Mullen v. Astrue

Filing 41

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Michael T. Mason on 8/8/13.(rbf, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
DANIEL T. MULLEN,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security,1
Defendant.

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No. 12 C 3751
Magistrate Judge Michael T. Mason

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Michael T. Mason, United States Magistrate Judge:
Claimant Daniel T. Mullen (“claimant” or “Mullen”) brings this motion for summary
judgment [28] under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking reversal or remand of the decision by
Respondent Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner of Social Security
(“Commissioner”), denying claimant’s application for disability insurance benefits
(“DIB”). The Commissioner asks the Court to uphold its previous decision [29-1]. For
the reasons set forth below, claimant’s motion for summary judgment is denied and the
Commissioner’s decision is affirmed.
I.

BACKGROUND
A.

Procedural History

Claimant filed an application for DIB on September 12, 2008, alleging a disability
onset date of December 15, 2005, due to Parkinson’s disease, avascular necrosis

1

On February 14, 2013, Carolyn W. Colvin became Acting Commissioner of Social Security. Pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d)(1), Carolyn W. Colvin is automatically substituted as the Defendant
in this suit. No further action is necessary to continue this suit by reason of the last sentence of section
205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

secondary to alcohol use and his status post bilateral total hip arthroplasty. (R. 105-11.)
Mullen was insured through December 31, 2010.2 (R. 11.) The Social Security
Administration (“SSA”) denied his initial application on January 14, 2009, and then upon
reconsideration on April 15, 2009. (R. 46-54.) Claimant filed a timely written request for
a hearing before and administrative law judge (“ALJ”) on June 16, 2009. (R. 64-65.)
Claimant was the only person to testify at the ALJ’s hearing on August 17, 2010. (R.
22.)
On September 21, 2010, the ALJ issued a decision denying the claim for
benefits. (R. 8-18.) Claimant filed a request to review the ALJ’s decision, and the
Appeals Council denied review on March 19, 2012, making the ALJ’s decision the final
decision of the Commissioner. (R. 1-3.) Claimant subsequently filed this appeal
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The parties consented to this Court’s jurisdiction [6]
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
B.

Medical Evidence
1.

Treatment Notes

Mullen has a history of avascular necrosis of both hips secondary to alcohol use.
(R. 184.) He underwent a right hip replacement in 2002 and recovered “beautifully.” (R.
182.) In January 2006, he had a successful left hip replacement with no complications.
(R. 184.) An April 2006 treatment note indicated that the “x-rays look good” and Mullen
was “really doing nicely.” (R. 181.) A February 20, 2007 treatment note again indicated
2

Because Social Security disability benefits under Title II equal insurance against lost income caused by
disability, the applicant/worker must show a recent connection to the work force to maintain insured status.
42 U.S.C. § 423(c) and 20 C.F.R. § 404.130. This generally means the applicant was working in 20 of the
last 40 quarters. For an applicant who is thirty-one years old or older, the “last date of insured status” is
generally five years after his date of last work.

2

that he was “doing reasonably well” and that his “x-rays look just fine.” (R. 180.) In fact,
claimant was “actually walk[ing] quite well,” but still had a little bit of weakness and
tightness in his left hip. (Id.)
In August 2007, claimant made an appointment to address concerns about his
left shoulder. (R. 221.) Claimant reported developing a sensation of “dead arm” over
the past four years. (Id.) The treating doctor ordered an MRI of the left shoulder and
referred him to Dr. Donn D. Dexter (“Dr. Dexter”), a neurologist. (R. 217.)
Claimant had an MRI of the brain in December 2007 because he was
complaining of tremors and questioned whether he had Parkinson’s disease. (R. 194.)
The MRI showed an indeterminate, subtle signal abnormality in the left portion of the
pons. (Id.) It also showed a benign 1cm left choroidal fissure cyst. (Id.) Other
intracranial contents were negative. (Id.) A follow-up MRI in June 2008, showed that
the pons abnormality had “nearly completely resolved,” and that the benign cyst was
stable. (R. 192.)
In June 2008, Dr. Dexter diagnosed claimant as likely suffering from Parkinson’s
disease. (R. 305.) At a follow-up appointment in August 2008, Dr. Dexter referred
claimant to Dr. Daniel Sa (“Dr. Sa”), a movement disorder specialist, for a second
opinion as to whether he was suffering from Parkinson’s disease. (R. 304.)
Dr. Sa evaluated claimant in September 2008. (R. 198.) Dr. Sa reviewed the
December 2007 and June 2008 MRIs of claimant’s brain and agreed that the slight
abnormality that appeared on the first MRI was virtually non-existent on the second
MRI. (Id.) In his conversation with Dr. Sa, Mullen reported a four or five year history of
stiffness, slowness, and clumsiness affecting his left arm and hand. (Id.) Those
3

symptoms initially worsened, but seemed to have stabilized over the past two years.
(Id.) He also reported a stress induced left hand tremor, and rare shaking in his left leg
that had been worsening over the past two years. (Id.)
Mullen was taking Levodopa, which helped the slow motion, but did not help the
tremors. (R. 198.) Dr. Sa found that claimant was not suffering from an intellectual
impairment, thought disorder, or lack of motivation, but did experience short periods of
sadness or guilt. (R. 199.) His daily living activities were generally normal. (R. 199200.) However, during his “off periods” Mullen’s handwriting, handling of utensils,
dressing, grooming, and walking were a bit slow. (R. 200.) The “off periods” lasted 2650% of the day and were predictable and did not come on suddenly. (R. 201.)
Claimant did not report the presence of dyskinesias. (Id.)
Mullen’s physical examination was generally normal. (R. 202-03.) However, Dr.
Sa noted slight tremors in claimant’s left and right hands and a severely impaired ability
to perform finger taps with his left hand. (R. 203.) His left leg agility was also mildly
slow. (R. 204.)
Dr. Sa concluded that despite claimant’s denials, he was depressed and should
consider treatment. (R. 204.) As for Parkinsonian syndrome, Dr. Sa found Mullen’s
symptoms “quite peculiar.” (Id.) A history of four or five years of symptoms followed by
stabilization is highly unusual, although claimant’s tremors did appear to have worsened
over that period. (Id.) The scant examination findings were also “strange” considering
the reported four year history of symptoms. (Id.) Further, the examination showed
incongruities like the marked slowness in finger taps with completely normal hand
movement. (Id.) Accordingly, Dr. Sa found it difficult to establish a definitive diagnosis,
4

but Mullen’s symptoms could represent early Parkinson’s disease. (Id.) The blood work
Dr. Sa ordered showed an elevated TSH level. (R. 206.)
Claimant had a check-up in October 2008 with Dr. Benjamin J. Boardman (“Dr.
Boardman”), who appears to be his primary physician, to check on the elevated TSH.
(R. 212.) Mullen reported suffering from Parkinson’s disease and being treated by Dr.
Dexter. (Id.) Claimant requested a referral to a teaching hospital rather than continuing
treatment with Dr. Sa at the Marshfield Clinic. (Id.) At the check-up, claimant’s balance,
gait, and coordination were intact and his reflexes were normal. (R. 214.) No tremors
or rigidity were noted. (Id.)
Claimant returned to Dr. Sa in March 2009. (R. 286.) Dr. Sa’s treatment notes
indicate “probable Parkinson’s disease,” with symptoms that reportedly began in 2003
or 2004. (Id.) Mullen’s Levodopa prescriptions seemed to help with slow motion, but
not tremors. (Id.) Dr. Sa “spent the majority of this 55 minute appointment in
counseling” and answering claimant’s extensive questions about Parkinson’s disease.
(R. 288.) After the second visit, Dr. Sa still hesitated in making a definitive Parkinson’s
diagnosis based on unusual facts about claimant’s history and some evidence of
psychogenic overlay. (Id.) Dr. Sa scheduled a follow-up visit in six months. (Id.) In a
March 10, 2009 letter, Dr. Sa indicated that claimant was his patient and that he was
following him for Parkinson’s disease. (R. 289.) At that time, Dr. Sa opined that the
disease was mild and not interfering with Mullen’s activities of daily living. (Id.)
Claimant saw Dr. Dexter for a follow-up visit in June 2009. (R. 302.) In his
notes, Dr. Dexter indicated that Dr. Sa reportedly confirmed the Parkinson’s diagnosis.
(Id.) Claimant did not take his medication prior to the visit and exhibited severe facial
5

masking and an intermittent, mild tremor over the upper and lower left extremities. (Id.)
Claimant saw Dr. Dexter for a six month follow-up visit in December 2009 and
reported that his Parkinson’s disease was worsening. (R. 300.) He reported having
more symptoms on his left side and noticing symptoms on his right side. (Id.) Dr.
Dexter found that the disease was progressing and prescribed Azilect. (Id.) He also
referred claimant to a Parkinson’s disease subspecialist, Dr. James Bower (“Dr.
Bower”).
Claimant saw Dr. Bower in March 2010. (R. 297.) According to Dr. Bower’s
notes, Mullen first saw Dr. Dexter in December 2007. (Id.) At that time, Dr. Dexter
diagnosed him with Parkinson’s disease and prescribed Sinemet. (Id.)
Claimant purposely did not take his Levodopa prior to the examination with Dr.
Bower. (R. 298.) During the exam, Dr. Bower found that Mullen had moderate
hypomimia and mild hypophonia. (Id.) He had left and right leg tremors and a left arm
tremor at rest. (Id.) Dr. Bower found that claimant had young-onset Parkinson’s
disease and that he was beginning to experience the typical complications from the
disease. (Id.) However, claimant did not appear to have dyskinesias and had a very
good response to Levodopa. (Id.) Dr. Bower suggested a slight modification to
claimant’s medicine, which included an increase in the Mirapex dosage and an
additional Sinemet tablet at bedtime. (Id.) He also noted that Mullen did not appear to
need deep brain stimulation at that time. (R. 299.)
Claimant saw Dr. Dexter in July 2010 for a follow-up to his December 2009 visit.
(R. 295.) Mullen reported that Dr. Bower had adjusted his medication to two Sinemet
tablets four times per day, Mirapex three times per day, and one Azilect tablet per day.
6

(Id.) Claimant also stated that his Parkinson’s was progressing and that he was
experiencing more problems with dyskinesias and bradykinesia. (Id.) Dr. Dexter noted
that Mullen’s Parkinson’s disease was moderately advanced and that he should
continue his medication and return for a follow-up visit in six months. (Id.)
2.

Agency Consultants

On January 8, 2009, Dr. Syd Foster (“Dr. Foster”) completed a physical RFC
assessment for claimant. (R. 258-65.) He did not examine or treat Mullen. (R. 258).
Dr. Foster opined that claimant could lift and/or carry 20 pounds occasionally, and 10
pounds frequently, and could stand and/or walk and sit 6 hours out of an 8 hour
workday. (R. 259.) He also found that claimant did not have any postural,
manipulative, visual, or communicative limitations, or limits on pushing or pulling. (R.
259-62.) However, he found that claimant should avoid even moderate exposure to
hazards due to his Parkinson’s disease and the possible progression of the disease.
(R. 262.)
Dr. Foster noted that medial source statements regarding claimant’s physical
capacities were not in the file. (R. 264.) In support of his conclusions, he noted that
medication seemed to adequately control the Parkinson’s symptoms and that claimant’s
balance and gait were “ok” during examinations. (R. 265.)
Dr. Kyla King (“Dr. King”) completed a psychiatric review technique for claimant
on January 12, 2009. (R. 266-279.) She found that Mullen was suffering from an
affective disorder, but that it was not severe. (R. 266.) Specifically, she found that
Mullen was suffering from mild depression that resulted in mild restrictions on daily
living activities, mild difficulties in maintaining social functioning, mild difficulties in
7

maintaining concentration, persistence or pace, and no extended episodes of
decompensation. (R. 276.)
3.

Claimant’s Functional Reports

Claimant submitted three functional reports dated November 24, 2008, June 10,
2009, and July 28, 2010. (R. 127-36, 318-21.) In the reports, claimant discussed his
daily activities and noted that “everything takes longer to accomplish.” (R. 129.)
C.

Claimant’s Testimony

Mullen appeared at the August 17, 2010 hearing and testified as follows. At the
time of the hearing, Mullen was forty-three years old. (R. 25.) He attended college for
three years, but did not receive a bachelor’s degree. (Id.) He was single with no
children and lived by himself. (Id.) He was not working, but received quarterly
payments as a tribal member of the Ho-Chunk Nation. (R. 26.) Mullen last worked a
40-hour week in 2005 doing sales and marketing for a family business. (R. 27.) Mullen
quit that job because of an upcoming hip surgery and decided not to return to work after
the surgery when the company was not doing very well. (Id.)
Mullen testified that he was not currently working because of symptoms related
to Parkinson’s disease. (R. 29.) He said that he had “the four main symptoms of
Parkinson’s.” (R. 30.) The worst symptom was probably the bradykinesia or the
extreme stiffness. (Id.) Mullen testified that despite his education, he did not think he
could be productive at any job. (R. 31.)
Mullen takes Parkinson’s medications that include Mirapex three times a day,
Sinemet four times a day, and Azilect once a day. (R. 38.) Once the medication “kicks
in,” he takes care of his grooming needs. (R. 31.) He also tries to get out of the house
8

once a day for fresh air. (Id.) He reads and watches sports on the television. (Id.) He
grocery shops and friends come to visit occasionally. (R. 32.)
Mullen explained that he experiences bradykinesia, or slow motion movement.
(R. 33.) He described it as a stiffness. (Id.) He also suffers from muscle rigidity and
tremors, more on his left side than his right. (Id.) He stated that these symptoms result
in a sustained disturbance of gross and dexterous movement. (R. 34.) He has a hard
time walking, but does not use a cane or other aid. (Id.) Mullen has been experiencing
these symptoms for four years, but they have become progressively worse. (Id.)
The Parkinson’s medications give him windows of time where they take away
approximately 75 percent of his symptoms. (R. 35.) Those windows occur four times a
day and last between two and two and a half hours. (Id.) Mullen takes his medications
every four hours and it takes between 30 and 75 minutes for them to take effect. (Id.)
During the hearing, Mullen’s left arm or hand had slight tremors. (R. 37-38.) Claimant
was not currently a candidate for deep brain stimulation, but he may have to consider
that in the future. (R. 38.) Mullen also testified that he lacked the hand dexterity to use
a keyboard accurately or for any length of time. (R. 40.)
II.

LEGAL ANALYSIS
A.

Standard of Review

The Court must affirm the ALJ’s decision if it is supported by substantial evidence
and free from legal error. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Steele v. Barnhart, 290 F.3d 936, 940
(7th Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla of evidence and is “such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” Diaz v. Chater, 55 F.3d 300, 305 (7th Cir. 1995) (quoting Richardson v.
9

Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). In making this substantial evidence determination,
the Court must consider the entire administrative record, but will not “reweigh evidence,
resolve conflicts, decide questions of credibility, or substitute our own judgment for that
of the Commissioner.” Lopez v. Barnhart, 336 F.3d 535, 539 (7th Cir. 2003) (quoting
Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 869 (7th Cir. 2000)). The Court will “conduct a critical
review of the evidence” and will not affirm the Commissioner’s decision “if it lacks
evidentiary support or an adequate discussion of the issues.” (Id.)
While the ALJ “must build an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to
[his] conclusion,” he need not discuss every piece of evidence in the record. Dixon v.
Massanari, 270 F.3d 1171, 1176 (7th Cir. 2001). At a minimum, the ALJ must
“sufficiently articulate his assessment of the evidence to ‘assure us that the ALJ
considered the important evidence ... [and to enable] us to trace the path of the ALJ’s
reasoning.’” Carlson v. Shalala, 999 F.2d 180, 181 (7th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (quoting
Stephens v. Heckler, 766 F.2d 284, 287 (7th Cir. 1985)).
B.

Analysis Under the Social Security Act

In order to qualify for DIB, a claimant must be “disabled” under the Act. A person
is disabled under the Act if he or she has an “inability to engage in any substantial
gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental
impairment…which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not
less than twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). In determining whether a claimant
is disabled, the ALJ must make the following five-step inquiry: (1) whether the claimant
is currently employed; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment; (3) whether
the claimant’s impairment is one that the Commissioner considers conclusively
10

disabling; (4) if the claimant does not have a conclusively disabling impairment, whether
he can perform his past relevant work; and (5) whether the claimant is capable of
performing any work in the national economy. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a); Dixon, 270
F.3d at 1176. The claimant has the burden of establishing disability at steps one
through four, after which the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that the
claimant is capable of performing work in the national economy. Zurawski v. Halter, 243
F.3d 881, 886 (7th Cir. 2001).
The ALJ followed this five-step process. At step one, the ALJ found that Mullen
had not engaged in substantial gainful activity after December 15, 2005, the alleged
onset date. (R. 13.) At step two, the ALJ concluded that he had the severe
impairments of Parkinson’s disease and avascular necrosis secondary to alcohol use,
status post bilateral total hip arthroplasty. (R. 13-14.) The ALJ further found that
Mullen’s mental impairment from depression was not severe because it did not cause
more than a minimal limitation in his ability to perform basic mental work activities. (Id.)
At step three, the ALJ concluded that, even in combination, claimant’s physical
and mental impairments did not meet or medically equal the criteria of any listing in the
Listing of Impairments in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. (R. 14.) The ALJ
explained that Mullen did not meet Medical Listing 11.06 for Parkinsonian syndrome
because the record did not contain signs of significant rigidity, bradykinesia, or tremor in
two extremities, which, singly or in combination, resulted in substantial disturbance of
gross and dexterous movements, or gait and station. (Id.) Claimant’s hip problems also
did not meet Medical Listing 1.02. (Id.)
At step four, the ALJ determined that Mullen had the RFC to perform light work
11

as defined in 20 C.F.R. 404.1567(b) except with avoidance of moderate exposure to
hazards such as dangerous machinery and heights and that he could perform his past
relevant work as an accountant. (R. 14-17.) The ALJ noted that in making that finding,
he considered all symptoms, objective medical evidence, opinion evidence, and
claimant’s testimony to the extent it was consistent with objective medical evidence. (R.
14-15.) The ALJ further explained that although Parkinson’s symptoms restricted
claimant in his daily activities, the medical evidence demonstrated that medications
were controlling the symptoms at an acceptable level for the claimant to perform at his
assigned RFC. (R. 17.) Because the ALJ found claimant capable of performing his
past relevant work as an accountant, he did not make a step five finding and concluded
that claimant was not disabled under the Act. (Id.)
Claimant’s father represented him at the ALJ’s hearing and in this appeal.
Attorney Mullen does not appear to specialize in handling social security cases because
a number of the issues raised in his briefs misstate or misconstrue the law applicable to
this appeal. The briefs also include numerous factual errors. The record before this
Court confirms that claimant did not meet his burden of establishing a disability at steps
three and four of the disability determination process. Nevertheless, claimant’s briefs
suggest that he believes he is entitled to a finding of disability merely because he has
been diagnosed with Parkinson’s disease and testified that he meets the requirements
of Listing 11.06. Unfortunately for claimant, a diagnosis and related symptoms do not
automatically entitle someone to a finding of disability and an award of benefits.
Skinner v. Astrue, 478 F.3d 836, 845 (7th Cir. 2007). There must also be some medical
evidence that the symptoms from the diagnosed impairment are not controlled by
12

proper medication and treatment, thus rendering him unable to work. The record before
this Court contains no such conclusive medical evidence.
The Court will address each of claimant’s three broad objections to the ALJ’s
decision below. Claimant argues that (1) he meets the requirements of Listing 11.06;
(2) the ALJ’s decision should be reversed; and (3) he is unable to work. By the Court’s
count, within these broad categories, claimant raises at least ten “sub-issues” that were
either factually or legally incorrect. However, claimant does not object to the ALJ’s
finding that his mental impairment of depression was not severe. Thus, our analysis is
limited to his severe physical impairments.
C.

Substantial Evidence Supports the ALJ’s Determination that
Claimant did not Meet the Requirements of Listing 11.06 and that he
has the RFC to Perform Light work.

Claimant’s attacks on the ALJ’s decision are a bit muddled, so we will address
his arguments that the ALJ erred in finding that he did not meet the requirements of
Listing 11.06 for Parkinsonian Syndrome in the step three analysis and his argument
that the RFC determination was wrong together. Both arguments misstate applicable
facts and law and are ultimately unpersuasive. Further, the ALJ’s findings that claimant
did not meet the requirements of Listing 11.06 and that he had the RFC to perform light
work that did not include moderate exposure to hazards such as dangerous machinery
and heights are supported by substantial evidence.
A claimant bears the burden of demonstrating that his impairment meets or
equals a listing, which requires satisfying all of the criteria of the listing impairment.
Maggard v. Apfel, 167 F.3d 376, 379-80 (7th Cir. 1999). In order to meet Listing 11.06,
Mullen must have signs of significant rigidity, bradykinesia, or tremor in two extremities,
13

which, singly or in combination, result in sustained disturbance of gross and dexterous
movements, or gait and station. See 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.
Claimant’s support for this argument is limited to functional reports he completed, his
hearing testimony, and treatment notes.
In support of the ALJ’s finding that claimant did not meet the requirements of
Listing 11.06, he cited to Dr. Foster’s January 2009 RFC, the only RFC assessment in
the record. Dr. Foster determined that claimant was capable of light work that did not
include moderate exposure to hazards, and the ALJ properly adopted that finding. The
ALJ also considered Dr. Sa’s March 10, 2009 letter, which stated that claimant’s
Parkinson’s disease was “mild and not interfering with his activities of daily living.” (R.
289.) Dr. Sa was the only examining physician to opine as to claimant’s functional
abilities and, contrary to claimant’s argument, the ALJ was required to consider that
opinion. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d). The RFC assessment and Dr. Sa’s opinion,
combined with the ALJ’s review of the medical evidence in the record are sufficient to
support the ALJ’s RFC finding and his finding that Mullen did not meet the requirements
of Listing 11.06.
Claimant incorrectly states that Dr. Sa only examined him once on September 9,
2008. In fact, claimant returned to Dr. Sa on March 4, 2009 for a 55-minute follow-up
visit. That visit was only six days before Dr. Sa opined that claimant’s Parkinson’s
disease was “mild and not interfering with his activities of daily living.” Accordingly, the
ALJ did not error in citing to Dr. Sa’s opinion in support of his finding that claimant did
not meet the requirements of Listing 11.06. See Simila v. Astrue, 573 F.3d 503, 514
(7th Cir. 2009).
14

The ALJ also considered treatment notes from Dr. Bower and Dr. Dexter. Mullen
argues that Dr. Dexter’s diagnosis of moderately advanced Parkinson’s disease is
evidence that he meets Listing 11.06. However, as stated above, the existence of a
diagnosis and related symptoms does not require a finding that claimant meets Listing
11.06. Skinner, 478 F.3d at 845. Further, claimant incorrectly referred to Dr. Dexter’s
treatment notes as “medical opinions” as to his functional abilities. “Medical opinion” is
a term of art defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527, and treatment notes do not fit within that
definition. The ALJ cannot attach controlling weight to treatment notes. Kittelson v.
Astrue, 362 Fed. App’x 553, 558 (7th Cir. 2010). Because Drs. Dexter and Bower did
not provide opinions as to claimant’s physical limitations and residual capabilities, their
treatment notes were of minimal help to the ALJ for purposes of making a disability
determination. Books v. Chater, 91 F.3d 972, 978 (7th Cir. 1996).
The ALJ’s observation of tremors in claimant’s left arm and hand also did not
require a finding that he meets Listing 11.06 because, among other things, the tremors
were only in one extremity and there was no medical finding that the tremors resulted in
sustained disturbance of gross and dexterous movements, or gait and station. Contrary
to claimant’s argument, the ALJ also did not state that he would qualify under Listing
11.06. (R. 33, 41.) Finally, the ALJ’s finding related to Listing 11.06 was not boilerplate
and included an extensive analysis of the objective medical evidence. See Rice v.
Barnhart, 384 F.3d 363, 370 n5 (2004).
A claimant’s RFC is the most a claimant can still do despite his limitations. 20
C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1). In assessing the RFC, the ALJ must consider all of the
relevant evidence in the case record, including information about symptoms that might
15

not be shown by objective medical evidence alone. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(3); SSR
96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *5. A court will uphold an ALJ’s decision “if the evidence
supports the decision and the ALJ explains his analysis of the evidence with enough
detail and clarity to permit meaningful review.” Arnett v. Astrue, 676 F.3d 586, 591-92
(7th Cir. 2012) (citing Eichstadt v. Astrue, 534 F.3d 663, 665-66 (7th Cir. 2008).
“Although an ALJ need not mention every snippet of evidence in the record, the ALJ
must connect the evidence to the conclusion; in so doing, he may not ignore entire lines
of contrary evidence.” Id. at 592.
Claimant’s attacks on the RFC all lack merit. Claimant argues that the RFC did
not reflect his current health status, did not indicate its source, and was incomplete and
contradictory. Dr. Foster’s RFC assessment, to which the ALJ afforded great weight,
was complete and indicated its source. (R. 258-65.) Further, in arguing that the RFC is
contradictory, claimant confused the ALJ’s analysis of his physical and mental functional
capacities. A correct reading of the ALJ’s analysis confirms that there are no
contradictions in his RFC findings. Finally, the ALJ’s inaccurate description of the cause
of alleged memory and concentration issues in one of Mullen’s functional reports does
not render the ALJ’s RFC determination erroneous. See Fisher v. Bowen, 869 F.2d
1055, 1057 (7th Cir. 1989).
Claimant also attacks the ALJ’s finding that he could perform his past relevant
work as an accountant, but does not provide any evidentiary support for this argument.
Mullen’s argument regarding his work in sales and marketing is misplaced because the
ALJ did not find that he could perform that type of past relevant work. Similarly, his
argument that the ALJ should only have considered his past work in sales and
16

marketing and not his work as an accountant in the step 4 analysis is wrong. Mullen’s
work as an accountant qualified as past relevant work because it was performed within
the past 15 years. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(b)(1). Finally, claimant argues that the
ALJ failed to make a step 5 determination. Because the ALJ found him capable of
performing his past relevant work as an accountant, the ALJ was not required to make a
step 5 determination.
D.

Substantial Evidence Supports the ALJ’s Credibility Finding

The ALJ is in the best position to determine the credibility of witnesses, and this
Court reviews that determination deferentially. Craft v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 668, 678 (7th
Cir. 2008) (citing Sims v. Barnhart, 442 F.3d 536, 538 (7th Cir. 2006)). In other words,
the Court will not overturn an ALJ’s credibility determination unless it is patently wrong.
To be patently wrong, an ALJ’s determination must lack “any explanation or support.”
Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413-14 (7th Cir. 2008); see also SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL
374186, at *2 (The ALJ’s decision must be “supported by the evidence in the case
record, and must be sufficiently specific to make clear to the individual and to any
subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the individual’s statements and
the reasons for that weight.”).
Once the ALJ determines that a claimant’s impairments could reasonably be
expected to produce the claimant’s symptoms, the ALJ must evaluate “the intensity,
persistence, or functionally limiting effects” of the claimant’s symptoms. SSR 96-7p,
1996 WL 374186, at *2. When statements about such effects are not substantiated by
objective medical evidence, the ALJ must make a credibility determination based on the
entire case record. Id. In making a credibility determination, the ALJ should consider
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the following factors in addition to objective medical evidence: (1) the claimant’s daily
activities; (2) the location, duration, frequency, and intensity of symptoms; (3) factors
that precipitate and aggravate the symptoms; (4) the type, dosage, effectiveness, and
side effects of medication; (5) treatment, other than medication, that the individual has
received; (6) any other measures the individual uses to relieve symptoms; (7) and any
other factors concerning the individual’s functional limitations. Id. at *3.
The ALJ’s credibility determination in this case was not patently wrong and
addressed many of the SSR 96-7p factors. In finding Mullen’s statements regarding his
symptoms not credible, the ALJ noted contradictions in his explanation for why he
stopped working in 2005. The ALJ also noted claimant’s vague answers to questions
from his doctors and cited to medical record notes about inconsistencies in his reported
symptoms and the objective medical findings. Similar to Simila v. Astrue, the ALJ found
that claimant was overstating his symptoms and not credible. 573 F.3d 503, 518 (7th
Cir. 2009). Further, the ALJ properly considered Mullen’s daily activities as part of his
SSR 96-7p analysis.
E.

Claimant’s Remaining Arguments

Finally, the Court briefly addresses Mullen’s remaining arguments. His claim that
the ALJ was biased is unfounded. The court “begin[s] with the presumption that ALJs
are impartial, and to overcome that presumption, a claimant must show that the ALJ
‘displayed deep-seated and unequivocal antagonism that would render fair judgment
impossible.’” Martin v. Astrue, 345 F. App’x 197, 202 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Liteky v.
United States, 510 U.S. 540, 556 (1994)). While the ALJ’s statements about a
government handout were ill-advised and inartful, they are not evidence of antagonism
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that rendered fair judgment impossible.
Mullen also argued that the ALJ erred by failing to recognize that Parkinson’s
disease is a deteriorating condition. In support of this argument, claimant criticizes the
ALJ for citing to medical records from 2005-2007 because those records predate his
Parkinson’s diagnosis. Claimant appears to argue that the ALJ should have most
heavily relied on the medical notes from his July 2010 doctor’s appointment, the last
appointment prior to the August 2010 hearing. Although in his briefs Mullen seems to
concede that he was not disabled prior to his Parkinson’s diagnosis in 2008, his alleged
disability onset date is December 2005. Therefore, the ALJ was required to analyze his
medical records beginning in 2005 through 2010 and was not required to give more
weight to the July 2010 treatment notes.
Finally, Mullen’s argument that the ALJ applied a heightened legal standard
because he was under the age of 50 is also misplaced. During the hearing, the ALJ
accurately stated that it was easier to be considered disabled under social security
regulations if an individual is over age 50. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.4563. However, such
age considerations only apply to step 5 evaluations. Because the ALJ found claimant
capable of performing his past relevant work as an accountant, his analysis ended at
step 4 and age was not a factor in the ALJ’s disability determination.
III.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, claimant’s motion for summary judgment [28] is

denied and the ALJ’s decision is affirmed. It is so ordered.

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ENTERED:

_________________________
MICHAEL T. MASON
United States Magistrate Judge

Dated: August 8, 2013

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