United States of America v. Derrick B. Tartt

Filing 78

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order. Mailed notice (mgh, )

UNITED STATES DISTzuCT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
Case

No. l2-cv-1416

v.
Judge John W. Darrah

DERRICK B. TARTT,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on the Report and Recommendation

of

Magistrate Judge Jeffrey Cole ("the Report") recommending this Court grant summary judgment

in favor of Plaintiff, the United States of America ("the Government"). Defendant Denick B.
Tartt, proceeding pro se, filed an Objection to the Report and also was granted leave to file a
Supplemental Response. For the following reasons, the Court adopts the Report and grants the

Government's Motion for Summary Judgment.

BACKGROUND
On February 28,2012,the Govemment fiIed its two-count Complaint against Tartt,
alleging he had defaulted ontwo Department of Education student loans and seeking to recoverthe
balance owed of more than

$775,000. By local internal operating procedure, student loan

are automatically assigned to a magistrate judge, see IOP

Magistrate Judge

Cole. The Government

1l(f),

cases

and the matter was assigned to

subsequently moved for summary judgment, and the

matter was fully briefed.
On May 16,2013,by a nine-page Memorandum Opinion and Order, Magistrate Judge
Cole entered summary judgment in favor of the Government and dismissed Tartt's "conspiracy"

counterclaim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. (See Dkt. No. 22,May 16,2013 Order.)
Magistrate Judge Cole cited to the evidence in the record, which included the copies of two

promissory notes signed by Tartt and two corresponding certificates of indebtedness from the
Department of Education. (Id.

at3-5.) Although Tartt disputed a few of the Government's facts,

Tartt did "not cite[] a single piece of evidence to support his contentions" and did "not submit[]
any evidence to the court that in any way casts doubts on his indebtedness and failure to
at 3,

5.)

pay."

(Id.

Therefore, Tartt failed to rebut the Government's primafacie case that he was in default

of the student loans at issue. (Id. at 5.)
Magistrate Judge Cole also dismissed Tartt's counterclaim for $50 to $100 million against
the United States, noting the claim "ha[d] nothing to do with [Tartt's] default on his student loan."

(Id. at

6.)

Rather, Tartt's counterclaim concerned a previous lawsuit filed by Tartt against his

former employers, which was eventually dismissed and then affirmed on appeal over six years

ago.

See Tartt v. Northwest Community

Hosp.,No. 00 C 7960,2004 WL 2254041(N.D. Il1.

Oct. 5, 2OO4) (Norgle, J.); Tartt v. Northwest Comm. Hosp.,453 F.3d

817

, 823 (7th Cir. 2006).r

Magistrate Judge Cole noted that Tartt's claim of a conspiracy, which involved the United States,

BMO Harris Bank, and a plan to torture him, deny him employment, and take away his liberty, was
"implausible on its

face."

(See Dkt. No. 22,

May 16,2013 Order at7-8.) Ultimately,

Magistrate Judge Cole dismissed the counterclaim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because
claims against the United States exceeding $10,000 must be brought in the United States Court
1

of

This was not Tartt's first federal lawsuit. In 1978, while in college, Tartt enrolled in the Army
ROTC pro$am and committedto serve six years inthe Army, includingthree years of active duty.
He sought and received delays in his active duty obligation while he attended medical school and
thereafter. When the Army ordered him to active duty in 1993, he challenged that order with a
petition for habeas corpus, which was ultimately denied. See Tartt v. Secretary of the Army,
No. 93 C 4550,1994WL75121, *1 (N.D. I1l. Mar. 9,1994).

Claims, and Tartt's demands vastly exceeded that amount. (Id. atS.)
Final judgment was entered in favor of the Government on June

3,2013. Tartt then filed

an Objection and questioned Magistrate Judge Cole's jurisdiction since the parties had not

consented. On June 6,20l3,Magistrate Judge Cole agreed, vacated the judgment, and altered the
Memorandum Opinion and Order to be a Report and Recommendation instead.
The matter was subsequently assigned to this Court for ruling on the Report, and an initial
status was set for September 10,

2013. A decision

on the merits was delayed after Tartt frled

several motions seeking to add non-parties as plaintiffs and to assert counterclaims against them,

including a request to add BMO Harris Bank as a plaintiff so that he could file an injunction
against them regarding an unrelated

foreclosure. The Court denied Tartt's motions and

subsequently ordered that Tarlt seek permission from the Court before filing future motions.2
Tartt was granted leave to file a Supplemental Response in support of his Objection, which he filed
on January

6,2014. The Government declined to file a reply.
LEGAL STANDARD

Under Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, aparty that disagrees with a
magistrate judge's report and recommendations on a dispositive motion must file "specific, written

objections" to the report. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); see also Johnsonv. Zema

Sys.

Corp.,170 F.3d

734,739 (7thCir. 1999). The district court then reviews de novo only those portions of the report
to which the specific written objection is made.
o'specific"

'

as used

Id.

The Seventh Circuit has interpreted

in Rule 72(b) to require aparty "only to specify each issue for which review is

Aft"t his motions to add plaintiffs

and assert counterclaims against them were denied, Tartt filed
lawsuit naming approximately fifty defendants, including Judges Charles Norgle,
Richard Posner and Kenneth Ripple, as well as various federal and state gor.*-.rt ugencies,
doctors, medical associations and BMO Harris Bank. See Tartt v. Magia Health,Syr., No.
a new

13-cv-8191

.

n

sought." Johnson,lT0 F.3d at74l. Where no objection or only a partial objection is made, the
district court "reviews those unobjected portions for clear error." Id. at739 (intemal citations

omitted). The district court may

accept, reject or

recommendations of the magistrate

judge.

Summary judgment is proper

if

modiff, in whole or in part, the findings or

Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3).

the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on

file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law.

as

to any material fact and that the

Fed. R. Civ. P.

56. The moving party bears

the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying the
evidence it believes demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material

fact.

Celotex Corp.

v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 ,323-24 (1986). If the moving party meets this burden, the nonmoving

party cannot rest on conclusory pleadings but, rather, o'must present sufficient evidence to show
the existence of each element of its case on which it will bear the burden

attrial." Serfecz

v.

Jewel Food Stores, 67 F.3d 591,596 (7thCir.1995) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp.,475 U.S. 574, 585-86

(1936). In considering a motion for summary

judgment, the court views the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, drawing
all reasonable inferences in the nonmoving party's favor. Abdullahi v. City of Madison,423 F.3d

763,773 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing Anderson,477 U.S. at255).

ANALYSIS
In both his fourteen-page Objection and his six-page Supplemental Response, Tartt makes
very few objections to the Report's finding that he defaulted on the two student loans at issue.3
3

Tartt has arguably violated Rule 72(b) by failing to specify the issues for which he seeks review.

SeeJohnson,l70F.3dat74l. However,givenTafit'sprosestatus,theCourthasgivenavery
liberal reading to his Objection and Supplemental Response as an objection to Magistrate Judge
Cole's entire Report.
4

He states that he "agrees that there is indebtedness but does not agree to owing $775,000 or more"
and that he "never stated the loans were secured at Fort Knox (Radcliff[,]

KY) but after. The

Plaintiff stated the loans were secured in 1995[,] at which time Defendant was stationed at Fort

Knox." (Obj. at2.)a

The rest of his Objection focuses on the dismissal of his counterclaim and

the related failure of his previous lawsuit. Likewise, in his Supplemental Response, Tartt largely
focuses on the alleged misconduct of Judge Norgle in dismissing his previous lawsuit and also
argues that an adverse ruling in the present action would negatively impact Tartt's newly

filed

lawsuit, Tartt v. Magna Health Systems,No. 13-cv-8191, in which he has sued Judge Norgle and
approximately fifty other defendants. (See supra, footnote 2.)
The Court has reviewed the evidence in the record and finds that summary judgment in the

Govemment's favor is warranted. Specifically, the Govemment submitted two promissory notes
in favor of the United States Department of Education: the first executed by Tartt on
July 23, 1997, inthe original amount of $325,125.56 (Count I), and the second executed by Tartt
on

April 30,1999, in the original amount of $45,863.61 (Count

of Material Facts,

tTfl

6-11, Exhs.

A-D.)

II).

(Gov't's Rule 56.1 Statement

The Govemment also submitted corresponding

certificates of indebtedness for the two loans. This was suffrcient to establish the Government,s

primafacie

case

of default. See, e.g., tlS. v. PetroYy1ine,557 F.3d 285, 290 (6thCir. 2009).

As Magistrate Judge Cole correctly noted, Tartt did not submit any evidence that would dispute
a

As Magistrate Judge Cole noted, the Government conceded that it made an error in its Rule 56.1
Statement because it mistakenly referred to the note in Count II as executed in 1995 instead of
1999. The corresponding Certificate of Indebtedness, however, correctly states that the note was
executed in 1999. In his Rule 56 Response, Tartt caught the Government's error and stated that
he signed the promissory note in1999,not 1995. Tartt further stated that he was on active duty in
1995 in Radcliff KY, an argument that he repeated in his Objection. However, since Tartt
admiued that he did sign the promissory note in l999,his whereabouts in 1995 do not change his
liability on the 1999 note.
5

that he is in default of the two student loans at issue.

Likewise, dismissal of Tartt's counterclaim is warranted. Even if Tartt could state a claim
against the United States, this Court would not have subject-matter jurisdiction over

it because

Tartt seeks damages in excess of $10,000. See 28 U.S.C. $ 13a6(a)(2) (district courts have
original jurisdiction, concurrent with the United States Court of Federal Claims over civil actions
against the United States

oonot

exceeding $10,000 in amount"); see also On-Site Screening, Inc. v.

U.5.,687 F.3d 896, 900 (7th Cir.2012). Therefore, Tartt's counterclaim is dismissed for lack
subj ect-matter

of

jurisdiction.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court adopts the Report and Recommendation
Magistrate Judge Jeffrey

Cole. Summary judgment

of America and against Defendant Derrick B.
subject-matter

of

is granted in favor of PlaintiffUnited States

Tartt. Tartt's

counterclaim is dismissed for lack

jurisdiction. Plaintiff shall provide a final calculation of the amount

due on the

two loans so that final judgment may be entered.

Date: April16.2014
States

District Court Judge

of