Carroll v. Village of Oak Lawn
Filing
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MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order signed by the Honorable John W. Darrah on 11/28/2012.(pcs, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
ANDREW CARROLL,
Plaintiff,
v.
VILLAGE OF OAK LAWN,
Defendant.
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Case No. 12-CV-4143
Judge John W. Darrah
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff, Andrew Carroll, initiated this action against Defendant, the Village of
Oak Lawn on May 29, 2012. Plaintiff amended his Complaint on June 18, 2012. Count I
of the Amended Complaint alleges Plaintiff was subjected to racial discrimination in the
workplace, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. Count II alleges that Defendant
retaliated against Plaintiff for reporting such discriminatory conduct to his supervisor, the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), the Illinois Department of
Human Rights (“IDHR”), and the Illinois Human Rights Commission (“IHRC”), in
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss both counts of
Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
BACKGROUND
The following facts are taken from Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint and are
accepted as true for purposes of resolving the Motion to Dismiss. Additionally, a court is
permitted to take judicial notice of public record, such as court documents, without
converting the motion into a motion for summary judgment, particularly where the public
record is central to Plaintiff’s claims. See Pugh v. Tribune Co., 521 F.3d 686, 691, n. 2
(7th Cir. 2008). Plaintiff is an African-American male currently employed as a police
officer by the Village of Oak Lawn. (First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 5, 6.) On March 22, 2005,
Sergeant Macke, a Village of Oak Lawn Police Department shooting-range instructor,
told Plaintiff that in order to score well at the shooting range, “an officer must imagine
that the targets are Mexicans, Africans, and Puerto Ricans.” (Id. ¶ 7.) Further, Sergeant
Macke said to Plaintiff, “Andy, I’m gonna make you white if it's the last thing I do.”
(Id.) In November 2005, Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC and the
IDHR alleging eight counts of discrimination and retaliation based on the comments
made by Sergeant Macke and Plaintiff’s subsequent reporting of such comments to his
employer. (Id. ¶ 7; Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. 1.)
By January 22, 2008, the IDHR had dismissed all but one of the eight counts for
lack of substantial evidence or lack of jurisdiction. (Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. 4.) The
sole remaining count in Plaintiff’s charge of discrimination alleged that Plaintiff was
retaliated against for reporting Sergeant Macke’s comments to his supervisor, by
management’s placing negative memos in his personnel file. (Id.) On February 6, 2008,
the EEOC issued a similar dismissal and a right-to-sue letter (“RTSL”) for the remaining
count. (Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. 5.) The RTSL informed the Plaintiff that he had
ninety days to file a lawsuit. (Id.) Plaintiff perfected his charge in the IHRC. (Pl.’s
Resp. at 3.) However, Plaintiff did not file a lawsuit within ninety days of receiving the
RTSL. (Id.) The IHRC case is still pending. (Id.)
On May 29, 2012, Plaintiff initiated this action. Plaintiff asserts he received a
RTSL within ninety days of the filing of his initial Complaint in this case. (First Am.
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Compl. ¶ 11.) In Count I of Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, he states he was
discriminated on the basis of his race in three ways. First, Plaintiff applied for a
detective position, as well as other specialty positions with the Oak Lawn Police
Department, and was rejected. (First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 9, 13.) Second, Plaintiff was never
promoted to Sergeant. (Id. ¶¶ 9, 14.) Finally, sometime in 2011, Plaintiff was removed
from the position of Evidence Technician. (Id. ¶¶ 10, 15.) In Count II, the retaliation
claim, Plaintiff asserts that he was retaliated against by the Oak Lawn Police Department
in the same ways he was discriminated against: he was removed from his position as
Evidence Technician; he was not promoted to Sergeant; and he was not permitted to act
in a specialty position. (Id. ¶¶ 20, 22, 24.) Plaintiff alleges Defendant continues to
retaliate against him because Plaintiff reported the comment made by Sergeant Macke on
March 22, 2005. (Id. ¶ 19.)
Defendant moves to dismiss Counts I and II of Plaintiff’s First Amended
Complaint, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), arguing that Plaintiff’s claims are
untimely and therefore barred. The motion has been fully briefed and is ripe for ruling.
LEGAL STANDARD
To properly assert a claim in a complaint, the plaintiff must present “a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief and a demand
for the relief sought.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. A defendant may file a motion to dismiss a
claim under Federal Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted. The defendant may assert a statute of limitations defense in a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss where “the allegations of the complaint itself set forth everything
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necessary to satisfy the affirmative defense, such as when a complaint plainly reveals that
an action is untimely under the governing statute of limitations.” United States v. Lewis,
411 F.3d 838, 842 (7th Cir. 2005).
Rule 8 “does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than
an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129
S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (Iqbal) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
555 (2007) (Twombly)). While a court is to accept all allegations contained in a
complaint as true, this principle does not extend to legal conclusions. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at
1949. To defeat a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must plead sufficient
factual matter to state a claim for relief that is “plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at
1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949.
However, “[w]here the well-settled pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer
more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not
‘show[n]’ – ‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950. For a claim
to be plausible, the plaintiff must put forth enough “facts to raise a reasonable
expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” supporting the plaintiff’s allegations.
Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
ANALYSIS
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b), “[i]f, on a motion asserting . . .
failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside
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the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as
one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56 . . . .” Venture
Associates Corp. v. Zenith Data Sys. Corp., 987 F.2d 429, 431 (7th Cir. 1993) (Venture).
However, there are some exceptions to this rule. The court may take judicial notice of
matters of public record without converting the motion to a motion for summary
judgment. Anderson v. Simon, 217 F.3d 472, 474-75 (7th Cir. 2000). Further, documents
that a defendant attached to a motion to dismiss can be considered part of the pleadings if
“they are referred to in the plaintiff’s complaint and are central to [his] claim.” Venture,
987 F.2d at 431. All other matters outside the pleadings should not be considered under a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.
Here, Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint references the 2005 EEOC charge and
IDHR filing. These charges are matters of public record and central to Plaintiff’s claim,
as Plaintiff alleges that they are the cause of the discriminatory conduct. As such,
Defendant’s attachment of documents relating to these charges is proper, and the Court
can consider them. Exhibits 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6 of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss are
incorporated into the pleadings for the purpose of this motion.
Attached to Plaintiff’s Response are three additional exhibits: (1) the order from
the IHRC; (2) a RTSL from the EEOC, dated February 29, 2012; and (3) a letter Plaintiff
wrote to the EEOC, dated December 15, 2011. The third document is not referred to on
the face of the EEOC charge, and Plaintiff fails to plead any facts in his First Amended
Complaint which indicate that it is incorporated into the January 10, 2012 charge. As
such, the letter is not incorporated into the pleadings. Only exhibits 1 and 2 of Plaintiff’s
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Response are incorporated into the pleadings for purposes of this motion.
The only fact alleged in Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint which alludes to his
timely filing of this cause of action states, “Plaintiff received a RTSL within 90 days of
the filing of his initial Complaint.” (First Am. Compl. ¶ 11.) Plaintiff alleges no facts
describing the nature of this RTSL in his First Amended Complaint. Importantly, he has
failed to distinguish whether the facts of this RTSL are separate from the initial 2005
charge. From the facts alleged in the First Amended Complaint, it is apparent that the
allegations stem from the same facts alleged in the 2005 EEOC charge. Plaintiff received
a RTSL on the 2005 charge in 2008. He did not file a lawsuit within ninety days of that
RTSL, as required, and thus waived his right to sue on the issues raised in that charge.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
To overcome the time-bar to the 2005 claim, Plaintiff must plead sufficient facts
in order to distinguish this case from the facts previously alleged. From the face of the
Complaint, the attachments, and exhibits central to the cause of action, Plaintiff has
failed to distinguish the claims made in his First Amended Complaint from his 2005 case.
In Count I, Plaintiff attempts to assert that the three discriminatory acts alleged are the
result of continual discriminatory treatment, stemming from the initial 2005 remark.
However, nowhere in his First Amended Complaint does Plaintiff state any facts
describing the nature of these discriminatory acts. For example, Plaintiff does not allege
where these acts occurred, how the discrimination is continuing from 2005, or who was
involved. He merely pleads legal conclusions without sufficient factual content to
support them. That is not enough to survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.
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As for the retaliation claim, Plaintiff asserts that he is being retaliated against
because he filed the initial 2005 EEOC claim, filed the IDHR complaint, and is
maintaining the IHRC suit. In order to state a claim for retaliation under Title VII,
Plaintiff is required to plead the requisite elements demonstrating that he is entitled to
relief. Here, Plaintiff could have either alleged that: (1) there exists a causal connection
between reporting the discriminatory conduct and suffering a materially adverse action;
or (2) that Plaintiff was performing his job satisfactorily and was treated differently than
other similarly situated employees. Harper v. C.R. England, Inc., 687 F.3d 297, 306, 309
(7th Cir. 2012). Plaintiff has failed to plead anything beyond legal conclusions and
speculations about how the purported retaliation is connected to reporting the 2005
comment. Further, Plaintiff has not pleaded any facts sufficient to plausibly demonstrate
that he was performing his job satisfactorily and was treated differently from other
similarly situated employees.
Since Plaintiff fails to distinguish this case from the claims from 2005, which he
waived, the statute of limitations has run, and Plaintiff has not stated a claim upon which
relief may be granted.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Counts I and II
of Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is granted, and the counts are dismissed without
prejudice.
Date:
November 28, 2012
______________________________
JOHN W. DARRAH
United States District Court Judge
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