White v. City of Chicago et al
Filing
111
MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Sharon Johnson Coleman on 8/30/2016. Mailed notice(lxs, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
MICHAEL P. WHITE
Plaintiff,
v.
J. FOLEY and T. QUINN, officers of the Chicago
Police Department,
Defendants.
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Case No. 12-cv-3136
Judge Sharon Johnson Coleman
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Michael P. White filed a complaint alleging Defendants James Foley and Timothy
Quinn wrongfully entered his home and wrongfully arrested him without probable cause in violation
of the Fourth Amendment. Defendants now move for summary judgment, arguing they had
probable cause to arrest White or at least arguable probable cause sufficient for qualified immunity.
They also assert White’s claim for wrongful entry is barred by collateral estoppel. The Court grants
in part and denies in part the motion for summary judgment.
Background
The following facts are undisputed except where a dispute is noted.1 On April 3, 2010 Detective
Luis Otero of the Chicago Police Department was assigned to assist in the investigation of an armed
robbery that occurred on April 2, 2010 at La Fiesta Flower Shop. (Dkt. 91 ¶¶ 4, 7.) Adriana Mateo
was the only employee working at the flower shop at the time of the robbery. (Id. ¶ 12.) She gave a
statement to the police which provided that a white male wearing a black White Sox jersey, a black
baseball cap, and blue jeans entered the store, displayed a knife, and told Mateo to open the register.
(Id. ¶¶ 9, 10.) Mateo complied and the offender took approximately $160.00 in cash and left the
Throughout White’s Rule 56 response to Foley and Quinn’s statement of facts, White contends he is “unaware” of
certain facts. However, he fails to cite to any evidence that calls the proffered facts into question. Because merely
asserting ignorance to a fact proffered by the movant is not a proper dispute of a material fact under Rule 56, these facts
are considered undisputed.
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store. (Id. ¶ 10, 12.) Using Mateo’s description and video footage from the security cameras, Otero
searched a law enforcement database for individuals matching the physical description of the robber
and identified White as a suspect. (Id. ¶¶ 15, 16.)
According to the defendants, Otero conducted a photo array with Mateo on April 14, 2010 and
she identified White as the robber. (Id. ¶ 19.) The defendants also assert that after White was
arrested on April 23, Mateo identified White again in an in-person lineup, again conducted by Otero.
(Id. ¶ 26.) White disputes that the photo array occurred before his arrest because Mateo in her
deposition testified that she was only asked to identify White after he was “caught” and that she
participated in the photo array and the in-person lineup during a single visit to the police station.
(Dkt. 98 ¶¶ 36-40.)
On April 23, Foley and Quinn were told by a fellow officer that Mateo had identified White as
the robber and were assigned to go speak to White. (Dkt. 91 ¶ 20.) Prior to going to speak with
White, Foley and Quinn reviewed an incident report containing Mateo’s previous statements to the
police describing the robbery and reviewed White’s photograph and criminal history report. (Id. ¶
21.) Foley and Quinn contend that when they arrived at White’s apartment, his wife invited the
officers inside and led them to the bedroom where White was located. (Id. ¶ 24.) Foley and Quin
observed in plain view clothing matching those of the robber on the day of the robbery and arrested
White and seized his clothing. (Id.)
White disputes that his wife gave the officers consent to enter the apartment. (Id. ¶ 25.) In
White’s criminal case, he filed a motion to suppress, arguing that Foley and Quinn had unlawfully
entered his home and therefore the seized clothing should be suppressed. (Id. ¶ 28.) White’s wife
testified at the hearing that she did not give Foley and Quinn consent to enter the apartment. (Id ¶
29.) Foley testified to the contrary. (Id. ¶ 32.) The judge denied the motion to suppress and White
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thereafter pled guilty to armed robbery and was sentenced to forty-five years in the custody of the
Illinois Department of Corrections. (Id. ¶¶ 34-35.)
Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence shows that there is “no genuine dispute as to
any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. The
party seeking summary judgment has the “initial responsibility” to show that there is no genuine
issue of material fact, Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986), but the Court must view all
facts and make all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party,
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). The Court may enter
summary judgment only if the record as a whole establishes that no reasonable jury could find for
the non-moving party. Michas v. Health Cost Controls of Ill., Inc., 209 F.3d 687, 692 (7th Cir. 2000).
Discussion
Qualified Immunity for False Arrest
Officers Foley and Quinn assert they had probable cause to arrest White based on the incident
report they reviewed that described the robbery and based on their fellow officer’s statement that
Mateo had identified White as the robber. White argues that Mateo’s deposition testimony creates a
factual dispute as to whether her identification of White occurred before or after White was arrested
and therefore the question of probable cause cannot be resolved on summary judgment.
Because a single identification from a credible eyewitness can supply probable cause, Hart v.
Mannina, 798 F.3d 578, 587 (7th Cir. 2015), it was reasonable for Foley and Quinn to believe
probable cause existed upon hearing Mateo had identified White. If probable cause did not in fact
exist because Otero fabricated the pre-arrest identification, Foley and Quinn are nonetheless entitled
to qualified immunity because their mistaken belief that probable cause existed was reasonable. See
Carmichael v. Vill. of Palatine, Ill., 605 F.3d 451, 459 (7th Cir. 2010). Police officers are entitled to
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qualified immunity when they reasonably rely on information provided by fellow law enforcement
officials, Spiegel v. Cortese, 196 F.3d 717, 726 (7th Cir. 1999), and there is nothing in the record to
suggest Foley and Quinn should have questioned the veracity of the information they were provided
regarding the eyewitness identification.
Collateral Estoppel
Foley and Quinn also argue they are entitled to summary judgment on White’s claim for
unlawful entry because he is collaterally estopped from re-litigating the issue of consent, which was
already decided at the hearing on his motion to suppress. However, Illinois appellate courts have
found that a ruling on a motion to suppress does not have a preclusive effect where the defendant
pleads guilty because the defendant lacks an opportunity to appeal. People v. Griffin, 117 Ill.App.3d
177, 181(1983); People v. Stiles, 95 Ill.App.3d 959, 964(1981). Courts in this district have applied the
same rule in Fourth Amendment §1983 cases. See e.g., Kyle v. Patterson, No. 95 C 137, 1996 WL
420277, at *1 (N.D. Ill. July 25, 1996)(Gettleman, J.) Mars v. Mormann, No. 92 C 7941, 1993 WL
211368, at *3 (N.D. Ill. June 15, 1993) (Williams, J.) Persuaded by this line of cases, the Court
applies the rule here. White is not collaterally estopped from litigating whether Foley and Quinn had
consent to enter his apartment.
For the reasons stated above, the Court grants in part and denies in part Foley and Quinn’s
motion for summary judgment [89].
IT IS SO ORDERED.
_____________________________
SHARON JOHNSON COLEMAN
United States District Judge
DATED: August 29, 2016
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