Sorg v. Doe et al

Filing 30

WRITTEN Opinion entered by the Honorable Charles P. Kocoras on 10/23/2012: This case is summarily dismissed as effectively time-barred. The clerk is directed to enter final judgment. As this suit was timely filed but is barred as a practical matter, no "strike" is assessed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). [For further details see written opinion.] Mailed notice.(mr, )

Order Form (01/2005)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois
Name of Assigned Judge
or Magistrate Judge

CHARLES P. KOCORAS

CASE NUMBER

12 C 1334

CASE
TITLE

Sitting Judge if Other
than Assigned Judge

DATE

October 23, 2012

Derek Sorg (#R-28259) vs. John Doe, et al.

DOCKET ENTRY TEXT:

This case is summarily dismissed as effectively time-barred. The clerk is directed to enter final judgment. As
this suit was timely filed but is barred as a practical matter, no “strike” is assessed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

O

Docketing to mail notices.

[For further details see text below.]

STATEMENT
The plaintiff, an Illinois state prisoner, has brought this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. The plaintiff claims that the defendants, officials at the Stateville Correctional Center, violated the
plaintiff’s constitutional rights by acting with deliberate indifference to his safety. More specifically, the plaintiff
alleges that the defendants failed to protect him from an attack by a cellmate even after the plaintiff reported that
the cellmate had manufactured a makeshift knife.
By Minute Order of September 11, 2012, the court denied the plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a second
amended complaint naming the “John Doe” officers in question and ordered him to show cause why this case
should not be dismissed as effectively time-barred. Having considered the plaintiff’s response, the court remains
satisfied that the case must be dismissed.
Amendment at this time to name the John Doe officers in question is futile. As the court advised the
plaintiff in its Minute Order of March 5, 2012, there is a two-year statute of limitations for Section 1983 actions
in Illinois. See, e.g., Dominguez v. Hendley, 545 F.3d 585, 588 (7th Cir. 2008); 735 ILCS § 5/13-202. Illinois
law does not toll the statute of limitations for prisoners. Schweihs Burdick, 96 F.3d 917, 919 (7th Cir. 1996);
Turner-El v. Davis, No. 10 C 5188, 2010 WL 3526379, *1, n.1 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 30, 2010) (Norgle, J.).
As the court additionally alerted the plaintiff, he cannot avail himself of Rule 15(c)’s provisions allowing
for “relation back” to the original complaint. In this circuit, a plaintiff cannot invoke the relation back principles
(CONTINUED)
mjm

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STATEMENT (continued)
of Rule 15(c) to replace John Doe defendants with named defendants after the statute of limitations has expired.
See Worthington v. Wilson, 8 F.3d 1253, 1256-57 (7th Cir. 1993); see also Wood v. Worachek, 618 F.2d 1225, 1230
(7th Cir. 1980); Williams v. Hardy, No. 11 C 4838, 2012 WL 1719181, *3 (N.D. Ill. May 15, 2012) (Guzmán, J.).
Unfortunately, the plaintiff filed suit just one month before the statute of limitations expired. Because the plaintiff
waited until the eleventh hour to commence this action, it is now too late to pursue a civil rights action against the
officers.
For the foregoing reasons, the case is dismissed as effectively time-barred. As this suit was initiated in a
timely manner but is now time-barred as a practical matter, no “strike” will be assessed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
The case is terminated.

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