W.C. Motor Company, Inc. v. Talley

Filing 31

WRITTEN Opinion entered by the Honorable John A. Nordberg on 3/14/2013: Petitioner's Motion to Stay 27 is granted. Respondent's motion for sanctions 14 and her motion to strike and dismiss 15 are denied. [For further details see opinion.] Mailed notice. (np, )

Order Form (01/2005)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois
Name of Assigned Judge
or Magistrate Judge

John A. Nordberg

CASE NUMBER

12 C 2307

CASE
TITLE

Sitting Judge if Other
than Assigned Judge

DATE

3/14/2013

W.C. Motor Co., Inc. vs. Rebecca Talley

DOCKET ENTRY TEXT

Petitioner’s Motion to Stay [Dkt. # 27] is granted. Respondent’s motion for sanctions [Dkt. # 14] and her
motion to strike and dismiss [Dkt. 15] are denied.

O[ For further details see text below.]

Docketing to mail notices.

STATEMENT
Before the Court is a motion to stay filed by petitioner West County Motor Company, Inc. (“WCM”).
WCM asks that we stay this case until the Supreme Court issues a ruling in Oxford Health Plans LLC v.
Sutter, No. 12-135, a case addressing the same general issue in this case – namely, when are class action
claims arbitrable. The Supreme Court is set to hear oral argument on March 25th and, if past practices hold
true to form, will likely issue a ruling a few months later before the current term ends. Respondent Rebecca
Talley opposes the motion, arguing that the Court’s ruling will not affect the issues raised in her three fullybriefed motions. See Dkt. # 14 (Respondent’s Motion To Sanction Brian E. McGovern); # 15 (Respondent’s
Motion to Strike and Dismiss); # 23 (Respondent’s Alternative Motion To Dismiss). For example, she
asserts that the ruling will not affect her argument that this Court lacks jurisdiction.
This Court has inherent power to stay a case as part of its general power to control its docket while
keeping in mind the “economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants.” Landis v. N. Am.
Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936); Itex, Inc. v. Mount Vernon Mills, Inc., 2010 WL 3655990, *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept.
9, 2010). In considering stay motions, courts typically look at three factors: “(1) whether a stay will unduly
prejudice or tactically disadvantage the non-moving party, (2) whether a stay will simplify the issues in
question and streamline the trial, and (3) whether a stay will reduce the burden of litigation on the parties and
on the court.” Tap Pharmaceutical Products, Inc. v. Atrix Labs., Inc., 2004 WL 422697, * 1 (N.D. Ill. March
3, 2004).
In considering and balancing these factors, we find that a stay is justified. The central issue since the
beginning of this arbitration has been whether respondent’s class claims were arbitrable. Resolution of this
issue could dramatically alter the scope of the arbitration from a single claimant, Ms. Talley, to one involving
a class of 700 or more WCM customers. It is fair to say that a single-person arbitration would greatly
simplify the issues and reduce the burden on the parties, the arbitrator, and this Court. It is possible, as Talley
points out, that some of her arguments for dismissal, such as her argument that we must defer to the earlier
ruling of the Missouri court, may not be changed by the Court’s anticipated ruling in Oxford Health. See Dkt.
12C2307 W.C. Motor Co., Inc. vs. Rebecca Talley

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STATEMENT
# 23 at 1. But this depends on how the Court rules. It is possible that the Court, in addition to clarifying what
evidence is needed to show an intent to arbitrate class claims, will also provide guidance on questions about
when during the arbitral process a party may go to court to challenge the class certification rulings. We note
that in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S.Ct. 1758 (2010), both the majority and dissenting
opinions raised questions about this very issue, and there was no clear answer on whether a party must wait
until the end of the arbitration to challenge in court the class determination ruling. See id. at 1767 n.2 and at
1777-78. The delay should be relatively minimal because, if the Court follows past practice, it will issue a
ruling by the end of June. For all these reasons, the motion for a stay is granted.
Although we find it advisable to wait for the Oxford Health ruling before addressing the pending motion
to dismiss (Dkt. # 23), we can simplify matters in advance by addressing respondent’s other two motions.
They are both motions for sanctions. First, Respondent filed a motion to strike and dismiss the complaint
(Dkt. # 15) because WCM had failed to designate local counsel as required by Local Rule 83.15. Shortly
after the motion was filed, WCM did designate local counsel and then argued that there was no prejudice. We
agree. This relatively minor failure is not a sufficient basis to dismiss the complaint. Second, Respondent
filed a motion for sanctions, pursuant to Rule 11, against opposing counsel for filing this case. (Dkt. # 14.)
The parties briefed this motion, which raises many of the same arguments on the merits that are also raised in
respondent’s later-filed alternative motion to dismiss. We have reviewed the briefs and are not persuaded at
this point that sanctions are justified because WCM has cited to case law and has made good faith arguments
in support of its positions. The litigation over sanctions would, in this Court’s view, be counter-productive
and distract the Court from focusing on the merits of the case. For these reasons, the motion for sanctions is
denied. However, to the extent that the parties have raised arguments in those motions that relate to the merits
of the still-pending alternative motion to dismiss, the Court will still review and consider those arguments
when it issues its ruling on that motion. The parties should notify the Court when the Supreme Court has
issued its ruling in Oxford Health and should indicate at that time whether they believe supplemental briefing
would be warranted.

12C2307 W.C. Motor Co., Inc. vs. Rebecca Talley

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