Young v. Astrue

Filing 15

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Sheila Finnegan on 3/28/2013: Mailed notice. (is, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
HEATHER YOUNG,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, 1
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

No. 12 C 3466
Magistrate Judge Finnegan

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Heather Young seeks to overturn the final decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner” or “Defendant”) denying her
application for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Social
Security Act. 42 U.S.C. §§ 416, 423(d). The parties consented to the jurisdiction
of the United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), and filed
cross-motions for summary judgment. After careful review of the record, the
Court now grants the Commissioner’s motion, denies Plaintiff’s motion, and
affirms the decision to deny disability benefits.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff was born on June 16, 1952 and has a bachelor of science degree
with a major in accounting and a minor in biology, an MBA in finance, and a

1

Ms. Colvin became Acting Commissioner of Social Security on February 14,
2013, and is substituted in as Defendant pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
25(d)(1).

nursing degree. (R. 48, 49, 175). She worked most recently as a registered
nurse but quit that job on April 1, 2009 due to her medical conditions. Prior to
that she worked as an accountant, a computer systems administrator, and a
computer consultant. (R. 50, 194). Plaintiff applied for DIB on February 26,
2010, alleging that she became disabled on April 1, 2009 due to sarcoidosis,
hypertension, cardiomeglia, diabetes, fibromyalgia and general anxiety disorder.
(R. 175, 192). The SSA denied the application initially on July 19, 2010, and
again upon reconsideration on February 28, 2011. (R. 85-89, 93-95). Plaintiff
filed a timely request for hearing and appeared before Administrative Law Judge
Kimberly S. Cromer (the “ALJ”) on August 11, 2011. (R. 27). The ALJ heard
testimony from Plaintiff, who was represented by counsel, as well as from
medical expert Frank J. Indihar, M.D., and vocational expert James Breen (the
“VE”).
Approximately two weeks later, on August 26, 2011, the ALJ found that
Plaintiff’s “diabetes mellitus, chronic stage 3 with insulin pump,” sarcoidosis, and
arthritis are severe impairments, but that they do not meet or equal any of the
listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.

The ALJ

acknowledged Plaintiff’s claimed anxiety disorder, but concluded that it “does not
cause more than minimal limitations in [her] ability to perform basic mental work
activities and is therefore nonsevere.” (R. 16). After discussing the medical and
testimonial evidence in detail, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff has the capacity
to perform sedentary work with the following restrictions: she can never climb
ladders, ropes or scaffolds; she can only occasionally climb ramps and stairs;
2

she must avoid concentrated exposure to excessive noise and pulmonary
irritants; and she cannot be exposed to moving or hazardous machinery, or
unprotected heights. (R. 18).
Based on this stated residual functional capacity (“RFC”), the ALJ
accepted the VE’s testimony that Plaintiff remains capable of performing her past
relevant work as a computer consultant and office manager. (R. 21-22). The
ALJ thus concluded that Plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the Social
Security Act, and is not entitled to benefits.

The Appeals Council denied

Plaintiff’s request for review on March 2, 2012, (R. 1-3), and Plaintiff now seeks
judicial review of the ALJ’s decision, which stands as the final decision of the
Commissioner.
DISCUSSION
A.

Standard of Review
Judicial review of the Commissioner’s final decision is authorized by §

405(g) of the Social Security Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). In reviewing this
decision, the Court may not engage in its own analysis of whether Plaintiff is
severely impaired as defined by the Social Security Regulations.
Barnhart, 362 F.3d 995, 1001 (7th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).

Young v.
Nor may it

“displace the ALJ’s judgment by reconsidering facts or evidence or making
credibility determinations.” Castile v. Astrue, 617 F.3d 923, 926 (7th Cir. 2010)
(quoting Skinner v. Astrue, 478 F.3d 836, 841 (7th Cir. 2007)). The court’s task
is to determine whether the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence,
which is “‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
3

adequate to support a conclusion.’” McKinzey v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 884, 889 (7th
Cir. 2011) (quoting Skinner, 478 F.3d at 841).
In making this determination, the court must “look to whether the ALJ built
an ‘accurate and logical bridge’ from the evidence to [his] conclusion that the
claimant is not disabled.” Simila v. Astrue, 573 F.3d 503, 513 (7th Cir. 2009)
(quoting Craft v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 668, 673 (7th Cir. 2008)).

Where the

Commissioner’s decision “‘lacks evidentiary support or is so poorly articulated as
to prevent meaningful review,’ a remand is required.” Hopgood ex rel. L.G. v.
Astrue, 578 F.3d 696, 698 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Steele v. Barnhart, 290 F.3d
936, 940 (7th Cir. 2002)).
B.

Five-Step Inquiry
To recover DIB under Title II of the Social Security Act, a claimant must

establish that she is disabled within the meaning of the Act. Crawford v. Astrue,
633 F. Supp. 2d 618, 630 (N.D. Ill. 2009). A person is disabled if she is unable to
perform “any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable
physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which
has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12
months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); Crawford, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 630; Strocchia
v. Astrue, No. 08 C 2017, 2009 WL 2992549, at *14 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 16, 2009). In
determining whether a claimant suffers from a disability, the ALJ conducts a
standard five-step inquiry: (1) Is the claimant presently unemployed? (2) Is the
claimant’s impairment severe? (3) Does the impairment meet or equal one of a
list of specific impairments enumerated in the regulations? (4) Is the claimant
4

unable to perform her former occupation? and (5) Is the claimant unable to
perform any other work? See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; Clifford v. Apfel,
227 F.3d 863, 868 (7th Cir. 2000).
C.

Analysis
Plaintiff identifies only one alleged error in the ALJ’s decision. Specifically,

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to consider her anxiety in combination with her
physical conditions, resulting in a flawed RFC determination. (Doc. 11, at 11). A
claimant’s RFC is the maximum work that she can perform despite any
limitations, and is a legal decision rather than a medical one. 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1527(d)(2), 404.1545(a)(1); SSR 96-8p. “When determining the RFC, the
ALJ must consider all medically determinable impairments, . . . even those that
are not considered ‘severe.’” Craft, 539 F.3d at 676.
At step 2 of the analysis, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s mental impairment
results in only mild limitation in her activities of daily living, social functioning, and
concentration, persistence and pace. (R. 17). The ALJ noted that in an April 1,
2010 Function Report, Plaintiff stated that she plays billiards with friends, chats
online, spends time with her daughter and girlfriend, and regularly attends social
groups, archery meetings, motorcycle meetings and group rides. (R. 17, 216).
At the August 11, 2011 administrative hearing, Plaintiff confirmed that she
spends time chatting on the computer and doing things with her daughter,
including a recent movie outing. (R. 17, 65-66). She also described being “pretty
good” at getting along with other people and functioning in an office. (R. 64).
The ALJ acknowledged that Plaintiff complained of some diminution in her ability
5

to perform certain activities, noting for example that she “becomes fatigued while
at the computer and, sometimes, forgets what she is doing at the computer.” (R.
17). The ALJ concluded, however, that any limitations in functioning “arise from
[Plaintiff’s] physical impairments” as opposed to mental problems. 2 (Id.).
Plaintiff appears to believe that her mental impairment is more severe. In
that regard, she directs the Court to a July 1, 2010 Psychiatric Report indicating
that she has “serious limitations with the ability to understand, carry out and
remember instructions on a sustained basis” due to “memory problems.” (R.
407).

Plaintiff also stresses her hearing testimony that “when I’m on the

computer I have a hard time following the chat that’s going on back and forth
between me and myself or between other people. I find I get confused easy as
well.” (Doc. 11, at 12 (quoting R. 71-72)). In addition, Plaintiff notes that though
she does a fair amount of reading, she “do[esn’t] remember anything.”

(Id.

(quoting R. 72)). Based on this evidence, Plaintiff claims that the ALJ did not
properly account for her mental impairment in determining an appropriate RFC.
This error is significant, Plaintiff argues, because the VE testified that a
hypothetical individual who can perform sedentary work and has moderate
limitations in concentration, persistence and pace would not be able to engage in
more than unskilled work and, thus, could not perform Plaintiff’s past work as
stated by the ALJ. (Id. at 12-13).

2

Plaintiff testified, for example, that she can only work on the computer for about
20 to 30 minutes before her fingers start hurting from typing and her joints get stiff from
sitting. (R. 66-67). Her difficulties with shopping and household chores likewise stem
from physical pain and fatigue. (R. 67-69).

6

The problem with this argument is that there is no competent evidence in
the record suggesting that Plaintiff actually has moderate limitations in
concentration, persistence and pace, or that she is incapable of more than
unskilled work. The ALJ expressly discussed the July 2010 Psychiatric Report
but gave it “little weight” because it was completed by a Licensed Clinical Social
Worker and not an “acceptable medical source” within the meaning of the
Regulations. (R. 20). See Compton v. Colvin, No. 11 C 8305, 2013 WL 870606,
at *9 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 7, 2013) (quoting SSR 06-03p) (social workers are “nonacceptable medical sources,” and “[o]nly ‘acceptable medical sources’ can
‘establish the existence of a medically determinable impairment,’ ‘give . . .
medical opinions,’ and ‘be considered treating sources . . . whose medical
opinions may be entitled to controlling weight.’”).

Significantly, the social

worker’s opinion conflicts with state agency consultant Dr. Kirk Boyenga’s
February 2011 opinion that Plaintiff is not disabled because there is “[n]o
evidence of any mental deficiencies.” (R. 491-93). Dr. Boyenga’s opinion, in
turn, is consistent with Dr. J. Gange’s July 9, 2010 opinion that Plaintiff has no
functional deficits aside from a mild limitation in maintaining concentration,
persistence and pace. (R. 419). The ALJ reasonably assigned Dr. Boyenga’s
opinion “great weight” in determining that Plaintiff’s mental impairment does not
impact her ability to work. (R. 20). See Scheck v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 697, 700
(7th Cir. 2004) (“The ALJ may properly rely upon the opinion of [state agency]
medical experts.”).

7

As for Plaintiff’s testimony, the ALJ acknowledged her complaints of
anxiety and memory problems, including “difficulty concentrating on the
computer” and “remember[ing] what she reads.” (R. 19). The ALJ nonetheless
found it significant that “there is no indication in any records of [Plaintiff] having
memory difficulties.” (R. 17). Moreover, though Plaintiff testified that she was
regularly seeing a psychotherapist, there are no treatment records to support this
claim. (R. 17, 63-64). Nor was Plaintiff ever prescribed medication for anxiety or
any other mental disorder. (R. 17, 19). On these facts, the ALJ did not err in
discounting Plaintiff’s claims of disabling mental problems. 3 Elder v. Astrue, 529
F.3d 408, 413-14 (7th Cir. 2008) (an ALJ’s credibility determination will be
reversed only if “patently wrong.”).
Viewing the record as a whole, it is clear that the ALJ recognized her
obligation to consider the combined impact of Plaintiff’s impairments, and
discussed all of those conditions in detail. (R. 17-21). In the Court’s view, the
medical and testimonial evidence fully supports the ALJ’s conclusion that
Plaintiff’s mental and other impairments do not preclude her from engaging in
substantial gainful activity within the parameters set forth in the RFC.

See

Tiemann v. Barnhart, 152 Fed. Appx. 540, 542 (7th Cir. 2005) (rejecting
argument that the ALJ failed to consider the plaintiff=s impairments in combination

3

Plaintiff does not argue that the ALJ’s credibility assessment is improper, or
provide any factual or legal analysis in that regard. Any objection to that aspect of the
ALJ’s decision is therefore waived. Reynolds v. Astrue, No. 10 C 1966, 2011 WL
3584474, at *12 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 15, 2011) (quoting United States v. Holm, 326 F.3d 872,
877 (7th Cir. 2003)) (“It is well settled that ‘perfunctory and undeveloped arguments, and
arguments that are unsupported by pertinent authority, are waived.”).

8

where Ahe thoroughly accounted for her impairments and adequately explained
why he concluded that she was not disabled.@).

Thus, the ALJ’s RFC is

supported by substantial evidence and does not justify a reversal or remand in
this case.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment
(Doc. 11) is denied, and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 12) is
granted. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of Defendant.
ENTER:

Dated: March 28, 2013

_____________________________
SHEILA FINNEGAN
United States Magistrate Judge

9