Hurns v. Corn Products International et al
Filing
22
MEMORANDUM OPINION signed by the Honorable Charles P. Kocoras on 11/20/2012.Mailed notice(sct, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
JOHNNIE L. HURNS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CORN PRODUCTS INTERNATIONAL,
RAYMOND DOOGAN, ANDREA BULANDA,
STEVE CARUSO, PATRICK GREENE and
JESSICA NEUMAN,
Defendants.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
12 C 3873
MEMORANDUM OPINION
CHARLES P. KOCORAS, District Judge:
This matter comes before the Court on Corn Products International’s (“Corn
Products”), Raymond Doogan’s (“Doogan”), Andrea Bulanda’s (“Bulanda”), Steve
Caruso’s (“Caruso”), Patrick Greene’s (“Greene”), and Jessica Neuman’s (“Neuman”)
(together “Defendants”) motion to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1) and (b)(6). For the following reasons, the motion is granted.
BACKGROUND 1
Pro se Plaintiff Johnnie L. Hurns (“Hurns”) brings this lawsuit against his former
employer and several of its employees. He alleges that he was suspended and fired
1
Plaintiff’s Answer to the instant motion (“Answer”) adds several details surrounding the
events underlying his claims. A court is bound to consider additional facts set forth in a nonmovant’s opposing brief “so long as the new elaborations are consistent with the pleadings.”
Geinosky v. City of Chi., 675 F.3d 743, 745 n.1 (7th Cir. 2012). Accordingly, the Court factors
Plaintiff’s additional allegations into this Memorandum Opinion to the extent they are consistent
with those found in the complaint.
because he was a union steward. Hurns was employed at Corn Products as a dock
worker. Sometime in September 2010, Caruso, a manager, instructed Hurns to label a
load of resin and to unload the cargo in the “42IX column.” Hurns complied. Pat
Greene inspected the cargo a day or two later.
The following week, Caruso called Hurns into his office. With Greene also
present, Caruso informed Hurns that he was being suspended for five days pending
discharge for mislabeling the load of resin and for storing it in the incorrect location.
Hurns responded that he was merely following Caruso’s orders. Caruso left to speak
with Doogan, a unit manager, in Doogan’s office. Hurns asked Greene why he was
being suspended and fired; Greene responded that he was only there to serve as a
witness, and then left to go to Doogan’s office. Hurns then confronted Neuman near
Caruso’s office, who refused to provide Hurns with any information.
Caruso returned to his office and told Hurns that an investigation had taken place
on the Friday of the previous week, and that the suspension and discharge would
proceed. Brad Johnson (“Johnson”), a non-party to this suit and apparently a Corn
Products manager, entered Caruso’s office, called a union steward into the office, and
confirmed that he was being suspended and fired. The meeting ended, and Caruso
escorted Hurns off the Corn Products premises.
-2-
A grievance hearing took place some days later in front of the human resources
department (“HR”). Joining Hurns at the hearing were representatives from Corn
Products and the union. During the hearing, Neuman distributed a print out that was
intended to show that Hurns incorrectly loaded the resin into the 42IX column in order
to accumulate overtime pay. In addition, Greene claimed that Hurns had previously
refused to take a training test that Greene attempted to administer. Greene stated that
Hurns merely initialed the test, and that he, Greene, later filled in the answers. Hurns
alleges that Neuman and Greene lied.
The complaint also raises allegations relating to events commencing a year prior
to the events of September 2010. Hurns alleges that he was the subject of another
grievance hearing in 2009 (the “2009 hearing”) as the responsible party for an
unspecified incident. During the hearing, Doogan threatened to suspend Hurns unless
Hurns submitted three ways that the incident could have been avoided.
Hurns
complied, but Doogan suspended him anyway. After learning of his suspension, Hurns
spoke with Bulanda, an HR employee. He told her that he wanted to be transferred to
another department because he felt that Doogan was unfairly targeting him. Hurns soon
after submitted a formal request, but Bulanda took no action. Hurns asked Bulanda nine
months later about the status of his transfer request. She replied that she never
processed it because she knew all along that Hurns did not want to leave his department.
-3-
Hurns raises claims against Defendants under the Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938 (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., the Labor Management Relations Act,
(“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 185, the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), 29 U.S.C.
§ 151 et seq., and state common law. Defendants filed the instant motion to dismiss for
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) and failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted under Rule 12(b)(6). With briefing completed, the Court
assesses the merits of the motion.
LEGAL STANDARD
In assessing a motion to dismiss, the Court accepts all well pled facts as true and
draws all permissible inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328,
334 (7th Cir. 2012). The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the Court has
jurisdiction over its claims. United Phosphorous, Ltd. v. Angus Chem. Co., 322 F.3d
942, 946 (7th Cir. 2003) (en banc). The Court may consider matters outside of the
complaint in ruling on a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
Ezekiel v. Michel, 66 F.3d 894, 897 (7th Cir. 1995).
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint.
Szabo v. Bridgeport Machs., Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 675 (7th Cir. 2001). The allegations
in a complaint must set forth a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A plaintiff need not provide
-4-
detailed factual allegations; he must only provide enough factual support to raise his
right to relief above a speculative level. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007). Furthermore, a claim must be facially plausible, a requirement that is satisfied
if the pleadings “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant
is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The
Court liberally construes the allegations in the complaint. Kyle v. Patterson, 196 F.3d
695, 697 (7th Cir. 1999).
DISCUSSION
I.
FLSA
The Defendants argue that Hurns fails to state sufficient facts to state a cause of
action under the FLSA. The FLSA “protect[s] all covered workers from substandard
wages and oppressive working hours . . . .” Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys.,
450 U.S. 728, 739 (1981) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 202(a)). The complaint summarizes the
circumstances culminating in Hurns’s suspension and dismissal. Hurns makes no
allegation suggesting that he was underpaid or overworked. The complaint therefore
falls well short of stating a claim under the FLSA. The claim is dismissed.
II.
LMRA
The Defendants assert that Hurns fails to state a claim under the LMRA. Section
301 of the LMRA provides: “Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and
-5-
a labor organization representing employees . . . may be brought in any district court of
the United States having jurisdiction of the parties.” 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). Generally, an
employee suing an employer or his union for breach of a collective bargaining
agreement must first exhaust grievance procedures under that agreement before seeking
redress in a federal court. Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652-53
(1965); Vail v. Raybestos Prods. Co., 533 F.3d 904, 908 (7th Cir. 2008). Employees
may nevertheless bring “hybrid” claims under section 301 against the union or employer
if the union breaches its duty of fair representation to the employee. DelCostello v. Int’l
Bd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 164 (1983). To survive a motion to dismiss, a hybrid
claimant must allege: 1) a discharge contrary to a labor agreement, and 2) the union’s
breach of its duty of fair representation. Wood v. Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local
406, 807 F.2d 493, 502 (6th Cir. 1986) (citing United Parcel Serv. Inc. v. Mitchell, 451
U.S. 56, 62 (1981) (labeling a union’s breach of fair representation as an “indispensable
predicate” to a hybrid claim under section 301)). A union breaches its duty of fair
representation if its conduct towards the employee was arbitrary, discriminatory, or in
bad faith. DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 165.
Hurns alleges in the complaint that he was discharged due to his service as a
union steward. Although Hurns makes several assertions in his Answer that pertain to
the union president’s conduct, none raise the inference that the president was involved
-6-
in any way with the employment action at the heart of this suit. Accordingly, the
Defendants’ motion is granted.
III.
NLRA
The Defendants argue that the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over
Hurns’s unfair labor practice (“ULP”) charge brought under the NLRA. The National
Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) “is vested with primary jurisdiction” to adjudicate
over ULPs. Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Mullins, 455 U.S. 72, 83 (1982). District courts
generally lack the authority to adjudicate conduct amounting to a ULP, and instead must
“defer to the exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations Board.” Id.
(citation omitted); see also 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158. A district court may nevertheless
claim jurisdiction over a ULP if a plaintiff brings a related claim under section 301 of
the LMRA. McCarthy v. Sunset Food Mart, No. 94-C-6459, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
17166, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 23, 1994).
Hurns fails to state a viable claim under section 301 of the LMRA. The NLRB
therefore retains exclusive jurisdiction the ULP charge. Defendants’ motion to dismiss
is granted. If Hurns wishes to have his ULP charge heard by a tribunal, he must file it
with the NLRB.
-7-
IV.
State Law Claims
With each of Hurns’s federal law claims dismissed, the Court declines to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over state common law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c);
Miller v. Herman, 600 F.3d 726, 738 (7th Cir. 2010). Hurns’s state law claims are
therefore dismissed.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the complaint is dismissed in its entirety.
Charles P. Kocoras
United States District Judge
Dated: November 20, 2012
-8-
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?