Fayfar et al v. CF Management-IL, LLC

Filing 33

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER signed by the Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly on 11/4/2012: For the reasons stated in this Memorandum Opinion and Order, the Court grants defendants motion to dismiss Counts 3 and 10 for failure to state a claim [dkt. no. 19]. (mk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

ANTOINETTE FAYFAR, JAMIE
TESTA, KELLY McCARTY,
and LAUREN NALLY,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
CF MANAGEMENT-IL, LLC,
d/b/a XSPORT FITNESS,
Defendant.

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Case No. 12 C 3013

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
MATTHEW F. KENNELLY, District Judge:
Plaintiffs Antoinette Fayfar, Jamie Testa, Kelly McCarty, and Lauren Nally are
trainers and massage therapists who worked for CF Management-IL, LLC (CF), which
operated a fitness club under the name XSport Fitness. They have sued CF under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Illinois Gender and Violence Act (IGVA), the Age
Discrimination Act of 1967, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, and the Family Medical
Leave Act. Plaintiffs allege, among other things, that they were subjected to sexual
harassment and a hostile work environment created and encouraged by CF’s general
manager Sheldon Botha, including both verbal and physical harassment.
CF has moved to dismiss counts 3 and 10, plaintiffs’ claims under the IGVA. CF
asks the Court to dismiss these claims on the ground that the IGVA does not create a
cause of action against corporations. For the reasons stated below, the Court grants
CF’s motion.

Discussion
Under Illinois law, when interpreting a statute, a court focuses on the legislature’s
intended meaning. Solon v. Midwest Med. Records Ass'n, Inc., 236 Ill. 2d 433, 440, 925
N.E.2d 1113, 1117 (2010); In re Madison H., 215 Ill. 2d 364, 372, 830 N.E.2d 498, 503
(2005). The best indication of legislative intent is the language of the statute itself. Id.
Words in a statute are given their ordinary and commonly understood meaning unless
the statute defines them in a different way. Bailey v. Ill. Liquor Control Comm’n, 405 Ill.
App. 3d 550, 555, 938 N.E.2d 629, 634 (2010). In addition, terms in a statute are not
read in isolation but rather are considered in context. People v. Beachem, 229 Ill. 2d
237, 243, 890 N.E.2d 515, 519 (2008); People v. Trainor, 196 Ill. 2d 318, 332, 752
N.E.2d 1055, 1063 (2001).
The relevant section of the IGVA reads as follows:
Cause of action. Any person who has been subjected to gender-related
violence as defined in Section 5 may bring a civil action for damages,
injunctive relief, or other appropriate relief against a person or persons
perpetrating that gender-related violence. For purposes of this Section,
“perpetrating” means either personally committing the gender-related
violence or personally encouraging or assisting the act or acts of genderrelated violence.
740 ILCS 82/10.
Plaintiffs ask the Court to read the word the statute’s reference to “persons” that
may be sued to include a corporate entity like CF that employs an alleged perpetrator of
gender-related violence. CF argues that the word “person,” on its face, is limited to
individuals.
Illinois courts read the term “person” in a statute to refer to an individual, not a
legal entity, absent a statutory definition that expands the meaning of “person” to

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include entities. In People v. Christopherson, 231 Ill. 2d 449, 899 N.E.2d 257 (2008),
the Illinois Supreme Court considered a statute that prohibited any “person” from seller
or giving alcoholic beverages to a minor. The court agreed with a lower court’s
conclusion that “the plain and ordinary meaning of the term ‘person’ is ‘an individual
human being.’” Id. at 455, 899 N.E.2d at 260 (quoting People v. Christopherson, 377 Ill.
App. 3d 752, 754, 879 N.E.2d 1035, 1037 (2007)).
It appears that when the Illinois legislature intends the statutory term “person” to
include legal entities other than individuals, it defines the term in that way. For example,
in the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act (ICFA), which imposes various prohibitions on
“person[s],” and permits lawsuits against any “person” who violates the Act, the
legislature provided that “[t]he term “person” includes any natural person or his legal
representative, partnership, corporation (domestic and foreign), company, trust,
business entity or association, and any agent, employee, salesman, partner, officer,
director, member, stockholder, associate, trustee or cestui que trust thereof.” 815 ILCS
505/1(c). This is consistent with the Illinois Supreme Court’s conclusion in
Christopherson that the term “person,” when used in a statute, typically refers to
individuals: when the legislature wishes to employ a broader definition, as it did in the
ICFA, it puts that definition in the statute.
The Court also notes that when read in context, it is apparent on the face of the
IGVA that the legislature intended the term “person” to refer to an individual. As quoted
above, the statute requires the “person . . . perpetrating . . . gender-related violence” to
have “personally commit[ed]” or “personally encourage[ed] or assist[ed]” the gender-

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related violence in order to be liable. One does not typically understand corporations or
other legal entities to “personally” perform actions; rather, they act through their agents.
Given these factors, the Court does not consider the IGVA’s use of the term
“person” to be ambiguous: it refers to individuals, not legal entities. But even if one
might consider the term ambiguous, that does not lead to a different understanding of
the term. Under Illinois law, if statutory language is capable or more than one
reasonable interpretation, it is considered ambiguous, and in that event a court may
consider “extrinsic aids to construction, such as legislative history.” County of DuPage
v. Ill. Labor Relations Bd., 231 Ill. 2d 593, 604, 900 N.E.2d 1095, 1101 (2008).
The legislative history of the IGVA includes a summary stating that the proposed
legislation “[p]rovides that any person who has been subjected to gender-related
violence may bring a civil action for damages, injunctive relief, or other appropriate relief
against the person who committed that act.” IL H.R. B. Stat. 2003-2004 Reg. Sess.
H.B. 536, Illinois House Bill Status, 2003-2004 Reg. Sess. H.B. 536 (emphasis added).
This confirms that the legislature used the term “person” consistently in referring to both
those who may sue under the statute and those who may be sued. An entity cannot be
the object of gender-related violence; only a person can. But this summary of the
statute, like the statute itself, uses the term “person” to describe both those who can sue
and those who can be sued. This parallel usage further indicates that only individuals
can be sued under the statute.
Plaintiffs argue that the intent of the IGVA is to hold accountable perpetrators of
gender-related violence. That is certainly true. But plaintiffs do not point to any

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language in the statute or the legislative history to indicate that the legislature intended
to define those “persons” liable under the statute to include corporate entities..
Plaintiffs also argue that CF may be held vicariously liable for the torts one of its
employees committed against others. They cite Benitez v. Amer. Standard Circuits,
Inc., 678 F. Supp. 2d 745 (N.D. Ill. 2010), for the principle an employer may be held
liable for one employee’s torts against another “that the employer could have prevented
by reasonable care in hiring, supervising, or if necessary firing the tortfeasor.” Id. at
765. Benitez, however, concerned common law tort claims, not statutory causes of
action like the one the legislature created in the IGVA. Plaintiffs offer no authority
indicating that the same principle applies to statutory torts.
Plaintiffs also cite Cruz v. Primary Staffing, Inc., No. 10 C 5653, 2011 WL
1042629 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 22, 2011), in which Judge Joan Lefkow declined to dismiss a
claim against a corporate employer under the IGVA. It does not appear from Judge
Lefkow’s decision, however, that the defendant in Cruz argued that the statutory
language does not permit claims against legal entities, as opposed to individuals. Thus
the decision is not inconsistent with the one this Court reaches in the present case.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the Court grants defendant’s motion to dismiss
Counts 3 and 10 for failure to state a claim [dkt. no. 19].

_______________________________
MATTHEW F. KENNELLY
United States District Judge
Date: November 4, 2012

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