pursued state-law survival and
wrongful death claims against the sheriff's deputies. The court found that the sheriff's
deputies were acting on behalf of the state because the judge was an officer of the
state. It concluded that the claims were barred by sovereign immunity because there
was "nothing in the complaint that would indicate that the deputies' conduct was
motivated by a purpose other than executing the judge's order." Id. at 442.
Defendants' argument confuses the issue of scope of employment with that of
the duty that gives rise to the particular claim. As the court stated in Fritz, "the critical
question is the source of the duty the employee is alleged to have violated—and
specifically, whether that duty exists solely by virtue of the defendant's state
employment." Fritz, 209 Ill. 2d at 314, 807 N.E.2d at 469. In contrast to Richman, in
which the sheriff's deputies were carrying out a duty directed by a state officer, in this
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case the duties in question are not duties that arise by virtue of the defendants'
employment by the state. As the Illinois Supreme Court noted in Fritz, "the duty not to
make false accusations of criminal conduct is imposed by the Illinois Criminal Code,
which makes no distinction between accusations by state employees and those leveled
by non-state employees." Id. The same is true of the duties at issue here.
Illinois law considers an action naming a state employee to be an action against
the state itself if there are no allegations that the state employee acted beyond the
scope of his authority through wrongful acts, the duty alleged to have been breached
was not one owed to the public generally, independent of the fact of state employment,
and the conduct involves actions ordinarily within the employee or agent's normal and
official state functions. Jinkins v. Lee, 209 Ill. 2d 320, 330, 807 N.E.2d 411, 418 (2004).
In this case, however, the defendants are alleged to have exceeded their authority by
wrongful acts, and the duties they breached are duties that are not specific to their state
employment. Thus the requirements for sovereign immunity are not met.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants summary judgment for defendants
on plaintiff's conspiracy claim (Count 2) but otherwise denies defendants' motion for
summary judgment [docket no. 61].
MATTHEW F. KENNELLY
United States District Judge
Date: March 16, 2014
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