White v. City of Chicago et al
Filing
86
MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Sharon Johnson Coleman on 1/11/2016:Mailed notice(rth, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
MICHAEL P. WHITE
Plaintiff,
v.
J. FOLEY and T. QUINN, officers of the
Chicago Police Department,
Defendants.
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Case No. 12-cv-3136
Judge Sharon Johnson Coleman
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Michael P. White (“White”) submitted a complaint in forma pauperis (“IFP”) to this Court
while in custody at Cook County Department of Corrections (“Cook County Jail”), alleging
Defendants Officers Foley and Quinn 1 entered his home and arrested him without probable cause
in violation of the Fourth Amendment. White’s complaint survived initial screening pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(a) and White was permitted to move forward with his claims.
Defendants now move for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c), arguing that White’s
complaint is time barred under the applicable statute of limitations. For the reasons stated below,
the Court denies the motion.
Background
White’s complaint arises out of events that occurred on April 23, 2010. (Dkt. 1, ¶ 16.) White
dated his complaint April 19, 2012. (Dkt. 1 at 9.) The trust officer at Cook County Jail certified
White’s motion to proceed IFP (“IFP motion”) on April 18, 2012. (Dkt. 3 at 4). White’s certificate
of service states he deposited his complaint within a sealed envelope “in the U.S. Mail at the Cook
County Department of Corrections . . . at approximately 5:00pm on the 19th day of April, 2012.”
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White did not provide Defendants’ first names.
(Dkt. 1 at 10.) White’s complaint was received by this Court on April 27, 2015. (Dkt. 1.) The
envelope in which the complaint was received by the court clerk was not postmarked. (Id.) The
Court’s order granting White leave to file an IFP complaint was entered on July 26, 2012. (Dkt. 5.)
Legal Standard
A party may move for judgment on the pleadings after the complaint and answer have been
filed. Supreme Laundry Serv., L.L.C. v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 521 F.3d 743, 746 (7th Cir. 2008). A court
should grant the motion “[o]nly when it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff cannot prove any
facts to support a claim for relief and the moving party demonstrates that there are no material
issues of fact to be resolved.” Id. When a motion for judgment on the pleadings is based on the
assertion of an affirmative defense, dismissal of the complaint is only appropriate if the complaint
presents all the facts necessary to establish the defense. Brownmark Films, LLC v. Comedy Partners, 682
F.3d 687, 690 (7th Cir. 2012). When the affirmative defense asserted is the statute of limitations, the
complaint must unambiguously set forth all of the relevant dates. Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 579
(7th Cir. 2009).
Discussion
Defendants argue that White’s complaint is time-barred because it was received by the Court
four days after the two-year statute of limitations period expired. White does not dispute that the
applicable statute of limitations period is two years, nor does he dispute the date on which the Court
received his complaint. Rather the parties disagree as to whether, under the “prison mailbox rule,”
White’s certification that he mailed the complaint within the limitations period saves his suit.
Defendants maintain that White cannot avail himself of the prison mailbox rule because he has not
averred that when he deposited the compliant into Cook County Jail’s mail system, postage had been
prepaid.
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The “prison mailbox rule” is the general principle that for incarcerated litigants, a document
submitted to a court is deemed filed “at the time . . . [it is] delivered . . . to the prison authorities for
forwarding to the court clerk.” Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988). The rule, initially only
applicable to notices of appeal, was established as a matter of federal common law in Houston, and
later codified at and limited by Rule 4(c) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. Under Rule
4(c), prisoners must use the prison’s legal mail system, if the prison has one, in order to take
advantage of the prison mailbox rule. If the prison does not have such a system, the prisoner may
establish timely filing via a declaration or notarized statement that sets forth the date the notice was
deposited into the prison mail system and states that first class postage was prepaid. Hurlow v. United
States, 726 F.3d 958, 962 (7th Cir. 2013); Fed. R. App. P. 4(c)(1).
Although the Seventh Circuit has not explicitly held that the prison mailbox rule extends to the
filing of civil complaints, it has indicated in dicta that filings submitted by detained litigants should
never be subject to “an actual receipt standard” absent exceptional circumstances. Edwards v. United
States, 266 F.3d 756, 758 (7th Cir. 2001). 2 But the Seventh Circuit has not held that when extending
the prison mailbox beyond the context of appeals, courts must import the statement-of-prepaidpostage requirement of Rule 4(c).
Furthermore, in this district, Local Rule 3.3 governs the time at which an IFP complaint is
deemed filed. “Such local rules are binding and have the force of law,” Grassi v. Info. Res., Inc., 63
F.3d 596, 602 (7th Cir. 1995), unless they conflict with federal law, Weibrecht v. S. Illinois Transfer, Inc.,
241 F.3d 875, 879 (7th Cir. 2001). Local Rule 3.3 provides that, where a plaintiff is in custody and
the order granting leave to file an IFP complaint is entered after the statute of limitations has run,
Additionally, every circuit to consider the question has held that the prison mailbox rule applies to §1983 complaints or
all civil complaints. Sulik v. Taney Cty., Mo., 316 F.3d 813 (8th Cir. 2003) overruled on other grounds in later appeal, 393 F.3d
765 (8th Cir. 2005); Casanova v. Dubois, 304 F.3d 75 (1st Cir. 2002); Richard v. Ray, 290 F.3d 810 (6th Cir. 2002); Cooper v.
Brookshire, 70 F.3d 377 (5th Cir. 1995); Dory v. Ryan, 999 F.2d 679 (2d Cir. 1993) opinion modified on reh'g, 25 F.3d 81 (2d
Cir. 1994); Garvey v. Vaughn, 993 F.2d 776 (11th Cir. 1993); Lewis v. Richmond City Police Dep't, 947 F.2d 733 (4th Cir.
1991).
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the complaint is deemed filed “as of the time of the plaintiff’s delivery of the complaint to the
custodial authorities for transmittal to the court.” LR 3.3(d)(1). Local Rule 3.3 does not prescribe a
specific method by which an in-custody plaintiff must prove the time at which he delivered the
complaint to custodial authorities for transmittal to the court. Accordingly, this Court shall treat the
issue as an ordinary question of fact. Here, that question has yet to be resolved and thus a grant of a
judgment on the pleadings is not warranted.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings [77] is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
_____________________________
SHARON JOHNSON COLEMAN
United States District Judge
DATED: January 11, 2016
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