Coleman v. Pfister et al

Filing 22

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order. Respondent Randy Pfister's "Motion to Dismiss" 10 is granted and petitioner Jonathan Coleman's "Motion to Stay Proceedings in Abeyance" 20 is denied as moot. Coleman's request for a certificate of appealability is denied. Civil case terminated. Signed by the Honorable James F. Holderman on 3/29/13. Notice mailed by judge's staff (ntf, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
JONATHAN COLEMAN,

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Petitioner,
v.
RANDY PFISTER,
Respondent.

No. 12 C 952

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
JAMES F. HOLDERMAN, Chief Judge:
Pro se petitioner Jonathan Coleman (“Coleman”) has filed a petition for writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his 2004 murder conviction in the Circuit
Court of Cook County. (Dkt. No. 1.) Pending before the court are respondent Randy Pfister’s
(“Respondent”) “Motion to Dismiss” (Dkt. No. 10) and Coleman’s “Motion to Stay Proceedings
in Abeyance” (Dkt. No. 20). For the reasons set forth below, Respondent’s motion to dismiss is
granted and Coleman’s motion to stay is denied as moot.
BACKGROUND
Respondent generally argues that Coleman’s § 2254 petition must be dismissed with
prejudice, because it was untimely filed pursuant to the deadlines set forth in the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). Accordingly, this background section is
limited to facts that are relevant to a determination of timeliness.
On December 16, 2004, following a jury trial in the Circuit Court of Cook County,
Illinois, Coleman was convicted of the first degree murder of Ricardo Cabrales. (Dkt. No. 10
(“Respondent’s Mot.”) ¶ 2.) Coleman was sentenced on January 25, 2005, to serve sixty-five

1

years of imprisonment. (Id. ¶ 2.) On March 2, 2007, the Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed
Coleman’s conviction and sentence. (Id. ¶ 3.) The Supreme Court of Illinois denied Coleman’s
petition for leave to appeal on May 31, 2007. (Id.)
On May 15, 2007, Coleman placed an unsigned and undated “draft” post-conviction
petition in the prison mail at Menard Correctional Center, addressed to Coleman’s mother. (Id.
¶ 5.1.) Instead of sending the draft petition to Coleman’s mother, staff at Menard Correctional
Center mailed the draft petition to the Circuit Court of Cook County, where it was received on
May 21, 2007 and filed as a pro se post-conviction petition on June 19, 2007. (Id. ¶ 4, 5.2, 5.3.) 1
After a series of subsequent filings and orders, the circuit court eventually corrected this error on
December 19, 2007, when the court determined that Coleman had withdrawn his May 15, 2007
submission. (Id. ¶¶ 4-6.)
On October 24, 2008, Coleman mailed a second 2 post-conviction petition to the Circuit
Court of Cook County. (Id. ¶ 8.) The circuit court denied Coleman’s October 24, 2008 postconviction petition on January 28, 2009. (Id.) The Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed the
circuit court’s denial of post-conviction relief on July 22, 2011. (Id. ¶ 9; see also People v.
Coleman, 956 N.E.2d 966 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2011).) On November 30, 2011, the Supreme
Court of Illinois denied Coleman leave to appeal. (Respondent’s Mot. ¶ 9.)

1

Respondent sates that the draft post-conviction petition was “docketed” on May 21, 2007, but also cites
Coleman’s assertion in state court that the draft post-conviction petition was “received” on May 21, 2007 and “filed”
on June 5, 2007. (See Respondent’s Mot. ¶¶ 4, 5.3.) The record from the state court shows that the draft postconviction petition was received on May 21, 2007 and filed on June 19, 2007. (State Record, Ex. K at C 032.) The
court will refer to the draft post-conviction petition as the “May 15, 2007 submission” in the remainder of this
opinion for the sake of clarity.
2

The circuit court’s eleven-page January 28, 2009 order makes no mention of Coleman’s May 15, 2007
submission, apart from what appears to be an erroneous entry on page 3 of the order, and does not otherwise treat
Coleman’s October 24, 2008 filing as a second or successive post-conviction petition. (See State Record, Ex. N at
C:00094-C:00104.)

2

Coleman’s appellate counsel learned of the Supreme Court of Illinois’s denial of leave to
appeal on December 6, 2011, and informed Coleman of the Supreme Court of Illinois’s decision
on December 9, 2011. (Dkt. No. 14 (“Petitioner’s Resp.”) ¶ 6.) Coleman’s § 2254 petition was
post-marked February 7, 2012, and was received by this court on February 10, 2012.
(Respondent’s Mot. ¶ 10; see also text of Dkt. Entry No. 1.)
LEGAL STANDARD
As noted above, Respondent argues that Coleman’s § 2254 habeas petition was untimely
filed pursuant to the applicable deadlines set forth in AEDPA. Section § 2244(d) sets forth the
relevant statutory language:
(1)

A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of
habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State
court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of —
(A)

(B)

the date on which the impediment to filing an application created
by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the
United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from
filing by such State action;

(C)

the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially
recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly
recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively
applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D)

(2)

the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of
direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims
presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due
diligence.

The time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment
or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation
under this subsection.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) and (2).

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It is undisputed that “the expiration of the time for seeking [direct] review” in this case
was August 29, 2007. 3 See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Accordingly, absent any “impediment to
filing . . . created by State action” (28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B)) or tolling for the period in which
a “properly filed application for State post-conviction” was pending before the state court (28
U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)), Coleman’s § 2254 petition was due to be filed one year later, on or before
August 29, 2008.
Respondent argues that Coleman’s § 2254 petition must be dismissed for failure to meet
the August 29, 2008 deadline, taking the position that “the limitations period was not tolled . . .
before it expired on August 29, 2008.” (Respondent’s Mot. ¶ 17.) In the alternative, Respondent
argues that even if the erroneous filing of Coleman’s May 15, 2007 submission had the effect of
tolling the limitations period, Coleman’s § 2254 petition would still be considered untimely
under § 2244(d) when it was mailed on February 7, 2012. (Id. ¶ 18, n.3.)
Coleman asserts that Respondent’s motion to dismiss should be denied, because: (1)
Coleman’s § 2254 petition was timely filed within the one-year deadline, when the deadline is
appropriately calculated and tolled; (2) Coleman’s lack of access to the prison law library and the
“inadequate instructions” he received on how to file a § 2254 petition “created an impediment to
filing an application” under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B); and (3) Coleman is entitled to equitable
tolling, because “extraordinary circumstances outside of petitioner’s control prevented him from
filing a timely petition.” (Petitioner’s Resp. ¶¶ 8, 9.)
Once a respondent “raises an AEDPA statute of limitations defense, the petitioner must
come forward with some evidence to support his claim that . . . 365 countable days have not

3

This date is ninety days after the Supreme Court of Illinois’s May 31, 2007 order, at which point Coleman’s time
for petitioning the United States Supreme Court for direct review expired. See Ray v. Clements, 700 F.3d 993, 1003
(7th Cir. 2012) (calculating limitations period from the date “the time expired for filing a petition for writ of
certiorari in the Supreme Court for direct review of the state court’s judgment”).

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elapsed.” Ray v. Clements, 700 F.3d 993, 1008 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Allen v. Culliver, 471 F.3d
1196, 1198 (11th Cir. 2006)). “After the petitioner makes this evidentiary showing, the burden
shifts to the government to prove that the limitations period has run.” Id.
ANALYSIS
1.

Statutory Tolling and Calculation of Standard One-Year Limitations Period
The parties first dispute whether the erroneous filing of Coleman’s May 15, 2007

submission tolls the applicable limitations period. Respondent argues that the May 15, 2007
submission cannot toll the limitations period, because it is not a “properly filed application for
State post-conviction or collateral review.”

(Respondent’s Mot. ¶ 18 (quoting 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d)(2)).) Coleman disputes this characterization of the May 15, 2007 submission, noting
that “when the trial court ruled on the post-conviction [petition] it denied the petition as being
‘frivolous and patently without merit.’ Not on any other grounds as argued by Respondent.”
(Petitioner’s Resp. ¶ 1.) The problem with Coleman’s argument is that it refers to the disposition
of his October 24, 2008 post-conviction petition, not the May 15, 2007 submission.4 The only
record evidence regarding the court’s disposition of Coleman’s May 15, 2007 submission is a
docket entry on December 19, 2007, stating “POST-CONVICTION PET WITHDRAWN.”
(State Record, Ex. B at 14.) This docket entry is consistent with the position taken by Coleman
in State court, that the May 15, 2007 submission was “mistakenly mailed” to the circuit court.
(State Record, Ex. L at C 306, ¶ 3.) Under these circumstances, the May 15, 2007 submission
cannot be considered a “properly filed application for State post-conviction or collateral review”
under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).
4

Coleman’s statement appears to refer to the circuit court’s January 28, 2009 order denying Coleman’s October 24,
2008 post-conviction petition, which concluded, “The court finds that the issues raised and presented by petitioner
are frivolous and patently without merit.” (See State Record, Ex. N at C:00104; see also State Record, Ex. B at 16
(1/28/09 docket entry stating “PETITION DISMISSED AS FRIVOLOUS AND PATENTLY WITHOUT
MERIT”).)

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In the alternative, even if this court were to conclude that Coleman’s May 15, 2007
submission did toll the limitations period as a “properly filed application for State postconviction or collateral review,” Coleman’s § 2254 petition would still be considered untimely.
Under those circumstances, the one-year limitations period would begin to run on December 20,
2007, the day after Coleman’s May 15, 2007 submission was officially withdrawn.

From

December 20, 2007 through October 24, 2008, Coleman did not have any properly filed postconviction petitions pending in the State court, 5 and 309 days of the one-year limitations period
elapsed. The remaining fifty-six days of the limitations period were then tolled from October 24,
2008 through November 30, 2011, while Coleman’s October 24, 2008 post-conviction petition
made its way through the State courts. This tolling period ended on November 30, 2011, the date
the Supreme Court of Illinois denied Coleman leave to appeal. See Gutierrez v. Schomig, 233
F.3d 490, 492 (7th Cir. 2000) (distinguishing § 2244(d)(1)(A) and § 2244(d)(2) and concluding
that the one-year limitations period is not tolled during the time when a petitioner could have
filed, but did not file, a petition for a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court
regarding the denial of a post-conviction petition); see also Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327,
331-36 (2007). Coleman’s § 2254 petition was then due fifty-six days later, on January 25,
2012. 6 As noted above, Coleman’s § 2254 petition was post-marked February 7, 2012, and was
received by this court on February 10, 2012. 7

5

Coleman’s appointed counsel erroneously filed a notice of appeal on October 31, 2007 pertaining to an alreadyvacated circuit court order. (Respondent’s Mot. ¶ 7.) This filing did not toll the one-year limitations period,
because it was not a “properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review.” See Artuz v.
Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 9 (2000) (“If, for example, an application is erroneously accepted by the clerk of a court lacking
jurisdiction . . . it will be pending, but not properly filed.”); see also Arangold Corp. v. Zehnder, 718 N.E.2d 191,
200 (Ill. 1999) (“a final judgment or decision is generally a prerequisite to appellate jurisdiction”). The Appellate
Court of Illinois dismissed the erroneous appeal on April 17, 2008. (See State Court Record, Ex. N at C:00059.)
6

The fact that Coleman did not learn about the November 30, 2011 order until December 9, 2011 does not impact
this calculation, because (1) the nine-day delay in notification does not constitute grounds for statutory tolling under
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), see Gutierrez, 233 F.3d at 492 (“Congress explicitly required a ‘properly filed’ pleading to

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For the reasons set forth above, the court finds that Coleman’s § 2254 petition was not
timely filed within the one-year limitations period.
2.

State-Created Impediment
Coleman argues generally that the “inadequate instructions” he received from the Pontiac

Correction Center’s Max Law Library (“Law Library”) on how to file a § 2254 petition
“creat[ed] an impediment to filing an application” under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B).
(Petitioner’s Resp. ¶ 8.) Specifically, Coleman asserts that, “upon receiving notification of the
[November 30, 2011] post-conviction PLA denial,” he requested from the Law Library “all
instructions on how to file a habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.” (Id. ¶ 7.) The
instructions he received, however, did not “explain[ ] that petitioner had any deadline.” (Id.)
Coleman further contends that “the only way he could of learned of the time limits at issue was
by writing the Max Law Library as he did,” because he has been in “punitive segregation” since
June 8, 2011. (Id. ¶ 9; see also Petitioner’s Ex. D ¶ 1.) Because the Law Library “failed to
notify petitioner as to when his deadline was for filing a Federal Habeas Corpus with this court,”
Coleman argues that the State created an impediment to him being able to timely file his § 2254
petition.

(Petitioner’s Resp. ¶ 8.)

Coleman does not identify when, if ever, the alleged

impediment was removed.

toll the statute of limitations”); and (2) the nine-day delay in notification does not constitute an “impediment to
filing . . . created by State action” under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B), see Moore v. Battaglia, 476 F.3d 504, 506-07
(7th Cir. 2007) (“whatever constitutes an impediment must prevent a prisoner from filing his petition”) and Powell
v. Davis, 415 F.3d 722, 728 (7th Cir. 2005) (“Without state action, there can be no state-created impediment by the
public defender agency.”). The nine-day delay in notification also does not constitute grounds for equitable tolling,
because this type of delay is not “extraordinary” and did not actually prevent Coleman from filing his § 2254
petition. See Ray, 700 F.3d at 1004, n.3 (the doctrine of equitable tolling “applies only when extraordinary
circumstances outside of the petitioner’s control prevent timely filing”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
7

Coleman’s § 2254 petition was signed February 1, 2012, but there is no evidence in the record that the petition
was mailed any time prior to February 7, 2012, the date it was post-marked. (See Dkt. No. 18 (“Respondent’s
Reply”) ¶ 7.) Under Rule 3(d) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, the
date of “deposit[ ] in the institution’s internal mailing system” generally governs the time of filing. See § 2254 Rule
(3)(d).

7

“The Seventh Circuit has suggested that a prisoner must have access to the habeas corpus
statute of limitations before it may be used to bar his claim.” United States ex rel. Strong v.
Hulick, 530 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1040 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (Kennelly, J.) (citing Moore v. Battaglia,
476 F.3d 504, 507-08 (7th Cir. 2007)). In Strong, District Judge Matthew F. Kennelly relied on
two key factual findings to conclude that petitioner Strong adequately demonstrated a Statecreated impediment to filing under § 2244(d)(1)(B) because he did not have access to § 2244(d).
First, Judge Kennelly noted that Menard Correctional Center was on lockdown “for fifteen of the
twenty-three weeks immediately preceding [Strong’s] filing deadline,” and that Strong “had no
access at all to law library materials” while the prison was on lockdown. Strong, 530 F. Supp. 2d
at 1039. Second, Judge Kennelly determined that a prison law clerk’s advice to Strong that “he
had a year to file” was attributable to the State, and could be reasonably interpreted to mean that
the law clerk told Strong “he had one year after his post-conviction appeal was concluded to file
a federal habeas corpus petition.”

Id. at 1038.

Judge Kennelly concluded that “[t]he

miscalculation of the due date for Strong’s habeas petition by prison personnel and the resulting
inaccessibility to Strong of the statute of limitations qualifies as state action impeding Strong
from timely filing his petition within the meaning of section 2244(d)(1)(B) and/or the doctrine of
equitable estoppel and/or tolling.” Id. at 1042. 8
Coleman’s argument is based almost entirely on his citation to Strong. Even assuming,
without deciding, that the circumstances as the court originally found them in Strong could
establish a State-created impediment to filing, the facts in this case are distinguishable. Coleman
does not contend that he was given erroneous advice by prison officials, or that he was prevented
8

Upon reconsideration, and after a further evidentiary hearing, Judge Kennelly concluded that Strong was not given
erroneous advice from the head law librarian “or anyone else delegated authority by prison personnel to calculate
filing deadlines,” and that Strong was not denied access to the law library when he failed to request access to the law
library before or after the four months of lockdown. United States ex rel Strong v. Gaetz, No. 07 C 435, 2009 WL
3060267, at *8-9 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 21, 2009) (Kennelly, J.) (granting motion to reconsider).

8

from asking the Law Library for information about the applicable deadline for his § 2254
petition. Rather, Coleman bases his argument on what the Law Library did not tell him. As his
argument makes clear, the materials he was given for the Northern District of Illinois simply do
not address the applicable filing deadline, (see Petitioner’s Ex. C1 (“Instructions for Filing a
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 & § 2254.”)), but this is
understandable in light of the fact that Coleman did not ask for materials regarding § 2254’s
statute of limitations. Instead, he asked for “all instructions on how to file a habeas corpus
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.” (Petitioner’s Resp. ¶ 7.) 9 Coleman attests that he also received
the standard form for the Southern District of Illinois in response to his request to the Law
Library, (Petitioner’s Resp., Ex. C ¶ 3), but he does not include a copy of the form as an exhibit
to his response brief.

A full reading of the Southern District of Illinois’s standard form,

submitted by Respondent in reply, shows that it includes the full text of § 2244(d).

(See

Respondent’s Reply, Ex. DDD.) If Coleman actually received this eighteen-page form from the
Law Library, a factual determination that the court need not reach, it would significantly
undermine Coleman’s assertion that the Law Library “failed to notify petitioner as to when his
deadline was for filing a federal habeas corpus with this court.” (Petitioner’s Resp. ¶ 8.) In any
event, Coleman has neither alleged nor argued that the Law Library provided him with erroneous
information about the filing deadline for his § 2254 petition or that it otherwise mislead him as to
the proper statute of limitations.
Coleman also does not contend that the Law Library failed to answer any of his requests
for legal materials, or that the procedures for submitting requests for legal materials prohibited
9

Respondent disputes Coleman’s factual assertions on this point, arguing that “the prison’s library has no record
that petitioner made the foregoing request or that the library responded in the manner petitioner describes.”
(Respondent’s Reply ¶ 14 (citing Respondent’s Exs. PP-TT).) The court accepts Coleman’s version of these
disputed facts for purposes of ruling on the pending motion to dismiss.

9

him from accessing the applicable statute of limitations. On the contrary, Coleman’s affidavit
suggests that the Law Library responded promptly to both of Coleman’s requests for
information. 10 The fact that Coleman was limited to submitting his requests in writing does not
mean, by extension, that he was denied access to the applicable statute of limitations. Although
Coleman asserts that he has had “extremely limited access to the law library” and that he has
only been allowed “access to the law library 8-10 times since confined in IDOC,” (Petitioner’s
Resp. ¶ 5; see also Petitioner’s Ex. A ¶ 5), these statements, when considered in context, appear
to refer to Coleman’s access to the physical Law Library facility.

Because Coleman

acknowledges that he “could of learned of the time limits at issue . . . by writing the Max Law
Library,” (Petitioner’s Resp. ¶ 9), his access to the physical Law Library facility is irrelevant. In
short, there is no indication that there was any impediment to Coleman asking for, and receiving,
information about the applicable filing deadline for his § 2254 petition.
In Moore v. Battaglia, the Seventh Circuit reiterated its previous statement that “whatever
constitutes an impediment must prevent a prisoner from filing his petition.” Moore, 476 F.3d at
506-07 (quoting Lloyd v. VanNatta, 296 F.3d 630, 633 (7th Cir. 2002) (emphasis in original)).
The Seventh Circuit considered the possibility that an “inadequate prison library” could be
considered a State-created impediment under § 2244(d)(1)(B), if the library did not contain a
copy of § 2244(d) or if the State prevented the petitioner from accessing a copy of § 2244(d), but
the factual record in Moore was too under-developed for the court to reach this legal question.
See Moore, 476 F.3d at 508.
Coleman has not submitted any evidence suggesting that the State prevented him from
accessing a copy of § 2244(d) or otherwise created an impediment that prevented him from
10

After erroneously receiving a copy of the standard form from the Southern District of Illinois, Coleman sent a
follow-up request for a “proper form” for the Northern District of Illinois, which he then received from the Law
Library. (Petitioner’s Ex. C ¶ 5.)

10

timely filing his § 2254 petition. As Respondent notes, Coleman “was able to ultimately file his
petition without access to the law library and when the alleged impediment still existed.”
(Respondent’s Reply ¶ 12 (citing Lloyd, 296 F.3d at 633).) It was Coleman’s burden to “come
forward with some evidence” of a State-created impediment to filing to support his claim that
“365 countable days have not elapsed.” Ray, 700 F.3d at 1008. Coleman has not met this
burden. Moreover, Respondent’s evidence in reply makes abundantly clear that the Law Library
imposed no impediment to filing in this case. (See Respondent’s Reply ¶¶ 13-16, 19-20 (citing
Respondent’s Exs. PP-VV, XX-YY, AAA, CCC-DDD).) The court therefore declines to find a
State-created impediment to filing under § 2244(d)(1)(B).
3.

Equitable Tolling
Coleman’s arguments in support of equitable tolling also rely on his alleged inability to

learn of the applicable filing deadline, as well as the fact that Coleman only has an 8th Grade
education and “[d]oes not understand the law well enough to litigate his case.” (Petitioner’s
Resp. ¶¶ 5, 9-10, 13.) In 2010, the Supreme Court confirmed that AEDPA’s one-year limitations
period “is subject to equitable tolling in appropriate cases.” Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549,
2560 (2010). A petitioner seeking equitable tolling must demonstrate “‘(1) that he has been
pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way’ and
prevented timely filing.” Id. at 2562 (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005).)
“[S]tanding alone, [a petitioner’s] lack of legal expertise is not a basis for invoking equitable
tolling.” Tucker v. Kingston, 538 F.3d 732, 735 (7th Cir. 2008). Additionally, “[m]istakes of
law or ignorance of proper legal procedures are not extraordinary circumstances warranting
invocation of the doctrine of equitable tolling.” Arrieta v. Battaglia, 461 F.3d 861, 867 (7th Cir.
2006).

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Coleman did not diligently request information from the Law Library about the filing
deadline for his § 2254 petition, nor has he demonstrated extraordinary circumstances that
prevented him from timely filing his § 2254 petition. The court finds no basis for applying
equitable tolling in this case.
4.

Certificate of Appealability
This court will issue a certificate of appealability if it finds that Coleman has made “a

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To satisfy
this burden, Coleman must demonstrate that “jurists of reason would find it debatable whether
the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason
would find it debatable whether [this court] was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v.
McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (emphasis added). Because this court finds it is not
debatable among reasonable jurists that Coleman’s § 2254 petition is untimely under § 2244(d),
the court denies Coleman’s request for a certificate of appealability.
5.

Motion to Stay
Coleman’s “Motion to Stay Proceedings in Abeyance” (Dkt. No. 20) addresses his

interest in filing a successive post-conviction petition in State court, based on the recent Supreme
Court case of Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). Because Coleman’s § 2254 petition is
untimely regardless of whether Coleman files a successive post-conviction petition in State
court, Coleman’s motion to stay is denied as moot.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, respondent Randy Pfister’s “Motion to Dismiss” (Dkt.
No. 10) is granted and petitioner Jonathan Coleman’s “Motion to Stay Proceedings in Abeyance”

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(Dkt. No. 20) is denied as moot. Coleman’s request for a certificate of appealability is denied.
Civil case terminated.
ENTER:

_______________________________
JAMES F. HOLDERMAN
Chief Judge, United States District Court

Date: March 29, 2013

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