Steinhauer v. Elsner et al
Filing
46
MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Edmond E. Chang on 11/5/2012:Mailed notice(slb, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
DAVID C. STEINHAUER,
Plaintiff,
v.
JOHN T. ELSNER, Chief Judge,
LINDA E. DAVENPORT, Associate
Judge Circuit Court of the Eighteenth
Judicial Circuit, SCOTT WALTHIUS,
Attorney at Law, and CYNTHIA L.
STEINHAUER,
Defendants.
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No. 12 C 01481
Judge Edmond E. Chang
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff David Steinhauer, representing himself pro se, brought this lawsuit
against his ex-wife Cynthia Steinhauer (to avoid confusion, she will be referred to by
her first name), her lawyer Scott Walthius, Judge Linda Davenport, and Chief Judge
John Elsner, alleging fraud, conspiracy to commit fraud, and malicious prosecution.1
Specifically, Steinhauer alleges that Cynthia Steinhauer and Scott Walthius conspired
with Judge Davenport during his divorce proceeding to obtain certain rulings on
marital property. Steinhauer also alleges that the Defendants violated his right to due
process under 18 U.S.C. § 241. Finally, Steinhauer claims that Judge Davenport
maliciously prosecuted him during the divorce proceedings. Scott Walthius and Judge
Davenport now move to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil
1
Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed Chief Judge Elsner on June 4, 2012, R. 22, 23. Thus,
only Walthius, Davenport, and Cynthia Steinhauer remain as defendants.
Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). R. 12, 25. Walthius moves for sanctions against
Plaintiff under Rule 11. R. 33. For the reasons stated below, the Defendants’ motions
to dismiss are granted in their entirety, but Walthius’s motion for Rule 11 sanctions
is denied.
I.
In evaluating a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept as true the complaint’s
factual allegations and draw reasonable inferences in Steinhauer’s favor. Ashcroft v.
al-Kidd, — U.S. —, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 2079 (2011). Plaintiff David Steinhauer was
married to Defendant Cynthia Steinhauer for around 20 years before the couple filed
for divorce in 2007. R. 1, Compl. Arg. and Exh. at 1. On May 2, 2007, David and
Cynthia Steinhauer appeared before Judge Davenport in DuPage County Circuit Court
for their divorce proceeding. Compl. ¶ 1. During the proceeding, Cynthia testified that
only two mortgages existed on certain real property owned by her. Compl. Arg. and
Exh. at 1. Steinhauer claims that in reality, he was named on three other mortgages
that were purposefully not disclosed in court. Id. at 3-4. Steinhauer alleges that
Cynthia and her attorney, Scott Walthius, knew that other mortgages existed on the
property but failed to identify the other mortgages in an effort to defraud Steinhauer
of his rightful portion of the marital property. Id. at 2.
Steinhauer also accuses Judge Davenport of conspiring with Walthius and
Cynthia Steinhauer to defraud him of his property. According to the Complaint, Judge
Davenport’s role in the conspiracy is “a matter of circumstantial evidence.” Id. at 4.
Steinhauer alleges that Judge Davenport’s rulings during the divorce proceeding—such
2
as improperly characterizing Steinhauer’s improvements to the marital property as
“repairs,” and excluding Steinhauer’s evidence of his role in the management and
upkeep of the property—contributed to the conspiracy to defraud and deprived him of
his property interest under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 6, 14.
Finally, Stienhauer claims that Judge Davenport “assume[d] the role of auditor and
prosecutor” and maliciously prosecuted Steinhauer when she falsely charged him with
“dissipation of marital funds” where no charges were in order. Id. at 10-11.
II.
The dismissal motions challenge the complaint on both subject matter
jurisdiction grounds and for failing to state a claim. With regard to subject matter
jurisdiction, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) provides the procedural vehicle
by which the defendant may move a federal court to dismiss a claim or suit on the
ground that the court lacks jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1); Apex Digital, Inc.
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 572 F.3d 440, 444 (7th Cir. 2009).
With regard to failure to state a claim, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
8(a)(2), a complaint generally need only include “a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This short
and plain statement must “give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quotation
and citation omitted). The Seventh Circuit has explained that this rule “reflects a
liberal notice pleading regime, which is intended to ‘focus litigation on the merits of a
claim’ rather than on technicalities that might keep plaintiffs out of court.” Brooks v.
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Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 580 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S.
506, 514 (2002)).
“A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the complaint to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted.” Hallinan v. Fraternal Order of Police
Chicago Lodge No. 7, 570 F.3d 811, 820 (7th Cir. 2009). “[W]hen a ruling on a
defendant’s motion to dismiss, a judge must accept as true all of the factual allegations
contained in the complaint.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56); McGowan v. Hulick, 612 F.3d 636, 638 (7th Cir. 2010)
(courts accept factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in
plaintiff’s favor). “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). These allegations “must be enough
to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The
allegations that are entitled to the assumption of truth are those that are factual,
rather than mere legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79.
III.
Walthius advances two theories under which Steinhauer’s complaint must be
dismissed. First, he argues that Steinhauer’s complaint should be dismissed for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction. Second, he argues that dismissal is warranted because
Steinhauer has failed to state a claim on which relief can be granted. As explained
below, each of these theories offers an independent grounds for dismissal.
A.
4
Walthius argues that Steinhauer’s complaint should be dismissed because the
court lacks subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)
to adjudicate his claims. R. 12, Def.’s Mot. Dismiss ¶¶ 1, 7. Specifically, Walthius
contends that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits lower federal courts from
reviewing state court decisions, and thus the Court must dismiss Steinhauer’s
complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, lower federal courts do not have subject
matter jurisdiction over claims seeking review of state court judgments. See Rooker v.
Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals
v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482-86 (1983). The doctrine applies not only to claims that
were actually raised before the state court, but also to claims that are inextricably
intertwined with state court determinations. See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482 n.16 (“By
failing to raise his claims in state court a plaintiff may forfeit his right to obtain review
of the state-court decision in any federal court.”). Rooker-Feldman thus requires a
party seeking review of a state court judgment or presenting a claim that a state
judicial proceeding has violated their constitutional rights to pursue relief through the
state court system and ultimately the Supreme Court.2 See Centres, Inc. v. Town of
Brookfield, 148 F.3d. 699, 701-02 (7th Cir. 1998). The doctrine stems, in part, from
recognition of the fact that “a decision by a state court, however erroneous, is not itself
2
It appears that Steinhauer did first pursue relief through the Illinois state courts
before filing the current complaint in federal court; eventually, the Illinois Supreme Court
denied his petition for leave to appeal. See Steinhauer v. Steinhauer, 938 N.E.2d 531 (Ill. 2010)
(No. 110553).
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a violation of the Constitution actionable in federal court.” Homola v. McNamara, 59
F.3d 647, 650 (7th Cir. 1995). “At its core, the doctrine is a recognition of the principle
that the inferior federal courts generally do not have the power to exercise appellate
review over state court decisions.” Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston Corp., 92 F.3d 506,
509 (7th Cir. 1996).
Because the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is jurisdictional in nature, its applicability
must be determined before considering the defendants’ other affirmative defenses. See
Garry v. Geils, 82 F.3d 1362, 1365 (7th Cir. 1996). In determining whether the RookerFeldman doctrine applies in a particular case, “the fundamental and appropriate
question to ask is whether the injury alleged by the federal plaintiff resulted from the
state court judgment itself or is distinct from that judgment.” Id. “If the injury alleged
resulted from the state court judgment itself, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine dictates
that the federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction, even if the state court judgment
was erroneous or unconstitutional.” Centres, 148 F.3d at 702 (footnote omitted). On the
other hand, “if the alleged injury is distinct from the state court judgment and not
inextricably intertwined with it, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply, although
the doctrines of claim and issue preclusion may be applicable.” Id. The pivotal inquiry
is “whether the federal plaintiff seeks to set aside a state court judgment or whether
he is, in fact, presenting an independent claim.” Kamilewicz, 92 F.3d at 510; see also
GASH Assocs. v. Village of Rosemont, 995 F.2d 726, 728 (7th Cir. 1993).
Here, Steinhauer contends that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply
because he is bringing an independent action against Defendants for their allegedly
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illegal activities in the state court proceedings. R. 28, Pl.’s Rebuttal at 6. This
argument is meritless. That Steinhauer seeks to have this Court review the state court
ruling in his divorce proceedings in violation of Rooker-Feldman is apparent from his
complaint, where he asks the Court to vacate Judge Davenport’s judgment and, on top
of that, remand the state case to a new state judge in a different jurisdiction. Compl.
at 3. It is true that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is narrow, and that it applies only to
“cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court
judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting
district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Crawford v. Countrywide Home
Loans, 647 F.3d 642, 645-46 (7th Cir. 2011) (quotation and citations omitted)
(challenge to mortgage foreclosure judgment was precluded by Rooker-Feldman
doctrine). But Steinhauer is not seeking vindication of some independent claim or right
separate and apart from the divorce proceedings. Rather, he is requesting that the
Court throw out the state court’s ruling entirely and grant him a new trial. The RookerFeldman doctrine forbids this Court from doing so.
The analysis of very similar facts in Davit v. Davit, 366 F.Supp.2d 641 (N.D. Ill.
2004), is helpful in drawing the distinction between injuries resulting from state court
judgments and independent claims that fall outside the ambit of the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine. In Davit, the plaintiff brought suit under the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq., alleging that his ex-wife,
her attorney, and state judges involved in his divorce proceedings had conspired to
achieve illegal rights to the marital residence, child support, and maintenance. The
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court dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding
that the RICO claims were barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Id. at 651. The
plaintiff argued that Rooker-Feldman did not apply because he was not challenging the
state court judgments; rather, the state court orders were evidence of the RICO
violations. Id. at 652. The court rejected this argument, pointing out that “[i]f the state
proceedings had gone in [plaintiff’s] favor many—if not effectively all—of the injuries
that he alleges that he suffered in this suit would not have occurred.” Id. In other
words, because the plaintiff would not be claiming injuries in federal court but for the
fact that he lost in state court, the plaintiff’s federal claims arise directly from the state
court judgment for purposes of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
Davit’s reasoning is applicable to Steinhauer’s federal court claims. Like Mr.
Davit, Steinhauer would have no claim of conspiracy but for the fact that he lost in the
underlying divorce proceedings. If the outcome of the state court proceedings had been
favorable to Steinhauer, he would not have suffered an injury. This conclusion, as
observed in Davit, is especially appropriate in light of the Seventh Circuit’s teaching
that “[t]he focus upon injury at the hands of a state court is particularly apparent in
cases where the federal plaintiff is actually suing the state court or state court judges.”
Garry, 82 F.3d at 1367-68 n.10. Accordingly, this Court concludes that it lacks subject
matter jurisdiction over Steinhauer’s claims under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and
Steinhauer’s complaint must be dismissed in its entirety.
B.
8
Walthius argues that in the alternative, Steinhauer’s complaint should be
dismissed for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
The Court agrees. Even if the Court were to broadly consider the allegations in
Steinhauer’s “motion for relief from judgment” [R. 5] in conjunction with his complaint,
Steinhauer has not alleged enough facts to state a claim on which relief can be granted.
First, Steinhauer claims that Judge Davenport, Cynthia Steinhauer, and Scott
Walthius acted under color of law to violate his civil rights under 18 U.S.C. § 241. See
Compl. Arg. and Exh. at 8. This claim must be dismissed because 18 U.S.C. § 241 is a
federal criminal statute defining civil rights violations that confers no private right of
action. See Pawelek v. Paramount Studios Corp., 571 F.Supp. 1082, 1083 (N.D. Ill.
1983). However, because Steinhauer is a pro se plaintiff, this Court is obligated to
consider whether there are other viable claims that are alleged in the complaint.3 Id.
at 1083. Thus, to the extent that Steinhauer intended to bring a claim under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, the Court will analyze his claim under the § 1983 framework.
But even if we construe Steinhauer’s complaint as bringing a § 1983 claim, he
still fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted. To state a cause of action
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) some person has deprived him
of a federal right; and (2) the person who deprived him of the right acted under color
of state law. Alvarado v. Litscher, 267 F.3d 648, 651 (7th Cir. 2001). Here, Steinhauer
3
Indeed, district courts have a special responsibility to construe complaints liberally and
to allow ample opportunity for amending a complaint when it appears that by doing so pro se
litigants will be able to state a meritorious claim. See Donald v. Cook County Sheriff’s Dept.,
95 F.3d 548, 555 (7th Cir. 1996).
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claims that Walthius and Cynthia Steinhauer conspired with Judge Davenport to
deprive him of his civil rights under color of state law. The Supreme Court has held
that private parties who conspire with a judge to violate a plaintiff’s federal rights are
acting under color of state law for purposes of § 1983. Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24,
29 (1980). But to establish § 1983 liability through a conspiracy theory, Steinhauer
must plead that (1) a state official and private individuals reached an understanding
to deprive him of his constitutional rights; and (2) those individuals were willful
participants in joint activity with the state or its agents. Fries v. Helsper, 146 F.3d 452,
457 (7th Cir. 1998).
Here, Steinhauer has alleged insufficient facts to show that Walthius and
Cynthia Steinhauer acted under color of state law. Steinhauer’s complaint and “motion
for relief from judgment” do not specifically allege that Walthius and Cynthia
Steinhauer had an understanding with Judge Davenport to deprive him of his
constitutional rights. Instead, the complaint merely states that Judge Davenport’s role
in the conspiracy was “a matter of circumstantial evidence.” Compl. Arg. and Exh. at
4. Moreover, in his motion for relief from judgment, Steinhauer asserts that because
none of the facts presented in the divorce proceedings supported Judge Davenport’s
final decision, the only plausible explanation is that Judge Davenport was abetting
Walthius and Cynthia Steinhauer’s conspiracy. R. 5, Pl.’s Mot. Relief J. at 10. The
conspiracy theory is not a plausible inference from a disagreement over the merits of
the divorce proceedings. Because both the complaint and the “motion for relief from
judgment” are bereft of any factual allegations that Walthius and Cynthia Steinhauer
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had some sort of agreement with Judge Davenport to deprive Steinhauer of his
constitutional rights, Walthius and Cynthia Steinhauer could not have been acting
under color of state law. As the Supreme Court has pointed out, “merely resorting to
the courts and being on the winning side of a lawsuit does not make a [private] party
a co-conspirator or a joint actor with the judge.” Dennis, 449 U.S. at 28. Accordingly,
Steinhauer’s § 1983 claim is dismissed.
Second, Steinhauer claims that he was defrauded of his rightful interest in the
marital property by Walthius and Cynthia Steinhauer. Compl. Arg. and Exh. at 2. To
the extent that Steinhauer’s complaint alleges common law fraud against Walthius,
dismissal is also warranted. To make out a claim of fraud under Illinois law,
Steinhauer must plead that (1) there was a false statement of material fact; (2) the
statement was intentionally made; (3) the party to whom the statement was made had
a right to rely on it, and in fact did; (4) the statement was made for the purpose of
inducing the other party to act; and (5) the party reasonably relied on the statement
to its detriment. Connor v. Merrill Lynch Realty, 581 N.E.2d 196, 200 (Ill. App. Ct.
1991). Here, even if we assume that Cynthia made a false statement of material fact
during the divorce proceeding (namely, by testifying that there were only two
mortgages on the marital property), Steinhauer’s fraud claim still fails because the
party to whom the statement was made was the state court itself, not Steinhauer.
Under the fifth element, the court relied on Cynthia Steinhauer’s statements in
making its decision, but not to the court’s own detriment. Rather, Steinhauer’s fraud
claim is predicated on the notion that Cynthia’s false statements caused the state court
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to render the decision it did—to Steinhauer’s detriment. Thus, because the harmed
party of Defendants’ alleged fraud is not the same party who relied on the fraudulent
statements, Steinhauer’s claim for fraud must be dismissed.
Third, although it is unclear whether Steinhauer intended this, the Court also
construes the complaint liberally to allege a common law claim for conspiracy to
commit fraud. Compl. Arg. and Exh. at 2-4. Because Steinhauer has failed to state a
claim for the underlying fraud, however, his claim for conspiracy must also fail. See
Indeck N. Am. Power Fund v. Northweb, PLC, 735 N.E.2d 649, 662 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000)
(when a plaintiff fails to state an independent cause of action underlying its conspiracy
allegations, the claim for conspiracy also fails.). Accordingly, Steinhauer’s substantive
claims against Walthius are dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief can
be granted.4
IV.
Defendant Cynthia Steinhauer has not brought any motions to dismiss. But
because this Court is obligated to raise on its own motion issues of subject matter
jurisdiction, see Wernsing v. Thompson, 423 F.3d 732, 743 (7th Cir. 2005), Steinhauer’s
claims against his ex-wife—for the reasons discussed above—are also barred under the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
Moreover, to the extent that any claims against Cynthia Steinhauer survive
4
In Walthius’s motion to dismiss, he also argued that claim preclusion is a basis for
dismissal. However, because the Court has already agreed with two other independent grounds
for dismissal, there is no need to address claim preclusion.
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Rooker-Feldman, they are dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
See Ledford v. Sullivan, 105 F.3d 354, 356 (7th Cir. 1997) (“Sua sponte 12(b)(6)
dismissals are permitted, provided that a sufficient basis for the court’s action is
evident from the plaintiff’s pleading.”) (internal citations omitted). This is because any
legal arguments Cynthia Steinhauer could raise in favor of dismissal would be the
same as those already made by her attorney, Scott Walthius. Because this Court has
determined that dismissal of all claims against Walthius is warranted under 12(b)(6),
the Court also dismisses all claims brought against Cynthia Steinhauer.
V.
Judge Davenport’s motion to dismiss adopts and incorporates the arguments
raised in Walthius’s motion to dismiss—namely, that the complaint against her should
be dismissed under Rooker-Feldman and 12(b)(6). R. 25, Def’s Mot. Dismiss ¶ 3. Thus,
for all the reasons already discussed, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and Rule 12(b)(6)
provide sufficient grounds for dismissing the claims against Judge Davenport. But
even if Rooker-Feldman did not apply, the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity
provides an independent basis for dismissing Steinhauer’s claims against Davenport.
The doctrine of absolute judicial immunity shields judges from civil liability for
their judicial acts unless they have acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. Stump
v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978) (internal quotations omitted). The doctrine
stems from “a long-settled understanding that the independent and impartial exercise
of judgment vital to the judiciary might be impaired by exposure to potential damages
liability.’” Snyder v. Nolen, 380 F.3d 279, 286 (7th Cir. 2004) (quoting Antoine v. Byers
13
& Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 435-36 (1993)). Thus, a judge will not be deprived of
immunity because the action she took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in
excess of her authority. Stump, 435 U.S. at 356-57. This is true even if the judge’s
exercise of authority is flawed by the commission of grave procedural errors. Id. at 359.
Two limits exist on the rule of absolute judicial immunity: first, judges are not
immune from suits that challenge an action that is not judicial in nature; and second,
a judge is not immune for actions, though judicial in nature, are taken in the complete
absence of all jurisdiction. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991). With respect to
the second exception, the relevant inquiry is whether the judge in question acted in the
complete absence of subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute. See Homola v.
McNamara, 59 F.3d 647, 651 (7th Cir. 1995) (internal citations omitted).
Neither of the limits is applicable here. First, Steinhauer’s claims arise from
Judge Davenport’s actions during the divorce proceedings and were unquestionably
judicial in nature. Second, Judge Davenport is a judge in the Circuit Court of DuPage
County, Illinois, which has original subject matter jurisdiction over all justiciable
matters, including divorce proceedings, subject to limited exceptions that are not
applicable here. See generally Employers Mut. Cos. v. Skilling, 644 N.E.2d. 1163, 1165
(Ill. 1994) (internal citations omitted); see also Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689,
704 (1992) (noting that “state courts are more eminently suited to work [related to
domestic relations] than are federal courts, which lack close association with state and
local government organizations dedicated to handling issues that arise out of conflicts
over divorce, alimony, and child custody degrees”). Because the court over which Judge
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Davenport presides is one of general jurisdiction, she properly exercised subject matter
jurisdiction over the Steinhauers’ divorce proceeding, and any procedural errors she
may have committed do not render her personally liable for her judicial actions. See
Stump, 435 U.S. at 359-60. Accordingly, Judge Davenport is shielded from liability by
absolute judicial immunity, and all claims brought against her are dismissed.
VI.
Finally, Walthius brings a motion to impose Rule 11 sanctions on Steinhauer.
R. 33, Def.’s Mot. Sanctions. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 requires anyone
presenting a pleading, written motion, or other paper to the court to certify that the
documents (1) are not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass,
cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation; (2) the claims,
defenses, and other legal arguments are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous
argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new
law; (3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support; and (4) denials of factual
contentions are warranted on the evidence. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b). If, after notice and an
opportunity to respond, a court determines that Rule 11(b) has been violated, the court
may impose appropriate sanctions on any attorney, law firm, or party that violates the
rule. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c). Walthius contends that sanctions are appropriate here
because Steinhauer’s complaint is frivolous and Steinhauer brought this suit with the
intent to harass those involved in the divorce proceedings. Def.’s Mot. Sanctions at 7.
For purposes of Rule 11, a complaint is “‘frivolous’ where a party or his attorney
fails to make a reasonable inquiry into the facts or the law.” Kelly v. Mercoid Corp., 776
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F.Supp. 1246, 1258 (N.D. Ill. 1991). In light of Steinhauer’s status as a pro se litigant,
we find that not to be the case here. As a lay person who is not trained in the law,
Steinhauer cannot be held to the same expectations as a lawyer for making reasonable
inquiries into his legal claims. It is clear from Steinhauer’s briefs that he has spent a
significant amount of time researching his legal arguments. Indeed, Steinhauer claims
to have spent the last five years litigating his case by himself, and has had to drive 30
miles to the nearest district court law library to conduct legal research. R. 38, Pl.’s
Resp. Br. at 12-13. That his efforts have yielded faulty results is no reason to find his
inquiries unreasonable. See, e.g., Leistikow v. Mangerson, 172 F.R.D. 403, 407 (E.D.
Wis. 1997) (fact that plaintiff’s complaint did not state a claim for relief did not
automatically mean that his claims also failed to pass Rule 11 scrutiny, especially in
light of plaintiff’s pro se status).
This is all the more true in light of the discretion a court must exercise when
imposing sanctions on pro se litigants. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 Advisory Committee Notes
(1983 Amendments) (“Although the standard [for imposing Rule 11 sanctions] is the
same for unrepresented parties, who are obliged themselves to sign the pleadings, the
court has sufficient discretion to take account of the special circumstances that often
arise in pro se situations.”). The Seventh Circuit has adhered to the principle that pro
se parties should be sanctioned under Rule 11 only after successive attempts to press
a wholly frivolous claim. See Ricketts v. Midwest Nat’l Bank, 874 F.2d 1177, 1182 n.4
(7th Cir. 1989) (“[T]he district court is authorized to impose sanctions against a pro se
plaintiff who successively seeks to press a wholly frivolous claim.”) (emphasis added);
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Hilgeford v. Peoples Bank, 776 F.2d 176, 179 (7th Cir. 1985) (sanctions imposed for
filing identical complaint to that previously dismissed for lack of jurisdiction). Here,
there is no evidence that Steinhauer has made successive attempts to press his claims
in federal court, even if his claims are frivolous. Accordingly, the Court holds that Rule
11 sanctions are unwarranted.
VII.
For the reasons stated above, Steinhauer’s complaint—including those claims
brought against Cynthia Steinhauer—is dismissed with prejudice in its entirety.
Defendant Walthius’s motion for Rule 11 sanctions [R. 33] is denied.
ENTERED:
___________________________
Honorable Edmond E. Chang
United States District Judge
DATE: November 5, 2012
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