Williams v. Cook County et al

Filing 37

WRITTEN Opinion entered by the Honorable Young B. Kim on 4/16/2013: Plaintiff's motion to bar settlement agreement and to seal it 32 is denied. However, because Defendants have presented matters outside the pleadings, the court must treat Defendants' motion to dismiss, pursuant to Rules 12(c) and 12(b)(6), as one for summary judgment under Rule 56. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). As such, Williams, who is proceeding pro se, has until May 17, 2013, to provide any arguments or materials pertinent to the pending motion and supportive of his assertion that the settlement agreement from his previous Section 1983 case does not preclude him from pursuing this case. He may title this submission as "Plaintiff's Supplemental Response to Motion to Dismiss." Defendants have until May 31, 2013, to file their supplemental reply in support of their motion to dismiss, now treated as one for summary judgment. (For further details see written opinion.) Mailed notice (ma,)

Order Form (01/2005)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois
Name of Assigned Judge
or Magistrate Judge

Young B. Kim

CASE NUMBER 12 C 3306
CASE
TITLE

Sitting Judge if Other
than Assigned Judge

DATE

April 16, 2013

Williams vs. Tucker et al

DOCKET ENTRY TEXT

Plaintiff's motion to bar settlement agreement and to seal it [32] is denied. However, because Defendants have
presented matters outside the pleadings, the court must treat Defendants' motion to dismiss, pursuant to Rules
12(c) and 12(b)(6), as one for summary judgment under Rule 56. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). As such, Williams, who
is proceeding pro se, has until May 17, 2013, to provide any arguments or materials pertinent to the pending
motion and supportive of his assertion that the settlement agreement from his previous Section 1983 case does
not preclude him from pursuing this case. He may title this submission as "Plaintiff's Supplemental Response
to Motion to Dismiss." Defendants have until May 31, 2013, to file their supplemental reply in support of their
motion to dismiss, now treated as one for summary judgment.
O[ For further details see text below.]

Notices mailed by Judicial staff.

STATEMENT
Plaintiff Jonathan Williams, a pretrial detainee at Cook County, brought this Section 1983 against Defendants
Cook County, Cook County Sheriff Thomas Dart, and four employees of the Cook County Jail arising out of an
incident that allegedly occurred on January 20, 2011. ®. 7.) Defendants Cook County and Dart have been
dismissed from this action, leaving only the jail employees as the remaining Defendants. In lieu of an answer,
and before the parties consented to the jurisdiction of this court, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, alleging
that Williams’s current suit is precluded by the settlement agreement reached in his previous Section 1983 case,
Williams v. Cook County, No. 11 CV 947 (N.D. Ill.) (Hart, J.). In moving to dismiss, Defendants did not provide
a copy of the settlement agreement. The assigned District Judge directed Defendants to file a copy of the
settlement agreement with the court if Defendants wanted to proceed with their motion. ®. 26). The assigned
District Judge reasoned that because the settlement agreement was neither filed along with the motion to dismiss
nor made a part of the record in Williams’s earlier case, the settlement agreement must first be made public and
part of the record before ruling on the motion to dismiss. (Id.) Defendants complied in a timely manner,
prompting Williams to file a motion to bar the consideration of the settlement agreement and to seal it [32].
Williams seeks to both bar and seal the settlement agreement. However, this court has already ruled that the
settlement agreement must be made public, citing Herrnreiter v. Chicago Housing Auth., 281 F.3d 634 (7th Cir.
2002), for the proposition that “when parties to a [settlement agreement] ask a court to interpret and enforce their
agreement, the [settlement agreement] enters the record of the case and thus becomes available to the public.”
Id. at 636; R. 26. The only exceptions to this rule are in cases where the agreement at issue contains confidential
information, such as trade secrets, information covered by a recognized privilege, and information required by
statute to be kept confidential. See id; Baxter Intern., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 297 F.3d 544, 546-47 (7th Cir. 2002).
Because the settlement agreement relevant to this case does not appear to fall within any of these exceptions,
12C3306 Williams vs. Tucker et al

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STATEMENT
Williams’s motion to seal the settlement agreement is denied.
Williams’s motion to bar the consideration of the settlement agreement in the context of Defendants' motion to
dismiss is also denied. Evaluation of the settlement agreement is integral and relevant to determining whether
Williams’s current lawsuit is viable. Williams argues that the court should not consider the settlement agreement
and Defendants cannot offer or refer to the settlement agreement in this case pursuant to paragraph 6 of the
agreement. ®. 32.) The relevant portion of paragraph 6 of the agreement provides that, "none of the terms of the
settlement agreement may be offered or received in evidence or in any way referred to in any civil . . . action or
proceeding other than proceedings that may be necessary to consummate or enforce this settlement agreement."
(R. 27 at 2.) Contrary to Williams's argument, this paragraph does not bar Defendants from offering, referring
or relying on the settlement agreement in support of their motion to dismiss the current action because they are
in fact trying to enforce the terms of the settlement agreement. Defendants are asserting that the terms of the
settlement agreement preclude Williams from pursuing this case because he agreed to "dismiss any and all claims
up to the time he signs this Agreement against . . . any other employees of the Cook County Jail, relating to
[Williams] being housed at the Cook County Jail as a pretrial detainee." (R. 27 at 2.) At the time Williams
executed this settlement agreement, on February 22, 2012, he had Section 1983 claims pending against
Defendants through the grievance process. (R. 7 at 10.) As such, Williams's motion to bar the consideration of
the settlement agreement is denied.

12C3306 Williams vs. Tucker et al

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